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28.03.18. Ridderhof,
Patrol report 5, los robles.
SECOND BRIGADE, U.S.M.C. E.F.
LOS ROBLES, NICARAGUA.
18 March 1928.
Patrol Report 5.
At 0800,
17 March 1928 I left with a patrol of two officers,
twelve enlisted, to map north from Pasa Real [Paso Real]
toward Guale. On this patrol the following
observations were made, and information received from
natives questioned along the road.
Pasa Real
was deserted except for women where on the previous day
there were a dozen men,some mounted, in and near
the store of Salvador Gutierrez.
From
several different sources I was told that Esperanza
Altamirano with fifty bandits had passed north on the
Pasa Real - Guale road on the 13th of March. That
previous to this other bands had come north from Pasa
Real some taking the east branch at Tumulyunca
[Tumayunca] going toward Los Cuchillas and La Virgen,
others taking the west branch going toward Guale and
Santa Cruz. That bandits are operating in the
Pantasma area at the present time, foraging for supplies
and causing much fear among the natives there.
That Sandino is moving north with Chipote as his
destination.
Roads are
good for bull carts as far as Tumuyuaca (2 miles north
of Pasa Real). From Tumuyunca to Bocadero [Embocadero],
3 miles, roads are hard surface, rough, but are passable
for bull carts. Bocadero is at the top of the
first of a series of mountain ranges, grades are steep
and footing bad. This patrol stopped two miles
beyond Bocadero and found trail continually getting
worse. There were some very muddy spots and in one
place saddle mules, unmounted, sank up to their bellies.
Pack mules would have the greatest difficulty on this
trail. This is the main trail to Guale and the
Pantasma Valley. The point where the patrol
stopped was about three miles from Guale according to
information received from several inhabitants.
South of Bocadero the area is thickly inhabited with
many trails, north of Bocadero the area is very sparsely
inhabited and from local information this is the only
trail across the mountains, there were no branch trails
leading in.
/ s / S. E. Ridderhof
1st Lieut. U.S.M.C.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
FIRST BATTALION, ELEVENTH
REGIMENT, LOS ROBLES, NICARAGUA
18 March 1928.
1st ENDORSEMENT.
1.
Forwarded.
2.
The Salvador Gutierez [Salvador Gutierrez] mentioned
herein, keeps a store and barroom at Pasa Real.
There have been reports that this place was a bandit
hang out and that bandits that might be within the area
were very likely to congregate there on Saturday nights.
3.
Captain Hunter with twenty three men of the 47th Company
cleared camp at 9.00 P.M. last night, surrounded and
picketed the above store and cross road, and remained
until just before daylight. Captain Hunter reports
that he believes that the presence of the patrol was not
observed. There was nothing suspicious. The
place was closed and there was no one traveling in the
locality.
4.
Lieutenant Humphrey with a patrol ambushed Los
Robles--Tuma trail.
/ s / K.E. ROCKEY
NA127/204/4
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Summary & Notes |
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•
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Much of
the zone described here remained inaccessible till the
end of the war; Peña Blanca Mtn., e.g., became the
principal refuge of EDSN Gen. Pedro Altamirano (Pedrón),
a zone so remote and isolated that the Marines-GN could
not touch him. Same with Las Cuchillas, La Virgen,
Guale, and the Pantasma Valley. These places were
on the very edge of settlement and the vast mountainous
frontier zone to the east. |
| |
•
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"Esperanza Altamirano" is probably Pedro
Altamirano. |
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•
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Same
pattern of populated places being deserted when Marines
arrive; people being warned by word of mouth and abandoning their homes until
the Marines depart. |
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•
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Mules
sinking into mud up to their bellies; gives a sense of
the ruggedness and difficulty of travel in these zones. |
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•
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Salvador
Gutiérrez store in Paso Real: a reputed "bandit
hang out" where EDSN members gather on Saturday nights. |
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•
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South of
Embocadero: "thickly inhabited with many trails."
North of Embocadero: "very sparsely inhabited."
Again, this is on the extreme eastern edge of the
Western Nicaragua frontier; conveys a good sense of
regional differentiation. |
| |
•
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Captain
Hunter will be mortally wounded near Peña Blanca in two
months' time (PC28.05.13). |
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•
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False
information being spread about Sandino: natives
report he's headed back to El Chipote; in fact he and a
large group are heading east to the Atlantic Coast
mining district; a key strength of EDSN information
capacities: disseminating false information to the
enemy.
|
PC-docs Inventory in excel file •
pc-docs inventory on pc-docs home
28.03.22. Rockey,
patrol report no. 7, los robles, jinotega.
|
LOS ROBLES, NICARAGUA.
22 March 1928.
PATROL REPORT NO. 7.
The undersigned, with Captain Hunter, Lieutenant Piper
and twenty-seven men of the Forty-Seventh Company, left
Las Robles at 8:00 a.m., 20 March for Cuchillas for
patrol and to secure topographic data. Route:
PASA REAL-TOMAYUNCE-CUCHILLAS [Paso Real -
Tumayunca - Las Cuchillas]. The patrol camped for
the nights of 20-21 March on the North bank of the TUMA
river, north of ESPERANZA. On the morning of the
21st a small detail was left at camp and the patrol
continued on foot to the northeast, to the top of
CUCHILLA MOUNTAIN RANGE. From local information LA
VIRGEN was about four miles beyond.
Near the main trail leading to GUALE the country is
rather thickly settled. Beyond, two miles east of
GUALE trail the country becomes rough and is very
sparsely settled. There are about six small coffee
plantations in the area covered, all owned by
Nicaraguans. A road passable with difficulty by
bullcarts is maintained to a point about six miles east
of the GUALE trail. Beyond that point the trails
are all very bad. The CAMINO REAL running north
from the TUMA section to LA VIRGEN is wide but passable
with the greatest difficulty to pack animals, because of
mud and fallen trees. The patrol covered about
five miles along this trail, and over this entire route
the trail was very boggy with mud, a foot or more deep.
The trails are so rough and slippery that travel at
night is practically impossible, and very slow and
difficult during the day.
One ANDREAS CIRAUS, owner of the finca LA VENCIDORO [La
Vencedora], talked very freely, give considerable detail
of the passage of Sandino forces in February.
According to him no bandit forces have operated in, or
passed through the area near his place recently.
The inhabitants interviewed were reticent and no
indications of bandit activities could be discovered.
Other trails from the TUMA section to LA VIRGEN and
trails from TUMA to PENA BLANCA pass to the east of the
area covered by the patrol. Recent bandit bands
which operated recently in Tuma apparently moved quite
far to the east.
/ s / K. E. ROCKEY.
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - -
DISTRIBUTION:
C.O.5TH MATAGALPA
C.O.5th MANAGUA.
C.O.11th OCOTAL
F I L E.
NA127/43A/20
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Summary & Notes |
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Again,
gives a good sense of the far eastern frontier of
settlement: east of Guale there's hardly anyone
living in the area: "very sparsely settled." |
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•
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Foot-deep mud, boggy, very difficult trails, ("rough,
slippery, slow, difficult"), even for someone as
experienced as Rockey. |
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•
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Local
inhabitants "reticent"; no useful information on EDSN. |
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•
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Six
small coffee plantations in the area, all owned by
Nicaraguans. |
PC-docs Inventory in excel file •
pc-docs inventory on pc-docs home
28.03.28. hunter, patrol
report, los robles, jinotega.
|
Los Robles, Nicaragua,
28 March 1928.
PATROL REPORT:
I left Los Robles at 0830, March 27, 1928, with
Lieutenant Piper and 24 enlisted, Marine Corps, and
proceeded via SAN ESTEBAN, TOMAYUNCA, BOCADERO [Embocadero],
to GUALE, and return.
It was learned that the herd of cattle seen by plane on
Sunday, belonged to Serapio Palacio [Serapio Palacios]
of Jinotega, and were being moved from the plains to his
potero [potrero] near BOCADERO. This information
was furnished by the Jefe de Cantonment [juez de canton]
of LOS CEDRAS [Los Cedros] (near BROCADERO), and by two
other habitants, who stated that the plans [planes] flew
low over this herd Sunday, while it was passing north
through TOMAYUNCA. Serapio Palacio's presence in
Jinotega was reported so he could not be questioned, but
the herd was observed by the undersigned grazing in the
proteras near BROCADERO.
It was reported to me that two different inhabitants
that about eight SANDINISTAS foraged SANTA MARIA VALLEY
on 25 March.The people at GUALE, which is a coffee
finca, stated that this was not true, but I am inclined
to believe that the people at this finca are
sympathizers and were giving false information, the
western end of the PANTASMA VALLEY is called SANTA MARIA
as far east as GUALE.
The road to GUALE is in very good condition at present,
being practically dry to the YALI divide, and passable
for pack animals on the north slope. It has
improved very materially in the past few weeks.
Inquiry at GUALE elicited the information that the
CAMINO REAL to QUILALI passes straight north across the
valley, thence across another range to the Coco River.
/ s / R. S. HUNTER
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - -
DISTRIBUTION: C.O.
5th, Matagalpa (2)
C.O. 5th, Managua. (2)
C.O.11th, OCOTAL. (1)
F I L E.
NA127/43A/20
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Summary & Notes |
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•
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More
reconnaissance and mapping; Hunter, Piper, Rockey all
exploring the same zones. |
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•
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Serapio
Palacios's herd of cattle: air report of Sunday,
March 25, has not been found, but similar reports of
"suspicious" concentrations of livestock during this
same week on Air-Docs page,
here. |
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•
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Small
local bands of EDSN reported in Santa María Valley
(western end of Pantasma Valley, as far west as Guale),
a zone that remained an EDSN hotspot till the end of the
war. |
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•
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False
information suspected from natives sympathetic to EDSN. |
PC-docs Inventory in excel file •
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28.03.28. geyer,
patrol report no. 1, los robles, jinotega.
|
1st MTD B'N.
LOS ROBLES
28 MARCH 28.
PATROL
REPORT NO. 1.
On March 25, a
mounted patrol composed of 27 enlisted, one Navy, Lieuts.
Humphreys and Jack, with the undersigned in command,
proceeded on a patrol NE of Los Robles.
Camp was made on the
night of 25 March at Antonio Rivera's, North of the Tuma
River (See map of Los Robles and vicinity).
Distanced marched 13 miles in 6½ hours. Roads fair
with the exception of the last three miles which were
steeply up hill and very muddy.
Information was gathered that Nivolas Davila [Nicolas
Davila, Nicolás Dávila], a foraging jefe of Sandino was
then in the house of Eulalio Flores, reported to have
been with Sandino the past and at present a forgar
[forager] for him.
Broke
camp the next morning and proceeded to La Pabona [La
Pavona] where the house of Flores is located.
Distance marched 7 miles in 5 hours. Roads very
bad, steeply up and down hill over very mountainous
country, rebundant [abundant, redolent] with bog holes.
From the
river Tuma to La Pabona is La Pabona [sic] is
directly over the Cuchillas mountains, as no pass exists
in this place.
Gathered information to the effect that a courier had
preceded patrol and that word had been passed ahead that
Marines were coming.
Arrived
at La Pabona. Captured Eulalio Flores (See
intelligence report attached). Made camp in home
of Flores. Found that Davila had left upon
receiving information that Marines were coming.
Also that he expected to return with re-enforcements
that night. Took due precautions. Nothing
materialized.
Broke
camp next morning and returned same route, stopping over
night at Rivera's. Returned to Los Robles 28 March
1928. Total distance marched 40 miles. Roads
as stated. Weather fair.
The trail
from the Tuma River passes to within 3 leagues of Pena
Blanca. The latter is nearly a range with the peak
proper distinguishable by white streaks (rocks) running
vertically on its face.
The top
of Pena Blanca is conservatively estimated to be
four miles long. Adjoining Pena Blanca is a peak
very nearly as high, called Chachagon. Both
overshadow the Cuchillas mountains. Between the
Cuchillas and Pena Blanca lies a foothill studded
valley. This valley extends roughly SE to NW and
would be a good foraging ground for a position on Pena
Blanca. No bandit groups were encountered.
The countryside is quiet and has been, with the
exception of foraging parties which have worked the
valley extensively, but have not been seen during the
past week. Lt. Jack made a road sketch of the
trail from Tuma River to La Pabona.
From
information received from natives, Sandino passed
through La Pabona in going north in February; his forces
which operated in Tuma section, in March, did not pass
through and must have moved by trails east of Pina
Blanca.
/ s / P. C. GEYER
Captain, U.S.M.C.
1st Mtd B'n.
Los Robles
28 March 28.
To C. O.
Matagalpa
For R-2
The
undersigned returned this date, from a patrol to La
Pabona, located in a valley North of the Cuchillas
Mountains. Recurring reports had come in to Las
Robles that Nicolas Davila, had been at the house of
Eulalio Flores, that he had left and was returning with
a bandit group.
While on
the road to the Tuma River, information was received
that both Davila and Flores were then in the latters
house. Davila is reported to be foraging jefe and
the valley mentioned is said to be one of his favorite
supply fields. Flores is a Juez de Mesta, is
reported as a supply depot used by Davila.
i.e./Davila makes the farm his headquarters and causes
inhabitants to bring food etc. to the Flores farm for
further transmittal to Sandino. Flores in turn is
reported to have used his power as Juez to ably second
Davila in the above procedure.
As Lt.
Jack was making a road sketch of the trail from Tuma
River North, and only Lt. Humphries and myself knew of
the contemplated attempt to get Flores and Davila, it
was a comparatively easy matter to give the impression
that the patrol was for the purpose of making a map,
which was done.
The
method by which Flores was caught is unorthodox and not
recommended although it worked in this case.
Knowing
that word had preceded us, I worked on the bare
possibility that Davila and Flores might not have left
or if they had, that they might be in the near vicinity.
The supposition proved correct in the case of Flores.
When
within a quarter of a mile from Flores farm, the
undersigned rode to the front of the point. The
house which sits well up on a hill, was closed up.
No one was in sight. This in itself was suspicious
as a patrol passing by inevitably draws the inhabitants
to their doors unless the place is deserted. When
about midway up a boy came down hill. Not wishing
to flush the quarry I allowed the boy to continue until
I reached the house when I passed the word to send the
boy back up the hill. I rode to back of house and
gently requested that the door be opened. Flores'
wife opened the front door. Inside the house were
the wife, a daughter and a maid, also three small
children. The wife was visibly frightened,
perspiring freely although the day was cool and had
visibly displayed, hanging from her neck a scapula and a
medal. Facing the door was a large sized altar
with a lighted lamp on it. Still gently, I
asked permission to make camp.-- I asked whose
house this was. In other words, feigned extreme
innocence. Permission to make camp was granted
with the suggestion that down by the stream would be
better. She asked why I had made the boy come back
and I told her that as the the place was closed I
thought he might be an inhabitant and that I was going
to ask him for permission to camp. [ p. 2 ]
She then
asked me if the boy was free to go and I told her
"certainly". Shortly thereafter the woman
re-assured went into the galley which adjoined.
While there she evidently made some signal because after
a little Flores came in, held a whispered conference
with his woman and introduced himself as head of the
house. He was immediately placed under
surveillance unknown to him and the trap was left open,
but Davila had gone. Flores had no intimation that
he was wanted until the next morning.
Returning to Los
Robles and while North of the Tuma River, a report was
received that Pedron Altamirano, Davila and a group were
at the time at a house of Santos Vasquez at La Virgen.
However, as the undersigned by then had the full
confidence of a conservative who had been instrumental
in the success of the mission and who had a rather fair
working intelligence system of his own, the matter was
referred to him and it was agreed that he was to check
up to see if the reports were correct, which he said he
could easily do, and that if it were true, he was to
communicate with us at Riveras' before 0800-28 March 28,
and that we would then proceed to La Virgen. No
report was received. Also made arrangements for
the same man to keep me informed of happenings in
Cuchillas, La Virgen, La Pabona and Guapinol.
Flores'
farm was searched. Eight machetes (narrow blade)
and a handful of ammunition were found. No other
arms. If he had them they were hidden out.
The boy
who came down the hill is a son of which he has two.
One about 18, the other about 20. He has working
for him eight mozos. During all the waking hours,
the women were making tortillas and the father and sons
were shelling and husking corn. The tortillas made
were far too many for the people there.
Supposition:-A shipment out is being prepared.-Also, on
the trail, Flores stated that the women had given aid
and prepared food for Sandino, but that he was
guiltless.
Herewith,
two sketches, which aviation might find useful. It
is believed that if a few of our friends' supply depots
are strafed, it will have a salubrious effect on the
slackening of enthusiastic help he is receiving.
Note:- I
told the woman that if a plane came by and dropped a
white rag, that it would be a signal for everybody in
the house to get out immediately, as the planes would
open fire within five minutes thereafter.
/ s / P. C. GEYER
Captain, U.S.M.C.
NA127/204/4
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|
Summary & Notes |
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•
|
Nicolas
Davila and Eulalio Flores being sought as EDSN suspects;
foraging jefes; Flores reputed a Juez de Mesta
(local sheriff); has 8 mozos and a female domestic
laborer working for him. |
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•
|
Vivid
description of Peña Blanca (vertical white streaks of
rock cliffs) and adjacent mountains and mountain ranges
(Chachagón, Las Cuchillas); this was extremely rugged
and isolated territory. |
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•
|
Bog
holes abundant on trails; very muddy, steep, difficult
trails. |
| |
•
|
EDSN
grapevine system of communication evidently working
well; locals knew the patrol was coming. |
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•
|
Antonio
Rivera was probably the conservative and informant to
whom Geyer refers; Geyer cultivating alliances with
local notables as sources of information. |
| |
•
|
Fascinating portrayal of ruse used to capture Flores;
description of inside of his house is precious:
religious images, lamp burning next to a religious
altar; women pounding tortillas; men shelling and
husking corn; very vivid and realistic portrayal of
rural life. Shows Geyer to be shrewd, cunning,
attentive to local cultural norms & values. |
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•
|
Pedrón
(Pedro Altamirano) reportedly in vicinity. |
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•
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Santos
Vásquez, EDSN, subordinate of Pedrón; one of the
earliest mentions of him. |
| |
•
|
Air war:
Geyer tells woman that if an airplane drops a white rag,
get the hell out of the house because it's going to be
attacked. (He doesn't say what she or her family
should do if they happen to miss the dropping of the
white rag and their house is strafed & bombed.
Duck I suppose.) |
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•
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Sketches
not found. |
PC-docs Inventory in excel file •
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28.04.05. Atkinson,
report of patrol to La trinidad-san isidro area vicinity of ollanca,
estelÍ.
Headquarters, 2nd Battaion, 11th
Regiment, Esteli, Nicaragua.
5 March [April], 1928.
From:
1st Lt. B. W. Atkinson, U.S.M.C.
To:
The Battalion Commander.
Subject: Report
of Patrol to TRINIDAD-SAN ISIDRO and area
vicinity of OLLANCA.
1.
In compliance with your instructions received Tuesday
April 3, 1928, I took command of a mounted patrol
consisting of 13 men and proceeded at 2045 to
investigate bandit reports in the TRINIDAD-SAN ISIDRO-OLLANCA
area. In this connection the undersigned has the
following report to make:-
The patrol cleared ESTELI at 2050
all mounted. Proceeded along the ESTELI-TRINIDAD
road without incident. Two automobiles proceeding
in the same direction were halted and instructed to
return to ESTELI in order that information of our
approach would not be received. On arrival at the
outskirts of town two men were left at the junction
where the road continued on to SAN ISIDRO and also
branched into town, with orders to prevent any parties
from continuing on to SAN ISIDRO. It was my
intention to get the Chief of Police in TRINIDAD and
have him lead me to the specific section of OLLANCA that
the bandits had been reported. This being in the
general direction of SAN ISIDRO, the above mentioned
guards were left for this purpose. The patrol at
this time was closed up to about 5 paces interval.
The point started into town along the route. As we
approached the plaza I passed word back to halt and
riding up to Tpr Wilson, the first man in the point, who
was familiar with the town and the location of the
police station, directed him to come with me and also
Pvt. E.F. Ballinger, the man directly behind him, and
that we would bet the Chief of Police. It was at
this time about 0015 and the location of the undersigned
and members of the patrol is shown on sketch attached.
We rode about 30 feet farther when suddenly a yell and
shot was fired immediately followed by a burst of fire
from the building used as a police station. At the
first yell and shot I called "dismount" and the three of
us threw ourselves from the horses and ran to cover, on
the porch of a house where position was later taken up.
Investigation later showed the shot hit the stirrup and
guard of the saddle ridden by Tpr Wilson.
Immediately fire opened up from houses on 3 sides of the
square. At this time the other members of the
patrol had taken up position under direction of Sgt
Seyler to work with his men around in rear of our
position and join me. This he did and positions
for the automatic weapons and others were selected as
shown in sketch. At this time I had 10 men.
Two privates, Kronjaeger and Dolan were on guard at the
road and were joined later by Pvt Vandenhoogen who had
trouble with his mule and was unable to keep up.
They took position in a house at the road and joined me
the next morning.
Although the moon was up and the square was very bright
all firing was directed at us from houses, so all that
could be seen were their flashes. I would judge
fire from at least 25 rifles and five or ten pistols
were directed at us. A position was built around
the automatic rifle and assistant that controlled the
square. From this position we were able to place
fire on three sides of the square. Fire continued
coming down the street from the police station but was
ineffective. From a position alongside of the
automatic riflemen I started eliminating fire from the
houses directly to our front. Two houses were
silenced almost at once by several bursts directed at
their flashes. One man firing a pistol from behind
a post was either killed or wounded by a short burst.
The telegraph office caused the most trouble and the
greatest volume of fire came from there. Some
automatic weapons, firing entirely semi-automatic fire,
came from this source. The following morning empty
shells, caliber 30 showing marks of extraction and
shells that had evidently caused jams were found.
After the initial burst [ p. 2 ] firing
continued quite heavily for the first half hour and then
slackened off to spasmodic bursts. Yells, vivas,
and the usual "Viva Sandino" were heard. Also the
usual profanity were used. Several of our horses
were grazing in the plaza and two men were killed when
the [they] endeavored to steal them. I say killed,
as I am certain they were, although the next morning
only blood was found at the two spots where they fell.
The bodies were evidently removed when the moon went
down and we were unable to see, preventing anyone coming
out to remove them. The firing completely stopped
about 2:30 or 3:00 a.m. No Marine casualties.
Position was maintained until daylight when two
automobiles came into town followed by the other three
members of my patrol mentioned above. One of these
cars contained the Chief of Police from CONDEGA.
Accompanied by him and while covered by the patrol we
searched the buildings from which fire had been directed
and all other buildings surrounding the square.
The entire town was practically deserted but almost at
once people began returning from all directions.
The Chief of Police of TRINIDAD next appeared, and on
questioning stated that the bandits had come in between
10 and 11 and that he and his policemen left the town
for the hills. However, a few minutes later the
Sergeant of the Police and one other policemen came in,
both of whom were wounded in the legs. The
Sergeant had been shot twice. On being questioned
as to how they were wounded if they had been in the
hills he replied that they had returned after our
arrival and engaged in the fight. His whole story
was filled with contradictions and I would not be at all
surprised if he were not in some way connected with the
bandit groups of that area. I do not trust him and
believe little that he states.
As far as could be ascertained from information gathered
from several sources, considered reliable, the following
was established:
That a group of bandits stated to be from 25 to 50
entered the town from the S between 10 pm and 12
midnight. That they did not know who the leader
was but that the group was from the group under
Condelario Cardoza [Candelario Cardoza] which had been
operating in that locality from time to time. That
they had left for OLLANCA and SAN ISIDRO area in several
groups after our arrival and that they said many had
been wounded. Reports later in the day placed the
wounded between five and ten. I personally saw two
drop and am certain they were killed.
2.
After gathering our horses I left at once with the Chief
of Police as guide for SAN ISIDRO. Arriving there
at 1000. Interviewed the Chief of Police who
stated that things were quiet there but that the group
encountered by me at TRINIDAD had left for that place
the afternoon before about six. He estimated them
to be fifty. That he did not know where they had
gone but thought to OLLANCA valley and mountain.
That the reports were that several had been wounded but
did not know how many.
3.
Left at once for OLLANCA accompanied by the Chief of
Police of TRINIDAD and one policeman from SAN ISIDRO.
This section in my opinion shows ever indication of
being a locality where either bandits live or operate
from. The valley itself is approached from SAN
ISIDRO via BOPAL. A trail leads off from there up
the valley. The valley is completely surrounded on
three sides by high mountains which rise to an elevation
of about 5000 feet. The trail goes up the center
winding around between numerous small huts and houses.
Would say at least 50. The area is very fertile,
plenty of sugar cane, guate, and other grain.
There was plenty of stock including many good looking
horses. The houses were practically deserted of
men. Many women and children who appeared
frightened on our appearance sought cover until seeing
we would do them no harm. On questioning many as
to the whereabouts of the men they stated that they were
out working. Observed many on the hills which rise
almost straight up, [ p. 3 ] some of whom
were at work, but to my opinion did not account for a
third of the male population. They stated that
they had not seen marines before and that they were told
we killed all we saw. On reaching the end of the
valley the ascent upward begins. This is almost a
straight upward climb for over an hour and a half.
The trail is well worn and shows lots of usage. On
reaching the top a view for miles can be seen. The
trail follows along the top of the mountain and then
starts the descent down, taking nearly an hour and a
half, and terminates right at the edge of the town of
TRINIDAD. The accompanying sketch gives an idea of
the route it follows. The table top of OLLANCA
mountain is perfectly flat with the exception of a
slight rise - almost in the center. This rise in
an excellent field of fire of the entire top.
Mounted on the crest controlling the area both for the
trail coming out of the valley and the trail leading
down into TRINIDAD, were many emplacements. To the
South I observed six or seven fox holes and built up
rock emplacements that had been recently made, which
appeared to be machine gun positions or for several
riflemen. The same number were on the sloe to the
north. In view of their being absolutely no high
brush or trees no the top a clean sweep is had over both
approaches. They can enter the valley from either
TRINIDAD or SAN ISIDRO and have a good retreat either
way. These emplacements were new, showing no signs
of ever having been used, and their selection showed an
excellent judgment of the proper sites for defending an
area that can be approached from either direction.
4.
Arriving at TRINIDAD at 1540, rested animals and left
for ESTELI at 1745. Arrived ESTELI at 1210 without
incident enroute.
5.
In this connection, I wish to bring to the Battalion
Commander's attention the splendid spirit and soldierly
conduct displayed on the part of all members of this
patrol A distance of 52 miles was covered in a
period 27 hours and contact made with bandits in an
engagement lasting over an hour. Their conduct
under fire was exemplary in every respect. All
were cool and calm, listened for orders, executing them
instantly, and without question. The next morning
the patrol was continued and we left in an attempt to
gain further contact with only coffee and a few rolls
for breakfast in order to save time. They rode all
day and up until 1540 without rest or food, and not once
was there a murmur of complaint. I feel that all
members should be commended for their actions while
under fire at a time when it was unknown as to the odds
that were against them, and under conditions which gave
indication of their having encountered a band many times
their size.
6.
Attached hereto are special commendations for certain
members of the patrol.
/ s / B. W. ATKINSON
NA127/43A/33; retyped copy in
NA127/212/1
Sketches that accompany Lt.
Atkinson's report.
•
Firing came from the three sides of the town square,
from two houses, two stores, the telegraph office,
and the police station.
•
Writing at the bottom on the second image reads "My
position & point when initial fire started.
Arrows indicate route patrol followed to join me."
•
Click on thumbnails for full images:
Maps in NA127/113C/12
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Summary & Notes |
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•
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These
were Conservatives, not Sandinistas; the yells "Viva
Sandino" were a ruse (trying to hide their identity and
blame their enemies). |
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•
|
A bold
move, for local Conservatives to attack a mounted patrol
of 13 Marines. Turned into a big defeat; several
killed (no Marine casualties), launched Marine-GN
investigation into principal players. |
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•
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Chief of
Police Carmen Vílchez henceforth implicated in
Conservative gang violence in the La Trinidad / San
Isidro area; part of the larger Chamorrista effort to
disrupt the upcoming Nov. 1928 presidential elections.
Other police officials and local elites also implicated
in the fight; episode part of larger and well documented
local struggles for power in the post-Espino Negro
Segovias. |
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•
|
Zone
remained a Conservative stronghold for years, while
Conservative gang violence continued into 1929 and
after. |
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•
|
Vivid
descriptions of moonlight mounted patrol of 13 men
heading into La Trinidad "to investigate bandit
reports"; turning around the automobiles; entering the
town; eruption of the firefight; events of the 30 minute
battle. 13 Marines vs. 30-35 armed assailants
firing from three sides of the town square; several
assailants killed (bodies dragged away); no Marines
killed or wounded. Amazing. In Atkinson's
telling the Marines won this fight decisively, and
there's no reason to doubt it. |
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•
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Candelario Cardoza, Conservative jefe in the district.
|
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•
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Vivid
description of Ollanco Mtn and environs. |
PC-docs Inventory in excel file •
pc-docs inventory on pc-docs home
28.04.05. Hart, Report of Patrol, Tuma.
Tuma, Nicaragua
April 5, 1928
From: C.O.
Tuma.
To:
C.O. Matagalpa.
Subject: Report of patrol
April 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 1928.
1. At 0600 2 April
cleared here with patrol of twenty men for the Coyolar
section, destination La Oriental, finca of one chinaman
name Rafail Kuan [Rafael Quan] - arrived 0900 found
things quiet and rested until 10:00. Our return up
arrival at junction of Cuatros Esquinos - Jinotega & on
trail we were halted by Juan Alvarez, who reported that
he had been notified that a lot of bandits were about 2
leagues up the trail (Cuatros Esquinos-Jinotega trail)
and they were looting etc.
I returned to his house about a
mile up road; he lived on the side of a hill and just
after our arrival a little boy came, saying mucho
hombres at Paula Arauz which house was across valley
between 1½ & 2 miles and on another high protrero [potrero,
pasture] hill. I searched place with my glasses.
Saw several people moving about and two men driving
horses from protrero. Trail lead direct from
Alvarez house to Arauz finca, but had very bad approach
(open protrero, uphill 200 yds. and road in kind
of gully.) I asked could he lead me to house under
cover. He said he could & did (sep sketch).
Upon our arrival at house of F. [Tinoco] we
found [ p. 2 ] place deserted, but on fire
boiling, filled with chickens, yuca & etc.
Evidently our approach had been seen or heard and place
deserted hurriedly. We then advanced cautiously up
hill from this house to ridge upon which house of Arauz
was located. Advanced cautiously, to the houses
here, found all deserted, but fires in cook house
burning and evidence of recent occupancy. Searched
area but no sign of anyone. Nor was there any sign
of any large groups having been there. We left and
returned to Alvarez place by main road. Met a man
who said that one Manuel Wright told him the Arauz place
had been robbed by two boys were [had] rifles & said
they were Sandinistas and going to join him. This
I believed at the time as I had not seen any signs of
where a large group of horses & men had passed or been
for any length of time.
Told Alvarez (my guide) to see if
he could get any further information, report to me here
Tuesday and he did. We returned camp 1745.
Alvarez reported Tuesday AM and stated that a Jefe by
name Peron [Pedrón, Pedro Altamirano] had 50-80 men,
partly mounted and they had arrived as far as Arauz
where they got word of us. Peron first ordered
they take battle formations, but when saw that we
intended flanking him and not [creep open] hill he
called his men in and left hurriedly. [ p. 3 ] He
further stated they said more were with them and they
were to meet in Caratera.
3. Upon my arrival in camp I
found one Capitan of police of Caratera name Errera
[Herrera] who reported Altamirano with about 150 men
partly mounted, mostly armed had arrived Caratera Sunday
afternoon and robbed house of that section. That
they spent the night at the house of Jose Zeledon about
one mile west of LeClaires place. Reported to have
had 2 machine guns. (Reported this by radio & same
checked with msg. from Mellinger.) Told Errera we
would help and for him to return & get me more
information.
4. With this recent
information and other from Alvarez I decided to start
for Caratera. I cleared camp 10:30 3rd April with
38 men. When about 1½ miles out we met one Alfario
Garcia (who lives on S Pis Pis trail between Hastrams [Haslam]
& LeClaires about half way) who reported that band of
about 150 passed his house 6 AM looted it, took all
cattle & horses and left going toward Pis Pis.
While writing this message to you one man Capitan of
Police of Vijagua [Bijagua] reported that they had
passed Hastrams place 0700 robbed it and he had met them
on edge of Vijagua. 0900 they robbed him and gave
him a black eye, traveling on Pis-Pis trail. Sent
this information back to you, deciding to go to Hastrams
as they [ p. 4 ] evidently had cleared Caratera.
Arrived Hastrams 1600 and planes picked me up there
1615. No new information, R. Hastram was not there
& sent for him. Gave planes all info possible and
[followed] direction Vijagua and Juan Palmeros finca
(also reported robbing them 0900). They left and
later I heard distant M.G. fire and faintly bombs.
They did not give me any late report.
1900. Alberto Hastram
arrived, he stated they robbed him, his place, took
$40.00 for which he was given the enclosed receipt,
signed Sanchez. He stated there were about 150 all
around, two MGs, one Thompson, did not know other make.
Left his place about 7 AM going on Pis-Pis trail.
Hastram agreed to go out for
further information to find which direction they took
after arriving Vijagua. From natives I found that
at Vijagua they could branch off on trail leading back
to foot of Pena Blanca and Los Cuchillos, take a shorter
circuit and join J-P.P. trail [or] LeClaires or continue
on to Bocay & Bocay Grande, cross Coco and return from
there [and last keep] on to Pis Pis & Coast. I
decided to wait for A. Hastrams report and they try to
cut them off - using if necessary what forces available
at Tuma for Caratera. I also send police to Caratera and
Juan Palmero. [ p. 5 ]
Hastram cleared camp there 0430
and started on foot with one mozo. Scout to
Caratera returned 1530 and reported killing of Lt. of P.
of Caratera Tuesday AM and taking of two rifles but only
small amount of ammunition. Same band.
Packed up ready to leave but [Lt.] did not return until
1700. He stated he had been to Vijagua talked to
natives and his report is enclosed (notes by me from
questions asked).
I then decided return here, report
information to you at once, which I did arriving here
2300.
4. Natives three firmly
believe they are headed for Pis Pis & Puerto Cabezas as
they were traveling fast. They all pass any
trail where they can return to Las Cuchillas without
back tracking - Trails for them are limited also as they
are mounted.
/ s / F. H. Hart
5. Sketch enclosed is rough,
but as it was made I am sending it in order to save
time. Notes were made at Hastrams.
F.H.H.
Resibí del señor, alfredo Masy la
suma de 40.00 cuarenta pesos en
mercansia para protecion del derecho
del ejercito defensor del derecho na__
cional de Nicaragua
Patria y Libertad
P. Sanchez H.
2° Jefe de la Expedicción
Hastram gave the
above name as he was afraid
to give his own. They had
him tied up at first, but
released him --
F.H.H.
.jpg)
|
Accompanying Sketch Map:
Trails to La Oriental, Sr. Rafael Kuan.
.jpg)
Click on thumbnails for
full images of (1) Porifrio Sánchez note, and (2) sketch
map:
NA127/43A/20
|
|
Summary & Notes |
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•
|
Handwritten, hurriedly; a field report. Tons of
information here; a complex series of events. |
| |
•
|
Basically: Pedrón and allied bands launch a
campaign of pillage and (measured) retribution prior to their
departure for the Pis Pis mining district, and the
Marines are catching glimpses of it, trying to figure
out where the enemy is, what they're doing, and where
they're going. Marines always several steps behind.
|
| |
•
|
Patrol
of 20 Marines from Tuma first heads to La Oriental
coffee hacienda of Chinese immigrant Rafael Quan (later suspected of paying Pedrón off
for guarantees on his property). |
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•
|
Patrol's
course shifted by crossing the path of a native, Juan
Alvarez, who reported a robbery. Alvarez then
serves as a guide and scout. Why? Why would
he return on Tues. morning? What's in it for him?
Implicit that he's being threatened and intimidated into
serving Marines. |
| |
•
|
Then the
little boy reports "muchos hombres" and another
fruitless chase across the valley. |
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•
|
As
Marines approach, people flee, leaving their pots &
kettles boiling. |
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•
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Finca
owners robbed and/or helping Marines: Paula Arauz;
Alberto Haslam; Alfario García; Juan Palmero.
LeClaire's finca. |
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•
|
Pattern
clearly established: both sides using threats &
intimidation to pressure civilians for resources
(information, animals, goods, compliance). |
| |
•
|
Two
captains of police: Herrera (Caraterra; Francisco
Herrera) and
nameless, Bijagu | |
.jpg)
