| |
28.02.27. Geyer,
patrol report no. 3, los robles, jinotega.
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PROVISIONAL BATTALION
LOS ROBLES, NICARAGUA.
27 FEBRUARY 1928.
PATROL REPORT NO. 3.
1.
Lieutenant S. S. Jack, fifteen men and Captain Geyer
commanding, on information that Sandino has to spend the
night at the home of one Saloman Carvafal proceeded to
San Antonio and return. Night patrol, mounted.
Distance travelled eleven miles. Weather rainy,
visibility zero, trail bad.
2.
Patrol left Los Robles at 2000-26 February 1928
investigated report and found same to be erroneous
returned 0130-27 February 1928. Habitants as a
whole suspicious and hostile. Saloman Carvafal too
friendly. During the night a party of three men
beat the woman, of the man who volunteered the
information and guided the patrol to Carvafal finca with
a club. Told her that if the beating was reported
to us they would set fire to the house and kill her.
Directed attack on woman he referred to local police.
/ s / P. C. Geyer,
Captain, USMC.
Bn-Ex, Bn-2
NA127/220/6
|
|
Summary & Notes |
| |
•
|
Night
patrol to find EDSN suspect Salomón Carvajal, who they
find and consider "too friendly." |
| |
•
|
Natives
encountered "suspicious and hostile"; but this was a
night march, and any natives encountered would've been
rousted from their beds and had their homes invaded; no
wonder they were suspicious and hostile. |
| |
•
|
Woman
beaten by three men because her man provided info to
Marines and guided them to Carvajal's house; threatened
her with death if she reported the beating; Marines
refer the matter to the local police; she probably ended
up dead; a revealing & tragic commentary on rural gender
relations. |
PC-docs Inventory in excel file •
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28.02.28. Hunter,
patrol report no. 4, los robles, jinotega.
|
PROVISIONAL BATTALION
LOS ROBLES, NICARAGUA.
28 February 1928.
PATROL REPORT No. 4.
1.
The undersigned with the 47th Company 3 Officers and
seventy four enlisted, left camp at 8:30 am,
Feb.26,1928, and returned at 10 am, Feb.28,1928.
Route Pass Real [Paso Real]-Tomayunca-4 miles south of
Guala [Guale]- thence return to Tomayunca- thence west
to Moncotal [Mancotal] and to Northwest moving along
south slope of the hills - Llangue and return
Miles covered about 48 miles.
2.
In all the area covered there was no sign of bandit
activity. Inhabitants questioned all along the
route: not friendly, guarded, would not give
information, seemingly pro-bandit.
3.
Route to Pass Real, about five (5) miles, flat, than
[then] rolling for about five (5) miles beyond Tomayunca.
Comparatively good going and passable to bull carts.
Then higher hills with trails boggy and deep mud.
On main trail toward Guala-Pantasma the pack animals
were halted and a part of the patrol moved ahead.
Trail at this point was practically impassable for pack
animals, and possible with great difficulty for land
riding animals. There is a network of trails in
the country south of the mountains. The people all
claim that there is but one trail leading across the
mountains, and that, the one described above.
4.
Effort was made to buy rations enroute. It would
have been possible to get a beef, and coffee was
purchased by buying small amounts here and there.
It is not possible to buy beans, corn, sugar, or other
components even in small quantities, except at a small
store in Pass Real.
5.
A diagrammatic sketch will be turned in later.
/ s / R. S. Hunter,
Captain, U.S.Marine Corps.
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Summary & Notes |
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•
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78
Marines out for two days in the coffee highlands NE of
Jinotega. |
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•
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Natives
"not friendly, guarded, seemingly pro-bandit." |
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•
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Very
difficult to buy food & supplies enroute. |
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•
|
Sketch
not found. |
PC-docs Inventory in excel file •
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28.02.29.
Cronmiller, Contact with bandits, somoto.
|
Marine Detachment
Somoto, Nicaragua
29 February, 1928.
From:
Second Lieutenant Le Page Cronmiller Jr., U.S.M.C.
To:
Commanding Officer, Area of the North.
Subject:
Contact with bandits.
1. Patrol consisting of Lt.
Cronmiller, ten enlisted marines and six Guardia cleared
Somoto at 0200 29 February 28 for Juali, twelve miles
South West of Somoto and six miles from the border of
Honduras, following information that a group of about
thirty bandits were in native huts on a mountain side
under leadership of Gregeris Diaz [Gregorio Díaz] and
Carmen Lopez. The patrol arrived at its
destination at about 0530. Dismounting and
approaching houses on foot, the patrol was detected and
signal given by outpost of arrival of patrol One
shot was fired at patrol and men could be seen leaving
houses and running for the brush. The Marines and
Guardia opened fire, killing one and wounding another.
The men in upper houses made way in the brush before the
patrol arrived. It is estimated that about fifteen
men were in the group, few had rifles, and a few shot
guns and the remainder were armed with machettes.
2. From information gathered
from other people, these bandits work in conjunction
with Jose Leon Diaz under leadership of Gregeris Diaz
and Carmen Lopez. The patrol left Juali and
proceeded to Santa Rosa, then to the hang-out of Juan
Banstita Rivera [Juan Bautista Rivera], one league from
the border. Searched the house of Juan Banstita
Rivera and finding nothing, the patrol returned to
Somoto at 1230.
3. There were no Marine or
Guardia casualties.
4. The following Marines and
Guardia were members of the patrol.
Marines
Guardia
Cpl. V. C. Bertram
Cabo Madriz Ramon # 274
Pfc. Jay H. Smith
Raso Lagos Salmon # 267
Pvt. Urette Dunn
" Blanco Federico # 205
"
Howard Gursky
" Rosenberg Bentrago # 231
"
George Chermak
" Morales Juan J. # 185
"
George Foote
" Rodriguez Felix # 409
"
Chester B. Wendell
"
Austin Mims
"
John N. Thompson Jr.
"
John Sangster
/ s / LePage Cronmiller, Jr.
NA127/220/6
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|
Summary & Notes |
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•
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Back to
the Somoto - Honduran borderlands. 11 Marines with
6 native Guardia. |
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•
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EDSN
Jefes Gregorio Díaz, Carmen López, José León Díaz,
leading a group of 15-30. |
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•
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Juan
Bautista Rivera soon allied with the Marines-GN,
becoming an important scout, guide, informant, and spy. |
| |
•
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Military
contact: at least one EDSN killed & one wounded;
no Marine-GN casualties. |
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•
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EDSN
poorly armed. |
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•
|
Patrol
initiated on receipt of information from an undisclosed
source. |
PC-docs Inventory in excel file •
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28.02.29. Claude,
Relief Patrol to DarailÍ from yalÍ.
|
Marine Detachment, Yali Nicaragua
29 February, 1928
From:
2nd Lieut. D. K. Claude, U S Marine Corps
To:
Area Commander, Area of the North
Via:
Commanding Officer, M.D. Yali
Subject:
Relief patrol to Daryli [Darailí], report of.
1.
At 2310, 27 February, upon orders from the Commanding
Officer M.D. Yali, I cleared Yali with patrol consisting
of twenty four enlisted marines, one enlisted navy and
two native guides for the scene of the ambush of Lieut.
O'Day's train near the ranch Daryli about 17 miles S.W.
[NW] Yali, to render any assistance which might be
needed there. At 0315 28 February on account of
darkness and lack of familiarity with the terrain I
halted the patrol. At 0520 I proceeded and at 0805
upon my arrival reported to Lieut. O'Day at the aid
station, offering the services of my patrol.
Having accomplished its mission, the patrol rested, had
breakfast, and at 0955 cleared for Yali (with exception
of one private from Lieut. O'Day's train and guides),
and . . . [second page missing].
[
/ s / D. K. Claude ]
NA127/220/6
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Summary & Notes |
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•
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This is
following up on the battle of El Bramadero of 27 Feb
1928, an important EDSN victory (Lt. O'Day's report of the
battle follows this one,
PC-Docs 28.03.01). |
| |
•
|
Claude identifies one of the Marines' major military
weaknesses: "lack of familiarity with the
terrain." |
| |
•
|
"M.D." =
Military District. |
PC-docs Inventory in excel file •
pc-docs inventory on pc-docs home
28.03.01. O'Day,
Report of engagement with bandit forces, condega (el bramadero,
27 Feb 1928).
The engagement at El
Bramadero, in which five Marines were killed and eight wounded,
became a key event in the emergent Sandinista narrative of the
crafty and invincible guerrilla, and steeled the Marines' resolve to
wage war without quarter against the "Bandit Forces" and their
supporters. This report by Lt. O'Day offers many revealing
details about the battle. It is followed by the New York
Times story; Sandino's published letter on the fight; and the
version of Sandinista propagandist Emidgio Maraboto (1929).
|
Headquarters, 2nd Battalion, 11th
Regiment.
Condega, Nicaragua.
1 March 1928.
From:
First Lieutenant Edward F. O'Day,U.S.Marine Corps.
To:
The Battalion Commander, 2nd Battalion, 11th Regiment.
Subject:
Report of engagement with bandit forces
1.
The following report of a skirmish with bandit forces is
herewith submitted:
On 27 February 1928, the ration train under my command
that left ESTELI on 23 February, 1928, and proceeded to
SAN RAFAEL and YALI with commissary stores, cleared YALI
at 8:15 a.m. on 27 February, 1928, all stores having
been delivered. The column consisted of one
officer, thirty five Marines, one pharmacists mate third
class, U.S.Navy, twenty muleros and two "Jefe" muleros
with ninety nine mules and was proceeding along the
trail between YALI and CONDEGA. At approximately
one-half the distance between the two towns, the column
was ambushed by the bandit forces. The exact
location of the skirmish is about one thousand yards
west of a town named BROMADEROS [El Bramadero].
2.
The column had just been closed up and was proceeding
west, and as it entered the flat space of ground between
the two ranges of hills, the Bandit Forces opened fire
on the right flank of the column throughout its entire
length, also from the front and rear of the column.
3.
The firing commenced at approximately 1:30 p.m., and
lasted until 8:30 p.m. the same date, when it subsided
to irregular harrasing fire throughout the night.
It is estimated beyond doubt that the bandit forces had
a minimum of four machine guns, at least six hundred
rifles and a large quantity of dynamite bombs. It
is estimated that at least two hundred dynamite bombs
were discharged.
4.
The bandit forces withheld fire until the entire column
was in front of them, varying in distance from 75 to 200
yards along the trail. The first shot of the
skirmish was directed at the undersigned and was
immediately followed by simultaneous firing along their
entire line, the opening up with everything that they
may have had. The mule train was stampeded upon
the initial burst of fire along the line. The
Marines eased off to the brush on their left and
commenced firing. Being out-numbered to such an
extent and the bandit forces having fire [ p. 2 ]
superiority, the Marines eased to the left gradually,
taking position on a ridge. The Bandit Forces
continued incessant fire until about 2:30 p.m. when they
advanced towards the Marines in line of skirmish.
The machine guns keeping up fire on the Marine's
positions, in addition to bandit rifles. Advancing
to the foot of the hill the Bandit Forces fell back at
about 3:00 p.m., leaving in the vicinity several groups
of their men. As they fell back to their
positions, they ravaged what could be found on the
train. At or about 6:30 p.m. they again moved
forward in skirmish formation and proceeded to the base
of the hill. This advance was also broken up and
stopped by Marine fire. The Bandit Forces kept
firing during the entire time until about 8:30 p.m.
They were evidently well supplied with ammunition as one
or more machine guns were firing practically all of the
time in addition to rifle fire and bombs. During
the night there was a great deal of movement of bandit
troops and what sounded like bull carts and a mule
train. The Marines maintained position occupied
until day-break when reinforcements from the 57th
Company, under Command of Captain William K. MacNulty,
U.S.Marine Corps, arrived on the scene at day-break.
The attack on Bandit Forces was then taken up.
5.
The following named Marines were killed in action on 27
February 1928:
Private PUMP, John C.
Private ROBBINS, George E.
Private SCHLAUCH, Albert.
Two more as follows, died the following day, 28 February
1928, from wounds received in action on 27 February
1928:
Corporal AUSTIN, Cicero D.
Private MOTT, Curtis J.
There were eight men wounded as follows:
Sergeant CHRISTIAN, Wilbourn O.
Sergeant ISHAM, Charles H.
Private BALLARD, Lewis E.
Private CRUM, Peter C.
Private DAVIS, Lem, C.
Private MAYNARD, Linton C.
Private CARTER, Raymond B.
Private PHELPS, Clarence E.
Four of the twenty muleros with
the column were wounded by rifle fire, two of them
leaving the vicinity for ESTELI at dusk, one going to
CONDEGA, the other being wounded in the groin,remained
with the Marines.
6.
On the morning of 28 February, 1928, after the attack
upon the enemy emplacements, the three dead Marines were
collec- [ p. 3 ] ted and interred near the
village of BROMADEROS under the supervision of Captain
MacNulty. Such equipment and effects as were found were
returned to CONDEGA. The bandits killed and
wounded in the skirmish were taken to their rear and it
is practically impossible to ascertain the number or to
form an estimate, although there were many evidences of
bandits having been wounded and evacuated.
7.
The two Marines that died on 28 February,1928,of wounds
received in action on 27 February, 1928, were interred
at DARIJLI. Existing instructions pertaining to
deceased Marines were complied with to the best extent
practicable.
8.
Two or more of the bandit forces could speak irregular
English, and made a specialty of harrassing the Marines
with slurs and insults during any lull in firing.
All the bandit troops that came in sight of the
undersigned were outfitted with shoes.
9.
At about 7:30 p.m., their fire was lulled and the man
with a tenor voice complimented the bandits for their
work. This was repeated in loud tones all along
the line, the message as heard seemed to be, "Complimentado
todos soldato por travio bueno." Upon the message
being repeated, three tremendous cheers were given,
interspersed each time with the detonation of from six
to ten bombs. The cheer was "Vive la Sandino, vive
las Nicaraguans."
10.
Immediately following this cheer, three more were given
for some general, the name I could not ascertain, but it
sounded as though it had three syllables.
11.
Shortly after 8:30 p.m., some of the bandit troops
started to leave. This was the signal for more
cheers. Some that were understood were "Bueno Concordia,
Adios Condega, Adios Jinotega, apparently detachments
from those vicinities.
12.
Approximately one-third of horses and mules in the
column were killed, wounded, or captured by the bandit
forces.
13.
The Marine dead were whacked over the head with bolos,
the bandit skirmishers, splitting their skulls wide
open.
14.
It is recommended that the following named men be cited
for exceptional bravery in the face of hostile bandit
fire. Statements of witnesses to the acts
described are not available at present, but can be
obtained at an early date. [ p. 4 ]
Gunnery Sergeant Herbert F. Larrick, U.S.M.C., who, in
the face of the tremendous volume of initial firing by
the bandits, by his steadiness and coolness in action,
displayed keen judgement in assembling the Marines near
the center of the train and conducted them to a point of
advantage, from where he opened up fire on the bandit
emplacements. Cooling down the men, most of whom
were receiving their baptismal fire, he ably assisted in
repelling the enemy advance. [handwritten in
margin: "citation"]
Sergeant Wilbourn O. Christian, U.S.M.C., who was at the
head of the column, his horse shot from underneath him
and he being pitched to the ground, maintained a cool
and steady nerve, although wounded, took charge of the
Marines in the forward section of the train, directed
their fire upon the bandit emplacements, and got them to
a point of vantage from where he opened fire on
vulnerable spots in the bandit defense, later assisting
to break up the bandit advance. [handwritten in
margin: "citation"]
Sergeant Charles H. Isham, U.S.M.C., who was bringing up
the rear of the column, having been shot through the
thigh on the first volume of fire, organized a squad of
men and delivered volley fire at vulnerable spots in the
bandit emplacements, his very active and conduct [sic]
under a disastrous and withering enemy fire, was an
example for the men near him, most of whom were
receiving their baptismal fire. By his well
directed fire, the remainder of the detachment along the
rear of the train, was enabled to get into position and
pick up the fire. Badly wounded, he exercised
command over the right of the line during the entire
engagement, disregarding his own comfort and safety to
perform an arduous task far beyond the call of duty.
[handwritten in margin: "Navy Cross"]
Pharmacists Mate Third Class Linn H. McEwan U.S. Navy,
with the bandit forces to the front and left front made
a timing movement around the head of the column, far
above and beyond the call of duty, volunteered to cross
an open field in order to get the message to Sergeant
Christian, under extremely heavy and close hand fire,
the bandit forces concentrating their fire on him.
He successfully performed the mission, and then
proceeded with treatment of the wounded, helping them
out of open spaces to cover under devastating machine
gun fire. No known wounded man went without
treatment, once McEwan was informed of the location of
the wounded, absolutely sacrificing his own safety to
render assistance to any man in need. [handwritten
in margin: "Navy Cross"]
Corporal Homer T. Provost, U.S.M.C., attached to train
from the Intelligence Section, Headquarters Company, 2nd
Battalion, upon the train being ambushed, knowing that
the Marines were greatly outnumbered, and being
surrounded, made a getaway right through their midst,
and once clear, make a straight course for CONDEGA, 15
miles distant, there informing the Battalion Commander
of the plight of the train. Enroute to CONDEGA, he
also advised Captain MacNulty, who had a combat patrol
[ p. 5 ] on the trail, of the circumstances, who
proceeded hastily to the scene of the encounter,
reaching there at day-break, probably saving many mens'
lives. [handwritten in margin: "citation"]
Private First Class Edward L. Garrison, U.S.M.C., who,
when Gunnery Sergeant Larrick asked for a volunteer to
get through the bandit lines and into YALI, about 12
miles distant, with the information that the train was
ambushed and surrounded, and that help was needed,
gladly and willingly, volunteered for the mission.
Leaving at dark, he successfully worked his way through
the bandits, and ran practically all the way to YALI,
where a mounted patrol under Lieutenant Cloud was
organized, and, under the guidance of Garrison,
proceeded to the scene of the attack. [handwritten
in margin: "citation"]
Several other exceptional and distinguished acts of
bravery by members of the train convoy will be forwarded
when all the details are available.
15.
It is further recommended that all the men in the train
convoy be commended for their loyal and brave conduct
under severe fire and adverse conditions, it being the
first time practically all of them had been subjected to
heavy fire, conducted themselves as well trained
soldiers performing their task in a very commendable
manner.
16.
The following is a roster of the men who participated in
the action against the Bandit Forces, 27 February, 1928,
near the vicinity of BROMADEROS:
57th Co., 2nd Bn.,
11th Regt.
Gy. Sgt. LARRICK,
Herbert F.
Sgt.
CHRISTIAN, Wilbourn O.
Sgt. ISHAM,
Charles H.
Cpl.
AUSTIN, Cicero D.
Cpl.
GRIFFITH, Forrest E.
Cpl.
PEARLSTEIN, Joseph.
Cpl.
ZERNICKE, Edgar L.
Pfc.
GARRISON, Edward L.
Pfc.
McDANIEL, Eugene I.
Pfc.
PETTERSON, Walter B.
Pfc. NINER,
Charles E.
Pfc.
SIMPSON, Oran G.
Pvt.
ADAMS, Romain F.
Pvt.
BALLARD, Lewis E.
Pvt.
BIGELOW, Tracy "L".
Pvt.
BREVIK, Lewis C.
Pvt. BUNN,
Bennie M.
Pvt.
CARTER, Raymond B.
Pvt.
CLARK, Lloyd. [ p. 6 ]
Pvt.
CORDON, Walter E.
Pvt. CRUM,
Peter C.
Pvt.
DAVIS, John.
Pvt.
DOUGHTERTY, Glenn M.
Pvt.
DOWNEY, John P.
Pvt.
LOUDEN, Arthur G.
Pvt.
McCARVILLE, John W.
Pvt.
MAYNARD, Linton C.
Pvt.
PHELPS, Clarence E.
Pvt.
PIERSON, Edward J.
Pvt. PUMP,
John C.
Pvt.
ROBBINS, George E.
Pvt.
SCHLAUCH, Albert.
Pvt. MOTT,
Curtis J.
Pvt.
DAVIS, Lem. C.
HQ&HQCo.,2ndBn,11th
Regt.
Cpl. PROVOST,
Homer T.
NAVY
PERSONNEL.
PhM3c.
McEWAN, Linn H.
/ s / EDWARD F. O'DAY.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - -
1st Endorsement
2 March 1928.
Headquarters, 2nd Battalion, 11th
Regiment, Condega, Nicaragua.
From:
Commanding Officer
To:
Area Commander, Northern Area, Ocotal, Nicaragua.
1.
Forwarded.
2.
It is recommended that those men recommended in
paragraph 14, for exceptional bravery by the detachment
commander be cited in orders and that they be
recommended for award of the Navy Cross. Necessary
statements will be forwarded as soon as obtainable.
Further recommendations are contemplated as soon as
necessary statements can be obtained.
3.
It is further recommended that the entire detachment be
commended by letter for the soldierly conduct under
fire. Verbal commendation has already been made by
the Battalion Commander.
/ s / H. C. PIERCE
NA127/204/3
Ancillary Document 1:
Sandino's Account
of the Fight at El Bramadero
27 February 1928
El Chipotón
February 28, 1928
To
Froylán Turcios
Tegucigalpa
Dear
Teacher:
I have the honor of informing you that the weapons defending
the sovereignty of Nicaragua continue to cover themselves
with undying glory.
Yesterday, the 27th of the current month, there was a bloody
battle between our forces and the punitive army and the
patricides in a place called El Bramadero, in the department
of Estelí. After our evacuation of the fortress of El
Chipote and after we had traversed the greater parts of the
departments of Jinotega and Matagalpa, we decided to set up
camp in the new fortress, El Chipotón, a place absolutely
unknown to the punitive forces, and from here with very
great success I began to carry out the plans that we had
drawn up. On the 26th I ordered out the infantry
column under the command of General Simón Montoya, aided by
the cavalry units of General Luis Espinoza Z. and Colonel
Carlos Quezada, as well as the batteries of Lewis machine
guns commanded by Lieutenant Colonels José Rosas Tejada and
José Lagos. This entire force was expected to overtake
a regiment of eight hundred pirates who had left the village
of Yalí in the direction of Condega. The moment was
not long in coming. On the 27th, at two in the
afternoon, as our army reached the juncture of the highways
that lead from Telpaneca to Estelí, they were informed by
Sergeants Major Leopoldo Telléz and Lorenzo Blandón, leaders
of the advance guard, that the previously mentioned regiment
was located less than a kilometer away on the same road.
Our army immediately took up positions, and we had hardly
gotten into place when the great pirate procession began to
enter the ambush, moving slowly, unwinding like some
wretched snake. When the pirates' advance guard
reached our infantry's extreme forward position, the latter
began to fire their weapons and, simultaneously, our two
cavalry units attacked the enemy's flanks, both rear and
forward; in this way the pirates were herded into a circle
of riflemen and machine gunners, being almost completely
wiped out. We are certain that their losses have not
been less than seven hundred. We think this is the
first time the Yankees have suffered a massacre of this kind
in Central America.
The battle lasted five and a half hours. We took from
them four hundred Lewis rifles, sixteen machine guns, one
hundred and eighty mules loaded with provisions and
ammunition, eleven cameras, four pairs of binoculars, two
cases of surgical instruments, sixty 45-caliber pistols, and
a large quantity of kitchen utensils. All this was
collected and taken to our main encampment. Divine
Providence protects us. With our war arsenal enriched
in this way, we can be certain that at this time we are
stronger in war equipment than that ridiculous Adolfo Díaz
himself.
This month there have also been clashes of little
importance, the biggest being the one that took place on the
outskirts of San Juan de Segovia, where twenty-seven
casualties were inflicted upon the conquerors and some
rifles were taken from them.
Soon we will give you additional news about our new
operations.
Please receive, in my name and that of my Army, a fraternal
embrace.
Patria y Libertad.
/ s / A. C. SANDINO
Robert
Edgar Conrad,
Sandino, Testimony of a Nicaraguan Patriot
(Princeton, 1990), pp.
185-86.
|
Ancillary Document 2:
Account
of the Fight at El Bramadero by
Emigdio Maraboto, Sandino ante el
coloso
(Veracruz, México, Ed. L. & M., S. en
C., 1929)
Fue el
27 de febrero. Ya nosotros conocíamos la táctica
yanqui, a quienes dimos por su juego. Emplazamos
todas nuestras ametralladoras en lugares estratégicos y
nos pusimos a esperar. La brigada completa se
colocó en el sitio deseado. Llegó el momento y . .
. nuestras máquinas de guerra trepidaron hasta fundirse
al calor. Los pobrecitos yanquis caían como
chapulines. Fue la matanza más grande que he visto
en mi vida. Desesperados, disparaban al azar, como
locos; se subían a los árboles y luego caían perforados
por las balas de las ametralladoras; se lanzaban al
ataque de los lugares donde partían los fuegos, y no
lograban llegar. Iban a pecho descubierto y
ofrecían un blanco admirable a nuestras balas. Sus
armas, las armas que bendijo el obispo de Granada, no
les sirvieron para nada. Huyeron en dispersión.
El triunfo de nosotros fue completo. El campo, un
cañaveral inmenso, resecado por los vientos, cobijaba
centares de muertos y heridos. Por los cuatro
costados se puso fuego a las hojas secas del cañaveral.
¡Era preciso acabar con las alimañas! Las llamas
se alzaron pronto avivados por el aire. El olor a
carne quemada se esparció en el espacio.
Pero Sandino fue generoso. Era crueldad inaudita
quemar a los heridos imposibilitados de moverse.
Cierto que eran los violadores de las mujeres nicaragüenses,
los invasores, los ladrones de objetos sagrados en los
templos, pero eran seres humanos. "A pesar de todo —
dijo el guerrillero — son mis hermanos." Y el héroe
agigantó su talla, mandando a apagar los fuegos del
cañaveral y a recoger los heridos.
Antes de retirarse de El Bramadero, Sandino recogió un botín
de guerra magnífico: ametralladoras Lewis y Colt,
rifles automáticos, gran número de pistolas Thompson y
cartuchos en enorme candidad. Además, recogió el
incensario de oro robado en la iglesia de Yalí, que fue
entregado a los vecinos más caracterizados de El Bramadero,
para ser devuelto a su lugar de origen. . . .
|
|
|
Summary & Notes |
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•
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A major
combat — successful ambush & major victory for the EDSN,
big defeat for Marines. |
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•
|
3
Marines killed that day, their corpses mutilated; 2 died
the next day; 8 wounded. For USMC one of the
deadliest days of the war. Unknown number of EDSN
casualties. |
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•
|
Estimated 1/3 of 99 mules killed, wounded, or captured
by EDSN. |
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•
|
EDSN had
ample weaponry & ammunition (a relative rarity); all
wore shoes; material resources evidently ample. |
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•
|
EDSN
contingents / columns from various locales converging
for an ambush; implicit here: very effective EDSN
intelligence and communications networks. |
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•
|
EDSN
morale extremely high; description of "tremendous
cheers" accompanied by many dynamite bombs. Some
wonderful descriptions of EDSN actions. |
| |
•
|
O'Day
calls rebels "Bandit Forces" — persistent capitalization
connotes a well organized and formidable enemy (also
somewhat ironic, oxymoronic). |
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•
|
Both
sides use the occasion to commemorate acts of heroism,
bravery, sacrifice. |
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•
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Sandino's version: inflates number of Marines to
800 (more than 20 times the actual number), 700
casualties (87 times the actual number). Vast
inflation of Marine casualties, amount of war materiel
seized, scale of EDSN victory. |
| |
•
|
Maraboto's version: Marines depicted as violators
of women, churches, thieves of sacred objects; Sandino
portrayed as magnanimous, humane, the embodiment of
justice. |
| |
•
|
EDSN
General (Colonel?) Luis Espinoza later died of wounds
inflicted in the fight; a nephew of Moisés González,
owner of the ranch Darailí; a pivotal event for González,
who soon after switched sides, allied with the
Marines-GN, and reluctantly permitted a garrison to be
established at his ranch. |
| |
•
|
Should
be read in tandem with the following report by Captain
W. K. McNulty. |
PC-docs Inventory in excel file •
pc-docs inventory on pc-docs home
28.03.05.
McNulty / Atkinson, Report of Action (at El Bramadero), condega.
57thCo, 2nd Bn., 11th Regt.,
Condega, Nicaragua.
5 March 1928.
From:
Captain William K. McNulty, U.S.M.C.
To:
The Commanding Officer, Second Battalion, 11th Regiment.
Subject:
Report of action - patrol of 57th Company, commanded by
Captain William K. McNulty, U.S. Marine Corps.
1.
In compliance with orders from Battalion Commander, 2nd
Battalion, 11th Regiment, dated 27 February 1928, I
cleared Condega at 5:34 pm, February 27, 1928, with 2
commissioned officers, 1 warrant officer and 85 enlisted
marines and 1 hospital corpsman, enroute to Yali and
Vegas via Daraili to investigate and suppress any bandit
activities at those places.
2.
At 10:30 pm, 27 February 1928, the column was halted by
Cpl Homer T. Provost about 4 miles from Daraili who
reported that Lt. O'Day's column had been ambushed about
3 miles the other side of Daraili and that he had made a
getaway to report to Condega (Cpl Provost is in the
Intelligence section, 2nd Battalion). I proceeded
to Daraili where the mule train and all extra equipment
was left under guard.
3.
Mr. Gonzalez at Daraili was questioned and stated that
he had heard firing between 1:00 pm and 8:00 pm, he did
not know anything about what was going on; a patrol was
dispatched to Condega with this information to the
Battalion Commander.
4.
At 12:45 am, 28 February 1928, the column left Daraili
for Lt. O'Day's relief; after marching 1 1/2 hours, I
decided that we were nearly up to the place of ambush,
no firing had been heard and only a few native yells; as
soon as it was light enough a reconnaissance was made
and it was found that we were about 500 yards from the
place of ambush. Moving forward, our point entered
an open space, I had gone forward at this time and we
saw two pack mules, one packed with what looked like
ammunition, running toward the hill on our left front.
I called the Marine Gunner Allen to shoot it, which he
did, at the same time halting the column in the brush
and got the point under cover. At this place we
found a marine hat and some equipment (sketching board
and map case).
5.
Shortly after the shots had been fired at the mules I
heard Lt. O'Day call from the brush on the right of the
trail asking "Who is there"? I answered, "Captain
McNulty with the 57th Company." Lt. O'Day then
came up thru the brush and joined the company giving me
the approximate location of the bandit positions, and
stating that his column was badly scattered.
6.
I gave Marine Gunner Allen instructions to get his
machine gun in a position where he could sweep the crest
of the hill on our left front and formed my company
along the trail, Lt. Chapelle on the left, Lt. O'Day on
the right, myself in the center, we started to advance
at 6:45 am, moving off to the northeast making a turning
movement to the right and advancing due east striking
the bandits of the right flank (see intelligence section
sketch); they opened fire at about u:12 am [sic]
which was returned, the advance was continued by short
rushes, the machine gun covering the ridge ahead of us
as we advanced, the gunner having a good view of the
crest of the hill gave him excellent position for with
very little danger to our line.
7.
Our advance continued until 8:20 am, when the last
bandits were cleared out of the vicinity.
8.
It is estimated that on the morning of February 28,
approximately 200 bandits were in position and a
conservative estimate of their casualties would be 10
dead and 30 wounded. 7 dead horses were counted on
the hill after the attack. There were no marine
casualties during the attack of February 28, 1928.
9.
It is believed by the undersigned that the attack on the
morning of February 28, 1928, was a surprise to the
bandits, they were waiting until daylight to complete
the destruction of Lt. O'Day's organization and did not
have information that reinforcements had arrived,
[ p. 2 ] when our automatic weapons started firing
there was a surprise yell all along their lines.
10.
The troops were withdrawn at about 9:30 am, and outposts
established. In assembling Lt. O'Day's patrol, it
was found that he had 3 dead and 10 wounded on February
27, 1928. The dead were buried, Brigade Order #28
of 1 March 1927, being complied with as nearly as
possible, stretchers were improvised and preparations
were made to return to Daraili with the wounded.
At about 12:10 pm, an airplane sighted us when reports
of casualties were made.
11.
The column left Bromaderos at 1:00 pm, and arrived at
Daraili at 2:10 p.m., where the Battalion Commander was
waiting.
12.
The entire command conducted themselves in the most
soldierly manner during the attack of February 28th,
most of the company being recruits with less than 4
months training yet they responded instantly to orders
and the line never faltered in it's advance.
/ s / W. K. McNulty
NA127/212/1
HEADQUARTERS, 2ND BATTALION, 11TH
REGIMENT,
CONDEGA, NICARAGUA.
2 MARCH 1928.
The
following report was made to the Battalion Commander by
Captain William K. MacNulty at DARAJLI, 28 February
1928, on his return from contact with bandit forces at
JOCOTO:-
Left
CONDEGA at 5:35 p.m., and proceeded to DARAJLI (15 miles
NE of CONDEGA). Enroute received unconfirmed
report that SANDINO was oeprating between DARAJLI and
YALI. at 9:40 p.m., Corporal Provost of the
Intelligence Platoon halted the column and reported that
Lieutenant O'Day had been ambushed about one and one
half miles east of DARAJLI. On arrival DARAJLI S.
Gonzales the owner of the finca told me that he had
heard firing between 1:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. He
also told me that Sandino was present with the bandits.
I left all packs and surplus equipment at the finca
under guard and left at 12:45 a.m. to relief of
Lieutenant O'Day. We arrived at JOCOTO about 3:15
a.m. As soon as it was light enough a
reconnaissance was made. At this time Lieutenant
O'Day called from the brush to keep clear of the point
of the hill. After a conference with Lieutenant
O'Day I decided to place a machine gun where it would
comb the hill leaving one squad with the gun with Marine
Gunner Allen and the balance of the company was formed
along the trail. Lieutenant O'Day on the right,
Lieutenant Chappell on the left, myself in the center,
making a turning movement across the face of the hill
striking the enemy on the flank; this movement started
at 6:45 a.m. and at 7:12 a.m. we were fired on from the
left center. The advance was continued driving
them to the north over the hill. The last bandits
leaving about two miles north of where contact was made.
There were no casuals [casualties] in this patrol.
During the fight of the morning of February 28th,
bandits lost approximately ten killed and thirty
wounded. The patrol under Lieutenant O'Day was
assembled and it was found that he had three dead and
nine wounded. The dead were buried at JOCOTO and
the wounded were cared for and taken to DARAJLI where
the command was met by Major Pierce.
/ s / B. W. Atkinson
First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps,
Bn-3.
NA127/113C/12
|
|
Summary & Notes |
| |
•
|
Should
be read in tandem with Lt. O'Day's report on the El
Bramadero fight, above. |
| |
•
|
A rescue
operation; coming to the aid of Lt. O'Day. |
| |
•
|
Some 113
Marines & Navy (McNulty with 89 + O'Day with 24 [37-13
casualties] = 113) vs. estimated 200 EDSN; fairly evenly
matched in numbers. |
| |
•
|
EDSN
evidently surprised by arrival of reinforcements; a
significant fight, begun at 7:12 a.m., ended at 8:20
a.m., Feb. 28. |
| |
•
|
EDSN
casualties estimated at 10 killed, 30 wounded —
significant losses after their big victory the day
before; must've been a pretty big letdown. No
Marine casualties. |
| |
•
|
Moisés
González at Darailí says Sandino was at the fight; not
so. |
PC-docs Inventory in excel file •
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28.03.05. ROckey, Report of Patrol, YalÍ.
|
Yali, March 5, 1928 9:00 A.M.
From:
Major K. E. Rockey
To:
The Brigade Commander (operations officer)
| |
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