| |
27.09.08. Chappell patrol near somoto.
This encounter between a Marine patrol and the band of Liberal
Colonel Joaquín Lobo near Somoto sheds additional light on the
extremely unsettled conditions throughout the western Segovias in
the months after the formal end of the Civil War. The
notorious Conservative gang leader Anastasio Hernández, for
instance, whose gangs brutally murdered some 200 people during this
period in the service of Ocotal's Chamorrista elite, was active in
the same general area (see
AH-DOCS
and my "Horse Thieves" article).
(undated photo, Liberal leaders around
the end of the Civil War near Somoto, US National Archives)
Allied with Sandino during the Civil War, Colonel Lobo would soon
retire from the field and become, in Sandino's eyes, one of the many
"chicken Liberals" who refused to join his fight against the invading Marines
and the despised Díaz regime.
SOMOTO,
NICARAGUA
8 September,
1927.
From:
The Commanding Officer.
To:
The Commanding Officer, Pueblo Nuevo.
Subject:
Patrol, report of.
1. On September 6, 1927, I
received several reports of bandits to the southwest of
SOMOTO. September the 7th at 1115, I took a
mounted patrol of nineteen (19) men out to investigate.
2.
The patrol passed thru San Isabel and Santa Lucia
enroute to Mr. Mosier's ranch. No armed bands were
encountered in either town, or on the roads.
Mosier's ranch was reached at 1800.
3.
The patrol then set out again at 2200 and proceeded in a
northernly direction. On arriving near Mal Paso at
0700, from information received, I believed that Lobo
and his band were using this as their headquarters.
4.
While attempting to investigate, I was fired upon by a
band located in a house. I returned the fire, and
the band after four or five rounds of fire, fled to the
rear of the building into a ravine. Due to the
brush I was unable to follow them.
5.
A careful search was made of the town and it was found
that we had killed three men and wounded two. The
two wounded men were in a serious condition so they were
left with people of the town. It is also believed
that several more were wounded and escaped. The
Marines suffered no casualties.
6.
Four mounts belonging to the band were captured and two
saddles, also three rifles and Lobo's red and black
banner.
7.
The patrol then returned to SOMOTO arriving at 1335.
/ s / S. J. Chappell
NA127/212/1
|
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27.09.20. kenyon, Complete report of somotillo area.
|
COMPLETE REPORT OF SOMOTILLO AREA
GATHERED FROM PATROLS FROM 10 JULY TO 19 SEPTEMBER,
INCLUSIVE
__________________________________________________
----- ROADS -----
The bull cart road to Somotillo via the ferry is
passable at all seasons of the year but bulls and carts
must be towed across at this crossing of the Estero.
Very little mud injures this road during the wet season.
The fordable crossing about nine miles above this point
involves the use of a mud road that is bottomless for
nearly twenty miles during the wet season. This
crossing is at the San Juan Ranch. All other
trails and roads east of Somotillo are little affected
with rain with the exception of the Mayacunda area.
All west are through spotted areas of short swamp grass,
and bad in wet season. The International bull cart
road to Honduras is very good. This road leads to
Choluteca and from there to Tegucigalpa. The roads
to the North and East of Somotillo are trails only with
the exception of a very bad bull cart road to Cinco
Pinos. This area north and east is very
mountainous, although not shown as such on the map of
Mr. Clifford D. Ham. From the mountains in this
area one can see Momotombo and two other active
volcanoes near Leon.
----- OCCUPATION OF INHABITANTS
-----
The entire area is given to cattle business. There
are a few cane mills but they are all operated by bulls
and the products sold locally. These mills are all
in the mountain sections where a considerable amount of
coffee is grown, but the business of coffee is in bad
condition due to abandonment of the mountain plantations
by the owners to to lack of police protection, and
consequently the sugar mills, which supplied the
laborers on coffee farms, do a very limited amount of
work. Every name on the Ham Map shown by a black
dot represents a cattle ranch with the exception of San
Francisco which is a mountain town and should have a
circle around the dot. All of the ranches are very
old with the exception of San Ramon of the Mountelvan
Estate which is located at what is shown on the map as
Casimiro. The other San Ramon near Villa Nueva is
property of the Midence Estate. Most of these
ranches have about one thousand head of cattle and from
fifty to three hundred head of horses, although many
have practically no horses. Cheese is made at all
ranches. Those ranches shown by the dots on the
river of the Honduran border are only small farms in the
mountain country. In the small towns there are
stores only in Villa Nueva and Somotillo. The
banditry in the mountains destroyed all stores in the
others and conditions are not yet safe for the natives
to attempt to stock the stores abandoned. Many of
the people living in the small towns are engaged in
carrying Honduran contraband tobacco to Leon and in
distilling liquor in native stills for sale to the ranch
laborers. In Somotillo there are more than a dozen
stores of varying character selling all kinds of cheap
wares and a considerable variety of imported liquors.
It is safe to say that a third of the population in the
town live by stealing from the big ranches or from one
another. The country is also infested with
professional game hunters who live in small huts in
isolated places and sell dried dear meat and skins of
all kinds. In this area this trade is pretty well
curbed due to the confiscation of every gun of every
hunter known to me at this time. The laborers on
the ranches are furnished with beef and corn and paid
from fifteen to twenty cents for each day of actual
labor.
----- NATURAL PRODUCTS -----
Very little native fruit is cultivated in this area.
All of it grows well. Wild game is abundant.
[ p. 2 ]
----- CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
NATIVES -----
Racially, most are Indians. Invariably lazy.
Murder and maiming with arms and machettes very common.
Considerable drinking on week ends and holidays.
Very few pay any attention to religion of any kind.
Churches in most towns abandoned and in ruins with
exception of Villa Nueva. Practically all totally
disarmed. Practically all profess to be members of
Liberal Political party, especially when seeking
clemency for stealing or murder. Women invariably
virtuous. There is no known prostitute in the
area. Bulk of natives illiterate. Health is
remarkably good. All are cowards and have a fear
of Americans that amounts to terror.
----- POLITICS -----
Although none of the natives can give any cause for
participation in politics, all are emphatically Liberals
or Conservatives. Liberals are in the majority.
Conservatives are usually property owners or town
officials holding offices until the coming elections.
The bandit Cabullo [Cabulla] visited this town twice and
murdered several people. Several of the young men
of the town joined him but the bulk of those who were in
the revolution from this section followed another well
respected bandit here called by his followers, General
Perraulta [Concepción Peralta]. A Conservative
leader, sent here from Managua goes by the designation
of General Pinera. He successfully hid from the
opponents during the revolution and is not accused of
banditry during the time he led a group of nearly one
hundred natives but stole the pay roll from his
followers and has no political support. Politics
is usually given as the motive for all crime.
----- PATROLS -----
All patrols are mounted. Six animals were
furnished this outpost by the Quartermaster. Only
three of these were ever serviceable. Two have
been returned to Chinandega and the owner of the Las
Mesas Estate came for another that was unserviceable.
A group of thirty horses and mules has been obtained by
collecting what are known as national animals.
These animals are delivered to property owners as soon
as the present proof of ownership. Patrols have
been made only to disarm natives known to have arms or
to catch those with stolen animals or capture criminals.
The following patrols have been made to date.
July 10th. Left at 2. p.m. for Villa Nueva with
Sgt Payne, Cpl. Nelson, one private and Marcelino Lopez.
Returned 7.p.m. Made inquiries in Villa Nueva of
activities of bandit Pinera. Learned he had left
for Honduras. Talked with Miguel Midenci [Midence],
owner of the Hato Grande, Las Posas, San Ramon of Villa
Nueva, and several other cattle ranches.
July 15th. Left 10. a.m. for Triumfo [Triunfo],
Honduras with Sgt. Payne, one private, and man who had
been caught carrying arms to make inquiries relative to
him. Returned afternoon of same day.
July 17th. Left 8:30 p.m. with Sgt. Payne, six
privates and guide to locate murderers of one named
Sanchez killed same day in Henoqual. Arrived at
the three houses occupied by the ones implicated about
1. a.m. They broke away when a private fired
without cause. Several shots fired after them.
One reported injured later. Returned 6. a.m. July
18th.
July 23rd. Left for Santo Thomas at 3. p.m. with
Sgt. Payne, Cpl. Holton, one private and guide.
Took one mule from Honduran who had no possession.
July 24th. Went to Cinco Pinos. Got one more
mule and four more horses. Arrived San Francisco
at dark. One mule and three [ p. 3 ]
horses of this latter group later called for by rightful
owners. July 25th. Started for Somotillo
before daybreak. Alcalde of San Francisco gave me
a good mule left there by the troops. Arrived
Somotillo 1:1t [sic] p.m.
July 25th. Went after a horse thief with Estephen
Varda and four Marines. Got small bay stallion.
The man crossed to Honduras. Left 9. p.m.
Returned 3:30 a.m.
July 29th. To Henoqual. Got pistol.
Out in morning, returned after dark. Sgt Payne, 1
Marine and guide.
July 30th. To Henoqual. Got large white
horse from Joaquin Ramos. July 31st.
Returned to Somotillo about 9. a.m. Sgt. Payne,
and guide.
Aug 2nd. Left for Santo Thomas at about 1. p.m.
Got two shotguns, 1 pistol, 1 horse, and 1 mule.
Aug 3rd. Returned to Somotillo after dark.
Cpl. Nelson, three Marines and guide.
Aug. 5th. Left 1. p.m. with Cpl. Holton and guide
for Villa Nueva. 1 shotgun. Returned
Somotillo 9. a.m. following morning.
Aug. 6th. Left 4. p.m. with Cpl. Nelson, two men
and guide for Santo Thomas. Aug. 7th. Took
two pistols and two horses. Aug. 8th.
Reached Somotillo about 10. a.m.
Aug. 9th. Left 1. p.m. for Mayacuna [Mayacunda].
Cpl. Holton and guide. All night at Calera.
Aug. 10th. Reached Mayacuna 10. a.m. Got two
horses and left about noon. Somotillo 9. p.m.
Aug. 12th. Sent Cpl. Holton and two men to Calera
to get bay stallion. They returned 1 Midnight with
stallion. Did not go myself.
Aug. 16th. Cpl. Nelson and three guides and seven
privates and I left at 9. a.m. for Santo Thomas.
Got two horses and three pistols. Took two of the
pistols and one horse from Marcial Rivera, bandit of
Cinco Pinos. Slept in Cinco Pinos. Aug.
17th. All day on road in search of information,
relative to Salgado. Slept in San Pedro.
Learned Sabino Rodriguez had burned the town hall and
killed the Alcalde during the revolution. Aug.
18th. Went to San Francisco. Went to house
of Sabino Rodriguez and got pistol. He later
surrendered his one stolen horse. Slept with three
men not far from border of Nueva Segovia. Other
four stayed in San Francisco during the night.
Aug. 19th. In Frisco nearly all day.
American engineer, Mr. Samuelson, asked me to locate
Waterman and recover his Luger pistol. He gave me
a bay stallion. Left at 4. p.m. for Somotillo.
Took mule on way which was later returned upon proof of
ownership. Slept near Henoqual. Aug. 20th.
Reached Somotillo at 6. p.m.
Aug. 21st. Left in afternoon with Cpl. Holton and
guide for San Ramon. Stayed all night at Las
Mesas. Aug. 22nd. Arrived San Ramon about 9.
a.m. Sent Cpl. Holton and guide back to get a
fresh horse to replace one became lame. Aug. 23rd.
Inspected brands of all mules on San Ramon Ranch.
Aug. 24th. Inspected all brands of mules at Las
Lahas [Las Lajas] and left for Somotillo at 2. p.m.
Aug. 27th. Left in afternoon with Cpl. Holton and
guide, for Las Pilas. Captured Rigoberto Sanchez,
murderer of Payan in Villa Nueva, and a .44 Colt pistol.
Returned at 6:30 a.m. Aug. 28th.
Aug. 28th. Left about 10. a.m. with Cpl. Holton
and two Marines to get mules in San Ramon. Got 5.
Returned 7. p.m. [ p. 4 ]
Aug. 29th. Left about 3. p.m. with Cpl. Holton,
one Marine, guide and Rigoberto Sanchez to collect arms.
Got two pistols and two shotguns. Returned noon
Aug. 30th.
Aug. 30th. Went with Lieut. and Captain of Guardia
to Patoka in evening to inquire for a criminal for
murder from Chinandega. Returned 1. a.m. 31 Aug.
No results.
Sept. 1st. Left at noon with Cpl. Holton and guide
to investigate case of horse killing. Caught
culprits at 1. a.m. 2. Sept. Reached
Somotillo. Culprits paid for horse.
Sept. 6th. Left about 9.30 a.m. for Villa Nueva to
investigate murder of Poncho Huete, killed by rifle 7.
a.m. that date. Had Cpl. Holton, one private,
guide, and Comandante of Police at Somotillo.
Slept in Calera. People accused one named Manuel
Garcia who had escaped. Sept. 7th. Went to
Mayacunda and Portilla. Returned to Villa Nueva at
dark and reached Somotillo at 3. a.m. 8
Sept. No results. Got one horse.
12 Sept. Left for Villa Nueva with Cpl. Holton,
one private, Commandant of Police and guide to
investigate telegraphic report that Garcia was in the
town. No results. Report unfounded.
Reached Somotillo before dark.
Sept. 14th. Went with Cpl. Holton, guide, and
owner of stolen bulls to catch thief near Canne Fistula.
Caught party who restored all stolen goods. Got
one shotgun and two horses.
Later reports covered by telegraphic report.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - H. N. KENYON - -
- - - - -
RG127/43A/20
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|
Summary & Notes |
| |
•
|
Paints an exceptionally vivid, detailed portrait of
borderlands around Somotillo in SW Segovias. |
| |
•
|
Merits a very careful read "against the grain" of
condescending tone. |
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27.09.22. Telpaneca attack
(Sept. 19) with
statements.
Led by General Carlos Salgado, this second major Sandinista attack
against a Marine-Guardia garrison in Las Segovias, in which two
Marines and upwards of 50 attackers were killed, shows the growing
strength and audacity of Sandino's movement. Captain Peard's report on the
attack is accompanied by four statements by Marines who defended the
garrison, and a Marine sketch map of the town and attack.
(Right: General Carlos Salgado,
middle, 1928, US National Archives)
Also
included here is Sandino's official account of the battle. As
can be seen, the rebel chieftain's account differs in important ways
from the Marines'. As exemplified here, Sandino
routinely inflated the number of enemy killed, the quantity of arms
captured, and the level of rebel military success.
27.09.22. Capt. Peard
on
Telpaneca Attack
27.09.22. Statement
of Lt. H. S. Keimling
27.09.22. Statement
of Sgt. Alva Eadens
27.09.22. Statement
of Cpl. F. Carlson
27.09.22. Statement
of Pvt. L. C. Handzlik
27.09.22. Sketch of Map
of Telpaneca
27.10.21. Brigade
Commander Gulick to Secretary of the Navy
27.09.20. Sandino's
Account of the Battle of Telpaneca
|
27.09.22.
Captain Peard's Report on the Telpaneca Attack
|
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER
PUEBLO NUEVO, NIC.
22 Sept. 1927.
From:
The Commanding Officer.
To:
The Commanding Officer, Fifth Regiment.
Subject: Telpaneca Attack.
1. At 1:00 a.m., 19 Sept., 1927,
two hundred bandits led by Salgado attacked the combined
forces of Marines and Guardia at Telpaneca. This
garrison consisted of twenty five enlisted Guardia and
twenty enlisted Marines, with First Lieutenant Keimling,
U.S. Marine Corps, now on duty with the Guardia
Nacional, as the only officer.
2. The attack started by a
bandit coming into the door of the Marines quarters and
emptying a Thompson gun into the bunk of Private
Russell, who was instantly killed. The night was
extremely dark and foggy and the bandits were at close
quarters before observed. In fact there was no
alarm until the bandits started firing into the barracks
buildings at close range.
3. It is believed that the
attackers had one Lewis machine gun, three Thompsons,
numerous home-made dynamite bombs, and the balanced
armed with rifles and machetes.
4. The fighting lasted at close
quarters for about four hours and at 5:00 a.m., the
bandit bugler blew retreat. The battle discipline
of the bandits was excellent in that they attacked in
two ways, one wave of riflemen and one of machete men.
It is apparent that a large number of the attackers were
drunk, this accounted for their close fighting or
otherwise they would not have had the nerve to come in
close.
5. A large number of the dead
and wounded were removed by the bandits before they
retreated, but a conservative estimate of their losses
was twenty-five killed and fifty wounded.
6. The first objective of the
attackers was the Guardia and this newly organized
Guardia Detachment acquitted itself in an excellent
manner. At one time during the fight, the bandits
at the rear wall of the guardia barracks tried to get
the guardia to desert to their side and help the bandits
clean out the Marines; the guardia's only answer was
another volley. One guardia picked up a bomb that
was thrown in the guardia compound, heaved it over the
fence, stepped around the corner and killed the bandit
who threw the bomb. One other guardia disguised in
civilian clothes, left Telpaneca at about five a.m., and
brought to Pueblo Nuevo the first news we had of the
attack; he arrived here at 1:00 p.m., 19 September, and
at 2:00 p.m., insisted on returning to Telpaneca with my
relief. Enroute to Pueblo Nuevo this same Guardia
brought five Guardia mules about half way and left them
in a portrero [potrero, pasture] for safe keeping so the bandits
would not get them, then walked the balance of the
distance. Another Guardia carried orders from Keimling from building to building throughout the entire
battle exposing himself to the enemy fire.
Separate reports and recommendations in these cases will
be submitted later. [ p. 2 ]
7. As for the conduct of the
Marines, they fought like Marines always fight, nothing
more need be said.
8. Five Guardia animals were
killed by bandits and have no exact [information] yet as
to how many are missing; the portrero [potrero] is in such a
location as to be impossible to guard during an attack.
The bandits cut the wire fence of the pasture thus
allowing the animals to wander through the town during
the battle.
9. Lieut. Keimling and the
entire garrison is to be commended for their courageous
and effective defense against large odds and a surprise
attack.
R. W. PEARD
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Capt., USMC - - - - - - -
NA127/212/1
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27.09.22.
Statement of Lt. H. S. Keimling
|
FIRST LIEUTENANT H. S. KEIMLING
STATEMENT OF THE BATTLE OF
TELPANECA
At or about one a.m., 19 Sept 1927, Bandit groups
numbering about 200 under the command of Colindre [Juan
Gregorio Colindres], Estrada [Francisco Estrada],
Salgado [Carlos Salgado], Diaz [José León Díaz], Tomas
Migado [Tómas Melgara?], Sanchez [Porfirio Sánchez],
Rameriz [Ramírez], attacked Telpaneca. Town was
blanketed by a heavy fog which permeated through the
buildings. Sky dark over cast with heavy
thundering. Battle stations were taken immediately
after explosion of dynamite bomb in rear of Marine
quarters. Pvt. Irwin sentinel in rear of Marine
Quarters killed the bandit as he ran after setting off
bomb. Bandits laid heavy rifle, Lewis Machine gun
and subthompson gun fire on the rear of marine and
Guardia Quarters followed by dynamite bombs and hand
grenades. The front of the Quarters was peppered
by sub-thompson fire followed by rushes by riflemen with
machete men in rear of them. Two groups rushed
right up to the doorway of the small buildings occupied
by the cooks & messman and the office building in which
the undersigned resided. As I was rushing out of
the doorway of the office building which was designated
during the attack as the Command Post Sgt Eadens shoved
me back saying "Here they come" and shot the bandit
whose rifle was pointed at me. As the bandit
staggered back he shot Pvt. Glaser U.S.M.C., who was
going to his battle station. Pvt. Irwin coming up
in the rear of Pvt. Glaser shot up the rest of the group
of the bandits. Sub-thompson fire was directed on
us. Pvt. Glaser staggered as Sgt. Eaden and I
grabbed him and dragged him into the office. Pvt.
Glaser received some more bullet wounds while we dragged
him in. Sgt. Eaden and I worked in reliefs
guarding the door and bandaging and attending the
wounded man. I told Sgt. Eaden to take charge &
guard the front as I was going to give some information
to my Marines and Guardias. I first ordered them
to fire faster, appointed men in different parts of the
Marine and Guardia Quarters to take command in my
absence & to let the men fire as fast as possible for
ten minutes and then to fire at flashes caused by their
rifle fire and to impress on the men to aim and conserve
their ammunition. After the first fifteen minutes
everybody settled down and shot like veterans. The
Marines & Guardias had excellent fire control and
discipline. Directed Pvt. Macon the Lewis Machine
Gunner to use traversing fire across the plaza.
While I was along side of Pvt. Morris he said "Look at
the bozo coming down the hill, skipper". We
watched the Bandit throw something in the Guardia
Quarters & next instant it was thrown out by Raso
Salamanca who then shot the bandit. Another form
was seen moving down the hill but no Marines fired as
they each had their own sector and would have fired into
the Guardia Quarters. Raso Cuena GNN got mad at
all the bombs exploding around his battle station so he
proceeded to leave the building under heavy fire and
shot the next bomb thrower coming down the hill
receiving a slug in his foot in return. The bandit
kept going towards the Lewis Machine Gun emplacement to
drop his bomb when Pvt. [ p. 2 ] Morris hollered
out "Who is that a Guardia." Raso Luis Huerta
said, "No, una bandito". Pvt. Morris let him have
it and the machine gunner finished him. I was
recalled to the Command Post. Got their [there] in
time to throw some grenades at a group making a rush
under fire toward the rear of the Command Post.
Several bandits groups fired by commands and did some
pretty good shooting. Word was passed to me that
the Lewis Machine gun was jammed. Before I could
say a word Sgt. Eaden gave me his rifle and said
"Captain guard the door I'll fix it" and he did out in
the open under fire without any shelter. The machine
gunner grabbed his own rifle firing rapid fire trying to
initiate a Lewis. Then some of the subtompsons
gave a little trouble, Sgt. Eaden went around and
swabbed them out each half hour when I would pass the
hour of the morning. No trouble after that.
Fog started to raise at about 2:30 a.m., and get lighter
about 4 a.m., Everything was all quiet at 5 a.m.
Investigation & search of the town showed that a
subthompson was operated from the plaza in front of
marine Quarters, one from south-east side of church, two
from either side of street corners sough and toward rear
of Guardia and Marine Quarters another was operated on a
slight rise toward the south-west of Guardia Quarters.
I passed the word whenever possible to jump a
subthompson if close enough. Acting Cpl. Justo
Salamanca, Rasos Luis Huerto, Luis Sanchez and Salomon
Cortes jumped a subthompson operating against their
quarters but had to withdraw when a group attacked them
with hand grenades. They accomplished their
mission as the thompson was withdrawn from that sector.
Undersigned believes that the bandits had 3 subthompsons
and moved them from one sector to another. One
Lewis was operated near a building south of Marine and
Guardia Quarters. Another was operated from hill
on the main road 300 yds from the town (NW).
Bandits had about 140 men in the main attack on the
Quarters of the Detachment. Other groups were
posted on all the roads and trails leading into town.
A general reserve was with all their animals on the
other side of the Rio Coco South East of 40. The
enemy started to withdraw their dead and wounded about 3
a.m. The enemy's riflemen went into battle with
about 50 rds of amm apiece. Enemies general line
of retreat was from the Northeast and Southeast of 40.
Houses were searched and a number of dynamite bombs and
hand grenades found. Average dynamite bomb had
from 24 to 26 sticks of dynamite. All enemies
munitions and explosives thrown into the Rio Coco.
Two dynamite bombs were thrown thru the roof in rear of
Guardia Quarters. Raso Pedro Saballos threw one of
the bombs out of the building receiving wounds to his
hand from the explosion of same. An unknown
Guardia threw out the other. So the bandits would
not hear my commands to the Guardia's I passed the word
for Raso Luis Huerta to report to C.P. He did
under heavy fire. I sent Raso Huerta several times
with verbal messages to my Guardias. He always
came back with a smile. I then posted him to guard
the front of the C.P and look after the wounded marine
till I came. Found everybody at the post and in
the best of spirits, passing jokes and firing at [
p. 3 ] the enemy's rifle flashes. Told Pvt.
Morris to get an automatic rifle and clean up the
outside of the rear of the Marine Quarters as I
suspected some bandits who had sneaked up in the
beginning of the attack were there and could not get
away. Out of the door he went unconcerned to the
enemies fire, accomplished his mission and returned.
Over the the Guardia Quarters I saw Raso Rafael Romero
(cook) while under fire keeping the Guardia Detachment
well supplied with hot coffee.
I believe I have overlooked a number of heroic deeds and
cannot express myself enough to do justice to the
bravery of the Telpaneca Detachment.
Casualties 1 Marine killed
1 died same day
1 Guardia seriously wounded.
Enemy 25 killed & 50 wounded.
The following are recommended for Guardia Medals,
promotion and cited for bravery in battle with bandits.
Cpl. Jose A. Hernandez, pro to
Sgt
Cabo Francisco Pena, citation
Raso Justo Salamanca - Medal-
pro to Sgt
"
Modesto Morales - pro to Cpl
"
Huerta Luis - Medal - Pro to Sgt
Raso Carlos Aguirres -
citation
"
Juan T. Altamirano - "
"
Pedro Ardon - Medal - pro to Cpl
"
Francisco Arguello - citation
"
Adan Centeno -
"
"
Francisco Canales - "
"
Hernesto Centillo -
"
"
Alberto Cheves -
"
"
Alberto Centeno
"
"
Salomon Cortes - Medal
"
Marcos A. Celedon - Citation
"
Diego Condega -
"
"
Miguel Jeres -
"
"
Octavio Mejia -
"
"
Ofilio Medina -
"
"
Alejandro Rodriguez - "
"
Rafael Romero - Citation
"
Napoleon Reyes - Citation
"
Pedro Saballos - Medal
"
Miguel Santamaria - Citation
"
Julio Tapia
"
"
Luis Sanchez
Medal
"
Domingo Sapata [Zapata] - Citation
"
Miguel Savala [Zavala]
"
"
F. A. Acuna - Medal
--------------------------------------------- H.
S. Keimling --------------
RG127/113C/12
|
27.09.22. Statement of Sgt. Alva Eadens
Marine Det.
Telpaneca, Nic.
22 Sept. 1927.
STATEMENT OF SGT. ALVA EADENS.
At 1:00 A. M. 19 Sept. 1927 while the Det. was sound
asleep and the night so dark that one could not see
farther than five to ten feet outside the doors. I
was awakened by a very loud explosion only a few yards
from the barracks, I jumped out of my bunk and grabbed
my rifle and started to the front door to go to the main
Bks. next door but when I reached the door I saw a man
armed with a rifle peeping towards the storeroom where
the cooks and messman were. I shouted to them of
the danger and about that time the bandit turned toward
me and beckoned to a group of bandits in his rear who I
could hear talking in spanish. I immediately fired
but he did not fall - only staggered and ducked around
the corner before I could reload and fire again.
That put a stop to them rushing in from the front side.
That same man had already fired a couple of shots into
the storeroom, killing Pvt. Russell. While I was
crouched there waiting to see if any more of them were
coming back, Capt. Keimling of the G. N. who was
sleeping in the same office where I was, ran out through
the door by me to shout out some commands and words of
cheer to his men of the Guardia Nacional also the same
to the Marines in the main Bks. When he came back
in the office, the enemy fire was getting very heavy in
rear of quarters (many bombs exploding a few yds from
the doors). He took a couple of hand grenades and
stood in the door, exposing himself to a very hot rifle
fire and to the explosion of the bombs and threw the two
grenades in different directions to prevent a machette
attack; from time to time he did this. I believe
they would have rushed in on us only for that. He
kept all the marines and men of the G. N. cheered up
throughout the night by joking and cheering them along
and keeping them posted on the hour of the night.
We were completely surrounded snipers equipped with
rifles, and on the hill to our west not more than two
hundred yds. away a machine gun was firing, also another
about 100 yds. away from us, but all conciled
[concealed], either inside buildings or behind corners
of them. In one house about twenty or thirty yds.
from the back door of the main Bks. there seemed to be
about fifteen or twenty men congrigated [sic]
with rifles and machettes: The machette men were
whetting and banging their machettes against the wall
and inside of building and shouting in spanish, this for
the Marines. And about thirty or forty yds. from
one galley there seemed to between thirty and fifty more
of them - most of the bombs came from this place.
All of this did not demoralize the Marines or the
Guardia, it only made them fight the harder, jeering
back at the bandits telling them to come on, they wanted
to get a shot at them in the open. Some of them
were nervy enough to try to, they crawled up within
fifteen or twenty feet of us before we discovered them,
but as soon as they were discovered by any individual
all of us were immediately notified of it and all hands
would concentrate their fire on that point. Every
body together like brothers. The G. N. fought just
like Marines and did all they could to help us out.
One of the bandits ran down the hill passed the G. N.
carrying a bomb consisting of 24 sticks of dynamite, he
was hit by the G. N. causing him to drop the bomb, but
he kept running in our direction, Pvt. Morris asked if
he was one of the G. N. one of the G. N. immediately
replied no, so Pvt. Morris with his rifle and Pvt. Macon
with the Lewis M. G. both fired at him, bringing him
down about 14 yds. in front of them. Pvt. Glaser
and Pvt. Russell did not participate in the fight more
than two or three minutes, as the latter was hit the
first shot after the bomb gave the alarm, he only fired
three shots after he was hit, then he was hit again
putting him out of the fight, Pvt. Glaser was hit while
passing from barracks to office also while enter the
office, therefore he did not do any firing at all.
When I left the office, there were only Lt. Keimling,
Pvt. Irwin and Pvt. Foote left to defend it but they
certainly did it well. Lt. Keimling guarded the
front door at the same time passed out information to
the marines and Guardia as to the locations of different
machine guns and snipers also urging them to be careful
with the ammunition and not waste it. Pvt. Irwin
and Pvt. Foote were taking good care of the rear door,
Pvt. Foote shouting come on you bandits, come out and
fight. All men did excellent in obeying commands.
ALVA EADENS,
SGT., USMC.
|
27.09.22. Statement
of Cpl. F. Carlson
|
STATEMENT OF CPL. F. CARLSON OF
THE BATTLE OF TELPANECA.
On the morning of Sept. 19, 1927, I was asleep in the
main barracks. I was awakened by an explosion of a
bomb which I've learned later to be a hand made one
(dynamite bomb). I jumped up and put my clothes on
to cover my white underwear, and grabbed my rifle and
ammunition, and made a break for my battle station which
was two room's below the main barracks, exposing myself
to the enemy fire. As I jumped in the room, and
the men were at their battle stations keeping the men
way with their fire. One of the men said to me,
Pvt. Russell was shot, but no one knew how bad he was
hit, a few minutes later we found out he was dead.
Pvt. Nichols and I were stationed by the front door
facing the plaza, we were kept busy by pot shooting at
the enemy snipers, who were in the church and trees.
At one off the building off the north west corner off
the plaza their was one Lewis machine gun firing in
burst at the three buildings which were occupied by the
marines. At times when things would quiet
down we thought they were planning a machette attack
which we had to expose ourselves to see if the enemy
were sneaking up on us. Lt. Keimling who was in
charge of this small post of marines and Guardia
National has cheered us up and fought with us as any
marine officer would have done, if not much better.
All night long we was directing the fight exposing
himself to the enemy trying to find where the snipers
were and giving us the dope to plug the snipers fire.
About 4:25 A. M. we heard the bugler blowing a call but
at that time we did not know what kind of call it was,
immediately after the firing was letting up and 5 min.
after the enemy retreated, this call which we learned
later was blown to recall their men and leave the
vicinity of their battle.
CPL. F. CARLSON.
|
27.09.22. Statement
of Pvt. L. C. Handzlik
|
STATEMENT OF PVT. L. C.
HANDZLIK
On the
morning of September 19th, 1927 the Marines and Guardia
Nacional under the command of Lt. Keimling when asleep
in their quarters were attacked by a gang of bandits
which were under the rebel leader, Gen. Sandino.
This attack took place at one o'clock in the morning
when it was so dark you could not see very far in front
of yourself. The first thing that woke us up was a
hand made bomb which was exploded in the rear of our
quarters. The first rifle shot fired was fired in
the storeroom where the cooks and messmen were asleep.
The first shot had hit Pvt. Russell who was sleeping
near the front door this same shot went through his bed
and through mine missing me by a few inches. Pvt.
Russell after he was wounded jumped up and grabbed his
rifle and fired three shots and was shot again near the
heart. He laid down his rifle and went to his bed
to lay down and die, which he done about 3 or 4 min,
after the fight started. Lt. Keimling who was in
charge slept in the next room and as soon as the fight
started he was on the job just as any Marine officer
would do if not better. He cheered the Marines and
the Guardia Nacional as much as any man could in the
position were were in. All night long you could
hear Lt. Keimling give out orders, exposing himself to
the enemy finding out where the snipers were and giving
orders where to find them. The heaviest firing was
done on the quarters of our Lt. Keimling. This
fight was sure a hard one on us men, but we sure stood
it though and sure have loved to see them stay for
awhile it got light so we could have showed Sandino our
Marksmanship. The heaviest attack of the enemy was
on the rear of our quarters as they had quite a few
houses and trees and shrubbery to hide behind. You
could hear the machette men congregated around the
buildings clattering their machettes against the
building yelling (Este por Marinos, Viva la Sandino
Muere Estadus Unidos) they had one machine gun firing at
us from the west of the building and a Sub-Thompson
machine gun with their rifle men were firing from the
opposite end of the building firing on us. On the
South west corner of our quarters their is two houses
situated their where their was a gang estimated to be
from 40 to 50 men hollering and cussing the Marines.
From these two buildings they were throwing their hand
made bombs and firing a Thompson and a Lewis machine
gun, they had thrown about 30 or 40 bombs from that
position, they had their rifle men strung along a line
from the building on the west to the buildings on the
southwest. In the front of the building I can not
say very much as my post was toward the rear of the
building, although I know they two Lewis machine guns
and two or three Sub-Thompson firing from that point.
Our battle stations which were strung out in three rooms
occupied by the Marines were eleven men in the main
barracks, five men in the office and five men in the
store-room. When the fight started every man was
at his post, some of the men had to come down from the
main barracks to their battle-stations, which was under
heavy fire by this time. Pvt. Glaser who was
also killed came down from the main barracks to the
office which was his post, was shot as he was entering
the room. Immediately Lt. Keimling and Sgt. Eadens
exposing themselves to the enemy grabbed Pvt. Glaser and
put him on the bunk so he could rest easy and during all
the fighting he was calling for water which was given to
him by either Lt. Keimling or Sgt. Eadens who were
taking chance of being hit by the enemy. Sgt.
Eadens was in the office had to go up to the main
barracks, he asked for some one to guard the door.
Lt. Keimling said give me your rifle, I'll guard [
p. 2 ] the door, which he did till the fight was
over. Pvt. Ruddock who is an automatic man was
stationed with me at the rear door of the store-room
which we did to the best of our ability. Cpl.
Carlsons, Pvt. Nichols were stationed at the front door
which they guarded to the best of their ability.
The men in the office, Lt. Keimling, Sgt. Eadens, Pvt.
Foote, Irwin fought to the best of their ability.
The main barracks which had eleven men fought to the
best of their ability.
SIGNED
PVT. L. C. HANDZLIK.
|
27.09.22. Sketch of Map of Telpaneca
27.10.21. Brigade Commander to Secretary of the Navy
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE MARINE
CORPS.
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA
21 October 1927.
From:
The Commanding Officer Fifth Regiment and
The Brigade Commander
To:
Secretary of the Navy
Via:
The Commander Special Services Squadron.
Subject:
Report on defense of TELPANECA, Nicaragua, on
19 September 1927.
References: (a) Copy of
statement of First Lieut. H. S. Keimling, USMC
(b) "
"
Sgt Alva Eadens, USMC
(c) "
"
Cpl. Frederick Carlson, USMC
(d) "
"
Pvt. Lawrence Handzlik, USMC
(e) "
"
Pvt. Vesper L. Nichols, USMC
(f) "
"
Pvt. Rodgers H. Irwin, USMC
(g) "
"
Pvt. Daniel E. Macon, USMC
(h) "
"
Pvt. Herbert E. Marsh, USMC
Inclosures:
8 (copies of references)
1.
There are transmitted herewith copies of statements of
First Lieutenant Herbert S. Keimling, U.S. Marine Corps,
and seven of the members of his command, describing the
successful defense of TELPANECA, Nicaragua, on the night
of 18-19 September, 1927, against a force of bandits,
greatly superior in numbers.
2.
The defending force consisted of one Marine Officer
Twenty (20) enlisted Marines and Twenty-five (25)
enlisted of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.
/ s / L. M. GULICK
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALL IN RG127/113C/12
|
27.09.20.
Ancillary Document: Sandino's Account of the Telpaneca Attack
Ancillary Document:
Sandino's Account
of the Battle of Telpaneca of 19 September 1927
El Chipote
September 20, 1927
The obstinacy of the
President of the United States, Mr. Calvin Cooldige, continues to be the
cause of the shedding of blood in Nicaragua. On the 19th of the
present month there was a bloody battle in the village of Telpaneca,
which came about in the following manner.
I ordered a cavalry unit to the edge of that town under the command of
Colonel Carlos Estrada, in order to provide protection to our
authorities, because we knew the Yankees were pursuing them pitilessly,
and that the constabularies [Guardia Nacional] were under orders to
murder those same authorities. Our cavalry arrived on the
outskirts of the town at twelve o'clock at night and, in accordance with
their order and the plan they had been given, they began to encircle the
enemy.
At 12:45 the first shot rang out against the enemy barracks, and
simultaneously firing began against the other enemy units. An hour
later my men had managed to dislodge the enemy from their outer
positions, and little by little they were gaining control of the
village. But when they had gotten into the town the enemy exploded
some mines, through without doing any damage. The struggle became
even more hard-fought, because the enemy had their line of fire in the
form of a square in all the village houses with their high windows, and
in each house there were four machine guns. The thrust of my
people into the village was heroic, and they managed to reduce the
invaders to a few houses and to capture three machine guns, forty-two
rifles, and about fifty thousand rounds of ammunition for rifles and
machine guns, and the number of dead among the machos [Marines] and the
constabularies was reckoned at eighty. Concerning my men, they
amused themselves by collecting supplies from the forward barracks.
Dawn came, and they had to retire to the sound of the trumpet, or rather
before the famous ball that is the sun. The eighty deaths of which
I speak were those of the enemy alone.
/ s / A. C. SANDINO
Robert Edgar
Conrad, Sandino, Testimony of a Nicaraguan Patriot (Princeton,
1990), p.
102
|
|
|
Summary & Notes |
| |
•
|
Some fascinating
details here. |
| |
•
|
Numerous instances
showing spirited energy & passion, even
recklessness, of EDSN attackers, and equally
passionate & determined defense of garrison by
Marines & native Guardia. |
| |
•
|
Intense mutual
hatred, so evident later in the war, infuses
soldiers' statements. |
| |
•
|
Beginnings of
another longstanding pattern: EDSN's failed
efforts to convince native Guardia to join them &
turn on the Marines. |
| |
•
|
Reports suggest
mutual hatred (Sandinistas vs. Marines-GN) developed
and hardened from the war's earliest stages.
|
| |
•
|
Also suggest
that the process of Guardia identity formation was
well underway, with combat key in forging that sense
of identity. |
PC-Docs Master Inventory
(excel file) •
pc-docs master inventory
(list on pc-docs home)
27.10.12. O'Shea, Engagement with the enemy at Sapotillal.
.jpg)
"On the morning of October 8, a two-plane patrol spotted a
Sandinista pack train and swooped down upon it with machine guns
blazing. The Sandinistas fired back with rifles and hit one of
the planes. The wounded plane limped through the air for a few
minutes and then crash-landed on Zapotillo ridge. The other
plane flew low over the wreckage and dropped a map to the downed
aviators, Second Lieutenant Earl A. Thomas and Sergeant Frank E.
Dowdell. . . . the hapless aviators were overtaken and captured by a
band of guerrillas. That same day the two Marines were tried
before a Sandinista court-martial and shot. The body of
Lieutenant Thomas was hanged from a tree and photographed.
Then the Sandinistas set up an ambush for the expected rescue
party." (Neill
Macaulay, The Sandino Affair, Duke U. Press, 1985, pp. 92-93;
photograph of Lt. Thomas, US National Archives)
This is the report of that "rescue party," led by Lt. C. J. O'Shea.
It describes an exceptionally difficult rescue operation whose
members almost ended up like the captured aviators. Notably,
the rebels' killing of Thomas & Dowdell infuriated the Marines,
while also absolving them from treating the Sandinistas as a
belligerent force as defined by the 1907 Hague Convention. In
effect, from the perspective of the US military, the laws of war (as
then defined and internationally recognized) no longer applied to
the Sandinista rebels, and the fight soon devolved into a brutal war
without quarter.
|
MARINE DETACHMENT, JICARO,
NICARAGUA.
12 October 1927.
From:
The Commanding Officer.
To:
The Commanding Officer 5th Regt., Managua, Nicaragua.
Subject:
Engagement with the enemy at SAPOTILLAL, Nueva Segovia
9 October, 1927
1.
At about 11:30 a.m., Saturday 8 October, word was
brought here by plane that Lt. Thomas and his observer
had crashed into the side of a hill near QUILALI and
that both were unhurt. A Ham map of Nicaragua was
also dropped to me showing the location of the plane
which indicated it to be about 3 miles NW of QUILALI.
At that time there was a patrol of ten men enroute from
here to OCOTAL, with all our good saddle animals.
A mounted guard immediately were asked to intercept
them. They returned to Jicaro at 3:30 p.m. with
the animals in a worn out condition due to their haste
in returning, so that they would have been useless for a
long patrol had I waited for them.
2.
Meanwhile realizing that haste was important since the
aviators were in grave condition
danger, I took 8 marines (all the available men able to
stand the trip), 10 guardia nacional, and Dr. J. B.
O'Neill (since I believed it likely that the aviators
would need medical treatment), borrowed four horses and
one mule, and with 3 days rations proceeded at 12:45
p.m., by forced marching toward QUILALI. At 7:00
p.m., reached a point 7 miles NW of QUILALI, having
marched 18 miles, and halted for the night. The
men were at that time in an exhausted condition, 6 of
the marines and several of the Guardia being weakened by
a recent attack of malaria. Had I had more exact
information as to the location of the plane and the road
to follow, I would have rested a few hours and pushed on
that night. Before leaving JICARO I had told the
men that I expected to have to fight to get to the
plane, but I expected to reach there before any great
number of the enemy could assemble.
3.
At 6:45 a.m., Sunday, 9 October, proceeded toward
QUILALI and at 8:00 a.m., reached a point 3 miles NW of
QUILALI. Could obtain no information of a plane
from inhabitants and therefore halted and waited for the
planes to arrive. When planes arrived they
indicated for me the area where the wreck was located.
It was about 3 miles N of us in a direct line, but in
order to reach it we had to make a long circuit marching
back about 3 1/2 miles and then following a ridge of
difficult mountains. It took 3 1/4 hours marching
to reach the place and meanwhile the planes had to leave
us because of shortage of gasoline.
4.
The mountain on which the plane crashed is called
SAPOTILLAL. Before reaching it we met a woman and
a boy, both of whom separately told us that the plane
was there but they knew nothing of the aviators.
Before starting up the hill I halted the patrol and gave
hill a close scrutiny. No movement or anything
suspicious could b | |
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