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PC28.01.08  satterfield

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28.01.04A BROWN
28.01.04 HUNT
28.01.05 KILCOURSE
28.01.08 SATTERFIELD
28.01.08 WADBROOK
28.01.21 SHAW
28.01.22 PEARD

28.01.08.   Satterfield, Engagement with Group of Bandits at Cuje

P C - D O C S :      P A T R O L   &   C O M B A T    R E P O R T S
thru 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 +

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T  R  A  N  S  C  R  I  P  T  I  O  N

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
TELPANECA, NICARAGUA
January 8, 1928

From: The Commanding Officer, Guardia Nacional.
To: The Commanding General, Guardia Nacional.
Subject: Engagement with group of bandits at CUJE 8 January 1928, report on.

     1.    A group of bandits 150 strong were reported to the undersigned on January 6 as being in the Cuje Area led by one Alejandro Ferrera, (Hondurian), one of Sandino's leaders. The undersigned was notified of this group of bandits by a reliable native that had previously been employed as a guide on a previous patrol in the above mentioned area. This native was directed to locate the camp of the bandits and report same to the Commanding Officer this post which he did on January 7.
 
   2.    The undersigned cleared TELPANECA at 0330, 8 January, 1928, with a patrol of 20 marines and 10 guardia.
 
   3.    I had previously been informed by guide that the bandits camp was some two and one half leagues from Telpaneca. But it was about four leagues as I did not arrive within the vicinity of their camp until 0830 therefore eliminating all possible chances of a surprise attack.
 
   4.    The bandit camp was located on a small hill where they were using seven native houses as quarters and very difficult to approach as there was a densely wooded ridge paralleling the trail on the left about 100 yards between my patrol and the bandit camp and an ideal place for an ambush.
 
   5.    I led the patrol along the side of a large mountain so as to approach this position and avoid being ambushed is [if] possible. I had previously observed the bandit camp from a mountain top some 800 yards away and could see no movements nor activities in their camp and immediately came to the conclusion that my patrol had been observed by one of their outposts which proved correct. I approached to within 150 yards of the ridge that was on my left when my advance guard reported seeing a movement on ridge to left of trail, at this time I immediately ordered my patrol to take cover along the left of the trail and my flank patrols out with orders to move to the flank and then proceed forward under cover and if possible gain contact with the bandits. In the meantime I ordered Cpl. Macon, USMC, to stand by with ten men and the balance of my patrol to stand by to cover Cpl. Macon and his men in their advance with covering fire as from my position covering fire could be employed nicely. My flank patrols advanced some 50 yards to the right and left front when they were fired upon from the ridge on the left at a range of about 50 yards. Raso Roman Aguston [Román Agustín] #248 was the forward left flank patrol and immediately took cover firing rapidly and at the same time gave in the exact location of the enemy. I immediately ordered covering fire on that part of the ridge to the left of Roman and Cpl. Macon down the trail until parrell [parallel] with Raso Roman and then to take up position on line with him, which Cpl. Macon did promptly and effecting as his men routed that part of the bandit force that were not routed by the covering fire. It was impossible to pursue the bandits thru the underbrush owing to the possibility of killing one of my own patrol. I then ordered Cpl. Macon and his men to cease firing and the rest of my patrol to move to the rear where they could observe mountain in rear of ridge that had been occupied by the bandits and to continue firing as long as they could see targets with what results I do not know. But several men were seen retreating around one side of the mountain and it is hoped that at least some were wounded.

[p. 2]
 
All firing ceased about ten minutes after the first shot was fired. The bandits lost five killed, wounded unknown, but am confident that there were at least twenty owing to the short range. Captured three rifles, and two shotguns, fifty two rounds of Remington ammunition.
 
Upon entering the bandit camp I found a large supply of food stuffs, twenty sacks of beans, twenty eight sacks of corn, and about twenty five sacks of coffee all collected within the last few days according to information given by natives in this area. All food stuffs was burned. The above mentioned group consisted of about 50 men in all, and not 150 as previously report, nor was this group led by Ferrera, but by one of his Lieutenants who was on a foregoing [foraging] expedition with Sandino.
 
Raso Roman Agustin #248 is to be commended for his coolness under fire and for giving me the exact information position of the enemy therefore making it possible for me to delay my patrol promptly had he not shown coolness and courage by pointing out the position of the enemy, I feel confident that some of my patrol would have been hit.
 
Patrol suffered no casualties.
 
The following Guardia Nacional troops participated in the engagement:
 
Lieut. J. H. Satterfield, G.N.
Raso Salamanca Justa, G.N. #245
 "   Moralez Modesto, G.N. #173
 "   Rodriguez Alejandra, G.N. #224
 "   Zapata Domingo, G.N. #225
 "   Gerez Miguel, G.N. #242
 "   Santamaria Miguel, G.N. #75
 "   Vargas Alfrado, G.N. #186
 "   Cantillo Ernesto, G.N. #176
 "   Roman Agustin, G.N. #248
 "   Sanchez Luis, G.N. #212

/s/ Lt. J. H. Satterfield, G.N.
CO 1st Co. G.N. Detachment
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127/43A/33

Summary & Notes:

   Should be read in tandem with Wadbrook's report (next). 

   Initiative & agency here really lies with  the "reliable native" who had served as a guide.  Who was he & what was his agenda?
   Gripping narrative of events; remarkable level of detail on military aspects.
   Rebels successfully escape through underbrush; shows extraordinary degree of intimacy with the land.

   Exceptionally aggressive & effective patrols, given what they were up against — mainly due to their own initiative & skills.

P C - D O C S :      P A T R O L   &   C O M B A T    R E P O R T S
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