QUILALI PATROL

                                                                               2 November, 1927.

 

From:          Second Lieutenant C. J. Chappell.

To:              The Commanding Officer, Fifth Regiment.

Via:             The Division Commander, Ocotal.

 

Subject:       Operations report.

 

     1.          On October 24, I received orders by plane at 1200 to execute.  At 1500 a patrol of one Second Lieutenant, one doctor and twenty four enlisted marines and one guardia lieutenant with fifteen enlisted guardia left Jicaro with seven days rations.  The patrol reached Jicarito at 2130 and camped for the night.

 

     2.          The following morning the patrol cleared Jicarito at 0700 arriving near Antonio Lopez's ranch at 1000.  The planes directed me to remain there until that afternoon, at Lieut. Gould's patrol was still two miles south of Quilali.  At about 1630 the planes dropped a message that Lieut. Gould would reach the scene of the crash that night.  As I had heard several dynamite bombs exploded ahead of me, I thought it unwise to travel that night and made camp on a hill for the night.

 

     3.          On October 26 we left for the scene of the crash at 0730.  After having travelled about one mile, a bomb was exploded about 800 yards ahead.  I had the point proceed very cautious and attempted to cross the saddle on the ridge that we were following.  On arriving at the bottom point we reached an open area which lay between us and a very steep hill covered with thick brush and large timbers.  Sergeant Shumate with the point discovered bandits on this hill and opened fire before attempting to cross this open area.  This drew the bandits fire and they opened up shouting for Sandino, Sacasa and Chamorro.  I moved my men into position and a short fight took place.   About this time several bombs were fired in our rear followed by rifle fire and yelling.   To cross the open area in front and take the hill, could not be accomplished without a great number of casualties and the loss of our animals.  To remain in our position where we were located and allow the enemy to hold the hill in our rear, would mean the same result as we had no other cover than light brush.  We forced the enemy to the rear and took the hill, losing several animals.  To move further to the rear would place us in the same position as before, so I took a position on this hill to wait for the arrival of the planes.  Immediately on reaching this hill, a machine gun opened fire on us from our right front where they had been waiting for us to attempt to cross the open area and take the hill on our front.  As the enemy was now about 500 yards distance, their fire was high and we had no trouble in fortifying our position.

 

     4.           At about 1030 all fire had ceased except a few occasional shots and on the approach of the planes the enemy kept quiet and tried to hide.  I displayed my panels and the planes opened fire and dropped bombs on the enemy.  As the planes gave me no formation in regard to the location of Lieut. Gould's patrol, I decided to remain until that afternoon as I was not certain of the correct trail.  [end ]

 

 

NA127/212/1

 

 

JICARO, NICARAGUA.                               2 November 1927

 

From:          Patrol Commander, Quilali Patrol.

To:              The Commanding Officer, Fifth Regiment

 

Subject:      Operations Report.

 

Reference:  (a) Orders CO 3rd Bn, 5th Regt, dated 15 Oct 1927.

 

     1.          In accordance with reference (a) a patrol consisting of 1 officer, 25 enlisted marines, 1 hospital corpsman USN, 3 officers and 40 enlisted Guardia, mounted with a total of 119 animals, left Matagalpa at 1100 on Oct 18, 1927, and camped successfully at the following places:  El Eden, 10 miles N of Matagalpa on the Jinotega road, Oct 18; Jinotega, Oct 19; Caso Real, Oct 20; Embocadero, Oct 21; Guale, Oct 22; Cierra La Breyera, Oct. 23; Las Piedras, south of EL Rio Coco and three miles W of Santa Cruz, Oct 24, at 1130. Oct 24, plane dropped a letter of instructions and reconnaissance report.  At 1030 Oct 25, cleared Las Piedras, crossing Rio Coco at point 1000 yards W of Las Piedras.  At 1045, plane dropped modified letter of instructions also map and mosaic showing scene of the crash.  Crossed the Jicaro River at 1600 arriving at Cierra La Compana at 1700 where patrol camped for the night.  At 0900 Oct 26, cleared Cierra La Compana arriving at Mata Guineo at 1700 where patrol camped for the night.  Passed through Quilali at 1300.  Sighted planes at 1045.  Requested information as to the location of the wreck and messages dropped stating that we were on the south side of the ravine in which the plain fell and that we were 2 miles to the E of it.  Left for the scene of the crash at 1100.  Sighted planes at 1400 while on the N side of the ravine headed W and received information that Lt. Chappell was being attacked by bandits to his N and S 3 miles W of our position.  In order to reach Lt. Chappell it was necessary to cross an almost impassable ravine.  Due to the steep slope of the ravine it was not crossed until 1700 at which time all firing had ceased which made it impossible to effect a junction with Chappell that night.  It was believed that we were within 1000 yds NE of Chappell when we deployed and took position on the ridge which we believed to be occupied by the bandits to the N of Chappell.  At 0930 the following day, we left the position that we held during the night and proceeded in the direction of Chappell's position arriving there at 1300.  At 0930 plane dropped message giving the exact location of Chappell and advising that Lt. Chappell would be informed of the probably time of our arrival.  Chappe The mountains, ravines, and heavy underbrush in the vicinity of Lt. Chappell's position combined with the lack of knowledge of the trails made the junctive [junction] with Chappell a very trying and difficult task.  A task, which without the aid of the planes, would have been near to the impossible.  Upon joining Chappell we found that his animals had not been watered for some time.  A patrol was sent out to cover the watering of the animals.  The patrol was fired on from to the SE.  The bandits were driven back after a skirmish of not more than 5 minutes.  The combined patrol remained in the same position during the following day, Oct 29, to afford the animals a long needed rest.  At 0900, Oct 30, cleared defensive position for the scene of the wreck, arriving there at the S side of the ravine, opposite the field where the plane fell at 1030.  The train under a strong guard was left on the road S of the ravine and with 50 men I proceeded to the scene of the wreck arriving on the field at 1150.  Inspected the plane and found the motor and all metal parts intact.  The machine guns were missing; also all parts that could be destroyed by fire.  The houses in the vicinity were searched and found to be occupied but temporarily deserted.  Planes were sighted at 1030 and at our request dropped several  bombs on the houses and a banana patch to the N of the ravine.  One plane circled the field of the crash for about 30 minutes while we were inspecting the wreck.  At 1300 we rejoined the train and left for the banks of the Jicaro river.  [ p. 2 ]  Arriving at a point 2 miles N of Quilali at 1615 where we camped for the night.  1000 Oct 31, cleared hill two miles N of Quilali.  At 0630 sent patrol consisting of 1 officer and 15 men to reconnoiter the E bank of the Jicaro.  This patrol returned and joined the main body at 1000 after having searched all houses along its path and without having encountered either inhabitants or enemy forces.  At 1130 passed thru Quilali where planes were sighted.  At 1700 arrived at Jicarito where we camped for the night.  Cleared Jicarito 0915 Nov 1; At 1030 Nov 1, we made contact with a bandit force of about 250 men on the road near Espino, six miles SE of Jicaro.  We engaged them for 35 minutes.  Marine casualties, one private, suffered slight injury on left elbow caused by fragment of dynamite bomb, Guardia casualties, two privates, both killed by rifle fire.  One mulero was seriously wounded in the chest by rifle fire.  Six mules were killed by fire on the scene of this action.  The enemy casualties are estimated at 60 dead and wounded.  The 2 Guardia dead were brought to Jicaro and buried in the cemetery at that place.  The wounded mulero is receiving treatment in the Marine Hospital at Jicaro.

 

     2.          This attack was of the nature of a well planned ambush but it fell short of the success which the bandits had hoped for, first; because the main body took a slightly higher trail than the bandits had planned on and second, because of the promptness and energy with which our forces returned a withering and accurate fire.  The bandits attempted to hold their places both with their rifle and with dynamite bombs but our grenades and rifles dislodged them after which they were followed up with all the weapons with which we were armed.  One of the bandits killed was identified as Morsal Solar of Jimyco, a colonel in Sandino's band.  The number of enemy engaged in this action is estimated from the volume of their fire and from the front over which they were deployed.  At a point about 3 miles from Jicaro the point of the advanced guard located a group of about 12 men in a position behind logs with a Lewis Gun, at a distance of about 150 yards ahead.  A short skirmish brushed away this group with no known casualties on either side.  The patrol arrived at Jicaro at 1600.  Every effort has been made by this patrol to obtain information as to the fate of the lost aviators.  No inhabitants were encountered in the entire area from Quilali to Jicarito, except the armed bands with whom we made contact.  In no case was it possible to take prisoners.  It is not believed that the missing aviators made a stand or engaged in a fight in any of the houses near the scene of the crash.  These houses were examined carefully for signs of a stand and for bullet holes but none were found.  In every instance of action and every case of obstacles to be overcome, the Guardia attached to my command fought and worked with outstanding courage and energy.  They proved themselves cheerful and willing in face of trying hardships and were ever eager to close with the enemy when encountered.  Throughout the movements and actions of this patrol in enemy territory the assistance rendered by aviation has been invaluable.  The information received from the planes was in every case accurate, useful and of the greatest importance to the intelligent conduct of this patrol.

 

                                                                         M. J. GOULD

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NA127/212/1

 

 

OFFICE OF THE DIVISION COMMANDER

DIVISION OF NUEVA SEGOVIA

OCOTAL, NIC.

                                                                       6 Nov. 1927.

 

From:          The Division Commander.

To:              The Brigade Commander.

 

Subject:       Report of situation in Quilali Sector.

 

          1.     After consideration has been given the facts in this letter, instructions are requested as to whether further operations in and around Chipote are deemed advisable at the present time.

 

          2.     As to the fate of Lieut. Thomas and Sergeant Dowdell; the undersigned and all officers at Jicaro and in Gould's column, feel certain that Thomas and Dowdell are dead.  At the Orosi Ranch between Jicaro and Ocotal, Gould was informed by the owner, who is very friendly and where our troops invariably spend the night enroute to and from Jicaro and Ocotal, that after the crash, the aviators removed one machine gun from the plane and attacked the bandits nearest to the, killing four.  When the machine gun ammunition was exhausted, they fled north-west along the valley of the Jicaro River, with only their pistols.  They succeeded in escaping from the bandits temporarily.  Two natives were met whom they forced to guide them in the direction of Jicaro.  One of these guides cut the aviator badly with a machete along the neck, and the other aviator shot and killed this guide.  Then the other guide escaped and informed Sandino where the aviators were.  Which one was wounded could not be found out, the other one, however, was able to support the wounded aviator to a cave, where they made their last stand and after killing two more bandits, were in turn, killed by a detachment of twenty-five bandits sent out by Sandino for this purpose.

 

          3.     The above story came from Presentacion Ortez, owner of this Orosi Ranch, and he stated he had this story from the brother of a bandit who was present at the time.  He assured our troops that the story was true, or at least that he believed it, as it was told to him frankly with no idea that he was going to repeat it to the Americans.

 

          4.     Now it is extremely doubtful if a new patrol would be able to get a further and more definite information than the above.

 

          5.     Gould and all the officers with him, state as their opinion that no less than one hundred and fifty combat troops will be required to capture Chipote, which is on top of the highest mountain in that area; furthermore, that trench mortars and 37 mm. guns will be necessary.  That Sandino has sent out a call to all his people stating that Chipote is being threatened by the Americans.  This will result in our next patrol meeting his combined forces, and bitter resistance.

 

          6.     Since the fate of the aviators seems to be fairly well established, it appears to me that very possible further operations in that area, with forces now available here, and under our present ration situation, at this time, may be premature, and that surer and better results might be expected in about three months, after Quilali, Jalapa and San Albino have been garrisoned.  [ p. 2 ]

 

          7.      This matter is of such importance, that I do not feel justified in making a decision without first putting the matter plainly before your office.

 

                                                                               R. W. PEARD

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NA127/212/1

MARINE DETACHMENT, SOMOTO, NICARAGUA

                                                                   7 November 1927.

 

From:          Second Lieutenant George H. Bellinger

To:              Commanding Officer

 

Subject:       Patrol

 

     1.          According to your instructions, a mounted patrol consisting of myself, ten marines, one navy corpsman, and a native guide departed from SOMOTO at 0200, Thursday, 3 November 1927.  We proceeded to the outskirts of SANTA ROSA waiting under cover until dawn at which time we made a surprise search of several houses in that area.  No arms or dangerous types of machettes were found.  Several men were in the first few houses searched but the remainder were practically void of men and machettes.  One native ran into the brush upon our approach but he was unarmed.  Some of the natives were hostile, others indifferent, and a very few friendly.  A native reported that a bandit leader of a small group of men lived in SANTA ROSA.  We found the house of this bandit whose name was given as Riveras.  He had from the appearance of his house quickly fled probably to the woods that morning.  The houses in SANTA ROSA are scattered helter-skelter in groups of from one to four in an approximate three miles area.  Friendly neighbors of bandits quickly war them of a patrol's approach by animals calls or by runner messengers.

 

     2.          The patrol proceeded to Espino arriving there at 1130.  The road enroute there was dry and compact but very rough in some parts near SONIZ.  About four miles outside of and on the way to ESPINO the telegraph line was cut in several places, and the houses were nearly all deserted.  ESPINO lies on the edge of the top of a high mountain facing the Coco River.  About twenty houses and sixty people comprise the pueblo.  Two stone piles separated about forth yards apart are supposed to indicate the HONDURAN-NICARAGUAN boundary lines.  This line runs through the center of the town.  Only one house on the Nicaraguan side of the town is occupied and the majority of the inhabitants living on the Hondurian side are Nicaraguan Citizens.  I was informed there that the town had no alcalde, that a Hondurian judge by the name of Matee Nelasco residing near San Marcos occasionally visited the town to dispense justice (?), that a Hondurian Guardia Patrol came to ESPINO at long infrequent intervals, that the boundary line was established in 1915 by a Honduran Commission, and that a bandit leader, Mardardo Ballejowith [Medardo Vallejos] about twenty followers was constantly making raids and depredations on Nicaraguans living near the border.  There were several men in the town and supposedly Honduran side who looked suspicious and hostile but made no hostile move.  The only indication of the border line was that previously mentioned - the two stone piles - but there was no sign post or flag there.  We returned to SONAZ and camped there for the night.

 

     3.          At dawn the next morning, 4 November 1927, the patrol  [ p. 2 ] left for MAL PASO.  The patrol had to pass over a rough trail.  Most all of the few houses we passed were deserted and one of them had only recently been burnt to the ground.  Reached MAL PASO at 0930.  This town is situated on the side of a mountain half way up and has about 18 houses in fairly close proximity to each other.  The place was quiet and very few men were seen.  The people voiced anxiety and alarm about the bandit Ballejo [Vallejos].

 

     4.          Continued on to Pataste passing most of the way over potreros which were well stocked with animals running wildly about and shy in their actions.  The potreros and roads near PATASTE were soggy and bad.  Reached PATASTE at 1645.  Mr. Mosher told me that there had been [a] treaty between Nicaragua and Honduras whereby the forces of one country could enter that of another in its patrolling or pursuit of bandits to a distance of one league but that he was uncertain whether the treaty was still in effect.  He also informed me that the boundary line around ESPINO had been in dispute for many years and as yet had not been settled.  Remained in PATASTE 5 November to rest animals.

 

     5.          Left PATASTE early Sunday morning 6 November, enroute to SOMOTO passing through SANTA ISABEL at 1300.  The houses there are practically all occupied occupying an area of approximately one-quarter square mile, the houses grouped in different parts of the town.  One man seen to run into the woods upon our approach.  The people bore the same attitude toward us at SANTA ROSA.  We looked over the town but saw nothing suspicious.  We were informed that a bandit group under the leadership of Fidencia Carazo [Fidencio Carazo] had killed seven members of one family on Thursday night and two other people on Saturday night.  The bandit group had been last seen headed for the mountains.

 

     6.          Arrived SOMOTO at 1430.  We traveled over a rough back trail to SANTA ISABEL from PATASTE.  The roads between SANTA ISABEL and SOMOTO are dry and in good shape.

 

                                                           GEORGE BELLINGER

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1st indorsement OFFICE OF THE DIVISION COMMANDER OCOTAL Nic.

                         9 Nov 1927

 

From:            The Division Commander

To:                The Brigade Commander Managua

 

     1.          Forwarded inviting particular attention to paragraph 4, in re treaty permitting patrols to cross into Honduras.

 

                                                      R. W. PEARD

 

 

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