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25 February 1929. Intelligence from Domingo Pérez, surrendered
from Pedrón's Band.
This report,
produced by Merritt "Red Mike" Edson during his Río
Coco expedition of early 1929, is remarkable in part because the
surrendered rebel who provided this information, Domingo Perez, is
very probably the same man who gave his oral testimony to the
Instituto de Estudio del Sandinismo in 1980. By that time
he was around 80 years old; in his oral testimony he described
Pedron in some detail, while his tales of his involvement with the
rebels focused on the early years and skipped over the period after
1929. Edson's 1929 report on the "dope" provided by Domingo
Perez provides additional
insight into Pedron's field tactics, and shows something of the
determination of the Marines & Guardia to "trap" him, which they
never came close to doing.
|
HEADQUARTERS
SECOND BRIGADE
MARINE CORPS
MANAGUA,
NICARAGUA
25 FEBRUARY,
1929
B-2 REPORT.
From:
0000 10 February, 1929
To: 2400
23 February, 1929 ...
... Following
additional information from Domingo Perez, surrendered from
Altamirano group:
Armament of
Pedron: 2 Lewis machine guns - 1 Browning
auto. - 50 Con Cons and Springfields -
5 rounds ammunition per man -- Plenty ammunition for
machine guns - Clothing very good -
Food poor and very scarce.
Altamirano has
no camp South of the Coco River. His only
permanent camps are near the Naranjo-Remangon-Oconguas area.
While in the Cua-Guapinol-Pantasma area he is continually on
the move. He crosses the Coco at the following places:
- Lira (north of Boca de Cua) - Boca de Cua
- Entaral - Coco and Guana. The band
always crosses together at one time and does not divide into
small groups for the crossing. Nicolas Davila is now
at La Pita (Upper Guasaneras Valley) and is no longer an
active bandit. Relative to Jiron's statement of 2-8-29
I would suggest that Spicer be given dope of Narciso Cruz
mentioned therein. My present plan is to return to
Poteca via the Guiguili River which will give me an
additional trail to enter this area. If considered
advisable I can return via Rempujon, but it is thought such
a move would be abortive at this time. Knowing the
approximate location we might trap Altamirano there later.
The plans for operations requested in Major Schmidt's letter
of 2-6-29 will be submitted immediately upon return to
Poteca. The best plan, I believe, is active and
continual patrolling by all three areas affected --
Northern, Southern, and Eastern. I would also suggest
an outpost permanently stationed at Boca de Cua and large
enough to keep a maneuvering unit in the field. Will
clear Oconguas at daybreak 2-15-29. Edson 1400.
IR29.02.25. RG127/209/1
|
Return to Document Inventory
26
March 1929. Information on Pedrón's Band from Anonymous
Jinotega Finca Owners.
This
intelligence memorandum by Capt. Hanneken summarizes information on
Pedron's band provided, reluctantly, by an anonymous married couple,
owners of a finca in the coffee district near La Flor, Jinotega.
The final line is especially noteworthy: Pedron told her that
if she told the Marines that he had camped at her finca, he would
come back and cut her head off -- underscoring the chasm separating
the rebels from wealthy landowners, and the Sandinistas' tactics of
terror used to compel compliance among property owners and others
opposed to their movement.
Also noteworthy is
that our anonymous finqueros (finca owners) were personally
acquainted with three-quarters of these men --
again suggesting the local nature of Sandinista operations. The
repeating surnames in the list (Garcia, Gutierrez, Romero, Rivera,
and others) suggests the family-based nature of Sandinista bands.
The report also illustrates the modus operandi of the Marines
& Guardia -- compiling lists of "bandits" and their places of origin
so they might be "hunted" down and eliminated. As the war
dragged on, such lists only grew longer, and the "hunting"
expeditions only more intensive.
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HEADQUARTERS, NORTHERN AREA,
OCOTAL, NICARAGUA.
28 March, 1929.
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM:
LA FLOR
March 26, 1929.
Memo: Area Commander, Northern Area.
1. "The following information was
given by Mrs. (Blank) and substantiated by her husband.
Mr. (Blank) has a finca about (blank) miles S.E. from La
Flor [Jinotega].
2. "That Altamirano's band at the
time he camped at (Blank's) finca on or about March 11,
1929, consisted of about 40 Bandidos, 35 of whom were armed
with rifles, 7 with cutachas; that he had one Lewis machine
gun and one sub-Thompson; the men did not have very much
ammunition for the rifles and that they had perhaps several
hundred rounds for the machine guns.
"That Pedron had about 15 Indians, who were not armed, but
who carried all the baggage. That Altamirano camped at
the finca for about 24 hours waiting for (Blank) to make an
appearance as Pedron wanted to kill (Blank). That no
mention was made about Sandino and that they, Altamirano's
men, were not looking for armistice, but want to fight the
Marines, Guardia, and Voluntarios.
"The following are the men with Altamirano, whom Mrs.
(Blank) knew and which was substantiated by (Blank):
| |
--- FROM --- |
|
1. Santos Vasquez, Jefe |
Guapinol Area |
|
2. Pedro Herrera |
" " "
" |
|
3. Gregorio Manzanares |
" " "
" |
|
4. Tomas Rodriguez |
Las Cuchillas Area |
|
5. Panfilo Gutierrez |
" " "
" |
|
6. Jose Rizo |
A spy who enters Jinotega occasionally |
|
7. Damas Rodriguez |
Las Cuchillas Area |
|
8. Carmelo Gutierrez |
" " "
" |
|
9. Sebastian Montenegro |
" " "
" |
|
10. Nicolas Garcia |
Boca de Cua Area |
|
11. Cornelio Garcia |
" " "
" |
|
12. Calixto Hernandez, Lieut. |
San Potreros Area |
|
13. Leocardio Garcia |
" " "
" |
|
14. Reyes Romero |
" " "
" |
|
15. Jose Romero |
Jinotega Area |
|
16. Calixto Guillen |
" " "
" |
|
17. Catalino Guillen |
" " "
" |
|
18. Matias Romero |
" " "
" |
|
19. Carmelo Garcia |
" " "
" |
|
20. Adan Rizo |
" " "
" |
|
21. Sixto Gutierrez |
La Pita Area |
|
22. Basilio Contreras |
A spy for La Pita and Jinotega area. |
|
23. Florencio Cornejo |
La Pavona area |
|
24. Guillermo Rivera |
La Pavona area |
|
25. Jose Rivera |
" " "
" |
|
26. Elijio Centeno |
Indefinite |
|
27. Filadelfia Rivera |
" " |
"The rest they did not know with the exception that Mrs.
(Blank) often heard them calling Filadelfia Gomez -- Note:
(Was in Sandino's immediate Guard) and Sebastian Centeno.
"Three quarters of the above men were known to (Blank) who
states they are Altamirano's bandidos. (Bland) also
states that a Mrs. Senora Fibersia Garcia [Tiburcia Garcia]
who lives near San Potreros is an Altamirano spy and that
Altamirano often passes at her place when crossing the Coco
River.
"Mr. and Mrs. (Blank) also stated that the above woman had
come alone at their finca about 20 days ago and had stopped
for a few hours and then left.
"From (Blank) and from other sources it is to be noted that
Altamirano does not use any of the trails except at
impassable localities. Pedron cuts thru the mountains
and brush.
"(Blank) further states that Altamirano uses the following
areas when crossing the Coco:
(a) La Pavona-Cuchillas-Los Cedros-Pantasma Valley
-- crossing Coco near Piedras thence toward Wana.
(b) La Pavona-Cuchillas-Los Cedros-Bilan-Los
Torres-Potreros to Coco or from Potreros to Rio Cua
about 4 miles East of Boca de Cua, (Marines call place
Alligator Pond, where Capt. Hall had contact some time
back.) North to Gualacario where he crosses Coco.
"Mr. and Mrs. (Blank) were afraid to give the names of the
bandits and only after promising them that it would never be
known except by myself, Gen. Escamilla and Headquarters,
Ocotal and that no other persons would ever know did they
consent to do so.
"It is thought that the above information may be of value to
patrols operating in the area around Pena Blanca.
"(Blank) also stated that Rosendo Zelaya, who owns a finca
at La Flor, had taken in this area, large numbers of beef.
(16 alone from (Blank).) Large quantities of dulce,
coffee, etc., and money for Sandino's cause about a year
ago. And that Zelaya is a strong supporter of
Sandino. Rosendo Zelaya is now in Jinotega.
"That Mrs. Zelaya had found a bandolier of ammunition on the
trail near La Flor and had sent it to Sandino. (About
a year ago.)
"Altamirano told Mrs. (Blank) that if she told the Marines
that he Altamirano had been and camped at her finca, he
would return and cut her head off."
/s/ HANNEKEN
/s/ L. B. REAGAN
Captain, U.S. Marine Corps,
R -- 2
M29.03.28. RG127/209/1.
|
Return to Document Inventory
8 April 1929. Operations of Stockes-Flores,
Hakala-Castillo, & Other Marine-G.N. Units in the Honduran
Borderlands.
Guerrilla
war, say the experts, is like a game of cat-and-mouse. These
reports offer a fine-grained look at such
cat-and-mouse games during an 11-day period in the Honduran borderlands. In late March
and early April 1929, a concerted effort by five Marine, Guardia,
and Volunteer columns, led by Captain George F.. Stockes, succeeded
in chasing the major rebel columns across the border into Honduras.
The rebels, led by Generals Carlos Salgado and Miguel Angel Ortez,
decided to stay in Honduras for a while, laying low until things
cooled down. These reports, all included in a single
intelligence report covering a two-week period, show some of the
dynamics at play in the Northwestern Segovias.
(Click on map at right to view a more detailed map of the zone
indicated, with some of the places mentioned in the report
highlighted.)
Captain Stockes, as
I have explored
elsewhere, was among the shrewdest and most doggedly determined
of all Marine field commanders. At the time these reports were
produced, the Marines & Guardia were in the midst of trying
something new -- combining their forces with columns composed of "Voluntarios"
[Volunteers], and led by Voluntario
Generals
-- in this case, Flores and Castillo. Other Voluntario columns
were active in Jinotega during this period, including one led by the
Mexican Juan Escamilla. This Voluntario experiment lasted
another month or so before it was abandoned as impractical and
counterproductive. (Photograph of Captain Geo.
Stockes & mounted patrol, Dipilto, Nicaragua, late 1928)
The reports help us
to better understand the differences between the Honduran
borderlands and, for example, Pedron's haunts in Jinotega -- with
the border and friendly Hondurans, not vast expanses of trackless
jungle, affording the rebels succor and protection. We also
see the autonomy and independence of the rebel columns.
Sandino was not directing any of this -- it was all up to local
jefes like Salgado and Ortez to figure out how to evade their
pursuers. We also see the frustration of the Marines, unable
to cross the Honduran border to give chase. We see, too, the
systematic collusion between the rebels and Honduran border
officials, and the shared material interests and familial relations
that linked them. We see much else besides. Stokes was
an exceptionally perceptive observer, as was Hakala. Their
reports always merit a very careful read.
|
HEADQUARTERS, NORTHERN AREA,
OCOTAL, NICARAGUA.
8 APRIL, 1929.
INTELLIGENCE REPORT, R - 2.
FROM: 0000 23 March, 1929
TO: 2400 7 April, 1929. ...
[March 27] ... From Capt. Stockes, Mar.
27: After my departure from Somoto received message
from [Honduran Expeditionary Chief Juan B.] Mendoza
that he would confer with me in Calpules. He moved
North along the border and arrived here 2300 yesterday.
Hakala column cleared Santa Emilia 0400 and arrived here via
border trails at 1030. Stockes column cleared Yaraje
at 0430 via Jocomico and arrived here 1100. Conference
immediately with Gen. Mendoza who has 50 men and is camped
here on the Honduran side. Col. Abie Vallodarez [Ballardes]
had conference with Salgado [EDSN General Carlos Salgado]
yesterday. He was representing Mendoza and offered
Salgado a guarantee in Honduras if he would surrender with
his force. Salgado has 50 armed men. He
requested 8 days armistice in which to decide and expressed
a desire to have a conference with my column.
Vallodarez told him no armistice could be arranged until
after he had talked with me. Salgado left following
the border trail North toward Bado Grande. Neither
Mendoza nor I believe Salgado is sincere. He is in a
bad way and only trying to get us off the trail for the time
being. We move after him, Mendoza stating he will
continue to operate along the border on the Honduran side.
Patrol dispatched from Yaraje yesterday captured commandant
of Bandit Civicos of Las Cabullas. Have also taken
into custody several other bandit supporters and turned over
to Mendoza list of suspects who have fled to Honduras. ...
[ p. 4 ]
[March 27] ... [From Lt. Hamas]
27 March, 1929. Las Manos. Arrived at 12:30
a.m., native agent reports Salgado at Pedregalito, Ortez at
Las Limas, Area Commander notified. ... [p. 9 ]
[March 27] ... From C.O., G.N., Dipilto,
Mar. 27: Native reported that Salgado is in
Pedregalito, Honduras, according to same report Ortez is at
Las Limas, Honduras. Ortez was seen passing through
Las Manos with cargo of coffee at midnight March 23.
Lt. Hamas' patrol has searched El Naranjo and El Poste, La
Laguna, Cabo Blanco in Las Manos area. Request further
instructions at Las Manos. Hamas. ... [ p. 5 ]
[March 28] ... Lt. Hamas and 15
Guardias patrolled Suyatal, El Horno, Buenas Aires Area,
captured Cypiano Salgado [Cipriano Salgado], armed with 38
revolver, Pedro Calix [Pedro Calis] was captured also, near
Suyatal. Cypiano Salgado suspected of being a
recruiter for the bandit force, he also states that bandits
are at Las Champas and Las Limas. Miguel Angel Ortez
bandit leader reported at Las Manos at the home of Alejandro
Ballardes. Bansillio Sauceda, Guadalupe Umanzor, David
Umanzor, great bandit supporters at Las Manos. Sabino
Galindo, Ortez's agent lives in a home of Alejandro
Ballardes, all this information furnished by two
intelligence agents. Hamas patrol at Las Manos at 7:30
p.m., left for Suyatal arrived at Suyatal at 11:00 p.m. ...
[ p. 10 ]
[March 28] ... From Stockes-Flores
Column, 100 yds. South of Pedregalito, Mar. 28:
Arrived here 0700 today. Hakala column will arrive
later today from Zapotal from Sapilde and Las Planos.
Honduran patrol has not yet arrived. Expect them this
afternoon. Salgado cleared here about 1400 yesterday
heading toward Suyatal where Ortez is reported.
Salgado is obtaining his food etc. from Honduras,
inhabitants of Pedregalito and Suyatal, are well known
supporters of Ortez and Salgado. ... [ p. 8 ]
[March 28] ... From Div. Cmndr., G.N.,
Ocotal, Mar. 28: Two natives reported that at 9:00
p.m. Mar. 23rd 20 bandits came to the house of Celso Paguaga
and tied up the above mentioned man. Ortez was jefe,
one man named Baquezana [Verbonico Vaquedano] was recognized
in the group. Ortez told these men that at that time
Salgado was attacking Dipilto and had by that time captured
the place. Also said that they were not to tell anyone
that he was jefe of this group, but to tell the Marines that
they (the bandits) would be at Milote, they had the mules
captured in the coffee raid a few days before, loaded these
mules with 2,000 lbs. of coffee taking the other mule also
from the owner to help carry the coffee, the telegraph line
was cut between Dipilto and Honduras. It seems
according to the dope that Ortez does not care for contacts
right now but is interested in getting some money out of
this coffee before it is all moved. ... [ p. 4 ]
[March 29] ... At 6:00 a.m. Lt
Hamas saw one bandit armed with rifle at the home of Paulino
Lopez, about 500 yds. in Honduras at Las Champas and about
10 more men not armed but mounted. At 6:30 a.m. Lt.
Hamas and 12 men left to patrol El Ayote, destroyed two
main, and one small bandit camp on top of El Ayote, found
and destroyed on cususera [moonshine still], also found a
large supply of corn stored in small shack near bandit camp.
... [ p. 10 ]
[March 30] ... From Stockes-Flores
Column, Mar. 30: Just after plane made pick up
yesterday conflicting reports re route taken by Salgado were
received. It is now certain Salgado split his force in
two sections here. One section about 25 men heading
toward Oropoli, Honduras, a town about 40 houses, 12 miles
West of Pedregalito. The other section following the
border trail East toward Suyatal. Commandant here
claims Salgado paid for all supplies in Honduras, also that
the Commandant to Alauca was notified promptly that Salgado
with a large armed group was in Honduran territory near
Pedregalito. Mendoza with patrol has not yet arrived.
If he intends to cooperate he will probably show up today.
Hakala-Castillo Column will clear here at 0830 today for
vicinity of Mata de Platano following the border trail.
Stockes-Flores will remain here in an attempt to get in
touch with Mendoza. Conflicting information about
Ortez some claiming he effected junction here with Salgado
others that he had talked with Salgado then left in
direction Northeast. If latter is true then he was at
that time two and a half days ago undoubtedly camped in
Honduras between Alauca and Suyatal. I believe he had
conference here with Salgado but is now operating
independently. All well. Stockes. ... [ p.
8 ]
[March 31] ... From Capt. Stockes, 100 yds.
South of Pedregalito, Mar. 31: Following received from
Hakala 0730 today by native runner. Quote One and one
half miles West of Boujie 1640 30th of March, 1929, to Capt.
Stockes. At about 1200 today near Chinampa we captured
suspect who states (a) He was a member of Salgado's
band but had been left behind to spy on our movements, (b)
That both Salgado and Ortez with approximately 80 are in
vicinity of Brujil, (c) That Salgado wants to quit and go to
Tegucigalpa accompanied by Maldonado arms to be turned over
to either Ortez or Honduran authorities, (d) That both
Salgado and Ortez left Pedregalito about 1500 Mar. 28
traveling East through Honduran territory, (e) That Salgado
had ordered him (the prisoner) to tell Carcamo Salgado
wanted to see him about laying down their arms (Adan Carcamo),
jefe Bandit Civicos at Santa Maria. We will move
immediately into Brujil our prisoner as guide in order to
force a contact. Prisoner states he is willing to pay
with his life if bandits are not in that vicinity.
Hakala. Unquote. So far no contact here with
Mendoza here or other Honduran troops. Unless such
contact is gained by 1300 today we move East toward Suyatal
and unless Hakala has had contact with enemy he will retrace
his route to Pedregalito. Hakala and I will pace the
border between here and Suyatal for the next few days.
All well, Stockes. ... [ p. 5 ]
[April 1] ... From Capt. Stockes Column, Brujil,
Apr. 1: Native just reported that about 2000 yesterday
large group of bandits were camped at Las Limones, Honduras.
Las Limones is midway between Las Manos and Paraiso.
Report believed true. Stockes. ... [ p. 6 ]
[April 1] ... From Stockes-Flores Column,
Brujil, Apr. 1: Group Salgado and Ortez definitely
located night of 30-31st in Honduras occupying positions
between Las Limas and Suyatal. Las Limas is one league
North of Masa de Plausas. Stockes-Flores cleared
Pedregalito at 1230 yesterday and arrived Brujil 1940.
Conferred with Skidmore on the trail just East of
Pedregalito. In view location of enemy Skidmore moved
from Santa Maria to Pedregalito yesterday afternoon covering
that part of the border. Hakala-Castillo cleared
Brujil at 0540 today for Pedregalito via border trail.
Upon arrival of Hakala column Skidmore will move to Zapotal
(on Rio Zapotal) moving via Bado Grande and border route.
No repeat no cooperation by Honduran troops.
Apparently Mendoza turned South from Calpules instead of
operating with my column. It is definitely known that
Salgado has been traveling Honduras since being chased out
of Rio Negro district. Prisoner captured by Hakala has
been with Salgado for the past 6 months. Salgado wants
to quit Ortez is holding out and from what is picked up here
and there Ortez claims he will never quit and to native here
stated if necessary he will go to the Malacate Mountains in
Jalapa district and establish a second Chipote. All
well. Stockes. ... [ p. 6 ]
[April 1] ... From Lt. Hakala's Column,
Pedregalito, Apr. 1: Juan Pablo Maradiaga member of
Salgado's band captured at Chinampa at 1200 30 Mar.
Salgado has 55 men 2 horses 3 mules 1 Lewis M.G. with 18
drums. Jefes are Escalante, Jose Maria Cruz and
Antonio Maldonado. Inez Hernandez deserted Salgado at
Calpules camped at Las Limas on 29th Suyatal on 30th.
Adan Carcamo is commandant for Salgado at Sabana Redonda in
Honduras Northeast of Pedregalito. Salgado sent
Maradiaga to get Carcamo to discuss advisability of laying
down arms together with Ortez. But Carcamo did not
show up the conference did not take place. Salgado is
desirous of surrendering arms, Ortez did not express any
opinion on this subject. Salgado and Ortez contemplate
going Eastward toward Las Manos but had received notice of
approximate location of Hamas and Hakala and went Westward
and then South, all travel performed in Honduran territory.
Salgado has no sick or wounded with him. His men get
very little to eat. All purchases made in Honduras are
paid for in money. Ortez has 25 men about 10 horses or
mules, no automatic weapons. Now operating with
Salgado. Second jefe is Vaquedano. Many of his
men wear hob nail shoes. Hakala. ... [ p. 6 ]
[April 2] ... From Stockes-Flores Column,
Suyatal, Apr. 2: Arrived here at 0730 today from
Brujil. Situation relative to enemy remains the same.
The Air Service has daily combed the border. The work
of the kind performed by Howard, Sanderson, Britt, etc., in
cooperation with our patrols will keep the main enemy groups
in Honduras. Until further reliable dope is received
Stokes-Flores will base Suyatal sending sub-patrols daily to
Brujil and Mata de Platano. Hakala-Castillo will
remain Pedregalito sending sub-patrols to Sabana Grande and
Chinampa. Former is three miles East of Pedregalito
latter five miles, both on border trail. All well.
Stockes. ... [ p. 7]
[April 3] ... From Lt. Hakala's
Column, 500 yds. South of Pedregalito, 3 Apr: Received
native report that Salgado traveled Westward in Honduras,
passing the house of Juan Alberto Matuca (Honduran), over
camino Juan Alberto, one kilometer Northwest of Chinampa at
1000 1 Apr. This appears to check with yesterdays
information that Salgado was at El Portillo de Lapa (one
half league of Chinampa) at 0800 the same date. Also a
native report that a group of Honduran troops under command
of one Gen. Flores were at Oropoli on 1 Apr. Hakala.
... [ p. 7]
[April 3] ... Las Manos: Lt.
Blanchard and 10 enlisted cleared for Suyatal at 8:00 a.m.
to inform Capt. Stockes about the conference with Honduran
delegates. Native agent reports Sabino Galindo agent
of Ortez prepared food at home of Alejandro Ballardes on 2nd
April, Ortez's bandits peeled coffee on the morning of 3
Apr. in the same home. ... [ p. 10 ]
[April 4] ... From Lt. Hakala, 4
Apr: Native information received stating that Salgado
accompanied by 6 unarmed men had been seen traveling toward
El Puercal on 2 Apr. El Puercal is Northwest of
Pedregalito. Also that Salgado's band has been broken
up through large numbers of desertions, and that many of his
deserters are at Oropoli and Alauca. Hakala. ...
[ p. 7 ]
[April 6] ... From Lt. Hamas, G.N.,
Dipilto, Apr. 6: Native who has returned from Alauca
to Las Manos today, received information from the natives to
the North of Las Manos that on Easter Sunday, 20 men,
believed to be part of Ortez group, were observed proceeding
to Las Canas, Honduras via El Poste with one sub-Thompson
and the others armed with rifles and pistols. ... [ p.
8]
[April 6] ... Las Manos:
Intelligence agent reports General Jose Sanchez after
disarming his troops let Salgado go free, and Salgado alone
armed with pistol heading for Pedregalito, the report of 5
April and 6 April took place at Las Partidas. On 5
April Alejandro Ballardes enlisted in the Honduran army
under the name of Luis Ramon Rodriguez. ... [ p.
10 ]
3. ENEMY SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT:
(a) Having been driven across the border by our
patrols, Salgado buried his arms in the mountains of
Honduras, near Alauca, where they were recovered by Gen.
Jose A. Sanchez, Expeditionary Chief of Yuscaran, Honduras,
on Apr. 3rd. Gen. Sanchez reported to Capt. Stokes, at
a conference in Las Manos that he had in that manner
captured the following arms and ammunition from Salgado:
|
15 |
Rifles, Con con, Remington. |
|
4 |
Rifles, Mausers. |
|
12 |
Rifles, Springfields. |
|
9 |
Rifles, Infume. |
|
1 |
Lewis machine gun. |
|
7 |
Drums, filled. |
|
300 |
Rounds of Krag ammunition. |
|
58 |
Rounds of Mauser ammunition. |
|
11 |
Rounds of Infume ammunition. |
|
80 |
Rounds of Con con ammunition |
|
850 |
Rounds of Cal. 30 Springfield ammunition. |
|
27 |
Bombs. |
|
46 |
Detonators. |
|
27 |
Trunks for carrying ammunition. |
| |
Supply of dynamite. |
In addition to the above listed arms, Salgado is reliably
reported to have had two Thompsons, sub machine guns which
were turned over to Ortez. ... [ pp. 8-9]
... The outstanding event of military importance of
recent weeks was the elimination of Salgado, one of
Sandino's best field jefes, in addition, he was generally
regarded as the best recruiter among the bandit forces and
an organizer of no mean ability. It was he who
recruited and organized the Guardia Civicos of Northwestern
Nueva Segovia prior to the elections.
The capture of his arms was accomplished by finally goading
the Honduran border officials into action. Five of our
patrols cornered the bands of Salgado and Ortez and drove
them into Honduras near Las Manos. They then camped on
the border while the Commander, Northern Area, repeatedly
informed the Honduran officials of the location of these
bandit groups and urgently requested appropriate action.
General Sanchez moved Southward from Yuscaran with a force
of about a hundred men, whereupon, Salgado hid his arms and
disbanded his group on Apr. 1st. The arms cached were
found by the Honduran commander two days later. ... [
p. 9 ]
...
A field message received from Capt. Stockes [no date,
probably April 7]: Although I have sent messages to
Mendoza and he personally assured me he would operate with
us and that he had control over the border from Espinal to
El Poste, we have been unable to gain contact with him since
leaving Calpules. Things are not working out just as
planned or expected. I am convinced Mendoza is sincere
but is up against a tough proposition as there seems little
doubt but that practically all border officials holding
minor positions are in sympathy with Salgado and Ortez.
Possibly they reap benefits, from sale of mules, cattle etc.
driven across the border by bandits. Of course groups
of both Ortez and Salgado are about four fifths Hondurans,
largely recruited along the frontier, with family
connections, etc. I feel certain at this writing both
Salgado and Ortez are in Honduras and am going to remain
near the border until such belief is disproved.
(Note: (1) The Mendoza referred to is Gen. Juan
B. Mendoza, Expeditionary Chief of San Marcos, Honduras, who
promised to cooperate by marching along the border parallel
to our column.) ...
6. MISCELLANEOUS:
ATTITUDE OF CERTAIN HONDURAN OFFICIALS
(a) That Honduras is and has been the asylum for
Nicaraguan bandits becomes more apparent as the campaign
progresses. That certain responsible officials of
Honduras are in collusion with the bandits is certain.
This is not peculiar to the incumbent regime in that country
--- it was true during the Conservative administration as
well. Our recent experience near Las Manos, when
Salgado lost his arms to the Honduran general, Sanchez,
seems at first sight to be indicative of future cooperation
but is in no way reassuring. A careful survey of the
incidents connected with this operation will lead to the
belief that the Honduran border officials cooperated only so
far as they were forced to by urgent circumstances, and only
then because, right or wrong, they believed that invasion of
Honduras by out troops in pursuit of bandit forces was
imminent. Some of the circumstances tending to
establish this as a fact are as follows:
(1) To begin with, Honduras has not suffered from
banditry in Nicaragua. her citizens along the
Nicaraguan-Honduran border are prosperous and
undisturbed, where the Nicaraguan side of the line has
been desolated by bandit ravages. A large
percentage of these outlaws are Hondurans who rustle
cattle and horses, rob coffee, etc. in Nicaragua and
sell them in their own country. (Four fifths of
Salgado's force which disbanded on Apr. 1st is said by
natives to have been composed of Hondurans.)
Certain Honduran officials and their agents do a
lucrative business by purchasing stolen property from
the bandits, selling them arms, ammunition, etc.
(2) Information is available from sources believed
reliable that certain controlling members of the Liberal
party of Honduras are indebted to Sandino, through a
working agreement entered into prior to the elections in
that country. (Sandino had agreed to join the
projected revolution in Honduras in case the Liberals in
that country lost the election).
(3) Many of Sandino's best jefes came from
Honduras. Among these are [Simon] Montoya, a
former Chief-of-Staff; [Porfirio] Sanchez, another
former Chief-of-Staff who succeeded Giron [General Jose
Manuel Giron Ruano]; [Simon] Gonzalez and [Carlos]
Quesada.
(4) Porfirio Sanchez, former Chief-of-Staff to
Sandino, is creditably reported to be a cousin of Gen.
Jose A. Sanchez, Expeditionary Chief of Yuscaran who
recently recovered the arms from Salgado.
(5) Honduran officials have failed to apprehend
bandit jefes and agents who crossed into that country on
missions for Sandino, and whose whereabouts was reported
by us. Among these are Col. [Carlos] Quesada who
has spent much time in Danli; Generals [Simon] Montoya
and [Porfirio] Sanchez and Colonels Rufino and Pastor
Ramirez and Colonel [Victor] Lagos. Gen. Sanchez
together with the Ramirez brothers are now in
Tegucigalpa where they were granted amnesty by their
government about two weeks ago.
(6) There is now, by what is considered reliable
information, a Sandinista club in Tegucigalpa.
(7) Gen. Mendoza, Expeditionary Chief of San
Marcos who commands the border patrol from Pedregalito
to the Gulf of Fonseca, admits being an old friend of
Salgado.
(8) The Commandant of Arms, Paraiso, Honduras, was
advised by us during our operations the past weeks that
a bandit force was at Munoz, Honduras, only a few miles
from his garrison. He replied that a search
revealed the presence of no outlaws. Private but
reliable information is to the contrary.
(9) Ortez has lived for the better part of last
month with a woman in the house of Alejandro Ballardes
in Las Manos, Honduras. Some of his soldiers
secured food at this house while Lt. Hamas was in
position on the border, only a few hundred yards away.
The same Ballardes is now an officer in the force of
Gen. Sanchez, who commands the border patrol from
Pedregalito to Cifuentes.
(10) There is a report that Gen. Jose A. Sanchez
had a conference with Salgado before the latters arms
are supposed to have been found in a cache. This
lends a suspicion to the whole proceeding.
Moreover, Ortez was permitted to escape without any
perceptible gesture against him.
(11) The reason which actuated Gen. Sanchez in a
measure of cooperation against Salgado may be inferred
from the following messages:
"From Commandant of Arms, Yuscaran, Honduras, Mar.
31: I have instructions from my government to
attack all Nicaraguan forces who penetrate Honduras
no matter which troops they are. Regulars or
revolutionary. Our laws do not permit
intrusion of this kind. Sincerely. /s/
J. A. Sanchez."
"From Commandant of Arms, Oropoli, Apr. 2:
Following instructions of my government, I left in
the character of Chief Expeditionary with a
respectable column to patrol the border. All
foreign forces who trespass through our Honduran
territory will be dislodged from our ground and if
it be necessary I'll attack the most convenient way
to make our National Sovereignty respected.
Sincerely, /s/ J. A. Sanchez, Chief
Expeditionary , Commandant of Arms." ...
... There are evidences that he [Sandino] is hiding in
Honduras. His woman, Teresa Villatoro, was in Danli,
Honduras about two weeks ago. His new Chief-of-Staff,
Porfirio Sanchez, together with [Simon] Gonzalez, another
member of his staff, is in Tegucigalpa --- reported to have
quit. Sanchez has been granted amnesty by the Honduran
Government. Honduras has denied us permission to enter
the disputed territory. Too, Sandino worked along the
Patuca [Poteca] River, in the disputed territory several
years ago and is said to have friends there. ...
/s/ L. B. REAGAN
Captain, U.S. Marine Corps,
R -- 2
IR29.04.08. RG127/209/1
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9
April 1929. Juan Pablo Umanzor Atrocity in Dipilto Area.
This
is the earliest reference I have found to Juan Pablo Umanzor, a
Honduran who by 1931 had risen to the rank of general in Sandino's
Defending Army. He and several others died alongside Sandino
when the Guardia Nacional assassinated the guerrilla chieftain on
February 21, 1934. (Photograph of General Juan Pablo
Umanzor, ca. 1931)
This report describes
a horrific scene in the village of Los Planos, near Dipilto in the
northwestern Segovias near the Honduran border. It is a
credible account, dictated by the widow of the slain man and
confirmed "in detail" by her two daughters. The murder of her
husband Anastasio Zamora, as described here, is not terribly
surprising: Anastasio Zamora's name appears in the statement
from prison made in early 1928 by the notorious Conservative gang
leader Anastasio Hernandez. Zamora was clearly a player in the
local gang culture, and such men often met violent deaths.
What is very
surprising here is the description of the rape of the two daughters.
All the sources agree that Sandino absolutely prohibited his
soldiers from raping women and girls. Tons of evidence makes
this point crystal clear. The only plausible
explanations for the widow Zamora's tale -- aside from the story being fabricated, which seems
very unlikely -- are that Umanzor and his men had not yet linked up
with the Defending Army; or, that at the time this report was
produced, were only tenuously affiliated with it; or, that Umanzor
did not know what his men were doing in this instance.
Whatever the case, this chilling report conveys a powerful sense of
the violence that by this time had engulfed the region.
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... Following is an extract from R-2 Report, 11th Regt,
dated 21 Apr., 1929:
"From Lt. Blanchard, Dipilto, Apr. 12: Locadia
Lopez Zamora, widow of Anastasio Zamora, stated that on
Tuesday 9 Apr., 1929 she was at her house in Los Planes.
She heard some shots and went out to the door to see
what was going on, and arriving at the doorway she saw
her husband fall on the ground with a bullet in his
head, then someone armed with a rifle grabbed her by the
wrist and dragged her to the back of the house, saying
that she was a bandit and an informant, and that they
were going to shoot her.
"While in the back of the house she heard a commotion
inside of the house and some shooting in front of the
house, then she heard somebody give an order to finish
the wounded with a cutacha. A few minutes after
being brought to the back of the house she heard
somebody give an order again to finish the wounded with
a cutacha [long thin-bladed knife]. A little later
her two daughters were also dragged at the same place
where they were lined up against a wall. Juan
Pablo Omansor [Juan Pablo Umanzor] demanded a
contribution of $100.00 or else he would shoot them all.
After being told that they had no money one of the
bandits shot at the ground near her foot and frightened
her.
"While all this was going on she recognized the
following men: Juan Pablo Omansor, Pablo Garcia,
and three other men who were armed only with cutachas,
they were: Toribio Munoz, Esquirion Mejia, Simeon
Sevilla, she said that those three last named came to
the house as guides and only helped the bandits in
locating and surrounding the family. They did not
molest anybody personally. She also stated she saw
16 men, 8 armed with rifles and the rest with cutachas.
All those armed with rifles were dressed in khaki
clothes and had rifle bolts and hats like the Marines.
They were armed with Krag rifles. She said she
believed the bandits came from Las Champas and that they
must have passed through Loma Fria. When they left
the house they went on the Camino Real, taking with them
all the clothes and food there was in the house and also
the two girls and said that they were going to shoot
them and then march on to attack Dipilto.
"The two girls verified the story in detail given by
their mother and stated that they were taken down the
road to the stream and there they were raped by four men
each, after that they were turned loose and the bandits
continued south saying that they were going to attack
Dipilto."
IR29.05.13: 5-6. RG127/209/1.
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10 April 1929. Felipe Zelaya, Mandador of La Union Finca,
Held & Released, and the old man Emilio Siles Killed by Rebels under Pedrón.
Here
is yet another window on General Pedro Altamirano, his troops, and
their operations, consistent with all the rest and adding new
details. Felipe Zelaya's description of rest and music and
song as the airplanes passed overhead especially evocative.
The Siles brothers' account of the killing of their father Emilio is especially chilling.
The ubiquitous precautions, the
marches through the wilds, the camps in the forests, the systematic
plundering, the infliction of a sense of terror among property
owners -- there's a lot here.
According to Somoza's book, the
photograph at right is of "the old man Emilio Siles, honorable
citizen, farmer and loving father and family man, whose gray hairs
and good deeds were not sufficient to protect him from the ferocity
of Sandino's forces." (Anastasio Somoza García, El
verdadero Sandino, Managua, 1936, p. 130)
It is true that
Pedron and his forces killed hundreds of Nicaraguans over the course
of the rebellion. Somoza says Pedron ordered Siles killed
because Siles had miraculously escaped a few months earlier, on
September 23, 1928, when Pedrón's band had killed "the distinguished
young man of Jinotega" Gonzalo Blandón. (p. 97) The
octogenarian Siles was the only surviving witness to the killing,
says Somoza, so Pedron wanted him dead.
This seems absurd.
Pedron did not care about witnesses. Everyone knew he was
a killer. What, then, had Siles done to merit such an end?
As his son describes, he had served as the president of the local
electoral board for the November 1928 elections. His, too, was
a political killing. Significantly, Pedron killed the old man
but let his two sons and widow live.
It seems that for every person he killed, Pedron captured, held, and
released many more. Why?
What lights guided
him?
Again, there are
many telling details here.
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Jinotega, Nicaragua.
24 April 1929.
From: The Commanding Officer
To: B-2,
Second Brigade Marines, Managua, Nicaragua.
District Commander, Matagalpa, Nicaragua.
R-2, Fifth Regiment
Subject: Information of recent
bandit movements.
1. Felipe Zelaya, Mandador of La Union finca, property
of Josefa Pineda Castellon located S.W. of Colonia and Santa
Isabel, near the Rio Tuma, states that he was captured by a
group of about 20 bandits led by Cornejo [Lieutenant
Florencio Cornejo] at Union Finca about 1830 April 10th,
1929 and taken to San Lucas Finca, about one kilometer to
the south where they came upon Altamirano and about 10 men.
He was then confined for the night but early the next
morning, the 11th, he saw about 100 men assembled at San
Lucas. These were divided into four companies, three
of which were armed with rifles and pistols, while the
fourth carried the provisions, machetes and ropes. The
band separated and proceeded north, avoiding trails and
keeping on high ground. The armed groups were led by
Altamirano, Sebastian Centeno, Cornejo [Florencio
Cornejo], one group had a Lewis gun and each of the others a
Thompson. Altamirano himself carried the Thompson also
two Colt 38's and a dagger. He, Zelaya, was held with
Altamirano group which consisted of about 12 men.
Zelaya states they passed between La Colonia and Pena Blanca
and camped in the forest near Las Cuchillas on the night of
Apr. 11-12 and he was released the morning of the 12th.
The conversation among the men was to the effect that they
intended joining with Sandino and that they would continue
as bandits while American forces were in Nicaragua.
Zelaya states that when airplanes came over on the 11th they
halted and remained motionless, while several of the band
played guitars and sang songs. During the time he was
with them, the bandits avoided all houses, clearings and
trails.
2. Maria Siles, widow of Emilio
Siles, who was killed on the morning of April 14, 1929, near
his home at Las Cruces, states that Altamirano with a force
of bandits had visited their home on 31 Jan, 29, taken
clothing and captured her husband and kept him prisoner for
two (2) days but had released him after inquiring as to
whether he was a spy for Moncada. He came again about
Mar. 10, but her husband was not home. On the morning
of April 14th, a band came to their house and took their
clothing, blankets and about $80.00 in cash. They also
said her husband was a spy and took him, her two (2) sons
Isais and Sylvester and a laborer, Salinas as prisoners.
3. Isais Siles states he was taken
prisoner by a band headed by Sebastian Centeno at about 0700
April 14, 1929 at Las Cruces and released early on the
morning of 15 April near Paso Real, Altamirano was not with
this band during this time. Centeno led the band which
was divided into three (3) groups one of which was led by a
man named / p. 2 /
Rodriguez, all were armed with rifles and nearly all had
pistols. Centeno's group led and one man in this group
carried a Lewis Machine Gun, the other two groups each had a
Thompson which was carried by a man about the center of the
group. They marched in pairs with about 50 meters or
more between groups. Siles states he could not see
whether any men were ahead of the column as a point but he
felt sure they had no one on the flanks. They marched
on high ground and avoided trails and clearings. On
the night of 14-15 April they camped in the forest, the
force divided into five (5) groups, Centeno with one group
of about ten (10) bandits and the prisoners occupied the
center. Each group put out one (1) sentry who was
relieved every hour.
4. Sylvester Siles states substantially
the same as his brother, except he estimates about eighty
(80) bandits instead of fifty (50). He and his father
were turned over to the leader of the rear group and after
proceeding about 1000 meters from their home Centeno gave a
paper to the leader of this group. He, the leader
whose name is not known detailed two (2) men from the group
to take his father out of the column and kill him. The
column was not halted. The two men took his father off
the trail and killed him with machetes. He also stated
that two men followed the column far to the rear.
5. Lieut. Hamas, G.N. stated that
while en route from Santa Cruz to Jinotega, a farmer about
five miles south of Guali told him that about fifty (50)
bandits had passed north on the hills west of Sta Maria
Valley on April 17th. On the same day, the 17th, a
native reported to him, Lt. Hamas at Sta Cruz that about
fifteen (15) bandits crossed the Coco River that evening,
near Las Piedras, headed north.
6. No definite information has been
received as to where Altamirano himself went after 12 April.
/s/ A. E. Simon
M29.04.24.
RG127/43A/24.
Excerpt in
IR29.05.13, NA127/209/1.
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Ancillary Document:
Anastasio Somoza García on the Killing of Emilio Siles
14 April 1929


Anastasio Somoza García, El
verdadero Sandino, o el calvario de las Segovias
(Managua: Robelo, 1936), pp. 130-31.
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