Marine and Guardia Detachment,

                                                                   Telpaneca, Nicaragua,

                                                                               8 January, 1928.

 

From:         The Commanding Officer,

To:             The Brigade Commander,

 

Via:            The Area Commander

 

Subject:      Engagement with a group of bandits at Cuje, 8 January 1928,

                  report on.

 

Enclosures: (1) Lieutenant J.S. Satterfield's (G.N.) report on the engagement,

                   copy of.

 

          1.     A group of 150 (one hundred and fifty) bandits under Alexandro Ferrera, (Honduranian), was reported in the Cuje district on 6 January, 1928 by a native who had been previously employed as a guide on patrols.  This man was directed to locate the camp of the bandits and report the same to the commanding officer, which he did on 7 January, 1928.  This man reported that the bandit chief was a Honduranian and one of Sandino's generals.

 

          2.     Lieutenant J. S. Satterfield cleared Telpaneca at 0330, 8 January, 1928, with a patrol consisting of twenty (20) enlisted marines and ten (10) Guardia Nacional.  The guide had reported the bandit camp eight miles distance but it was actually twelve miles, Lieutenant Satterfield therefore arrived at 0830 thus preventing the surprise attack planned.  The camp was located on a small hill, the bandits using seven native houses as quarters.  It was a difficult position to approach, as a densely wooded ridge paralleled the trail, between the trail and the hill.

 

          3.     Lieutenant Satterfield led his patrol off the trail and approached the camp, but could observe no movement.  It was evident that the bandits had observed the patrol.  The advance guard reported a movement on the ridge; the patrol took cover and flankers were ordered out.  A cautious advance was begun.  Corporal Macon U.S.M.C. with ten men led an advance party covered by the balance of the patrol.  The left flank was fired on at a range of about fifty yards; Corporal Macon took his party to the point fired upon and succeeded in routing the bandits at that point.

 

          4.     It was impossible to pursue the bandits due to the dense underbrush, and the possibility of the patrol shooting each other.  Corporal Macon was ordered to cease firing and the balance of the patrol moved to the rear to secure a better field of fire.  These men continued to fire as long as the bandits were visible.  Firing ceased about ten minutes after the first shot was fired.

 

          5.     The bandits lost five (5) killed, wounded unknown, three rifles, two shotguns, and fifty two rounds of Remington ammunition.  The following foodstuffs was found in the bandit camp:

20 Sacks Beans

28 Sacks Corn

25 Sacks Coffee

 

The foodstuffs was burned.  Natives reported the group of bandits as being fifty (50) in number, led by one of Sandino's lieutenants but not Ferrera.

 

          6.     The patrol suffered no casualties.  The following named marines were on the patrol:

Sgt. Wagner, John E.

Cpl. Macon, Daniel E

Pfc Barfield, Henry J.

Pvts. Albright, Clyde H.

  "     Bryan, Robert I

  "     Bush, John M.

  "     Dzierwa, Walter J.

  "     Eicher, William

  "     Greathouse, Lester V.

  "     Harris, Thomas W.

  "     Isdell, Charles J.

  "     Kincannon, John W.

[ "    --- ]

 

                                                 / s / C. G. Wadbrook

 

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA

TELPANECA, NICARAGUA

January 8, 1928

 

From:          The Commanding Officer, Guardia Nacional.

To:              The Commanding General, Guardia Nacional.

 

Subject:       Engagement with group of bandits at CUJE 8 January 1928,

                   report on.

 

     1.          A group of bandits 150 strong were reported to the undersigned on January 6 as being in the Cuje Area led by one Alejandro Ferrera, (Hondurian), one of Sandino's leaders.  The undersigned was notified of this group of bandits by a reliable native that had previously been employed as a guide on a previous patrol in the above mentioned area.  This native was directed to locate the camp of the bandits and report same to the Commanding Officer this post which he did on January 7.

 

     2.          The undersigned cleared TELPANECA at 0330, 8 January, 1928, with a patrol of 20 marines and 10 guardia.

 

     3.          I had previously been informed by guide that the bandits camp was some two and one half leagues from Telpaneca.  But it was about four leagues as I did not arrive within the vicinity of their camp until 0830 therefore eliminating all possible chances of a surprise attack.

 

     4.          The bandit camp was located on a small hill where they were using seven native houses as quarters and very difficult to approach as there was a densely wooded ridge paralleling the trail on the left about 100 yards between my patrol and the bandit camp and an ideal place for an ambush.

 

     5.          I led the patrol along the side of a large mountain so as to approach this position and avoid being ambushed is [if] possible.  I had previously observed the bandit camp from a mountain top some 800 yards away and could see no movements nor activities in their camp and immediately came to the conclusion that my patrol had been observed by one of their outposts which proved correct.  I approached to within 150 yards of the ridge that was on my left when my advance guard reported seeing a movement on ridge to left of trail, at this time I immediately ordered my patrol to take cover along the left of the trail and my flank patrols out with orders to move to the flank and then proceed forward under cover and if possible gain contact with the bandits.  In the meantime I ordered Cpl. Macon, USMC, to stand by with ten men and the balance of my patrol to stand by to cover Cpl. Macon and his men in their advance with covering fire as from my position covering fire could be employed nicely.  My flank patrols advanced some 50 yards to the right and left front when they were fired upon from the ridge on the left at a range of about 50 yards.  Raso Roman Aguston [Román Agustín] #248 was the forward left flank patrol and immediately took cover firing rapidly and at the same time gave in the exact location of the enemy.  I immediately ordered covering fire on that part of the ridge to the left of Roman and Cpl. Macon down the trail until parrell [parallel] with Raso Roman and then to take up position on line with him, which Cpl. Macon did promptly and effecting as his men routed that part of the bandit force that were not routed by the covering fire.  It was impossible to pursue the bandits thru the underbrush owing to the possibility of killing one of my own patrol.  I then ordered Cpl. Macon and his men to cease firing and the rest of my patrol to move to the rear where they could observe mountain in rear of ridge that had been occupied by the bandits and to continue firing as long as they could see targets with what results I do not know.  [ p. 2 ]  But several men were seen retreating around one side of the mountain and it is hoped that at least some were wounded.

 

All firing ceased about ten minutes after the first shot was fired.  The bandits lost five killed, wounded unknown, but am confident that there were at least twenty owing to the short range.  Captured three rifles, and two shotguns, fifty two rounds of Remington ammunition.

 

Upon entering the bandit camp I found a large supply of food stuffs, twenty sacks of beans, twenty eight sacks of corn, and about twenty five sacks of coffee all collected within the last few days according to information given by natives in this area.  All food stuffs was burned.  The above mentioned group consisted of about 50 men in all, and not 150 as previously report, nor was this group led by Ferrera, but by one of his Lieutenants who was on a foregoing [foraging] expedition with Sandino.

 

Raso Roman Agustin #248 is to be commended for his coolness under fire and for giving me the exact information position of the enemy therefore making it possible for me to delay my patrol promptly had he not shown coolness and courage by pointing out the position of the enemy, I feel confident that some of my patrol would have been hit.

 

Patrol suffered no casualties.

 

The following Guardia Nacional troops participated in the engagement:

 

Lieut. J. H. Satterfield, G.N.

Raso Salamanca Justa, G.N. #245

  "      Moralez Modesto, G.N. #173

  "      Rodriguez Alejandra, G.N. #224

  "      Zapata Domingo, G.N. #225

  "      Gerez Miguel, G.N. #242

  "      Santamaria Miguel, G.N. #75

  "      Vargas Alfrado, G.N. #186

  "      Cantillo Ernesto, G.N. #176

  "      Roman Agustin, G.N. #248

  "      Sanchez Luis, G.N. #212

 

                                                                      ( s )  Lt. J. H. Satterfield, G.N.

                                                                              CO 1st Co. G.N. Detachment

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

 

NA127/43A/33

 

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY,

SPECIAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, THIRD BATTALION, FIFTH REGIMENT

San Albino, Nicaragua                                                 16 January 1928.

 

From:          Captain Arthur Kingston, U.S. Marine Corps.

To:              The Area Commander, Nueva Segovia Area, Ocotal, Nicaragua, C.A.

VIA:            The Commanding Officer, San Albino, Nicaragua.

 

Subject:       March of Supply Train, Ocotal to San Albino, January 13-16, 1928.

 

Reference:   (a) Radio 8614-1540 (1928).

 

     1.          In reply to reference (a) I have to state that there was no intent on my part to disobey either the written or verbal orders given to me by the Area Commander prior to my leaving Ocotal for San Albino.  After leaving San Fernando, I found that the Muleros, who left Esteli with my train, were still with me.  It had been so firmly impressed upon them at Esteli to accompany me to my destination, that they did.  As it later developed, it was fortunate that they did stay with the train, as they released the Marines to duty as a Guard.  There were persistent rumors of the possibility of an ambush on the road between Ocotal and San Albino, and in such an event the fire power of the Marines would prevent the loss of the stores - the muleros holding the mules in check.

 

     2.          The train arrived in San Albino without having encountered armed resistance.  Due to the discretion allowed me by the Area Commander in the conduct of the march, all the men and animals of the train arrived in San Albino in excellent condition.

 

                                                                         / s /  Arthur Kingston

 

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY,

SPECIAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, THIRD BATTALION, FIFTH REGIMENT

San Albino, Nicaragua                                                 16 January 1928.

 

From:          Captain Arthur Kingston, U.S. Marine Corps.

To:              The Area Commander, Nueva Segovia Area, Ocotal, Nicaragua, C.A.

VIA:            The Commanding Officer, San Albino, Nicaragua.

 

Subject:       March of Supply Train, Ocotal to San Albino, January 13-16, 1928.

 

Reference:   (a) Radio 8614 dash 1715 (1928).

 

     1.          In reply to reference (a) I have to state, that the Muleros commandeered to accompany my column were those secured, at Esteli, by Captain Kieren.  No Muleros were commandeered by me en route.

 

     2.         I do not recall the Gomes mentioned in reference (a), and search has failed to locate him at San Albino.

 

     3.          The column arrived at San Albino with fifty-one (51) animals, fifty of which were branded "U.S."; one mule was claimed by a mulero as his personal property.

 

     4.          Because of the many steep grades encountered it was necessary to lighten the bull carts and place a part of their load on the unloaded mules.  It developed that the number of muleros was not excessive as they released Marines to duty as a force to be used in case of attack.  From the information given me I expected the column to be ambushed at almost any moment.  I conducted the march of the train so as to have all the men, stores and animals arrive in San Albino in the best of conditions.  Upon arrival at San Albino, the men and animals could have continued the march without delay.

 

                                                                      / s /  Arthur Kingston

 

 

[ REPORT MARKED "B" ]

SPECIAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, THIRD BATTALION, FIFTH REGIMENT,

San Albino, Nicaragua                                                  20 January 1928.

 

From:          Captain Norman M. Shaw, U.S.M.C.

To:              The Commanding Officer, San Albino, Nicaragua.

 

Subject:       Statement of Captain N.M.Shaw, USMC.

 

Reference:  (a)  Radio from Area Commander, Ocotal, 8619-0950.

 

     1.          Captain Kingston's column, took no coffee, salt, sacks, or sewing machines from "Hula" ranch.  I saw all carts and mules loaded on morning of 16th of January and also examined carts in the train during the first two hours on the road.  The Gunnery Sergeant of the advance guard reported to me that coffee was loaded on a cart near one of the outlying buildings, but careful search failed to locate the bulls.  From attitude of "family" at Hula, it is my opinion that if anything is missing from there, the enemy has it.

 

     2.          At a hacienda west of San Fernando (name unknown) one of our bull-carts went over the bank, and two bulls were injured and left behind.  Two other bulls were hooked on, but it was my understanding that they came from our column.  I have no information concerning any steel bar, axe, or lariat from that ranch.

 

                                                          / s /  N. M. Shaw

 

SPECIAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, THIRD BATTALION, FIFTH REGIMENT,

San Albino, Nicaragua                                                  20 January 1928.

 

From:          Captain Arthur Kingston, U.S.M.C.

To:              The Commanding Officer, San Albino, Nicaragua.

 

Subject:       Statement of Captain Arthur Kingston, USMC.

 

Reference:  (a)  Radio from Area Commander, Nueva Segovia Area,

                        8619 - 0950  (1928)

 

     1.          One of the bull-carts accompanying the column which cleared Ocotal on January 13, 1928, for San Albino, went over the embankment during the march to San Fernando.  As it was one of sixteen carts, I proceeded giving orders to the men with the cart to get it on the road and come along with the rear of the column.  They secured two additional bulls to get the cart on the road.  When the cart arrived in San Fernando it had four bulls attached to it the same as it had when it left Ocotal.  If there was an exchange of bulls, it was without my knowledge.

 

     2.          At "Hula" it was reported to me that there was a quantity of coffee and salt stored nearby.  I endeavored to find out to whom it was consigned, but no one seemed to know.  "Hula" is without doubt a sort of depot of supplies for the bandits in this section.  In spite of this I left the coffee and salt behind.  The report that the Marines took two sewing machines, would indicate, that the people at "Hula" were trying to blame the Marines for all their losses.  I saw every bullcart and mule unloaded at San Albino.  There were no sewing machines in the cargo.

 

     3.          There were no native male residents at "Hula" on January 15-16, 1928.  If they were friendly to Marines, there is every reason to believe that they would have been there.

 

     4.          To my knowledge there was no property taken along the route from Ocotal to San Albino.

 

                                                                     / s /  Arthur Kingston

 

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,

SPECIAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, THIRD BATTALION, FIFTH REGIMENT,

San Albino, Nicaragua                                                  21 January 1928.

 

From:          The Commanding Officer.

To:              The Commanding Officer, Division of Nueva Segovia,

                   Ocotal, Nicaragua.

 

Subject:       Statements from Captain Kingston's Officers.

 

Inclosures:   (2).

 

     1.     Forwarded herewith are statements from Captain Kingston, and from Captain Shaw as directed in Radio 8619-0950.

 

     2.     First Lieutenant Esau is on outpost duty and statement will be sent when he returns.

 

                                                          / s /   A. Young

 

 

[ REPORT MARKED "A" ]

2nd endorsement.          23 January 1928.

Headquarters, Nueva Segovia Area, Ocotal, Nicaragua.

 

From:          The Commanding Officer.

To:              The Commanding Officer, Fifth Regiment.

 

Subject:       March of Supply Train, OCOTAL to SAN ALBINO,

                   January 13-16, 1928.

 

Enclosures:   (2)

 

     1.          Forwarded.  This communication should have been addressed to the Regimental Commander.

 

     2.          Attached hereto are two (2) communications marked "A" and "B" on this subject.  It appears that the officers attached to the column do not know anything about the depredations alleged to have been committed by members of the column.

 

     3.          Many of the things complained of were undoubtedly committed, and the undersigned is of the opinion that the march discipline was very lax.

 

     4.          The letter marked "B" refers to Captain Kingston's failure to send the OCOTAL muleros back with Gould's column which his written orders directed him to do.

 

                                                                   / s /  B. S. Berry

 

NA127/204/5

Summary & Notes

• 

Issue with muleros - contractors for Marines, to manage mules on resupply expedition.  Rumors of ambush required Marine vigilance.  Muleros joined under compulsion.  51 mules, probably 8-10 muleros.  Area Commander thought it an excessive number.

• 

Patrol CO's Kingston & Shaw reports in response to sharp rebukes from AC Ocotal, Berry, received by telegram.

• 

Ula Ranch residents allege Marine pilfering of coffee, salt, steel bar, axe, lariat, and two sewing machines.

• 

Kingston & Shaw either unaware of looting or turned a blind eye.  Was Ula Ranch a Sandinista "depot" as Kingston alleged?

• 

Area Commander Berry concludes members of the Marine column basically looted the ranch of coffee, salt, and other goods; portrays "lax march discipline."

Office of the Commanding Officer 16th Co., Special Expeditionary Force,

Third Battalion, San Albino, Nicaragua.     22 January 1928

 

From:          Captain R. W. Peard, Guardia Nacional, Patrol Commander,

                   Las Cruces Patrol.

To:              The Commanding Officer, Fifth Regiment, Managua, Nic.

Via:             The Commanding Officer, San Albino, Nicaragua.

 

Subject:      Patrol Report.

Reference:  (a)  Your radio 8619-1230.

 

     1.     At 1000 January 20, 1928, the undersigned left SAN ALBINO with a combat patrol of 80 enlisted marines, as per orders contained in reference (a).  This patrol consisted of all available men of the 16th Co., Special Expeditionary Force, 3rd Bn., with 2 Browning Machine Gun squads and one trench mortar squad attached, 37 animals and 3 days rations were taken.

 

     2.     The patrol arrived at the northern base of LAS CRUCES mountains and camped for the night at 1700 near Plan Grande.  During the night, lines of moving lights along our flanks, indicated that bandits were converging troops on our front around LAS CRUCES, but no bandits were seen or encountered during the first day.

 

     3.     FIRST CONTACT:   At 0830 on January 21, 1928, just as our pack train was about loaded and ready for the days march, a heavy rifle and machine gun fire from concealed bandit forces, estimated at not less than 50 rifles and 1 machine gun, opened up on us from the hillside across a deep, densely wooded canyon, at a range of from 1500 to 2000 yards.  The range was so great that they could not hope to deliver accurate fire with rifles, but many hits in and around our position were made.  The bandits waited to commence this attack until they felt assured that our machine guns had been packed on mules ready to move out.  As a matter of fact, both of our machine guns were in position and manned, in good positions, at each end of the camp.  Our machine guns returned the fire instantly, combing the ridge lines to the west, but I soon stopped their fire and withheld all other fire, as the range was too great for rifle fire and no enemy targets could be seen, not even smoke puffs from their rifle or machine gun fire be visible with field glasses.  The bandit fire continued all along our right flank for about thirty minutes, with many of their shots going over hour heads.  The bandits expended several thousand rounds of ammunition in rifle fire alone.  About 0900, upon signal of a dynamite bomb, from LAS CRUCES, to our front, this fire stopped, and bandits retired amid repeated shouts of "VIVA CHAMORRA" [Chamorro].  The deep heavily wooded canyon between us and the bandits position prohibited us from doing anything except taking secure positions and letting them waste their ammunition.  It appeared to me, that the firing from our right flank, was probably planned to detract our attention in that direction, while another bandit force moved into position to ambush us at LAS CRUCES.  We remained in position at Plan Grande until 1000 waiting for "Letter of Instructions", which was due by plane.  This letter was never received until my return to SAN ALBINO today.  At 1005, no planes having arrived, I gave orders to move out for BUENA VISTA via LAS CRUCES, as the road to BUENA VISTA turns to the south west at the top of LAS CRUCES mountain, within 50 yards of the bandits favorite ambush position, where Richal's column was ambushed, and where an ambush of my QUILALI column was broken up by aeroplanes and trench mortar fire when we were enroute to SAN ALBINO.

 

     4.     SECOND CONTACT:  About half way up LAS CRUCES mountain and about half a mile from the summit, our advance routed out an ambush of about 15 rifles, on the DOWN HILL side of the trail.  These bandits were smoked out by protective fire from automatic weapons along flanks of wooded trail.  This was the first bandit ambush that has come to my attention in which their dispositions were made on the down hill side.  I immediately put our trench mortar into action, covering LAS CRUCES as far up as  [ p. 2 ]  possible, then raked the balance with machine gun fire.  One dead bandit was found and two wounded were seen being carried off by machette men.

 

     5.     THIRD CONTACT:  We continued on up LAS CRUCES mountain with caution and had about reached the top, when a machine gun opened up on us from a knoll, about 1200 yards to the west, in the direction of BUENA VISTA.  We at once silenced this gun by well directed machine gun fire, and continued our advance on BUENA VISTA.

 

     6.     The road at LAS CRUCES continues straight ahead to QUILALI, turns sharply to the right for BUENA VISTA, and another fork turns to the left there along SAPOTILLAL RIDGE.  This ridge is about 5 miles long and runs north-east into the northern end of CHIPOTE and SAPOTILLAL RIDGE at this northern end.  CHIPOTE itself runs almost due north and south.  It is believed that the bandits were fully convinced, that my patrol was on the way back to QUILALI; that the bandit force fire encountered on LAS CRUCES withdrew along the road to QUILALI to ambush us again, and that the gang originally on our right flank at Plan Grande, withdrew towards BUENA VISTA, thinking their days work was over.  Our march towards BUENA VISTA was conducted in absolute silence, and the nature of the terrain concealed our movements fairly well.

 

     7.     FOURTH CONTACT:  At 1530, when about 500 yards from entrance to BUENA VISTA, Lieutenant W. S. Brown, at head of the point of our advance guard, was challenged by a bandit sentry.  This convinced me, that our approach had been a complete surprise, as otherwise no challenging would have been resorted to by these bandits.  Lieutenant Brown's answered this sentry's challenge by shouting "Amigos" and concealing himself on the side of the trail until balance of advance guard had caught up, at which time he rose up and shot the sentry in his tracks.  A general fire fight ensued for about ten minutes.  It is estimated that the bandits had about 30 rifles in this fight.  As soon as I was able to get our trench mortar into action the bandits dispersed into a ravine on our left flank, where they were assisted in their flight by a shower of hand grenades from all along our line.  Four dead bandits were found and several wounded men were believed to have been carried away by machette men, as tracks were found in several places indicating that bodies had been dragged off the trail.  Due to the danger of shooting our own troops, it was no [not] considered advisable to leave the trail for any great distance in order to check up on casualties.  One rifle was captured, several rounds of dum-dumed bullets, and also ten rounds of loaded cartridges of Mexican manufacture was found on the trail, which had been snapped but had failed to fire.  It is believed we caught up with the rear guard of the force withdrawing leisurely to BUENA VISTA, the same which had an earlier contact with our right flank.

 

     8.     We entered BUENA VISTA without further incident, found the place deserted, but with evidence, that it had been recently occupied by at least 50 people.  BUENA VISTA consisted of six houses, three of which were large and well constructed of lumber with shingled roofs; all houses were bunched within an area of about one city block.  Two springs of excellent cool and clear water were found within 100 yards of one house.  All houses were plentifully supplied with corn, eggs, tortillas still warm in the kitchens, large pots of beans still cooking on the stoves, much cattle, many hogs, chickens, turnkeys, salt, and sugar.  The houses were well furnished with beds, tables, chairs, and cooking arrangements.  At 1630 the planes came over and delivered orders from the Brigade Commander for my patrol to "return to SAN ALBINO tomorrow".  I had intended to continue south next day and clean out San Lucas and San Juan, and then report to TELPANECA for rations, returning to SAN ALBINO via Ciudad Antigua and San Fernando.  [ p. 3 ]

 

     9.     At 0830 January 22, 1928, we commenced our return trip via same route taken on our way out, first destroying all bandit supplies at BUENA VISTA we were unable to take along.  Between BUENA VISTA and Plan Grande we found three fresh graves, that were not there the day before.

 

     10.     FIFTH CONTACT:  At 1030 January 22, 1928, when we were about half way between BUENA VISTA and LAS CRUCES, our advance guard flushed another ambush of about 25 rifles from a knoll near the trail on our left flank.  Lt. Clark, who had the advance guard for the return trip shot and killed one bandit, whose body was recovered, and two other wounded bandits were seen being carried off by machette men.  Trench mortars and automatic weapon fire completely routed this ambush, and we proceeded on to SAN ALBINO, by forced march, as per orders "to return to SAN ALBINO tomorrow" as received by plane on January 21, 1928.  We arrived at SAN ALBINO at 1700 today.

 

     1.     BANDIT PROPERTY AND SUPPLIES CAPTURED, ALL CONTACTS:  One Remington 46-70 rifle; two Krag 30 caliber rifles #369981 & 225551, Springfield Armory 1898; one good riding mule; two good saddles; two good horses; one mule branded USMC and US, believed to have been lost by Richal's column; ten aparejos complete; 55 chickens; 16 leather bags for pack saddles loads; 2 turkeys; numerous hogs and cattle 50 pounds of salt and several hundred pounds of native brown sugar.

 

     12.     No planes were present during any of our contacts; planes arrived between the second and third contact and after the fourth, when we were already in BUENA VISTA.  They also arrived today after our fifth contact, when we were passing down the northern slope of LAS CRUCES.  These last planes covered territory to our front, and materially assisted in expediting our return to SAN ALBINO.

 

     13.     The conduct of all personnel under fire was very good; the work of Lts. Brown and Clark as advance guard commanders, was excellent; the machine gun crews and trench mortar squad went into action in excellent manner and placed their fire where directed, exceptionally well.  Due to nature of terrain and trails, the advance guard, main body and rear guard, marched in single file with our distance, as few places on trail covered, permitted an enemy fire at any one time on more than 10 men, even when command was well closed up.  Distance between elements of the command would only have increased their vulnerability.  One machine gun, and one trench mortar was attached to the advance guard which was composed of two infantry squads; one machine gun squad was attached to the rear guard, which was also composed of two infantry squads.  Each infantry squad had one Thompson sub-machine gun, one Browning automatic rifle, and one rifle grenadier.  The main body consisted entirely of the pack train, with one marine assigned to guard each animal.

 

     14.     The undersigned as Patrol Commander, marched with the trench mortar and machine gun of the advance guard, and personally directed all fire of these weapons.  In each contact, except the first, the advance guard was the only portion of the command, which actually did any fighting; in other words two squads supported by one trench mortar and one machine gun, routed the bandits alone in each contact, except the first.

 

     15.     From above report of rifles used against us, a fairly accurate estimate of enemy encountered can be made, when it is considered that the bandits normal organization includes from three to five machette men for each rifleman; the duties of the machette men being to cheer the riflemen along, carry off the wounded, and stage a machette attack, if conditions appear to be favorable.  There were no marine casualties in any of the contacts.

 

                                                         / s /   R. W. PEARD

 

 

NA127/212/1

 

 

SAN ALBINO, NICARAGUA.

31 January, 1928.

 

From:          Commanding Officer, 20th Company, Third Battalion.

To:              Commanding Officer, Special Combat Expedition against El Chipote.

 

Subject:       Report Activities 20th Co. from 19 Jan to 30 Jan inclusive.

 

Reference:  (a)  Verbal instructions Commanding Officer.

                  (b)  Captured field order of bandit leader, Augusto Sandino, dated

                         20 Jan. 1928.

                  (c)  Captured personal letter of same leader.

 

          1.     In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), the following report is herewith submitted:

 

                 On 19 January, 1928, the 20th Company moved from San Albino to a position about five miles east by north from San Albino and south east of the position occupied by the 45th Company.  Four days rations were carried by mule train.  The verbal instructions at the time were to occupy successive secure positions directly in the line of approach to El Chipote.  Aerial reconnaissance of same date reported El Chipote abandoned.  On the morning of January 20th, I left my company Headquarters with a Reconnaissance patrol of five squads to verify the report of the air force of day before.  Due to lack of knowledge of trails my patrol went to left of direct trail and approached the heights of Santa Rosa from the road leading to Jicaro.  We proceeded at a good rate of march and placed rifle grenades in places in road that looked favorable for ambush.  At about 12 noon we were in the open places on the heights proceeding up hill on the side of a sharp ridge that was well cleared off.  I was walking abreast with Gunnery Sergeant Brooks ahead of the point when fire broke out from concealed places on the crest from what sounded like one machine gun and a section or platoon of rifle at a range between two hundred and three hundred yards.  The members of the advance party immediately took cover as was available on the slope.  All rifle fire was held up by my orders until the enemy could be seen.  All rifle grenades were placed in firing range of the machine gun nest and automatic rifles trained on the areas where smoke was spitting.  The bandits held their fire for about twenty minutes.  The rifle grenadier beside me was shot through the fleshy part of both buttocks with flank fire. When the enemy began to thin all Marines were ordered to pursue.  Only a few of the retreating men were seen jumping into the brush as they fled from their position.  No dead or wounded were found.  Due to the cliff like sides of the knife ridge where that skirmish occurred, it would be easy for wounded to escape detection or dead to be concealed.  The plane observers two days later reported vultures eating four bodies near the location of the contact.  A prisoner captured in El Chipote reported three killed and five wounded including Maradriaga [Maradiaga] who ambushed Lieut. Richal's column and Captain Livingston at Quilali.  The sharp cries of the enemy and thirty or forty well directed grenades and automatic fire followed by his complete and immediate rout indicated to me that someone had been hit.  The enemy officers in the engagement were General Montaya [Carlos Montoya] and Colonel Maradriaga [Colonel Fernando Maradiaga] whose orders from Sandino were typed that day and captured along with considerable native ration and some person equip-  [ p. 2 ]  ment and a letter in the handwriting of Sandino.  All letters herein mentioned and included in references have been forwarded to Brigade Headquarters.  The conduct of the Marines under fire was excellent throughout.  Special recommendations are included in a latter part of this report.  Our column pursued into and beyond Santa Rosa and stayed there for the night while the wounded man was returned and preparation made to bring up the company train at daybreak.  On January 21st the company train was moved up and the outguards occupied the low ridge encircling Chipote.  On January 22nd, the ration was exhausted and the command subsisted on forage with the exception of sugar and a limited amount of coffee and hardtack from then until returning to San Albino.  There was ample native coffee, beef, beans, and fruit.  On the same day the Commanding Officer of the Expedition arrived and accompanied a ration foraging party on the base of Chipote.  Two bombs were fired from the heights above followed by one or two rifle shots but all was beyond range.  On January 23rd, I extended my line of outguards in the forenoon to observe roads and river crossings leading to Chipote.  In the afternoon, in company with the Battalion Commander, the 20th Company crossed the Murra River and occupied an enemy storehouse, filled with provisions, on the base of Chipote and left an observation group in a house on the other side to remain until quartering and messing arrangements were completed.  The outpost was fired upon by snipers at approximately five hundred yards.  Private Hagerman of the observation group was shot in the hand and Private Ingles, leading the ration party back to the observation post, was shot through the forearm.  The observation group and ration party were withdrawn and the entire company quartered near and in the storehouse for the night.  Several scattered rifle shots were fired during the late afternoon by the enemy and a few bombs exploded but none near the company position.  I had my company train move up just at dark.  Fox holes were dug on the steep slopes and all men made as secure as possible from sniping during the night.  On January 24th, one section of the 8th machine gun company arrived at about 10 A.M., in command of Lieut. Clark.  The day was spent in reconnaissance and making preparations to move toward the position known as the main fort.  In the late afternoon and early evening a reconnaissance patrol accompanied by the Battalion Commander moved up the mountain and destroyed an enemy observation post with a large supply of corn after the position had been bombed by the stokes mortar.  It was freshly abandoned.  The 45th Company and 8th Machine gun Company proceeded in combat formation on the left side of the Murra River toward the fort.  The 45th Company moved along the right bank as far as the road lasted.  An entrenched and scantily fortified position one mile below the fort was found abandoned with evidence of fresh occupancy after rifle grenading.  The fort was bombed with the mortar and found abandoned at 1 P.M.  The machine gun saddle and many other saddles and odd pieces of American equipment taken from the two ambushes near Quilali were found in the fort along with a considerable amount of 1927 issue expended 30-30 ammunition and pieces of flying machine tools.  A large number of native saddles were taken and many bull hides used for shelter tents.  I returned to our last position with a part of the command and brought up the company train.  The Battalion Commander established his headquarters in the fort that  [ p. 3 ]  night.  On January 26th, a combat patrol of the 20th Company accompanied by the mortar and Machine Gun in company with the Battalion Commander pushed completely to the top.  Various barricaded buildings and two large hastily constructed buildings were found freshly abandoned.  A freshly butchered beef was found hanging near the house said to have been the headquarters of Gen. Salgado and a chicken still limp and undressed was on the floor of the quarters near the fireplace.  When the column reached the top of the cleared area at the barracks, a camp smoke was seen in the thickly wooded area above.  A light rain was then falling.  The mortar was trained on the camp fire.  The rain ended abruptly and the column penetrated the highest wooded positions of El Chipote to find what could safely be estimated as the tracks of fifty or more men leaving the bombed area in all directions.  The tracks were fresh on the rain-wet leaves.  An outpost was left at the barracks overnight to watch for enemy stragglers.  It consisted of the machine gun, the mortar and two squads of infantry.  Lieut. Clark caught one straggler who was turned over to Lieut. McDonald of the Guardia in the evening to lead him to what was said to be the private quarters of Sandino.  (See report of McDonald)  The 45th Company and Guardia Company arrived at the fort during the day.  On January 27th, I made a reconnaissance of the valley area and completed the complete destruction of every enemy storeroom in the immediate area and captured five mules and five horses from a pasture said by muleros to be that of Sandino.  Preparations were made to move toward Quilali the following morning.  The 45th Company returned to our last camp and Guardia left on special patrol.  On January 28th, the entire company and train accompanied by the Battalion Commander proceeded to Quilali where it camped for the night and found the landing field dug with pits to wreck incoming planes.  The pits were filled.  On January 29th, the company and train proceeded in the direction of San Juan with slow progress due to no guides and bad trails.  A camp was made for the night on a height near Teosintal Creek about five miles above Quilali.  At night went on a special patrol to run down a bandit rumor.  Took three squads.  Left at 12 M and returned at 8:30 A.M. following day.  The patrol was accompanied by Lieut. Clark and the Battalion Commander.  No results.  On January 30th, broke camp after noon meal and was proceeding to San Juan when planes dropped message and course was directed toward San Albino.  Arrived San Albino in excellent condition relative to personnel and materiel at 10 P.M.  Left Chipote first camp with twenty pack animals returned with thirty eight.

 

     2.     Recommendations:

             It is recommended that Private H. O. Nation, be commended for his conduct under fire.  As a rifle grenadier he held his advance position in the point and delivered the grenades on the enemy machine gun nest.  He suffered temporary interruption from the near explosion of an enemy bomb and was wounded by enemy machine gun fire.  He continued firing on the enemy gun until it was out of action and pursued the retreating enemy with rifle fire after he, Private H. O. Nation had been seriously wounded and had lost a considerable amount of blood in spite of orders from Company Commander to fall back to the rear.  Private Nation refused to be carried to San Albino and walked over four miles before he could be placed on a mule for the hospital.  [ p. 4 ] 

 

It is recommended that Gunnery Sergeant Brooks be commended for personally rallying and leading the advance party in pursuit of the enemy when the enemy fire began to weaken and for displaying a high example of personal courage in combat.

 

It is recommended that Sergeant Floyd be commended for directing the fire of the automatic weapons of the main body of the patrol in constantly exposed positions with effective destruction on the parties in ambush.

 

          3.     Comments:

                  I do not believe from what I have actually seen of Sandino's position that he has ever had a force of more than two hundred and fifty men at any time.  There is no indication that his force is mounted or ever was.  Possibly forty or fifty may have been at times.  There is no indication from the trails leading to and from Chipote that he left his position in a body.  He cannot subsist on Chipote after we left it.  Neither has he quarters there now. I have never heard any reliable report from anyone who has seen or counted the actual command of Sandino.  I believe that his force is broken into very small groups that may continue to operate for several months.  His letter head dated 20 January was from Chipote.  Since that date no large body has left Chipote unless by careful filtration.

 

                                                                     / s /  Howard N. Kenyon

 

 

NA127/220/2