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27.12.18. martin,
engagement with bandits aT macuelizo.
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HEADQUARTERS
SECOND BRIGADE MARINE CORPS
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA
27 December 1927
B - 2 REPORT
. . . (F) MILITARY
OPERATIONS: . . .
On December 17th, Corporal Martin with a mounted patrol
of nine enlisted Marines and a native guide cleared
SOMOTO, for a period of three days, for the purpose of
patrolling the area to the northwest. At 1230, on
December 18th, Corporal Martin, accompanied by two
members of his patrol reported at SOMOTO with the word
that his patrol had been attacked near MACUELIZE [Macuelizo],
which is nine miles west of OCOTAL, by a force of
approximately two hundred (200) well armed men, some of
whom were wearing the uniform of the Honduranian troops.
In the early part of the engagement the patrol forced
the enemy back to the village of MACUELIZE. But,
with their ammunition running low and under heavy fire
Martin's men were forced to retreat unde
down the RIO COCO; this move broke up the patrol and
Corporal Martin, reporting in at SOMOTO stated that the
six other men of his patrol had left for SOMOTO before
him. Later in the afternoon the native guide
reported in at SOMOTO stating that the six other
Marines, uninjured, were near the town of PARAISITE,
about fourteen miles northeast of SOMOTO, and were
requesting assistance. A mounted patrol with
Corporal Lukeshides in charge immediately left to
re-enforce them. Captain Peard also sent heavy
re-enforcements direct to MACUELIZO, with Lieut. Wells,
G.N., in charge. (Upon the completion of their
missions both of these patrols reported the patrolled
area as quiet) at 1730, December 18th, five men of
Corporal Martin's patrol reported in at OCOTAL without
hats and mounts and stated that Private Callaway had
been killed in action.
At 1425, December 18th, Observation Squadron sent there
planes to reconnoiter this area; upon the completion of
their mission they reported that the area appeared
quiet. No bandit activity or groups were seen.
The people around the farms showed no fear of the planes
even when they came down low. The town of
MACUELIZO is the only part of the area which could be
called abnormal, as it appears nearly deserted, but, as
it is the first time a patrol has been made in that
direction it is not possible to say that this condition
is only the ordinary or not. . . .
B-2 Report, 27 Dec 1927, Managua,
pp. 3-4, NA127/43A/3
Ancillary Documents:
Statements of USMC Corporal
Frederick F. Martin and Privates Gerald D. Kent, Wallace
L. Jacobson, Edward J. Carter, Leo L. Lussier, George O.
Smith, Leonard H. Taylor regarding the death of Private
Calloway, Macuelizo, December 18, 1927. All
statements carry the heading "Marine Detachment, Somoto,
Nic., 9 February 1928."
*
STATEMENT OF CORPORAL FREDERIC F.
MARTIN, U.S.M.C.
relative to an attack on a
patrol from Somoto, December 18, 1927.
On December 17, 1927 I left Somoto with a patrol of nine
men and one Native Guide for a four day patrol.
The first night out we camped at a ranch in San Luis and
on the following morning proceeded to Macullizo where we
were fired on by a large force of bandits well armed and
organized. After fighting them for about an hour
and finding our rifle grenades defective we decided to
withdraw. Privates Smith, Taylor and myself stayed
behind to cover the retreat of the remainder of the
patrol where we intended joining them on the Somoto
trail. When we thought they were outside the town
we mounted and started for the place we thought they
were waiting for us but could not find them. In
the rear of us the bandits had both sides of the road
covered and were trying to head us off. They
sniped us for about eight miles on our way to Somoto.
Private Calloway distinguished himself during the first
attack and Private Carter did excellent work also.
/ s / Frederick F. Martin
Corporal, U.S.M.C.
STATEMENT OF PRIVATE GERALD D.
KENT, U.S.M.C.
relative to attack on a patrol
from Somoto, Nic. December 18, 1927.
I was a member of a patrol with eight other marines,
Corporal Martin in charge, that left Somoto for a town
called Macullizo on December 17, 1928. The first
night out we stopped at a place by the name of San Luis
at a ranch house. The next day we left at about
6:00 A.M. for Macullizo and on arriving at the town we
were fired upon and took cover and fought for about
forty five minutes. During this attack Corporal
Martin and two other men became separated from the squad
and were not missed until we were out of the town.
Thinking that they were still in the town, we returned
and fought our way back in the town but could not find
the missing men. Private Calloway then took charge
and we started for Somoto. When we were about two
miles from San Luis we were again fired upon by a large
force of bandits that had us surrounded in a pass
between the hills. Private Calloway was shot at
this place and he called Private Carter and told him to
take charge of the squad and get out if possible.
Private Carter then took charge and insisted that we
remain with Private Calloway until he died which we did.
Private Carter then took charge and led us up the side
of a mountain under a heavy fire in the direction of
Ocotal. After reaching the top of the hill Private
Carter conducted the squad into Ocotal and reported to
the Commanding Officer at that place. At all times
during the firing, Private Carter was cool and used good
judgment.
/ s / Gerald D. Kent,
Private, U.S.M.C.
STATEMENT OF PRIVATE WALLACE L.
JACOBSON, U.S.M.C.
relative to an attack on a patrol
from Somoto, Nic. December 18, 1927.
Our patrol of nine men left Somoto at 2:00 A.M. on
December 17, 1927 for a four day patrol. We
arrived at Macullizo at about six O clock A.M. December
18th and were attacked. We fought at this place
for about an hour and withdrew from the town. We
had not moved more than a quarter of a mile from the
town when we noticed that Corporal Martin, Private
Taylor and Private Smith were missing. Private
Calloway then said lets go back in the town for them.
We got back into the town but could not find the
remainder of our force and withdrew again due to the
heavy fire we were under. We then started for
Somoto and had gone about seven miles when we were again
fired upon by a large force that had us well ambushed at
a place we could not take cover. Private Calloway
was killed here and before he died he urged Private
Carter to take the rest of us out the best way he could.
Private Carter refused to leave until he had died and
then led us up the side of a mountain in the direction
of Ocotal. We followed Carters instructions at all
times.
/ s / Wallace L. Jacobson
Private, U.S.M.C.
STATEMENT OF PRIVATE EDWARD J.
CARTER, U.S.M.C.
relative to an attack on a
patrol from Somoto December 18, 1927.
I left
Somoto with a patrol December 17, 1927 for a four days
patrol in the direction of Macullizo. We arrived
at Macullizo on the morning of the 18th and was fired
upon by a large number of bandits. We fought here
for about an hour and as the fire was very heavy and the
bandits closing in on us from all sides we withdrew from
the town. Just after we got out of the town, we
missed Corporal Martin, Private Taylor and Private
Smith. Private Calloway then took charge and we
decided to go back into the town for the missing men.
We fought our way back into the town but could not
locate the men and had to withdraw again. We then
started for Somoto and after we had gone in that
direction for about six miles we were again hit by a
large force of bandits who had us ambushed from all
sides. At this point Private Calloway was shot
several times and killed. Before he died he urged
that we all make a get away but I was determined not to
leave him until he was dead. I placed him in an
upright position by a tree and remained with him until
he was dead. I then took his rifle bolt and threw
it away and led the men over the hill in the direction
of Ocotal to which place we arrived that night about six
O clock and reported to the Commanding Officer.
/ s / Edward J. Carter
Private U.S.M.C.
STATEMENT OF PRIVATE LEO L.
LUSSIER, U.S.M.C.
relative to an attack on a
patrol from Somoto December 18, 1927.
I was a member of a patrol that left Somoto, Nic.
December 17, 1927 to be gone about four days. We
had nine men with Corporal Martin in charge. We
stopped the first night out at a ranch house in San Luis
and left the next morning at about six O clock for
Macuillizo. Arriving at Macullizo we were fired
upon by a large force of bandits who were located on all
sides of the town in the hills. We returned the
fire and fought them for about an hour but as they kept
closing in on us we decided to withdraw from the town.
During this action, Corporal Martin and two other men
became separated from the squad. Private Carter
told us then that we all stood a better chance by
sticking together and we all agreed to return to the
town and find Corporal Martin and the other two men.
Private Calloway being in charge at this time. We
fought our way back into the town but as the fire was
too heavy to remain there and, failing to find Corporal
Martin and the other men, we withdrew in the direction
of Somoto. On our way to Somoto we were again
attacked by a large force of bandits who had us ambushed
in a pass between the mountains. At this point
Private Calloway was shot. We fought here for
about thirty minutes. Although Calloway did not
die instantly he told us to seek our own safety.
Carter then took charge and placed Calloway beside a
tree and remained with him until he died making the
remark that we would not leave him there alive. He
then led us up the mountain side in the direction of
Ocotal and we made our escape to that place. It is
my belief that if Private Carter had not taken charge of
the situation when he did none of us would have gotten
away. He was cool and used good judgment at all
times.
/ s / Leo L. Lussier,
Private, U.S.M.C.
STATEMENT OF PRIVATE GEORGE O.
SMITH, U.S.M.C.
relative to an attack on a
patrol from Somoto December 18, 1927.
I was a
member of a patrol that left Somoto December 17, 1927
for a four day patrol with Corporal Martin in charge.
On the following day, early in the morning, we arrived
at Macullizo and were fired upon by a large force of
bandits. We fought them for about an hour but as
our rifle grenades failed to go off and they were
closing in on us from all sides we had to quit the town.
We thought we would all come together on the Somoto
trail but after we got out of the town we found that
only Corporal Martin, myself, and Private Taylor was
present. Thinking they had gone on to Somoto we
proceeded to that place and found that they had not
returned.
/ s / George O. Smith
Private, U.S.M.C.
STATEMENT OF PRIVATE LEONARD H.
TAYLOR, U.S.M.C.
relative to an attack on a
patrol from Somoto December 18, 1927.
I was a
member of the patrol that left Somoto December 17, 1927,
Corporal Martin in charge for a four day patrol.
On the second day out we arrived at Macullizo early in
the morning and on entering the town we were fired on by
bandits. We fought them for quite a while killing
and wounding several but as they kept closing in on us
we had to leave the town. In leaving the town,
Corporal Martin, myself and Private Smith became
separated from the other members of the patrol and could
not find them on the Somoto trail where we expected to
meet them. We returned to Somoto and found that
the remaining six had not returned.
/ s / Leonard H. Taylor
Private, U.S.M.C.
NA127/204/3
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Summary & Notes |
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Top
document: extract
from serial intelligence report; original combat report
not found. Statements of Cpl. Martin and Pvts.
Kent, Jacobson, Carter, Lussier, Smith, and Taylor on
how the squad became separated into two groups, and on
the death of Pvt. Calloway. |
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Describes hard-fought battle near borderland town of Macuelizo;
death of Pvt. Calloway the only Marine casualty. |
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Participation
of some men wearing Honduran Army uniforms suggests "bandits" were Chamorrista
Conservatives. |
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Nine
Marines vs. ~200 armed men. |
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Part of
wider pacification effort in the zone, with Cpl.
Lukeshides, Capt. Peard, Lt. Wells; this report goes along with the following report by Wells. |
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return to marine corps casualties
27.12.19. Wells, report on patrol, ocotal.
DIVISION OF NUEVA SEGOVIA
OCOTAL , NICARAGUA
19 December 1927
From:
Lieut. D.E.Wells, G.N.
To:
The Division Commander.
Subject:
Patrol, report on.
1.
Cleared Ocotal on 18 December 1927 at 7:15 p.m.
with Dr. Townsend, twenty marines, one guardia and
native guide. Arrived in the vicinity of Macuelizo
a 4:00 a.m. on 19 December 1937 [1927]. At 5:30
a.m. we took up a position overlooking the town.
We entered the town shortly afterwards as there did not
appear to be any one there. We found one old lady
was the sole inhabitant. She said fifty or sixty
bandits had been there the day before and had left in
the afternoon. She did not know whether there were
any Honduranian soldiers among them or not. Three
houses contained beds and other furniture and showed
signs of having been occupied frequently. We
departed at 7:30 a.m. for Amatillo and when about two
thousand yards from there were could see the people
running towards the top of the mountain. There are
about ten houses at Amatillo scattered over the side of
a mountain. At one house there was a woman and
three daughters. She said the men seen running
from her house were bandits; that a large group of
bandits had camped on top of the mountain the night
before and had started towards Honduras early the
morning. About one mile from there, on our return
to Ocotal, we saw several barricades built of rocks.
These were on top of a mountain and had been built
within the last couple of days. We did not see any
of the large group of bandits reported in that vicinity
the day before. We reached Ocotal 720 p.m. on
December 19 1927.
2.
This patrol went out with the idea of staying several
days and living off the country. This was
impossible as there is nothing to be had in the way of
food stuffs with the exception of cattle. There
are many cattle scattered over this area.
3.
From what we could learn all of the people living in
this area are bandits but are active only when a large
group comes over from Honduras or some other place.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - D.E.WELLS - - - - - - - - - - - - -
NA127/43A/20
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Summary & Notes |
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Continuation of
events relating to Cpl. Martin's engagement at Macuelizo, above.
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20
Marines, one GN, one native guide. |
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Describes settlement patterns in village of Amatillo. |
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Describes migrations & movements of civilians in
response to political and military threats and
dangers; all except "one old lady". |
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Shows continuing unsettled political conditions. |
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•
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Last
paragraph conveys a sense of the rhythms of
mobilization and demobilization in the borderlands,
ubiquity of armed mobilization in the area. |
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27.12.23. Smith, report of contact, jicaro.
MARINE DETACHMENT, JICARO,
NICARAGUA
23 December 1927.
From:
Sgt. F. G. Smith, U.S.M.C.
To:
The Commanding Officer
Subject:
Report of contact between a patrol from Jicaro under my
charge
and bandits on 5 December 1927.
1.
On 5 December, 1927, I received verbal orders from Lt.
Waterman to take charge of a patrol of 10 marines and 10
Guardias and proceed by the road to Ocotal to meet the
bull cart train coming from San Fernando.
2.
We cleared Jicaro at 0805 and passed thru SUSU CAYAN at
1000. We had just passed a ranch called San Pedro
at 1040 when we heard a bomb explode. Very soon
after this a guardia fired a shot at a man he saw in the
underbrush. Immediately after this a bomb was
thrown in the road in front of us and everybody took
cover except one guardia who was killed.
3.
This guardia's name was Raso Marcos Fonseca #39.
After the others had taken [cover] he remained standing
in the road and was immediately killed by a bullet thru
his chest from rifle fire of the bandits that commenced
immediately after the explosion of the second bomb.
4.
The Marines and Guardia took advantage of what little
cover was available. We were in a position in the
shape of a V and were being fired on from two hills and
a valley. It is estimated that about 40 bandits
made the first attack but they were soon reenforced and
the began to close in from all sides. We drove
them out of the valley, by which they were endeavoring
to get closer to us, by rifle grenades. The
guardia were driven back from their position, but soon
held the bandits in check. The fighting lasted in
this place for about one hour and twenty five minutes,
the bandits throwing a lot of dynamite bombs as well as
firing their rifles. We decided to fight our way
to a hill so rushed one in our rear. We gained
this and the enemy withdrew, not attacking anymore.
5.
In the first part of the battle Pvt M. Brown's B.A.R.
failed to extract and the empty cartridge could not be
taken from the chamber. He therefor put his B.A.R.
and belt on the ground removing the trigger group and
crawled over to the dead guardia to get his rifle.
Pvt Brown buried his trigger group. The bolt of
one Springfield broke near the end, another failed to
extract, and two others were put out of commission by
projectiles becoming lodged in the barrel due to faulty
powder. All of this happened in the first part of
the fighting.
6.
After the fighting was over Raso Valentin Galeno [Valentín
Galeano] #5 could not be found. He later reported
back to Jicaro.
7.
The bandits were all similarly dressed, wearing brown
uniforms which afforded them excellent concealment in
the underbrush. They seemed to be well armed with
rifles and had a great many dynamite bombs which they
threw often but which had no effect on our men.
One of their leaders spoke English very clearly and
could be heard to curse the Marines at different times
saying "Kill those damn marines". I estimate that
they had about 200 men. We know of 8 that were
killed and saw several of our rifle grenades explode
right where there were others so estimate about 30
bandits killed.
8.
The Marines and Guardia on this patrol fought well and
were calm during the entire fight. The guardia
were inclined to fire too much at random but they all
fought well. Discipline was excellent.
Fred G. Smith
NA127/212/1
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Summary & Notes |
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Back
to the Northeastern Segovias, firmly under EDSN
control. |
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10
Marines & 10 Guardia vs. estimated 200 rebels. |
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Well-laid ambush, 80 minute firefight. |
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USGN problems with BARs, firing triggers; battle
saved by rifle grenades. |
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Rebels all wearing brown uniforms; well armed, ample
dynamite bombs (no effect). |
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Remarkable that Marines & Guardia able to extract
themselves with only one GN killed. |
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For
the second time in this area, EDSN jefe cussing the
Marines in English during the fight. Who was
this guy? |
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27.12.31. gould,
engagement with bandits, camino real north of quilalÍ.
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Quilali, Nicaragua.
January 31, 1928
[actually December 31, 1927]
From:
Commanding Officer, Special Expedition against Chipote.
To:
The Brigade Commander.
Subject:
Engagement with bandits.
1.
At about 0930, January December 30,
1927, while marching on Quilali, this expedition
encountered a bandit force of Sandino, estimated at 400
to 500 strong on the Camina [Camino] Real, about 1500 yards south
of Quilali. The action continued on for about one
hour and twenty minutes when the enemy was driven off.
2.
At the time the enemy force was encountered, this force
was marching single file on a narrow trail along the
side of a mountain with the Jicaro river on our left
(west) flank. The mountain sloped at an angle of
about 45 degrees and the slope from the trail to the
river 100 feet below us was about the same. The
river at this point was about 200 feet wide and made a
sharp turn to the west, and side of the mountain, and a
hill directly ahead flanking the trail at the bend was
covered with woods and extremely heavy underbrush.
A sketch, showing the general situation, not to scale,
is enclosed.
3.
As our point passed point "A", a midway point to "B", it
observed suspicious movements at point "B". Fire
was immediately opened by enemy from point "A" and "B"
all along the line "C", and from across the river from
point "E", with machine guns, automatic rifles, rifles,
pistols, dynamite bombs, and unidentified weapons
sounding similar to our trench mortars and mountain
batter guns. Enemy guns and riflemen were cleverly
concealed; the riflemen being along the barbed wire
fence on the mountain slope, each man being ab
behind an individual barricade of rocks piled around
tree stumps about 15" high and wide. Fire was
opened simultaneously from all points by the enemy on
discovery of this point at "B", but it is believed that
this was not in accordance with his plans as our
examination of the trail north of "B" disclosed that he
had prepared positions along the trail thru a banana
grove, and it is believed that it was his plan to allow
the advance guard to enter the trail in the banana
grove, and strike the entire column simultaneously.
The discipline maintained, the morale, and the accuracy
of fire of the bandits, as well as the tactical
disposition of their troops were far above anything
displayed by them in any of their actions heretofore in
this section and leads to the belief that they are
receiving training from sources other than Nicaraguans
because of the up-to-dateness of their tactics.
All enemy seen were garbed in clothing similar to our
summer field in color. No prisoners could be
captured because of the superiority of the enemy's
position and the fat that they removed their casualties
with them. [ p. 2 ]
4.
(a) Bandit leaders unknown.
(b) No mounts seen.
(c) Aerial assistance - none of our planes were
present during engagement but two planes arrived
immediately after, strafed the hills in the direction
given by us and departed.
5.
CASUALTIES:
Marines:-
(a) KILLED:
HEMPHILL, John W. 1st Sgt.
(Lt. GN)
THIEIHART, Adolph
Cpl.
GOLDSMITH, George E. Pfc.
WATSON, Grady W.
Pfc.
CROSSON, Estler
Pvt.
(b) WOUNDED, seriously-
LIVINGSTON, Richard
Captain
CORYALL, Fred
Gy-Sgt.
COLLINS, Robert H.
Pvt.
TURNER, Charles E.
Pvt.
COYNE, Berhnard W.
Pvt.
SMITH, Leonard J.
Pvt.
(c) MINOR WOUNDS - Fragments
of bombs, etc.
MINNICK, William T.
Lt. (MC) USN
ROOS, Otto N.
Sgt.
GOULD, Moses, J.
1st Lieut.
FIELDS, Scott
Sgt.
NEEL, John W.
Cpl. (Lt GN)
LEACH, Anthony J.
Cpl.
BRANDENBURG, Raleigh R. Pfc.
DOWD, Thomas F.
Pfc.
BLANCHARD, Harry M.
Pfc.
LITTLE, Jacob
Pvt.
FITZPATRICK, Arthur L.
Pvt.
NEWBURGER, Albert H.
Pvt.
ENDRESS, Clifford C.
Pvt.
MERCHANT, William C.
Pvt.
HUSKA, Paul
Pvt.
SMITH, Glenn
Pvt.
WALKER, Edgar, B.
Pvt.
GUARDIA -
(a) KILLED:
HEMPHILL, John W.
Lt. (See above under Marines)
HERNANDEZ, Enriques
Cpl. #356
(b) Wounded seriously:-
GARCIAS, Louis C.
Pvt. # 49
GUTIERREZ, Policarpo
Pvt. #355
(not expected to live)
[ p. 3]
(c) WOUNDED, not seriously:
NEEL, John N. Lt.
(See above under Marines)
NATIVE GUIDE:
Killed: SALINI, Ramon.
BANDITS:
Losses unknown, but believed to be heavy.
PRISONERS:
None.
(6) Medical Officer
considers it necessary that all listed as seriously
wounded be evacuated immediately because of lack of
facilities for proper care.
(7) Pack train badly
shot up and scattered, report of losses of stores and
animals will follow later.
(8) No losses of
ammunition or weapons known at present. Check up
being made.
(9) Check of
ammunition expenditures being made.
(10) Further details
later.
(11) Dead will be
buried here.
(12) Captain
Livingston was wounded immediately after action started
and the undersigned has assumed command pending arrival
of Lieutenant Richal.
M. J. GOULD,
1st Lieutenant, USMC,
Commanding.
Sketch of Scene of Action
Capt. Livingston's Column
30 December 1927.

NA127/212/1 and /113C/12
See also Neill Macaulay, The Sandino
Affair (Duke 1985), pp. 99-100.
Ancillary Document:
Sandino's Account
of the Fight at Trincheras, 30 December 1927
Major
Encounters near El Chipote at the End of 1927 and on New
Year's Day, 1928
. . . On
last December 30, at eight in the morning, the enemy, made
up of three hundred Yankees and two hundred patricides
[Guardias], halted at a place called Trincheras, four
kilometers from Quilalí, as if to conduct an exploration,
and by slow degrees they maneuvered like some loathsome
reptile, which couldn't be some any other way since they
were not moving in a straight line. The liberators'
irony was reflected in their gaze; their sarcastic smiles
accentuated their expressions of hatred for the invaders;
the firing sights of the famous "concones" searched eagerly
for the hearts of the murderers of our sovereignty.
With their feet firmly placed, the mortar operators waited
for the enemy to bunch up so that they could exterminate
them with the terrible explosions of their bombs.
So it was that at five minutes past eight the chain of
Yankee riflemen, made up of sixty men who advanced slowly
against our trenches, was completely destroyed by a
well-aimed discharge of our musketry, causing tremendous
confusion and indescribable panic among the enemy, who in
giddy flight trampled down everything in their way, the
place we chose to defeat them being called El Paso de la
Muerte. Those who miraculously escaped with their
lives will remember that place forever. With the
enormous number of casualties inflicted upon them over a
period of five minutes, the enemy could not reorganize at
the same point of combat to effect an orderly retreat.
Instead, in total disarray they fled by different trails
toward Quilalí, hoping to join another column of blond
bandits who had left Telpaneca, aiding the advance of the
seventh column of pirates who were defeated at Trincheras.
With the violence of a thunderbolt and God's help, in five
minutes freedom's defenders destroyed the battle plan that
the punitive army had taken two months to prepare.
Exploring the field we affirmed the results of our victory:
sixty-four enemy dead, sixty-nine rifles and a Lewis
machine gun, six thousand cartridges of various kinds, and
many items of less importance.
With our one-day march the enemy's advance in this sector
was ended. . . .
Patria y Libertad.
/ s / A. C. SANDINO
Fortress of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua
El Chipote, January 4, 1928
Robert Edgar
Conrad,
Sandino, Testimony of a Nicaraguan Patriot
(Princeton,
1990), pp. 151-52.
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Summary & Notes |
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80
minute battle on Camino Real just north of Quilalí; 5
Marines killed, 23 wounded; made the front page of the
New York Times; prompted US Pres. Hoover to announce he'd
send 1,000 more troops to Nicaragua. A very
consequential battle. |
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Launched
just on the eve of the Sixth Pan-American Conference in
Havana, |
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This
"Special Expedition against Chipote" one of the few
times in which Marines militarily weaker in the field
than EDSN. |
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Sketch
map of the action and Sandino's account of the fight
included. |
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Should
be read with other reports, incl. report on the Battle
of Las Cruces and Kilcourse Diary (both below). |
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return to marine corps casualties
28.01.04. brown,
engagement with bandits at guanacastillo.
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Quilali, Nicaragua. 4 January 1928.
From:
Non Commissioned Officer in charge of Lt. Richal's
column.
To:
The Brigade Commander, 2nd Brigade, USMC.
Subject:
Engagement with bandits.
1.
At about 1255, December 30, 1927, while marching on
Quilali, this expedition encountered a bandit force of
Sandino estimated to be about 50 strong on the trail
about 22 miles from Telpaneca. The action lasted
about 25 minutes, when the enemy was routed and our
forces proceeded toward Quilali.
2.
At the time the enemy force was encountered our forces
were marching in single file, up a steep narrow trail
from a creek or river (name unknown to the undersigned),
our point had just gained the crest of this hill when
the enemy opened fire from a position on our left flank,
and a distance no greater than 50 feet, with rifles and
pistols. The bandits were well hidden and at no
time were more than three seen. The bandits were
so situated that to retreat all they did was to drop
down the hill on the opposite side, which they did after
about 20 minutes, being driven back by our point.
3.
By command of Lt Richal, our point made an attempt to
flank the enemy after their retreat by advancing to a
point about 500 yards ahead of our column, but the
flanking party could only get in a few long range shots,
which damaged the enemy to the extent of three killed.
MARINE CASUALTIES:
Wounded seriously, COYLE, John P. Pvt.
4.
(a) No ammunition lost.
(b) No cargo lost
(c) No animals lost.
5.
It is unknown to the undersigned as to whether or not
Lieut. Richal submitted a report of this engagement.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - E. G. BROWN * * *
* * * *
Gy-Sgt., USMC.
NA127/43A/20
See also Neill Macaulay, The Sandino
Affair (Duke 1985), p. 100
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Summary & Notes |
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Skirmish
with 50 rebels at Guanacastillo near Quilalí, 30 Dec.
1927. |
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1 Marine
seriously wounded, |
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Sandwiched between two disastrous engagements for the
Marines: the Trincheras / Camino Real fight
earlier the same day (previous report) and battle of Las
Cruces two days later (next report). |
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See
Macaulay, The Sandino Affair, p. 100. |
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return to marine corps casualties
28.01.04. brown,
engagement with bandits at las cruces.
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QUILALI, Nicaragua,
4 January 1928.
From:
The Non-Commissioned Officer in charge of Lieutenant
Richal's column.
To:
The Brigade Commander.
Subject:
Engagement with bandits.
1.
At about 1230, January 1, 1928; while marching on
Quilali, this expedition encountered bandit forces
of Sandino, estimated at 350 to 450 strong, on the
Sapotial [Zapotillal] Hill, about six miles NW of QUILALI. The
action continued for about one hour, when the enemy was
routed.
2.
At the time of the encounter our force was proceeding
along the trail in single file up the side of a mountain
which was on our right or NW flank. A field which
extended for a distance covering nearly the whole column
on the right flank. The hill was covered with
pinewoods and the field with heavy brush.
3.
Our point had just turned a curve at the bottom of the
above mentioned hill when Lieutenant Bruce (GN) observed
a movement and started to draw his pistols, when the
enemy opened fire with machine guns, rifles, pistols,
and dynamite bombs, from points all along the hill and
field on our right flank. There were also a small
amount of the enemy on our left flank that opened fire
on our left flank and rear guard. On the hill the
enemy were well entrenched, behind parapets thrown up
and behind pine trees. The bandit forces were well
disciplined, and when Lt. Bruce was killed were able to
rush our point and advance at the command of their
leader, forcing our troops to retreat to a point 50
yards behind our Stokes Trench Mortar where they took a
position in line with our machine gun which had jammed.
There they established a skirmish line and held off the
enemy until the machine gun was repaired and gotten into
action again. The machine gun with the Stokes
mortar, and the 37 MM gun, which fired from a position
in the rear of the column gained fire superiority and
routed the bandits.
4.
Our forces took up a defensive position on the hill
captured and awaited re-enforcements from QUILALI, which
arrived at 1415, January 2, 1928.
5.
(a) Bandit leader unknown.
(b) No Mounts seen.
(c) Aerial assistance, none, but two planes
appeared about ten minutes after the route of the enemy
and strafed the hills and the woods in the vicinity.
CASUALTIES:
MARINES KILLED:
BRUCE, Thomas G. 1st Sgt. (1st Lt GN)
MARINES WOUNDED SERIOUSLY:
RICHAL, Meron A. 1st Lt.
POMORSKI, Edward L. Pvt.
MARINES WOUNDED NOT SERIOUSLY:
HOOKS, Lee M. Pvt.
HENRY, Wallace Cpl.
GUARDIA NACIONAL:
BRUCE, Thomas G. 1st Lt. Killed. [ p. 2 ]
BANDITS:
About 20 dead bodies were found
near the place of attack.
PRISONERS: None.
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