Additional References to Dionisio Arteta

1.  B-2 Report, Managua, 11 November 1929  (IR29.11.11, NA127/209/1)

... A small band under Domingo Arteta passed one-half league South of Concordia on the 3rd [of November 1929] ...   [ p. 2 ]

 

... From Guardia Jinotega:  "Lieutenant Krebbs thirty nine reports ten bandits robbed Santiago and Unico Gutierrez at Sabeli three leagues south of San Rafael at five p.m. 1st [November] stop they cleared in the direction of Trinidad at five a.m. of the 2nd stop Stevens at Concordia reports eight bandits under Domingo Arteta [Dionisio Arteta] with Pablo Valdora [Pablo Valdivia] and one other as prisoners passed half league south of Concordia at one thousand (10 a.m.) on the third stop they were armed with rifles and pistols stop Erskine 18203 Nov. 29."  [ p. 6 ]

2.  R-2 Report, Managua, 12 December 1929  (IR29.12.17, NA127/209/1)

... From CO Esteli 4 December:  Lt. Farrar and four men cleared for Limay.  Donico Arteta [Dionisio Arteta] is jefe of small group of twelve reported to be in vicinity of San Vicente.  Names of people forming this group are:  Jose Dolores Blandon, Angel Arteta, Secundino Hernandez, Bernardo Quintero, Pablo Valdivia, Pedro Rodriguez, Felix Rodriguez, Juan Gutierrez Rodriguez.  These men live around Colon and the Rio Negro.  Have no property and hide around Zapote near Concordia and Miraflores Mountains.  They are part-time bandits.  Have made many efforts to get these people but they are all related to people around Rinconada and Colon who hide them. ... [ p. 4 ]

3.  R-2 Report, Managua, 18 January 1930  (IR30.01.18, NA127/209/1)

... From Intelligence Report Ocotal 4 January:  Dionisio Aciona Arteta, jefe of a small group operating in the vicinity of Colon, was killed by his bandit group on the night of the 1st of January.  Several people, including the Administrator of Rents of Esteli, identified the body.  His death occurred during a fight over the distribution of money and other articles which the group had stolen.

 

From CO Esteli 3 January:  The body of Dionisio Arteta, jefe of a small bandit group which has been operating recently in vicinity of Colon and who was reported to have been killed by his bandit group at El Carrizo on night of 1 January to this office, arrived Esteli at 0700 with Guardia patrol sent to investigate reported death of the bandit jefe.  Dionisio Arteta was killed at the house of Luciano Arteta, at Carrizo over distribution of money and other articles which the group had stolen.  He was shot three times; once through the neck and twice through the heart.  Arteta was identified by Simon Rodriguez, Administrator de Rentas of Esteli; Julian Moreno; Fito Mairena; Manuel Montoya; and Guseleio Arteta and identified positively as the bandit Dionisio Arteta.  In addition to bullet wounds, had two large machete cuts over left side of face and one on each side of stomach. ...  [ p. 13 ]

August 8, 1930.  Contact Report of Lt. G. C. Smith, Esteli, with endorsement by Capt. McDonald.

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA

OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER, ESTELI

8 August 1930

From:     2ndo. Tnte. George C. Smith, Jr., G.N. Esteli.

To:         The Jefe Director, G.N., Managua

Via:        Official Channels.

Subject:     Contact Report.

     1.     On the night of 4 August 1930 information was given me from refugees who arrived in large numbers, that Pedro Blandon with four other jefes and a group estimated at one hundred twenty-five bandits had sacked all the fincas in the Carao area  (48.4 - 24.3), on the previous night 3 August 1930.

     2.     I immediately ordered Lt. John M. Cobb G.N. and seven enlisted with one sub-Thompson and rifle with grenades from La Trinidad to Esteli, who arrived Esteli at 2320 same night.  Upon authorization from the Area Commander, I cleared with a combat patrol with Lt. Cobb and twenty-five enlisted all mounted, at 0500, 5 August 1930.  We proceeded directly to Carao, where information was gained that the bandit group had split, Pedro Blandon heading north and Juan Boton heading south.  My informant stated that Boton was close, as he had raided haciendas on night of 4 August, the area southeast of Carao.  We continued the march southeast, across the Zapote mountains, arriving at dawn 6 August 1930 at finca of Epifanio Herrera, abut two leagues east of Sacasti (11.4-H.3, 5th Regt Spl Map of Nic), in the Department of Jinotega.  Men and animals rested here about three hours.  We found this entire area devastated, the women beaten and raped and the houses burned.

     3.     We proceeded in the general direction of Matagalpa from Herrera's finca, arriving at the finca of Geronimo Rizo, about one half league from Nance Dulce (12-H) at 1100.  A boy of about fourteen years of age was found here, who, after being threatened with death, admitted knowing the position of the bandit camp, and agreed to lead us to it.  We approached the bandit position which was located on the top of a small rise almost impenetrable on account of heavy brush and thorn bushes, from the West.  About a mile from this point I ordered the men to dismount and proceeded forward on foot, leaving two men guarding the animals.  When abut five hundred yards from the enemies position, I divided my force into three groups, giving Sgto. Melendez the left flank Lt. Cobb the center and taking the right flank myself.  After covering about half the distance, Lt. Cobb's party came in sight of the bandits in their camp, and at once opened fire.  The bandits, although completely surprised, immediately returned our fire, retreating to the east.  I at once ordered a general advance, the attack being covered by the Lewis machine gun fire on the right flank, and rifle grenade fire on the front and left flank.  We pursued the fleeing bandits for about a mile and a half to the east along a three hundred yard front.  The firing, which lasted approximately two hours, finally ceased, and I ordered the men to assemble on me, as all were completely exhausted -- and hand, faces, and uniforms were badly torn and scratched due to the heavy thorny brush on the ground the engagement was fought over.  I called the roll and found none dead, wounded or missing.  I then instituted a search of the field.  Six dead bandits and one wounded were found.  The wounded one gave his name as Guillermo Meza and stated that the group numbered forty-five, that General Juan Boton, Colonel Palmazon, and Pedro Salgado were the jefes.  He identified Boton and Palmazon amongst the dead.  The following articles were captured from the dead bandits and from the site of their camp:

2  Krag Rifles #473878 & #179325 with ammunition belts.

43 Rounds, Ammunition Cal 30 Krag rifle.

2  Long barreled shot-guns, with pouches and large supply of powder, caps and balls.

9 Mules, 6 horses with complete riding equipment and blanket rolls with numerous articles of clothing.

6  Revolvers -- two Smith and Wesson, Two Colt, and Two Spanish, each with ammunition belt and holster.

36 Rounds, in all, pistol ammunition.

1 Automatic Lugar, with attachable shoulder butt, and six magazines

3 Dynamite bombs -- 8 Red and Black Hat Bands.

9 Rain Coats, rubber -- 3 flash lights -- 8 Brass Hilted Honduranian Cutachas.

Numerous articles of Guardia uniforms and equipment marked with the number #1261.

     4.     Boton was killed during the first few minutes of the combat, by a direct hit through the heart, fired by Raso Pastor Rodriguez, #3220 at a range of 250 yards.  A careful search of the scene for dead and wounded bandits was impracticable due to the exceedingly heavy under-brush and thorns.  However, Torencio Herrera, a native living near Nance Dulce reported to me at Esteli on 7 August 1930 that he had found bodies of six dead bandits near the scene of the combat, badly eaten by buzzards.  It was estimated, at the time, that twelve bandits had been wounded, taking into consideration the numerous signs of blood and the evidence of the captured bandit.

     5.     We cleared the scene of the contact, after the mounts had been brought up and six dead bandits and loot had been packed on the captured animals.  Geronimo Rizo, known bandit and member of Boton's group, was captured hiding in a corn field about one mile West of Nance Dulce, and was brought prisoner to Esteli.  The patrol arrived Esteli at 2000, 6 August 1930.  The dead bandits were put on exhibition in the park for all to see, and the two captives securely locked in the brig.  Boton and Palmazon were recognized many times by over two thousand people who viewed their bodies, and who were very much elated over the death of these two men.  Some of the women who had been raped by these same two men a few days previously were among the onlookers.  A committee of citizens from Esteli and the surrounding countryside called in a body at the Cuartel and offered congratulations to all Guardia.  All loot captured, except the arms and ammunition, has been returned to the respective owners.

    6.    2do Tnte. John M. Cobb, G.N., Sgto Octavio Melendez #1190, Cabo Bernardo Molina #1203, Raso Aquilino Lopez #1222, Raso Pastor Rodriguez #3220, and Raso Pedro Rodriguez #1125, are worthy of special citation, which I will cover in a separate letter.

     7.     The patrol was armed with one Lewis Machine-gun, one sub-Thompson Machine-gun, two Springfield rifles with grenades and dischargers, and hand grenades.

     8.     Total distance covered by patrol 63 miles.

                    /s/  George C. Smith, Jr.

   -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA

OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER, ESTELI

8 August 1930

From:     The Department Commander, Dept. of Esteli, Esteli, Nic.

To:         The Jefe Director, G.N., Managua, Nic.

Via:        The Area Commander, Northern Area, Ocotal, Nic.

     1.     Forwarded.

     2.     It is recommended that Second Lieutenant George C. Smith, G.N. be awarded the Navy Cross, for his excellent leadership and skill which he demonstrated on this occasion, which resulted in the killing of bandit General Juan Heriberto Rodriguez and Colonel Palmazon.  The first named bandit leader, alias Juan Boton, has committed many atrocious crimes, mostly against young girls ranging from eight to ten years of age.  On the day prior to his death, he raped a small girl eight years of age at Moropotente, Department of Esteli.  His group ransacked the surrounding countryside and was the cause of many farmers abandoning their farms, and was returning from an animal stealing excursion from Matagalpa when he and his group were attacked by Lieutenants Smith and Cobbs patrol.  His death is a serious blow to organized banditry and a great relief to womanhood of this vicinity.  Boton was identified by the Jefe Politico, District Criminal Judge and many other citizens of Esteli.  Buton had a large machete scar on the back of his neck, by which means he was positively identified, and his family also stated that there was no doubt that was the body of Juan Buton.  Buton was an old Guardia and an excellent Lewis machine gun man, and prior to turning bandit resided in Esteli.

                    /s/  D. McDonald.

RG127/202/10/52.0

Additional References to the Telpaneca Mutinies, Oct 6 & 21, 1929

1.  Julian C. Smith, History of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, unpublished mss., Marine Corps Historical Center, pp. 111-115.

Telpaneca (First)

 

     At about 2:00 a.m., on October 6, 1929, Second Lieutenant Lewis H. Trogler, G.N. (Sergeant, USMC), Commanding Officer of the Guardia Nacional garrison at Telpaneca, Nueva Segovia, was shot to death in the town of Telpaneca by mutinous members of his command.  The mutiny had been carefully planned and involved the entire garrison, although some were unwilling participants.

 

     A written agreement had been drawn up by First Sergeant Fernando Larios, hijo, as leader, and five others, and signed by them on October 3rd, providing that Lieutenant Trogler, who was the only officer serving in Telpaneca, was to be killed, and, as circumstances permitted, all other North American officers, as a sign of their opposition to the "American occupation" of Nicaraguan territory.  All other members of the garrison of twenty-three enlisted, signed the document, either voluntarily, or through fear for their personal safety if they refused.  In each case a seal was placed opposite the signature, made from the blood of the respective individual, obtained by cutting and squeezing his thumb.  Some of these signers had not read the document and had no knowledge as to its contents.

 

     It appears that First Sergeant Larios, and one of the other conspirators who was a corporal, had been recommended for reduction by Lieutenant Trogler, and that both knew of this.  Larios was undoubtedly the prime mover, and there is a strong probability that he was actuated also by other personal and political motives.  He had been a Conservative prior to joining the Guardia, and his father Fernando Larios, padre, a leader of the Conservative element, had been exiled only shortly theretofore by the Liberal Government.  His antipathy for North Americans had not been revealed previously, but became apparent by his actions during the signing of the pact of blood and during the subsequent mutiny.  It was related by witnesses that he gleefully viewed the body of Lieutenant Trogler, and that he refused permission to civilians who desired to hold a wake over it.  Several letters were found in the possession of Larios which boldly stated his hatred of foreigners.

 

     There was dissatisfaction among some of the enlisted members of the command over a dance given by Lieutenant Trogler for the civilian population of Telpaneca on the night of October 5th.  No Guardia was invited, and it has been said that Lieutenant Trogler had stated that the guardias were of a lower social status than his intended guests, and that on this account he had not invited them to participate.  Some were disgruntled because they had been sent by Lieutenant Trogler to carry chairs from other houses to the scene of the party, and they believed that they should not have been so employed:  that in so doing they were being utilized in the capacity of servants.  A concerted effort was made by various guardias to induce the civilians not to attend the fiesta, intimating that some untoward event might occur there.

 

     It was planned by the mutineers to simulate a bandit attack and to kill Lieutenant Trogler as he was returning to his quarters from the fiesta.  To make it appear true in case of an investigation, men were stationed at various points throughout the town, with orders to open fire when they heard firing going on.  That afternoon a civilian agent of First Sergeant Larios reported to Lieutenant Trogler, in accordance with Lario's instructions that a bandit attack on the town would take place that night.  It does not appear that Lieutenant Trogler took any extraordinary precautions that night as to the security of the town.

 

     Because of the fact that he returned from the dance about 1:30 a.m., in company with a prominent civilian, Lieutenant Trogler was not fired upon at that time.  However, soon after reaching his quarters the simulated attack commenced, and weapons were trained and fired upon the doorway of the officers' quarters, through which Lieutenant Trogler emerged and safely ran across the street to the barracks.  He then started in the direction of the church plaza where some of the defensive works were located, doubtless with the intention of directing the defense, when he was struck and killed.

 

     Throughout the balance of the night sporadic firing took place, but it has been definitely established that no bandits attacked Telpaneca that night, and that the simulation of an attack was planned and carried out as a smoke-screen to hide the real purpose of the mutineers, the killing of Lieutenant Trogler.  Having accomplished this object, no attempts were made to loot or commit other violence, and no one of the command deserted.

 

     Proof of the complicity of First Sergeant Larios in the plot to mutiny was lacking at the time, but a strong suspicion rested upon him, and he was soon transferred to Ocotal, the Area Headquarters station.  He was relieved by Sergeant Adrian Salinas, but his influence was to be felt within a short time in a second mutiny at Telpaneca.  He was later tried before a general court-martial and convicted, when the investigation of the Second Telpaneca mutiny brought to light the facts as to the first.

 

Telpaneca  (Second)

 

     Following the death of Lieutenant Trogler, Second Lieutenant Charles J. Levonski, G.N. (Sergeant, USMC), was assigned to duty as Commanding Officer, Guardia Nacional, at Telpaneca, and assumed command.  He was a capable, energetic and likeable officer, and the morale of the command seemed to improve.  For two weeks he observed nothing which indicated to him that the men would not remain loyal.

 

     Rumors were received from Ocotal by the men to the effect that First Sergeant Larios had been executed as a punishment for his part in the mutiny of October 6th.  This was untrue but was believed by some of them.  A newspaper published in Managua, La Prensa, at this time carried an article on the subject of the infliction of the death penalty upon members of the Guardia Nacional  guilty of certain acts, and was read and discussed in Telpaneca.  It should be remembered that practically the entire command at this station remained unchanged, and that they had just recently participated in a mutiny following the signing of the Larios Pact of Blood, and had treacherously murdered their Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Trogler.  Unrest and a feeling of apprehension lest they be discovered and awarded the death penalty, filled the minds of the men.

 

     A fatal error was made in not relieving at least fifty percent of the command and replacing them with other men of known integrity, immediately after the death of Lieutenant Trogler, as a matter of precaution if for no other reason, and especially as, even at that time, the circumstances surrounding the affair, with its "bandit attack" which everyone doubted, and other inconsistencies that pointed to mutiny, were sufficiently evident to warrant such action, particularly when one considers the isolated location of Telpaneca in the mountains, the lack of communications and the impossibility of bringing prompt relief in case of necessity.  It was not until October 20th that a patrol under the command of Second Lieutenant James C. Rimes (Sergeant, USMC) arrived at Telpaneca via Palacaguina with ten replacements for the station.  The patrol was composed of seventeen enlisted, all but two of whom were recruits.

 

     The rumors of the execution of First Sergeant Larios and discussion of the newspaper article on the death penalty, brought to the minds of enlisted men and civilians in Telpaneca the thought, which soon became a thoroughly believed conviction, that the ten men ordered replaced and transferred were going to Ocotal to be executed for their part in the recent mutiny.

 

     It was established later that one of the members of Lieutenant Rimes' patrol carried a letter from First Sergeant Larios in Ocotal to Sergeant Salinas, who had relieved him as Acting First Sergeant at Telpaneca, and who had previously served with him and was a good friend of his.  This letter was not recovered, but it is known that Salinas announced to various of his men, following the second Telpaneca mutiny, that Larios would join the column of mutineers on the trail near Santo Domingo, between Telpaneca and San Juan de Telpaneca, and that Salinas and his group waited for him at this point until it became evident to them that he was not going to arrive.

 

     It is highly probable that Larios' letter also contained plans, or suggestions, for another mutiny of the garrison at Telpaneca, and it may have been he who suggested the idea of the intended execution of the ten men being transferred, in order to induce Salinas and the others to carry out his plans for this mutiny, a continuation of his pact of blood scheme to kill North American officers and to demonstrate opposition to the presence of these officers in Nicaragua.

 

     At any rate Sergeant Salinas, who theretofore had been a mild mannered company clerk, seemingly trustworthy and incapable of becoming the leader of a revolt (he had been Captain Burwell's sole body-guard on numerous pay trips earlier that year to the outlying stations of the Department of Managua and Carazo), held a meeting of various members of the command about 12:30 a.m., October 21st, and formulated plans for a mutiny.  Salinas named himself as a colonel.

 

     At 6:50 a.m., that same morning while Lieutenants Levonski and Rimes were about to have breakfast, they were surprised by six armed guardias, three having entered the house via the front door and three from the rear.  Lieutenant Rimes was not armed; Lieutenant Levonski was disarmed, and both were taken prisoner, marched to the Guardia brig and confined.  Expostulations on the part of the officers were silenced with threats of immediate death if they continued talking.

 

     Lieutenant Rimes had intended clearing for Ocotal with his patrol at 7:30 a.m., had given the necessary orders for the movement, and,, before going to breakfast, had noted that the men were getting themselves and the animals ready.  These men knew nothing about the plans of the mutineers, and were as much surprised at the events which transpired as the two officers.  Some attempted to leave town, but were apprehended, and all were forced, through fear of death, to stand watches and to accompany the group when they cleared town later that day.

 

     The mutineers at once placed sentinels over all trails leading out of town, also machine guns, destroyed the radio set and threw it into the river, and ordered the inhabitants to close their doors and not to leave their homes.  Groups then looted the principal stores and private residences for money and merchandise, and secured animals upon which to carry their stolen goods.  Guardia Nacional funds, and the cash, clothing and jewelry of the officers was taken, and all Guardia property, including machine guns, automatic weapons, grenades, ammunition, etc., was gathered together to be taken along.  The services of various male civilians were impressed for the loading of the pack animals, and later for help in the crossing of the Rio Coco just below town, in boats.

 

     About noon two Marine Corps planes passed over Telpaneca and made a drop of official and personal correspondence.  The aviation panels at the station had been permanently laid out, and one of the mutineers, dressed in Lieutenant Rimes' uniform, recovered the drop, so that there was nothing apparent to the pilots that anything irregular was going on.

 

     During the entire day the two officers remained in confinement, without food and hourly expecting to be taken out and shot.  A record of events and some of their thoughts, written by them, was later found on the cell wall.

 

     About 5:00 p.m., the officers were removed from confinement, and taken, with hands tied and lead-rope around their necks, to the river.  They were accompanied by all members of the mutinous group, including both the regular garrison and Lieutenant Rimes' patrol, the cargo and animals.  At this time they begged the mutineers to shoot them at once, for they feared torture.  The crossing of the river was completed at about 7:00 p.m., and many bulky articles were left behind at this point, due either to haste and lack of direction or to insufficient animal transportation.  However, all machine guns, automatic weapons and ammunition were taken.

 

     The column continued the march all night, and at daybreak arrived at the Polanco ranch near Santo Domingo Valley.  A number of the men who did not wish to accompany the mutineers were able to escape during the night, and did so.  The following day others deserted the column as the opportunity presented itself.  Lieutenants Levonski and Rimes were told by Salinas that they were going to be killed.  Salinas, however, was courteous at all times, stood at attention when addressing them, and shared his food and drink with them.

 

     One of the men agreed to assist the officers to escape, but lost heart and disappeared from the column alone.  Later, about 8:00 p.m., Levonski and Rimes found a favorable moment when an accident to a cargo caused a halt and a separation of the force into two groups.  They escaped and rushed precipitously up a side trail and into the brush, becoming separated almost immediately.  Levonski sprained his ankle, but both encountered some of the loyal men, and with them returned to Telpaneca, Rimes arriving first.

 

     Practically all of the personnel papers of Lieutenant Rimes' patrol, and a few of the original Telpaneca garrison, reported in either Telpaneca or at Palacaguina.  The balance continued on and made their way to Honduras, where the arms and ammunition were confiscated, and the men jailed temporarily.  They were not returned to Nicaragua.

 

---

2.  Excerpts from Roswell Winans, USMC, Patrol Report, Apali, Nic., 28 Oct 1929, NA127/212/1.

     ... 6.      No information at San Juan on our return.  Night of the 26th Lt Hooper obtained information to the effect that a man who had been in Telpaneca at the time of the mutiny was out in the country a mile.  He was brought in Sunday morning his statement follows:

 

            Name Lucio Nulgado - was impressed as a guide at Telpaneca to guide the mutineers to San Juan.  The officers were captured Monday at 0700.  The people of the town worked all day packing animals with loot.  They forced various people to give up about $1000.00 in cash.  From 0700 to 1300 all doors were required to be closed.  They crossed the Coco at the lower crossing, Mutineers and loot in a boat - swimming the animals.  Cusuli trail - decided to go to Santo Domingo.  Officers were walking arms tied down to their sides -- necks connected with a rope.  They were in the center of the column.  Lucio the civilian with them.  Went to Santo Domingo -- then to Potreros -- took them all night to get to Potreros -- arrived at 0600 -- Lola Matamoros house is at Potreros -- let him go at Potreros -- returned toward Telpaneca he staid Tuesday night at the house of Adan Melgara.  He saw one of the officers returning with some of the Guardia to Telpaneca and heard that the other one had been released also and had returned with more men.  He saw them at 1300 Wednesday.  The jefe in charge of the mutineers was Salinas -- the second jefe, Navarro -- third jefe was Sedeno.  The reason they went so slow the first night was that they had so much cargo.  They were twelve hours getting to Potreros -- three hours normal travel from Telpaneca -- they were not drinking -- though they took whiskey from the town -- they had no intention of killing the officers at the time but were taking them to Honduras, the reason that some of them turned back was that even when they left Telpaneca, they were unwilling to go.  The guide from Potreros -- he did not know but was probably one of the Polanco brothers, of whom there are three and each of them has a house there.  Probably their trail would be via Barillal-Jamisco-Suscallon-Ula.  He could give no satisfactory reason why he did not promptly report the movements of the mutineers, but it is believed that he was so glad and grateful to get away with his life as they would just as well have killed him, that he did not wish to make a report or was afraid to. ..

3.  Gen. D. C. McDougal to Capt. Wm. W. Scott, Charges and Specifications in the Case of Fernando Larios, First Sergeant, Number 45, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, 3 Dec. 1929, NA127/198/1.

...  1.     The above named man will be tried before the Consejo de Guerra General of which you are the Judge Advocate, upon the following charges and specifications.  You will notify the president of the court accordingly, inform the accused of the date set for his trial, and summon all witnesses, both for the prosecution and the defense.

 

     CHARGE I.  (acquitted)  [ Premeditated murder of First Lt. Lewis H. Trogler]

 

     CHARGE II.   (guilty)  [ Mutiny against Trogler on Oct 5, 1929 ].

 

     CHARGE III.  (acquitted)   "... did, on or about Oct. 3, 1929, in the Guardia Barracks at the said Telpaneca, use provoking, reproachful, and intimidating words, gestures, and menaces toward Corporal Francisco Miranda, #1863, Guardia Nacional, serving at the Guardia Barracks aforesaid, by saying to the Corporal Francisco Miranda ... "anyone who does not sign this paper with his own blood with go to Eternity," or words to that effect ... [ remainder of specifications not proved ]