HEADQUARTERS, SECOND BRIGADE MARINE CORPS, MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.

July 21, 1927.

 

FROM:          COMMANDING GENERAL

TO:                MARCORPS

 

  8521 OUR 8617 DASH 1540 BEST INFORMATION AT PRESENT IS THAT WHILE SANDINO MET WITH A SEVERE REVERSE AT OCOTAL ON SIXTEENTH AND SEVERAL OF HIS LEADERS HAVE BEEN KILLED AND RUMORS THAT OTHERS HAVE DESERTED HIM WITH THEIR FOLLOWERS WE MUST STILL CONSIDER THAT SANDINO IS AN ENEMY IN BEING UNTIL HE IS DEFINITELY DISPOSED OF PERIOD RUMORS HAVE IT THAT HE HAS RETIRED TO HIS STRONGHOLD NEAR CHIPOTE WHERE HE IS REORGANIZING AND MAY CAUSE MORE AND SERIOUS TROUBLE PERIOD 1445

 

C O D E

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

 

HEADQUARTERS, SECOND BRIGADE, MARINE CORPS, MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.

26 JULY 1927.

 

FROM:          COMMANDING GENERAL.

TO:                MARCORPS.

INFOR:         COMSPERON.

 

8626   COLUMN UNDER MAJOR FLOYD SIX OFFICERS COMMA SEVENTY FIVE MARINES AND THIRTY SEVEN PROVISIONAL GUARDIA CLEARED OCOTAL NINE HUNDRED TWENTY FIFTH FOR SANDINO COUNTRY AND SAN ALBINO MINE PERIOD THIS CANCELS PLANS FOR ADVANCE BY TWO COLUMNS AS OUTLINED MY LETTERS JULY EIGHTH AND THIRTEENTH PERIOD FLOYD OCCUPIED TOWN OF SAN FERNANDO AFTER SKIRMISH WITH ABOUT FORTH OF SANDINO'S BANDITS WHICH WERE DISPERSED AT FIFTEEN HUNDRED TWENTY FIFTH PERIOD ONE MARINE SLIGHTLY WOUNDED  1600

 

C O D E

NA127/206/1

Field Message No. 4.                                                       SAN FERNANDO

                                                                                           July 26, 1927

 

From:     Major Floyd.

To:         Commanding Officer, 5th Regiment, U.S.M.C., Managua, Nic.

 

     1.     Yesterday about 3:00 p.m. upon entering San Fernando, we noted some men retiring from the hills, finally a shot was fired at us; in the meantime by advance units were almost entering the town.  The town was then rushed and armed force was dispersed.  I estimate enemy at forty.  We buried four and I believe 3 others were killed in the hills.  Probably as many as six were wounded.  Only one Marine casualty - this man was wounded in the buttock, can not ride.  One woman in town was wounded by automatic fire, wounded in legs.  All firing ceased about 3:45 PM.

 

     2.     I am remaining here until I can evacuate my wounded man.  There is NOT a single native here to impress - NO bulls are available.  I have directed Hatfield to send one bull-cart from Ocotal with guard to evacuate my wounded man, and by wire, Hatfield says he will not be able to get it before 10:00 AM today.  I will not reduce my strength by a sufficient guard for return of my wounded man.

 

     3.     Amid all rumors, the following is the first accurate information of conditions North-East of OCOTAL - This from my observation yesterday.  All small barrios from OCOTAL to San Fernando are deserted with nothing left in houses except MOSONTE where women and children and few men are still seen.  SAN FERNANDO shows signs of normal life only in 3 or 4 houses and NO MEN are in town.

 

     4.     A dying Sandino man yesterday stated that Sandino had 200 men and was concentrating in Chipote or Jicaro.  My guide from OCOTAL says Chipote is 3 leagues beyond SAN ALBINO.

 

     5.     Here, I took yesterday, 5 serviceable rifles, one case of dynamite and about 30 hand made bombs.

 

      6.     Hatfield states that the white people at SAN ALBINO mine are in no danger - this per an intercepted wire from Sandino to his (Sandino's) father.  I just learned yesterday after leaving OCOTAL that Mr. Morgan at San Albino Mine is generally reputed to be the illegitimate son of Mr. Butters, and that there are no white women at the mine.

 

     7.     After my observations yesterday, I am convinced that my further progress will be accomplished only as follows under present conditions:

(a)  I will have to wage a real blood and thunder campaign and will have casualties every day.

(b)  I will become involved in a real small war.

(c)  These people will shoot it out with small arms opposition for at least a while.  [ p. 2 ]  

(d)  All people encountered are unquestionably strong for Sandino.

(e)  Nothing can be procured from the country.

(f)  Arms will be received only from dead and wounded.

     8.     The above is facts as I have observed and opinions as I see it - I am willing and anxious to go on; but the interests of the United States and my injunctions from General Feland demand that I lay the facts before you with my comments.

 

     9.     Please show this letter to General Feland personally.

 

                                                          / s /  O. Floyd.

 

I will camp night 26-27 July, 1927 at SAN FERNANDO (here).

 

                                                                  O. Floyd.

 

Latest reports say enemy instructed to take cover on approach of our planes.

 

                                                                  O. Floyd.

FIELD MESSAGE NO. 8 

JICARO, NICARAGUA

July 30, 1927

 

From:        Major Oliver Floyd, USMC.

To:            CO, Fifth Regiment, Managua.

 

Subject:     Report.

 

     1.     I was detained the whole of July 26 in San Fernando while arranging for the evacuation of Private Toro who had been wounded at that place on July 25.

 

     2.     On July 27, I marched from SAN FERNANDO; while leaving that place, the planes were heard to fire and bomb to the northeast; and planes later reported that they had dispersed a band of about 40 men with one machine gun.  The march was continued; and many women at a ranch named OROSI were questioned about the retirement of the aforementioned force.

 

            About 1 mile southeast of SANTA CLARA, near a ranch house, APALI, my column was ambushed in an excellent place from the enemy point of view by a mounted force of about 60 men armed with rifles and two machine guns, one of which was identified as a Lewis (the other MG is believed to have been a Lewis) - The firing was begun by the bandits machine guns at about 2:30 PM and continued for 1 hour and 30 minutes.

RESULTS:

   Bandit Casualties:

     Five (5) known as killed (including the machine gunner.)

     Much evidence of wounded, but no wounded seen.

     12 animals killed.

     Approximately 8 animals captured.

     Some grenades (Dynamite in bottles and bull hide cage.)

     14 Lewis ammunition drums.

     1 case Dynamite.

     1 revolver - given to an unarmed guide.

     About 6 other fire arms.

     Some machettes.

NOTE:  All of the above material (except captured animals and revolver) was destroyed.

 

   Marine and Guardia Casualties:

   

          NONE.

          From my best information, the machine gunner killed was Colonel Miguel Angel Colindres, who is the second in command of General Sanchez at APALI.  The force encountered was commanded by Sanchez according to reports.  --- If true, the report that Sanchez has split with Sandino is probably false, though possibly true.  [ p. 2 ] 

 

          One (1) prisoner, an ignorant youth, was taken while pretending to be dead.

 

     3.     I camped the night of July 27-28 at CALPULES.  That night about ten men slept within fifty yards of a squad on outpost.  The squad leader was aware of this for several hours; and was preparing to surprise them by fire at dawn --  The bandits were aware of the presence of the outpost and fled to the brush just as the fire was about to be delivered.  The squad pursued them by fire; the bandits returned the fire; this was followed by a thorough following up thru the brush but no one was seen thereafter.

 

     4.     I marched July 28 to the and camped near the northern limits of SABANA GRANDE.

 

     5.     July 29, I took fifty (50) men with machine guns and marched to JICARO for purposes of reconnoitering and feeling out the enemy.  I left my train and remainder of men at SABANA GRANDE.

          At about 10:45 AM, the planes reported everything quiet in JICARO--visibility was poor at that time; and I renewed my cautious advance.  At 11:50 orders were issued for the occupation of a hill immediately south west of town; the movement for the hill was just getting underweigh [sic] when the planes returned and opened up with MG and bombs.  The whole force with me (except one MG) was pushed forward.  It is estimated (Planes reports will be better than my estimate) that the enemy left only 10 or 12 men in JICARO who were distributed in pairs on various nearby hills to set off Dynamite mines on the crests thereof.  Little rifle fire was encountered; and little was delivered.  No enemy casualties were noted.  No casualties in my command.

          My train was ordered to come forward to JICARO this morning.  My train reported by messenger that everything was "O K" late yesterday afternoon.

          Four plants of mines have been discovered on the peaks of nearby hills.  We are playing safe with them one exploded yesterday after we entered the town.  My advance elements entered JICARO at 12:20 p.m.

          JICARO is a town normally of about 800 people. It is absolutely deserted except for one half witted-boy who was hiding -- I am holding him.

          Practically every house has in it loot and evidence of soldiers such as small pieces of time fuse, exploder caps - and property evidently of Mr. Butters is everywhere throughout the town, Last Night, two men were observed trying to get the time fuse of a dynamite mine on the hill just south of town.  Yesterday, the fuse was burning and then taken up before explosion.

          The town of JICARO is simply a MESS, with all evidence of the headquarters of a lawless band.  The same set of furniture is scattered throughout the town; the same is true of table ware and dishes.  Houses of no value are found to contain loot of every description.  But there is nothing of military value except a few scattered pieces of fuse and primers in practically every house.

 

     6.          There is no information about Sandino or on which I can rely in making an estimate relative to taking San Albino mine.  [ p. 3 ] 

 

     7.          I am writing this without access to my papers which are with my train; but in one of your letters you tell me to estimate the situation and submit my plan for taking San Albino for approval before I start for that place.

 

          My men are in high morale; but need a chance to clean up.

 

          My plan is to advance on San Albino leaving my train here in JICARO - exactly in the same manner that I entered JICARO; after taking San Albino mine to have the train follow and join me.

 

          I WILL NOT split my forces between JICARO and San Albino Mine.

 

     8.          I see now NO reason why Hatfield should be sent out to join me.  My wire communication is cut behind me; but Jefe Politico at OCOTAL has promised to keep me followed by a repair party.

          The simplest plan (and I recommend it) to resupply me is to let the train arriving at OCOTAL with its original guard be sent forward to me with its supplies.

          After taking San Albino mine, I plan to take such light important parts of machinery as will put the mine out of commission - to secrete or carry with me such parts.

 

          So far as JICARO is concerned, there is actually no reason for occupying the place except the show of holding Sandino's former capital.

 

     9.         I trust no information here except what I see or reports from my command.  You have noted that my marches since OCOTAL have been very short.  I have been extremely methodical and cautious in my advance; and I shall continue to carry out this principle.

 

                                                                               O. FLOYD.

Field Message )

   No. 9           )                                               SAN ALBINO.

Plane pick up  )                                           NUEVA SEGOVIA.

                                                                            August, 2, 1927.

 

 

From:          Major Floyd, USMC.

To:              Commanding Officer, Fifth (5th) Regiment, Marine Corps,

                    Managua, Nicaragua.

 

Subject:       Report - Opinion - Recommendations.

 

     1.          July 31, on the outskirts of Jicaro, one of my Guardia Officers arrested three (3) men with some pack animals loaded with merchandise.  The apparent leader of these men was a Honduranian; the other two claimed to be Nicaraguans; each was armed with a pistol.  After questioning them separately, many discrepancies developed in their statements; their merchandise was searched and practically all of it bore evidence of coming from Honduras.  Among their merchandise, was a Honduranian paper which bore on the margin a written note to Sandino --- This note purported to be signed by a Nicaraguan woman and sought to prevail upon Sandino to save his (Sandino's) life until 1929.   Further questioning resulted in the men declaring that the note was sent by one Pancho Barahona [Francisco Barahona] from DANLI, Honduras.  I am keeping these men as prisoners, and will return them to Ocotal.

 

     2.          During my stay in Jicaro, we unearthed four (4) plants of explosive, getting a total of about 350 sticks of dynamite.

 

     3.          While at Jicaro, only two ignorant women and one very old decrepit man came into town.

 

     4.          My command with train arrived in SAN ALBINO August 1st.  The march was without incidents.  Upon approach, about fifteen people were seen in the hills, and close observation revealed that they were probably unarmed people fleeing from the town.  About four (4) suspicious men were noted near the mine - it was NOT determined whether they were armed, and the quickly took to the brush.

 

     5.          At San Albino, I found Mr. Williams and Mr. Madison [Matteson], each with their families.  Mrs. Madison is a white woman (I was in error in my message no. 4, when I stated that there are no white women in San Albino)

 

     6.          Mr. Williams and Madison are each claiming to be British - subjects, and claim that such is the reason they were not bothered by Sandinos men here in San Albino.  I doubt Madison's claim, believing him to be an American.

 

     7.          My questioning of Williams and Madison results in the following:

 

                  Williams has been here about 28 years.

                   There is no place in this country generally and long known as Chipote.

                   [ p. 2 ] 

 

          Williams believes [illegible] Sandino recently.

          Sandino took over the mine on June 19, at which time Madison was superintendent of the mill and Mr. Morgan was manager of the mine.

          After Mr. Butters left, Morgan remained consistently intoxicated, had a fight with one of Sandinos officers and was sick in bed thereafter.  Morgan had the combination to the safe.  Sandinos men compelled Morgan (on his bed) to turn over combination to Madison, who in turn was compelled to open the safe.  In the safe was found a large bag of money which was taken by Sandinos man.

           Sandino required Madison to write Williams a letter requiring Williams to come to San Albino.  Upon Williams arrival, he was informed that he (Williams) would be required to remain here and help in the mine.

          Sandino turned back the mine to Williams and Madison on July 23rd.  During Sandinos period of working the mine, he got out about $5,000 worth of gold, and probably spent half of that amount for labor.  The man, Manuel Echevarria, a Mexican, was Sandino personal representative during this period, there were about 75 men while the bandits operated the mine.  During this period there were about 75 men employed as a average.  Upon leaving San Albino, Echevarria was determined to demolish the mine property, and blow up several plants on hill tops.  Williams and Madison talked him out of this.  Yesterday, with the assistance of a German renegade, we unearthed three plants of dynamite in this vicinity.

          This German is a mechanic and the one who was to mint money for Sandino -- the minting project never materialized.

          During the long occupation of San Albino by Sandino, there were an average of about 20 soldiers maintained here.  There was much talk about Chipote, but its location was never divulged.

          Williams and Madison estimate Sandinos strength as from 200 to 400 men at Chipote, mostly Indians.

          About seventy-five (75) boxes (or nearly two tons) of dynamite has been taken eastward from San Albino.  Sandino must have all the fuse and primers desired as some of this material is still left in the mine.

          The Sianide [cyanide] (100 pounds) at this mine has not been touched.

          Sandino himself, accompanied by two boys, came through here from direction of Jicaro on morning of July 29, the day I entered Jicaro.  He (Sandino) took breakfast with Madison; and was visibly nervous.

          Sandino declares he will NOT disarm until Diaz is ousted from the presidency; that he will kill any American attempting to reside in Eastern Segovia.

          After Morgan was able to travel, Sandino wanted to kill him; but was finally prevailed upon to let Morgan go over the border to Honduras.  Williams has heard through personal information that Morgan made Honduras and is now there.

          Sandino regrets that he (Sandino) did NOT kill Mr. Butters.

          Mr. Williams, without any exact information, suspects that "Chipote" is southeast of here about 8 or 9 miles on an air line from here -- the place he suspects is the most prominent peak on the second range of mountains east of here -- the distance by trail being probably 15 to 20 miles.  First east of here is the Jicaro river; then a high range; then the Mur  [ p. 3; illegible] Chipote.  Williams only suspects from no intimation whatever but from his mere knowledge that there is one outstanding peak on the second range to the eastward beyond the Murra River.

          Williams informs me that roads cease east of here, that there is nothing but trails of the most rugged and difficult type; that everything east of here is mountains.

          Sandino states that in the event he is defeated in Chipote, he (Sandino) will retreat farther into the mountains and wage banditry killing all Americans from time to time.

          The mine has NOT been injured; but loose storeroom and other property has been taken away.  Williams and Madison have been able to keep enough supplies to last their families for about two weeks longer.

          During my march from Ocotal, I have not seen a bull-cart or a pack mule -- except the pack mules of the smugglers that were arrested in Jicaro on August 31.

          All activities have ceased at the mine.  All soldiers and laborers have left except six (6) laborers who have been faithful to Williams and Madison.

          The mine can be prepared so that the bandits will not be able to work it with but little trouble -- this without damage to any appreciable extent.

 

                    FACTS.

(a)  There is NO certain information as to the location of Chipote.

(b)  I am about forty-five miles from my base at Ocotal.

(c)  My effective strength is seventy-four (74) enlisted Marines.

(d)  Unquestionably, the roads are difficult in my rear -- and I feel certain that they are extremely hard trail only farther to the east.

(e)  Everything from Ocotal to San Albino has been looted, including transportation and stores.

 

                    OPINIONS.

(a)  Considering my original mission to move eastward from Ocotal, and deprive Sandino of the towns in that direction and the use of San Albino Mine, my mission has been accomplished to date.

(b)  NOBODY knows location of Chipote.

(c)  To set out to attack Chipote might result in a blow in the air by a small force far away and over difficult country from the base.

(d)  It is reasonable to assume that the towns Telpaneca and Palacaguina have been looted and are in the same condition as Jicaro, Totogalpa, Yalacaguina, and Condega, as a result of their continued occupation by bandit forces.

(e)  If Chipote can be located, and attacked by my force, we will carry that place -- but we will not get Sandino himself nor any large part of his present gang there.  Sandino will then flee farther into the mountains and continue bandit raids.

(f)  An attack on Chipote, although successful, will result in many casualties, and well-nigh impossible conditions for evacuations.

(g)  I believe that Sandino Prestige is shattered in this country, by our depriving him of Jicaro and the San Albino mine.

(h)  With the rainy season coming on, and with all supplies in the country having been massed in Chipote, Sandinos gang of bandits will desert him within two or three months.  [ p. 4 ]

(i)  There is nothing more in this area for Sandino to do which will enhance his supplies or revenue.

(j)  Ocotal and San Albino Mine are the only places which it is necessary to deny to Sandino at present.

 

                    RECOMMENDATIONS.

(a)  That I put the Mine out of commission without material damage to same.

(b)  That I serve on Williams and Madison written advice to leave this country with their families, offering them transportation for their families and more valuable belonging, send them back to Ocotal if they accept -- furnish American Minister and British Counsel at Managua each with copies of my letters to them.

(c)  That I remain here for about one week, not later than July [August] 9th with my command.

(f)  That further operations to the eastward be NOT considered by my force.

(g)  That my force upon leaving San Albino Mine proceed to Ocotal for further orders.

(h)  That the garrison at Ocotal (Marine Garrison) be set at fifty (50) men strength sufficient to preclude apprehension as to their future safety without aid of daily Air Service liaisons.

(i)  That law and order be radiated eastward from Ocotal, for which purpose a detachment of forty (40) Guardia now at Ocotal be sent to Garrison San Fernando.  The later a guardia detachment be sent to Jicaro.

(j)  That no measures be taken to resupply me from Ocotal.

 

     8.          It is my opinion that I should not be returned via Telpaneca and Yali -- I will make better progress the other route and will be able better to straighten out the animal situation by taking this train back over its former routes.

     9.          I consider the further operation of my force to the east as unwise, and recommend against it.

 

                    NUEVA SEGOVIA Problem in General.

     10.          There will be banditry, smuggling, illegal arms in this country for one and one half years regardless of what is done or or whatever practical plan is adapted.

                     The only way as I see it, to settle this country, and restore law and order, is to radiate from Ocotal gradually with all guardia as available to have the Managua Government declare for Nueva Segovia what is analogous to martial law with an American officer as the head of same -- such an officer should be a guardia officer.

 

     11.          I shall await your reply to this by planes August 3 (tomorrow) and I shall spend the meantime getting all the information available which I may have overlooked to date.

 

                                                                / s /  O. FLOYD.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

I recommend that Mr. butters be formally warned NOT to return to Segovia in the near future.

                                                         O. FLOYD.

                                                                                San Albino Mine,

                                                                                August 2, 1927.

 

Field Message No. 10.

 

From:          Major O. Floyd, USMC.

To:              Commanding Officer, Fifth Regiment, USMC, Managua.

 

Subject:       Report.

 

     1.          After planes left this morning, Privates Clarence W. Noro and Lucian E. Wilson arrived in my camp unharmed, and clad in regulation Khaki trousers, and OD shirt, with fair shoes, and all equipment and other clothing gone.  These men disclaim desertion saying that they were having trouble with a pack mule and became lost from a column enroute from Ocotal to Esteli about one month ago.  These men state that they were captured by a large band of Sandinos men the next day while they were sleeping; that they were taken to QUILALI where they have been confined ever since until their release July 31st; that Sandino came to Quilali July 30th.  When they were set free they were told to go and do as they liked.  During their confinement at Quilali, they were able to observe many pack animals from time to time leaving Quilali and going eastward.  Their impression is that Quilali and Sandino's City are the same place, and that it is east of Quilali.  I personally questioned these men carefully, checking up every statement, and I believe they are trying to tell the truth, though it is difficult for them to remember details after their experience.  I shall keep them with me.  They state that most houses between here and Quilali are deserted; that there were between 40 and 50 soldiers at Quilali when they left July 31.  They have seen two Lewis Guns in Quilali - this was about 10 days ago.  They encountered NO soldiers enroute from Quilali to San Albino.  These men do not know the country, but simply came upon us by accident in their hike westward after their release.

 

     2.         I shall leave here tomorrow August 3, immediately after getting this information to you by pick-up, I shall go directly with my whole column to what Mr. Williams believes the Air Service to mean in its recent report as to probably location of Chipote.  I hope to be camped night August 3-4 so that I can reconnoiter the place effectively early August 4.

 

                                                                       O. FLOYD

                                                                     San Albino, Nicaragua

                                                                            August 6, 1927

Field Message  )

   No. 11          )

 

From:          Major Oliver Floyd.

To:              Commanding Officer, 5th Regiment.

 

Subject:      Report.

 

     1.          After arrival of plan sent this place August 3, I promptly moved out with my entire command in search for the place "Chipote".  I took with me Mr. Williams to whom I gave the recent information of our planes relative to the location of "Chipote".  After a difficult march of constant climbing and about eight (8) Miles, we came to a place locally known as San Geronimo; it is near the "B" in "San Albino", and in the opinion of Captain Bleasdale, Mr. Williams and of myself, this is the recent place suspected and reported as probably Chipote by the planes.  The description, location, direction from San Albino all tend to confirm my conclusion.  The place is absolutely quiet.

     2.          Continuing farther, I camped the night of August 3rd near a small uncharted village, Santa Rosa.  A small charge of dynamite was exploded just as we started making camp which was believed to have been a signal.  Prior to arrival in camp, acting on information from a native, I sent a small patrol to reconnoiter to our left and a woman and a few men fled from a house on approach.

 

     3.     There is a large prominent mountain exactly north of Quilali, during the night, August 3-4, the place bine [sic] in full view, it was constantly watched for lights but nothing seen.  On August 4, I marched for about ten miles along the crest of a prominent irregular and saw-tooth ridge east of the Jicaro River -- my command constantly studied the mountain north of Quilali and the ranges on either side of my route, but discovered no signs of a stronghold or retreat.  On same day, August 4, I crossed the Jicaro River and ascended the northern slopes of Santa Rita Del Sapotiyal [Zapotillal] for about two hours, then I turned on an obscure train leading toward Quilali from where I had a poor view of that town.  During the night, August 4-5, mountains were again observed but no indications of a stronghold revealed.  [ p. 2 ] 

     4.          August 5.  I marched to QUILALI.  Upon approach, I believe that my column was unnoticed; as my route was a very poor trail not frequently used.  I sent a strong combat patrol into the town; and I believe the patrol was unseen until its arrival.  The town was deserted except for one house where beans were still cooking.  This house was used by soldiers and is at the west edge of town where sentries were placed to guard the main road leading from JICARO (this per information from Marines recently held by Sandino).  I believe that a few men were left here to explode mines upon my approach from the West; that these men were surprised by seeing my first patrol which entered the town from the North, whereupon they instantly fled.  The head of a beef killed probably three days previously and undoubtedly by the small group which was in QUILALI (again report of Marines recently held by Sandino), was noted in the town -- I believe the town had been deserted except for probably a squad on or about August 3.  My patrol was in QUILALI when the planes passed on August 5; later planes returned and my whole command was in town.  The missing of the planes on August 4 was unavoidable -- As they passed, we were on the crest of a ridge in the high brush and made every effort to attract attention; but it was evident that the planes had not sighted us.  From QUILALI, yesterday (August 5) I continued my march with the entire command to SAN ALBINO, arriving here with tail of column at 9:00 PM.  Nothing at the mine has been molested during my absence.

 

     5.          My route August 5th (yesterday) from QUILALI to SAN ALBINO was almost parallel but to the North of the plotted road on the Ham Map; from my route, I could observe the unimportant barrios of VUELTAS and GOLFO, and I passed through JICORITA without knowing it until reminded by the guide.  (so small is this place).  My march (west to east of QUILALI,) was an evident surprise to the few people seen enroute and many houses were deserted.  I passed over SANTA RITA DEL SAPOTIYAL, the highest point between JICARO and QUILALI, and within one hundred (100) yards of the peak -- this is another reputed "CHIPOTE" (just north of the "O" in NUEVO SEGOVIA on the Ham Map).

     6.          I estimate that my clockwise circuit August 3, 4 and 5, from SAN ALBINO - QUILALI - SAN ALBINO covered a distance of about forty-five (45) miles at least.  Enroute, no suitable pastures were found for my train; routes are mere trails and very steep grades (up or down) marked fully three-fourths of the total; The spurs are so close to the streams that trails along streams are either deep mud or a succession of hard grades up and over the spurs.  I started out from here with my whole command, because I would need it should "CHIPOTE" be found; then when I approached QUILALI feeling that I might be able to spring a surprise at that point, I continued with the whole command -- The practical result, as I see it, has been to show these people that we can move a sizeable force even into their mountains.  [ p. 3 ] 

 

     7.          CHIPOTE.  Everyone talks about Chipote.  No one who talks has ever been there; ask any man where Chipote is and he will give you answer, then upon further questioning it will develop that he has not been there and that even his informant never was there.  Sandino is a notorious prevaricator.  Sandino is out for the money and nothing else; there never was in this country a place known as Chipote until Sandino's recent regime; Chipote is a semi-slang term meaning a bump raised by a blow on the head; Nicaraguans love the sensational and among their hundred rumors there will always be the one truth, yet NOBODY has been to Chipote.  Now there are many places mines (gold) down the Coco River; Explosives and supplies are needed and used down that river.  I believe that Chipote is a myth so far as being a fortress is concerned; I know that various soldiers of Sandinos have been informally discharged throughout this country.  Sandino has covered up his actual work of getting supplies down the Coco or perhaps to Honduras (or both) and kept these ignorant people working for him to this and by boasting of "Chipote" and how they will eventually live there in luxury; ease, and security -- while all the time, only a few trusted men have been engaged in the actual work of handling the supplies east of Quilali.  For ten days, I have privately suspected this ruse.  Now it is my conviction, and I am willing to be quoted as saying that I do not believe Sandino has a fortress known even to himself as Chipote.  I believe that grain reported to have been moved to that place for planting has been sold --- In other words, my opinion is that the whole thing is a hoax.

     8.        The worst part of the rainy season (continuing for two months) commences about August 18th; Now we are having one real down-pour at least each day.  The last three days have been most telling on my animals; four simply stopped on me yesterday morning and I had to heave them behind.  It is generally conceded that grass-fed animals are good for 15 days and then must have a like period for recuperation.  Distance is not the only thing that counts in determining what animals have done, it is the hours under the pack, Even in some of my short marches from San Fernando to San Albino my cautious security required my animals to be under pack of a train which would make two successive trips with supplies to Ocotal from Sebaco.  Now I can get this train back in good shape if I am not compelled to work it too hard from now on; every day my animals ore out is costing considerable rental; and every day operations in this country will cost some for animals which have to be left behind.  [ p. 4 ]

 

     9.          My plans  -  It is absolutely necessary that my animals get two full days rest here at San Albino.  I shall remain here until August 8th on which date I shall go to Jicaro with all my force.  Remaining here is so important that without any spirit of insubordination, I shall consider any orders from Managua to do otherwise as leaving the the question of leaving here before August eighth (8) to my discretion.

 

             Upon arrival in Jicaro, I shall promptly dispatch an officers patrol mounted on best animals to Jalapa in compliance with your orders, said patrol to return to Jicaro.

 

            My stay in Jicaro will be devoted to straightening out the place and getting it as sanitary as possible before arrival of permanent detachment for Jicaro.

 

            If anything goes wrong in the supply plane (arrival in Jicaro), I expect my patrol to Jalapa to return in time so that I could get to Ocotal if necessary on what I shall have left of supplies.  Of course, I don not anticipate such a contingency, but I shall be prepared for it should the necessity arise.

 

     10.  My recommendations:

 

            Jicaro will be a difficult place to supply; so I recommend that you pull me out of there as early as possible leaving all supplies except what my men need for a march to Ocotal to which point I be ordered as soon as the detachment to garrison Jicaro arrives at Jicaro.

 

            The Guardia part of the contemplated garrison for Jicaro will have great difficulty in rationing itself at that place -- I recommend that I be authorized to turn over to the guardia all Nicaraguan supplies that I can spare when I leave Jicaro.

 

          Lt. Pugh, according to orders, will remain in Segovia.  Pugh has been my disbursing officer for Nicaraguan funds and has handled the animal situation throughout this expedition.  He should be left with me until the animal question has been completely settled.  To settle the animal bills, I should spend with him about two days in Esteli and at least ten days in Matagalpa, and some time in Tipatapi [Tipitapa].  I do not want to see this expedition disbanded in a disorderly manner.  Pugh does not want to remain here personally; and to take him away from me until the financial and animal questions are settled and accounted for is considered a most unwise thing to do.  [ p. 5 ]

 

          The contemplated idea of having my detachment furnish practically a complete replacement detail for the garrison at OCOTAL is believed good.  Although it should be remembered that my men have had a very hard month before they can arrive in OCOTAL, and their eventual relief from OCOTAL should be timed accordingly.

 

          I consider that Sandino's Force has been disorganized in Eastern Nueva Segovia; I believe that the foundation is laid for, and that prompt action in establishing guardia posts in this country will result in law and order in due time.  Frankly and without boasting, I believe my expedition has been a success; and I believe that the best way to preserve whatever success I may have had is to carry out my ideas above given, and promptly disband the expedition in an orderly fashion.

 

                                                                    O. FLOYD.

 

Note:  I arrived here personally last night after 9:00 p.m.  I am writing this on a typewriter without ribbon; and trying to make sure that I get it to you by plane pick up today.  These account for my poor composition and arrangement.  Please pardon.

 

 

                                                           JICARO, NICARAGUA

                                                              August 9, 1927

 

FIELD MESSAGE )

                               :

NUMBER 12.        )

 

FROM:     Major O. Floyd, U.S.M.C.

TO:           Commanding Officer, 5th Regiment, U.S.M.C.

                 Managua, Nicaragua.

 

Subject:    Report and Recommendations.

 

     1.          I arrived at Jicaro with all my force yesterday (August 8th).  Your letter of August 7th received.  I have sent a mounted patrol of one (1) Officer, 16 men and 1 interpreter and guide to JALAPA with mission of dispersing any bands that may be in that vicinity, getting information and returning to Jicaro.  This patrol has good mules, all men with saddles, lightly equipped, panel for communication with planes.  I venture the opinion that the patrol will return by August 11th and without incident so far as enemy is concerned; yet, showing marines up to the north will have a good effect.  Smugglers whom I arrested July 31st, say everything was quiet at Jalapa when they came thru.  In anticipation of sending this patrol, I sent out a secreto [sic] to Jalapa who was given no information as to my plans and whom I expect the patrol to meet enroute.

 

     2.          Inflicting no substantial loss on the owners, I have San Albino Mine in such a condition that bandits cannot operate it.  At 5 different places, the rope (used as a belt) on the main drive has had one (1) strand out; the small amount of mercury has been hidden by Mr. Mattison (formerly referred to me as Madison).

 

     3.          On August 3, before leaving the Mine on my 3 day circuit thru the mountains and QUILALI, I conferred with Mr. Mattison and Mr. Williams relative to the disposal of explosive material at the Mine - because of the comparatively small quantity, the petty thievery of employees and the many military reasons existing, with their full approval, I had all this material destroyed.  I realize fully that this act of mine was in direct violation of your orders; and I will assume full responsibility.  I also destroyed the sianide [cyanide] at the Mine.

 

     4.          On August 3, I received the order to get two (2) named enlisted men to Managua by August 10th, stating that same was in furtherance of MGC's instructions - I have taken NO measures to comply for 2 men should not be sent out along and I will not fritter away my small force by tolling off sizeable detachments except for a paramount military reason.  In other words, I have let my judgment prevail over my desire to comply strictly with orders of an administrative nature.  [ p. 2 ]  

 

     5.          I have advised Williams and Matteson to keep in touch with the detachment to be left at JICARO.  I have given each a permit for pistol without fee.  I have advised Matteson to get his wife to nearest American detachment at first sign of any future trouble.  I have advised both that in assuring ourselves that they are unharmed and in keeping a detachment at Jicaro the U.S.A. has done all that they as English subjects reasonably can expect, and that, from now on, they should avail themselves of proximate American or Guardia troops to whom they and their families should report in person in the event of any signs of threatening banditry which might endanger them.

 

     6.          On August 5, I arrested one ISIDORO ISAGUIRRE who recently acted as Jefe Mulero for Sandino at San Albino; packing and dispatching loot.  For reasons, I feel positive that this man eventually told me the truth when he stated that only once had he conducted personally supplies eastward and that at the end of his trip, the supplies were left at a small group of houses on the Murra River near QUILALI, beyond which point, he, his men and the animals were NOT permitted to go.  One ex-soldier of Sandino tells a similar story. I feel sure of ISIDORO ISAGUIRRE's telling me the truth eventually.  There would be no profit for Sandino in establishing and Maintaining a "CHIPOTE" and more than ever I am convinced that "CHIPOTE" is a camouflage for covering up his actual selling of loot and keeping these ignorant Mozos working for him.

 

     7.          I have with me as prisoner one Antonio Lopez, a heretofore respected thrifty cuss; but at San Albino he repaired fire arms and made the battle and bull-hide bombs.  I think he turned to looting recently and I shall take him to MANAGUA.  Other prisoners will be released, or turned over to new CO at Jicaro, or taken to OCOTAL according to their several implications, as adjudged by me.  Remember - I am getting information from my prisoners and working them; but I am committing NO high crimes or misdemeanors.

 

     8.          Rivers are high - this is the only source of my apprehension about my patrol to JALAPA getting thru.  It poured all day the 6th, rained pretty hard the 78th and let up a bit yesterday.

 

     9.          I do not believe the report that Sandino and Sanchez were in Jicaro on August 4th, as given by a frightened fleeing native to Hatfield 2 days thereafter.  While absent from Jicaro, some people evidently were in the town - from appearances I think they were property owners and others coming from the brush to rescue their possessions in the one case and to look for something to eat or wear in the other.  Incidently Mr. Butter's Typewriter cannot be found.  About 10 people are in town; and I am doing everything possible to get the usual inhabitants to  [ p. 3 ]  return.  A few others came in this A.M.

 

     10.          Recommendations.

a.  Detachment for Jicaro

     Guardia - 1 officer, 3-4 squads

     Marines - 1 officer, 2-3 squads

            The Marines to be taken from guard of train arriving from OCOTAL.

            The minimum garrison (3 squads Guardia and 2 squads Marines) will be sufficient to defend itself; the maximum (4 squads Guardia and 3 squads Marines) will be able to carry out much patrolling which will the largest factor in spreading control over this area.

b.  I shall leave at Jicaro:

 

     Some of my ammunition.

     A native telegrapher.

     1 M.G.

     All Nicaraguan rations that I can spare.

 

c.  You send to Jicaro following rations:

 

     75 days for whatever number of Marines are to be stationed there.

     4 days (or 300 rations) for my command, provided I am ordered to OCOTAL without delay after arrival of supplies or not later than August 15th.

 

d.  That I replace enlisted Marines at Ocotal with like number from my men.

 

e.  That I lose no time in leaving Ocotal for Matagalpa via Esteli and Trinidad.

 

f.  That for return trip, I get rations from each forward point to last only to next point in rear.

 

g.  That I be allowed 2 days in Esteli, at least 10 days in Matagalpa.

 

h.  That Guardia detachment which I left in Trinidad be  [ p. 4 ]   discontinued and I take up all remaining supplies in passing thru Trinidad.

 

i.  That your orders which I shall receive while still in Jicaro be as complete and as far reaching as possible - this will give me better judgment on many details.

 

j.  That this Expedition be disbanded by Floyd and Pugh or by Bleasdale and Pugh, in other words, Pugh to stay to the last and either Floyd or Bleasdale with him.  I mention this to provide for case Washington orders me home and I have to take plane at OCOTAL for Managua.

     11.          I am becoming firmer in my conviction that Sandino's force is disorganized with nothing to anticipate from them except perhaps very small pillaging groups and that the best way to meet such activities is by constant patrolling from small detachments to be gradually established by guardia in this locality.

 

     12.          My foregoing recommendations are, I believe, such as will be most simple in carrying out and give you in Managua the minimum of concern.