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28.04.05 HART
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28.04.08 HOLMES
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28.04.08. Holmes et al. on
the Combined Assault on El Chipote, 3-10
April 1928
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This page combines six reports that
describe a complex combined operation of five
different Marine-Guardia patrols in the
Northeastern Segovias, April 3-10, 1928.
The operation targeted the vast, remote,
mountainous zone between the Ríos Jícaro and
Coco, which the EDSN had controlled for most of
a year (since at least June 1927). In mid-January 1928
the Marines reached El Chipote for the first
time, and in March aerial reconnaissance and
combats identified the zone as a key Sandinista
stronghold. Now, in early April, the goal is to
put boots on the ground to rid the zone of
"bandit forces" before the rainy season begins. The larger strategic goal is to root out
Sandinista influence in the area. (Photos: Marine
patrol, Río Coco, April 1928, Marine Corps
Research Center)
The Chipote operation was conceived as
the western half of a big pincer movement. The
eastern half was led by Major Harold H. Utley &
Captain Merritt A. Edson in their legendary Río
Coco Expedition. Edson began ascending the Coco
from its mouth at Cabo Gracias a Dios on the
Atlantic Coast in mid-February 1928, an episode
treated in some detail in the published
literature (see Edson, "The Rio Coco Patrol,"
Marine Corps Gazette, Aug. 1936; David C.
Brooks, "Marines, Miskitos and the Hunt for
Sandino: The Rio Coco Patrol in 1928," Journal
of Latin American Studies, May 1989).
The Marine strategy of rooting out
Sandinista influence in the area never
succeeded. In fact, as later PC-Docs show,
the strategy backfired, generating enormous
popular sympathy for the EDSN throughout the
zone. Shooting, burning, killing, and
destroying, the patrols succeeded mainly in
inflaming popular sentiments against them.
In this instance there is another irony
—
for just as the
Marines were engaged in this complex pincer
movement, the main Sandinista columns were
poised to strike at the La Luz and Bonanza Mines,
far to the east of these patrols and far to the
south of Edson's, which they did starting on April
15, as seen in the
Top
100, p. 9.
These reports offer a fascinating
portrait of the upper Río Coco-El Chipote zone's
topography, geography, production, and
settlement patterns; popular sentiments among
its inhabitants; Sandinista organizing and labor
expenditures over the preceding year, the nature
of the Marine-Guardia invasion, and larger
patterns in the unfolding war, among other
things.
28.04.08 Holmes, Field Reports, Guiguilí
28.04.10 Skidmore, Rios Coco & Poteca, 8-10
April
28.04.10 Kingston, Report of Operations, 4-9
April, Quilalí
28.04.10 Gray, Patrol Report, San Albino
28.04.12 Kenyon, Patrol Report, Jalapa
28.04.20 Feland / Dunlap, Consolidated Report of
Recent Operations in Chipote Region
|
28.04.08.
Holmes, Field Reports, Guiguili
T R A N
S C R I P
T I O N S
From: CO 52nd Company, GUIGUILI. April
6, 1928.
To: AREA COMMANDER OCOTAL
1106 At 1045 April 5, fired on three men
fleeing into bush from house, one
fleeing into bush from house, one seen
to bear firearm. Wounded one, all
escaped. Found cached in bush around
house: 1 shotgun with powder and ball,
11 fighting machetes, several axes, leg
irons for pole climbing, saddle with
Sandino colors in bands, quantity of
native clothing and blankets, two houses
contiguous to caches had quantity of
beans, corn, and bananas.
1530 Man found spying our movements,
following in canoe on Cua River in
direction of Cua. 2nd Lt. Norman and
squad attempted capture. Native fled,
squad fired and pursued. Native fled
through house in which were found muzzle
loading carbine, powder and ball, hat
with Sandino colors.
0215 April 6. Cleared camp at 0600
arrived Guiguili. No bandits present. No
sign bandit activity. House of Eduardo
Palma vacant but contained at least 1200
pounds of beans. (Dumped beans in river)
Palma alleged fleeing from bandits. Am
forwarding a number of letters which
apparently contain useful information.
Holmes 1300
From: CO. 52nd Company Guiguili. April
7, 1928.
To: AREA COMMANDER OCOTAL
1107 Cleared Guiguili for Bentias at
0745. Received your 1106-2100 at 0945.
had believed it good plan to base here
if only to interrupt river traffic. Also
found indications that small bandit
group had probably started this way
yesterday then turned in direction of
Cua. Group of houses on Bentias trail 5
miles southwest Guiguili. All houses had
lately been deserted. All had small
quantities black powder, some ball, and
in one of the group we found a pair of
Marine shoes marked with name L. J.
Smith. There are no other identifying
marks in them. Patrolling Coco River
North and South Guiguili this afternoon.
Combat patrols to Cua,- Bentias - San
Bartolo on 8th stop Holmes 1500.
From: CO. 52nd Company Guiguili. April
8, 1928.
To: AREA COMMANDER OCOTAL
1108 While enroute here from Guiguili,
at 1345, point fired on party of 3
natives, one of whom wore khaki and
carried a rifle, all mounted. Natives
fled, one quitting a gray mule, brand
U.S. boot number 245. On mule was native
saddle carrying pair of regulation (our)
saddle bags in which were 7 cartridges,
.50 caliber, Krag (RA 17), One 11 Field
Message Book, U.S.M.C. Condiment can
contained notes only, in number, 7
signers, including Coronado Maradiaga.
Also found muzzle loading shotgun in
same house. Have been occupying house of
Eduardo Palma for which section is named
Guiguili. Found there on 7th. additional
caches of 500 pounds of beans and
smaller articles bringing total there
approximately 2100 pounds. Also found
full bandolier Krag ammunition. Withheld
burning house to keep as quarters stop.
Holmes 1700. Strength patrol Capts.
Holmes and Phipps, 40 enlisted one (1)
Navy. 1100.
127/43A/33
|
Holmes:
Summary & Notes:
•
Terse reports but packed with meaning: 43 men, search & destroy mission, based at
Guiguilí, up & down Río Coco, up Río Cua;
working in conjunction with Skidmore
(below); lots of food & supplies destroyed
(dumping 1,700 lbs. of beans into river
—
think of the labor that went into growing
those beans!).
•
Plentiful evidence of EDSN organizing in &
dominion over the zone.
•
Rules of engagement: shoot to kill anyone
with a firearm or running away.
•
Eduardo Palma's house: warehouse of
sorts; lots of supplies there; small cache
of correspondence seized (coded HOL2);
another cache of correspondence seized by
Major Rockey around this same time (PC28.04.05d)
links Eduardo Palma to Guadalupe Rivera at
Santa Cruz, cousin of
EDSN Colonel Abraham Rivera; see
EDSN-Docs
and Statement of Abraham Rivera with
correspondence seized by Edson around this
same time,
Top 100, p. 11.
•
EDSN Col. Coronado Maradiaga named in captured
correspondence.
•
Marine shoes found marked "L. J. Smith";
Pvt. Leonard J. Smith killed in action near
Quilali, 30 Dec. 1927 (see USMC-Docs—Marine
Corps Casualties).
|
.28.04.10. Skidmore, Rios Coco & Poteca, 8-10
April
From: CO, 2nd Platoon, 52nd
Company, GUIGUILI, 8 April 1928.
To: AREA COMMANDER
OCOTAL
1108 "Patrol left GUIGUILI at 0915 north
on COCO RIVER to PALUSMA. Patrol burned
houses on river containing military
supplies, powder and shells. Strength of
patrol 1 Sgt., 2 squads. Patrol returned
1200. Skidmore." Holmes.
From: CO. 2nd Platoon, 52nd
Company, GUIGUILI. 9 April 1928.
To: AREA COMMANDER
OCOTAL
1109 "Lt.Skidmore with two squads
cleared GUIGUILI for POTECA. Found many
signs of bandits and bandit activities.
One 16 gauge shotgun with ammunition
found in house after occupants had fled.
Burned five houses containing powder,
lead, cartridges and military supplies -
destroyed 800 pounds dried beef - 1200
pounds beans - 5600 pounds corn - 12
boats. Skidmore 1100" Holmes.
From: CO, 2nd Platoon, 52nd
Company, GUIGUILI. 10 April 1928.
To: AREA COMMANDER
OCOTAL
1110 "Lt Skidmore with patrol two squads
left GUIGUILI at 0830 on patrol to North
and East of GUIGUILI. Found no signs of
human occupation. No trails, or means of
livelihood. Nothing in this area that
will supply bandits. Skidmore." Holmes.
127/43A/33
|
Skidmore: Summary & Notes:
•
Brief messages from Lt. Skidmore to Lt.
Holmes, who forwarded them to the AC in
Ocotal (more reports on this patrol likely
exist).
•
From these snippets: an aggressive
search-and-destroy operation for enemy
properties along the river: in 2 days burned
at least 7 houses, destroyed tons of stored
food, 12 boats along Río Coco.
|
28.04.10 Kingston, Report of Operations, 4-9 April,
Quilalí
MARINE DETACHMENT
QUILALI, NICARAGUA
10 April, 1928.
From: |
Captain Arthur Kingston,
U.S.Marine Corps. |
To: |
The Area Commander, Northern
Area,
Western Nicaragua, Ocotal,
Nicaragua. |
Subject: |
Report of Operations 5 April,
1928 to 9 April, 1928. |
Reference: |
Field Order No 4, dated 30 March
1928 (with accompanying maps). |
1. In accordance with the reference, a
detachment consisting of Captain Arthur
Kingston, U.S.M.C. (Commanding), Captain
LePage Cronmiller, Jr., G.N.N., Cadet
Chester A. Davis, G.N.N., Cadet Paul
Williams (Medical Corps), G.N.N.,
thirty-three enlisted Marines, one
enlisted Navy, Medical Corps, and
thirty-five enlisted Guardia with a pack
train of thirty animals cleared Quilali
at 0840, April 5, 1928.
2. April 5, 1928, Column
cleared Quilali at 0840, marching to the
South [North?] over a comparatively
level trail and arrived at BUFONA
[Bujona] at 1310. Upon arrival at
BUFONA, a native man was seen to take to
the brush to the East. The native guides
insisted that this was REMANGON but I
doubted the truth of their statement.
BUFONA is approached from the Northwest
up a steep hill about two hundred feet
in height. The settlement consist of
five houses in a basin surrounded by
mountains. On the side of the Mountain
(LA BUFONA) to the North are four other
houses. All houses in this area were
thoroughly searched. Four natives were
found in a house to the Northeast of
BUFONA but they escaped upon approach of
the column. One house on the side of the
mountain contained approximately fifty
thousand ears of corn. All of these
houses, especially those far up the
mountain-side contained large quantities
of corn. A herd of fifteen head of
cattle was in a pasture in this area.
There was no water at BUFONA and as the
native guides insisted there was none to
the North it was necessary to go back
about half a mile, where the column went
into camp at 1815, April 5, 1928.
Distance marched approximately twelve
miles.
3. April 6, 1928. Cleared
camp at 0800. Proceeded through BUFONA
and headed to the North. About a mile
Northwest of BUFONA two aeroplanes
circled overhead. Displayed panel "VZ"
(Report our location) to find out where
we were, but the planes evidently did
not understand the signal as a question.
Approximately two miles Northwest of
BUFONA, in a valley near a creek of
excellent water, we found eight
comparatively new crude shacks built of
poles, thatch and palm leaves, which
would accomodate about twenty men. [ p.
2 ] There were outpost shelters on the
trail to BUFONA and on the
mountain-side. At the main encampment
were four head of cattle, a large number
of chickens, ducks, about fifteen white
pigeons, shelled corn, coffee, salt, and
plenty of beans. This spot was hidden
from aerial observation by thick
foliage. The native guides insisted
there was no trail to the North, that
the only way out was back through
BUFONA. After a reconnaissance a trail
was found leading to the Northeast. It
appeared to be a comparatively new
trail, blazed, and the small saplings on
each side freshly cut to allow the free
passage of a pack train. It went up the
side of a hill with a very steep descent
on the other side. At 1330 the column
arrived at two houses near a small
banana grove. In one of these houses was
found approximately twenty feet of fuse,
some lead and primers. At 1430 the trail
lead into another trail running North
and South. This trail had the appearance
of having been recently used by a large
number of men and animals. It was of
black mud and well screened by trees
from aerial observation. At 1530 two
aeroplanes passed overhead but
apparently did not see us. This
detachment had not been supplied with
Very Pistols so could not attract their
attention. At 1615 the column camped
near a creek, the guides still insisting
they did not know our location. Distance
marched approximately fourteen miles
over a succession of high hills until
encountering the main trail which was
fairly good.
4. April 7, 1928. Cleared
camp at 0800. At 0900, after ascending a
steep hill and advancing toward a house
in a clearing, the point was fired on.
The fire was returned and the remainder
of the column advanced. Three natives
were seen running to the woods from a
house about a mile across a deep gully
to the East of our position. A group of
about ten were heard by the men in the
point to take off hurriedly to the
Northeast. We pursued immediately but
lost them in the woods. This place was
REMANGON. It consisted of one shack in a
clearing in which were several knolls.
It was heavily wooded on all sides
except to the East, where there was a
deep valley with another shack and woods
on the far side. Near the first shack
were several pigs and the hides of three
cows which appeared to have been killed
during the past week. In the house was a
bin full of shelled corn, plenty of
beans, and pieces of burlap and iron
used in making dynamite bombs, also a
cross having the name Altamirano. On the
trail leading to the Northeast in the
woods were found evidence of an
encampment for use in the day time by
about twenty persons, two stones used by
the natives in preparing corn for
tortillas, hot coffee and hot parched
corn. On a tree was pencilled notice
signed with the initials "MEA", to the
effect that everything was quiet in the
mountains. There was an outpost position
to the South between this encampment and
house. There were no prepared defensive
positions except several trees which had
been felled some time. ago. The
description of REMANGON as given by
Carleton Beals was greatly exaggerated
in reference to the log barricades. The
logs were there, but as stated, had not
been hauled into any semblance of a
prepared position. The house would
accomodate about ten persons. On the far
side of the hill to the West were found
shacks constructed of poles and palm
leaves accomodating fifty or sixty men.
These shacks had not been occupied in
some time. This trail, as discovered the
next day, led to [ p. 3 ] MONCHONES. The
trail used by this column was not
guarded to the South of the house. The
column proceed to the Northeast and
about three miles from REMANGON was
found a freshly cut trail leading to the
East. We followed this trail down the
side of the mountain and came to a
clearing in which were five hills. On
two of these hills were houses from
which three natives ran to the woods
upon our approach. Both of these houses
were exceptionally well constructed of
cedar planed boards. The tables, bins
and boards for beds in all of them being
of smooth planed cedar. From papers
found in one of the houses it appeared
to belong to Simeon Montoya Maza and
that Sandino himself had been there. In
the house was found a dynamite bomb,
twenty sticks of dynamite, two coils of
fuse, thirty detonators, corn, coffee
and beans; also a "Ham" map of Nicaragua
sown on muslin, of the class used by the
air service. This map had the two
squares of OCOTAL and SAN ALBINO cut off
it. Near the house were found two
rifles, one a "50-7-", the other a
Guardia issue rifle No.472183, with the
name of Mendez on it. Mendez was a
Sergeant in the Guardia who was killed
with Lieutenant O'Shea's patrol when
searching for Lieutenant Thomas. The
other house had in it five saddles and
bridles, a freshly killed beef, small
potatoes, cooked beans, with the fire
still burning. Nearby were found ten
mules and four horses. One of the mules
was branded "US", saddled with two rolls
of clothing strapped to the saddle. In
one of these rolls was a red and black
banner about eighteen inches wide and
five feet long. The "US" mule was a mare
mule, about eight years old, thirteen
and a half hands high, bay in color. Its
tail was stunted and its right ear
looped at top, that is doubled back. It
was branded with a Spanish "N" on the
left hind leg. After destroying the
dynamite and stores, the column
proceeded to the Northwest. About four
miles further, in a native shack was
found a dynamite bomb but no natives. We
continued the advance to the end of the
trail and camped at 1615. Distance
marched approximately twelve miles over
several steep mountains.
5. April 8, 1928. Cleared
camp at 0800 and marched toward
REMANGON. At 1145 two aeroplanes passed
overhead. The trail was hidden by the
trees but we attracted their attention
by firing two signal parachute rockets
and displayed panels in a small open
space. The planes opened fire with their
machine guns and it was thought at first
they had mistaken us for a bandit group.
The trail followed on our return to
REMANGON was a main trail and did not
lead to the house of Montoyo. The
clearing at the house could be seen in
the valley to the South from one point
on this trail. At 1415 the column
reached REMANGON and proceeded to the
West. To the West of REMANGON were the
shacks referred to in paragraph four
above. This trail led down the side of a
steep mountain through slippery black
mud, then on down to MONCHONES, where we
arrived at 1715 and camped. Distance
marched approximately sixteen miles.
6. April 9, 1928. The column
cleared MONCHONES at 1335, marching
South through the valley of the MURRA
and JICARO Rivers along a level trail.
This trail has not been used in some
time. There were no houses on it except
in the immediate vicinity of QUILALI.
Arrived at QUILALI at 1605. Distance
marched eight miles.
7. This column accomplished
its mission in destroying bandits
supplies and rendered REMANGON and the
retreat of MONTOYO uninhabitable. [ p. 4
] The bandits in that area, if they
remain there, will have to live in the
woods.
8. The morale and spirit
shown by all the men attached to the
column were excellent. They were all
anxious to go forward and each hill was
passed by with the slogan that we could
still find bigger and better hills. At
REMANGON the men were well in hand and
regretted that there was no marked
resistance, and entered the advance
rapidly with the one thought of clearing
out the bandit group. I cannot praise
too highly the conduct and spirit shown
by all the officers and men attached to
this column. The conduct of the Guardia
personnel was excellent. They were also
very anxious to continue at all times
and no task seemed too difficult. Upon
return to QUILALI the men and animals
were in excellent physical condition. I
desire also to commend the Air Service
for their excellent co-operation.
9. It is my opinion that the
bandits in the area passed through by
this column have been deprived of all
their stores and that their spirit has
been broken.
10. The papers confiscated
on this trip are enclosed.
/s/ ARTHUR KINGSTON
127/43A/33
|
Ancillary Document:
Excerpts from Carleton
Beals on his time in Remango, in The Nation,
Feb.-March 1928
". . . We broke
camp early next morning and began our
forced pilgrimage with Colindres's
soldiers and juanas [camp women] through
risky country to Remango. We circled the
reten El Retiro, where the marines were
now burning the houses—smoke curled up
grimly over the side of the mountain.
Finally, on a late, cold evening, under
a brittle, gray-green sky, we climbed up
a bald mountain knob swept by a
remorseless wind out of the great
valleys beyond and below. Grinning
rifles menaced us over log barricades
tilted against the skyline. Red and
black hat-bands, bodies crouching low,
waiting. This reten is one of the key
outposts. It is almost inaccessible to
attack and had been held by Sandino
since the beginning of hostilities. Its
corrals were filled with animals—cows,
pigs, chickens. A number of outhouses
clustered around the main barracks. And
here at El Remango we found Captain
Altamirano and about seventy-five
soldiers. . . .
. . . Though
the wind howled over Remango (since the
beginning of hostilities one of
Sandino's key outposts) we spent the
night snugly in the long barracks. The
soldiers were as free and easy as if the
enemy were a thousand miles away instead
of on the next ridge. The barracks were
made of huge driven poles with a high
thatched roof. At one end were kitchen
tables made of tree trunks split in half
or slabs of stone set on wooden posts.
The walls were lined with bunks of
rawhide stretching over poles pegged
against the wall as a protection from
the wind. The Juanas or camp women had
erected a little shrine presided over by
Saint Anthony and decorated with colored
tissue paper, against which burned a
carbide lamp. A baby squalled from a
sisal hammock. Soldiers, each with his
rifle by his side, clustered in groups,
some telling stories—the attack on
Ocotal, the surprise assault against the
Machos in Las Cruces, the burning of the
hacienda El Hule, and the violation of
women by the hated Gringos—and here was
I in their midst, a Macho Yankee Gringo,
yet treated with all consideration and
the greatest deference. Other soldiers,
seated on sawed-off stumps, were
reading, by the light of ocote torches,
novels, the latest numbers of Ariel, or
stray newspapers. A man of Negroid type
was making love to a Juana with a high,
red comb set with sparkling glass
diamonds. Another, in white "pyjamas"
grimy with use, roasted meat, using his
ramrod as a spit. A guitar thrums a
Sandino song with a simple, Whitmanesque
flavor and a Mexican tune, "La Casita."
To the sound of such music we danced
most of the night away—a crowded
confusion of babel and song, smoke and
smell, flame and color. . . ."
Carleton Beals, The Nation,
February-March 1928.
|
Kingston & Beals:
Summary & Notes:
•
Kingston mistyped, his column heading NE
from Quilalí, not "south" as the report
says; all the place names in the report are
NE of Quilalí.
•
37 Marines, 1 Navy, 35 enlisted Guardia = a
73 man patrol, plus at least two "native
guides" and animals.
•
Numerous dispersed settlements very well
hidden from patrols, airplanes; enormous
stocks of food stored (one has estimated
50,000 ears of corn); very elaborate
barracks and housing near Remongón with
"planed cedar boards"; very decentralized
settlement and food storage.
•
Carleton Beals description of log barricades
at Remongón; clearly the Marines are reading
Beals' articles (published in The Nation
only weeks earlier).
•
Harassing fire by small bands.
•
Clumsy and ineffective communication with
airplanes; not surprising in such thickly
wooded & rugged territory.
•
¶ 8 on
column's "morale and spirit": these guys are
itching for a fight; very aggressive,
gung-ho.
•
EDSN papers found; Simeón Montoya.
•
Patrol also finds EDSN loot from various
contacts, including part of Ham Map probably
taken from the two downed aviators back in
Oct. 1927 (see
PC
27.10.12 O'Shea).
•
¶ 9:
"It is my opinion . . . that their spirit
has been broken" — a good example of
wishful thinking, imputing beliefs &
sentiments to the enemy that bore no
relation to reality.
|
28.04.10 Gray, Patrol Report, San Albino
MARINE DETACHMENT
SAN ALBINO, NICARAGUA
10 April 1928.
From: |
Major John A. Gray, U.S. Marines
Corps. |
To: |
The Area Commander, Northern
Area, Ocotal. |
Subject: |
Patrol report. |
Reference: |
Field Order No. 4. |
1. In compliance with Field
Order No. 4 dated 30 March 1928, I
organized a combined detachment
consisting of three officers and 76
enlisted, U.S.M.C. and 1 enlisted U.S.
Navy, from the following places:
2 officers and 35 enlisted U.S.M.C. and
1 Navy enlisted from San Albino.
1 officer and 20 enlisted U.S.M.C. from
Jicaro
21 enlisted U.S.M.C. from Apali.
I was in command of the above detachment
with First Lieutenant Everett H. Clark,
U.S.M.C. and Second Lieutenant George H.
Potter, U.S.M.C., additional officers.
Guides and muleros accompanied the
column. The detachment was armed with 1
Thompson Sub-machine gun and 1 Browning
automatic rifle to each squad, with a
generous allowance of rifle and hand
grenades. One Browning machine gun and
one Stokes Mortar, with initial
allowance of ammunition for all weapons,
were carried. A Field radio set was
carried together with rations for eighty
men for ten days. There were forty-four
pack animals in the train and all
officers were mounted.
2. This detachment cleared
SAN ALBINO at 1800 April 5, 1928,
proceeding along the SAN ALBINO - SAN
GERONIMO - SANTA ROSA trail. At 2300
when the head of the column was entering
the SANTA ROSA area, firing from
automatic weapons was heard in the
direction of SAN PEDRO. This firing I
estimated was from the JALAPA column,
which Lieutenant Kenyon confirmed when
he joined me at MOCHONES. A short
distance south of SANTA ROSA the trail
forks, the left fork leaving the ridge
and entering the MURRA valley, crossing
the MURRA river, winding along the west
slope of CHIPOTE and over the southern
crest of CHIPOTE down into MOCHONES,
which is located on the Southern face of
the mountains about 50 feet above the
junction of the MURRA river and MOCHONES
Creek. The right fork continues south
along the ridge running generally
parallel to the MURRA River until the
ridge gradually develops into a spur,
which ends on the JICARO River opposite
the north slope of SAPOTILIAL
[Zapotillal] Mountain. The trail there
follows the bed of the JICARO RIVER to
the junction of this river and the
MURRA. From this point it proceeds up
the MURRA River, one half mile to
MOCHONES. This latter trail is much the
longer of the two trails from SANTA ROSA
to MOCHONES but is to be preferred to
the CHIPOTE Ridge trail for troops
accompanied by a pack train, for the
reason that the CHIPOTE Trail is nearly
perpendicular in places. I followed the
right fork and after marching all night
came out, at 0500 April 6, on the JICARO
River. The men were tired and the pack
animals exhausted (one animal died at
this time), as the trail followed had
been little used and was overgrown with
brush which slowed the column to a
crawl. I rested the column until 0730
then followed the JICARO River to
MOCHONES, along the route above
described, where I arrived at 1100 April
6 and established a base.
3. The base camp was
established about 50 feet above the
creek bottom on a ledge that included
the area of the lower of the two houses.
MURRA River MOCHONES Creek insured an
excellent water supply, and there was a
potrero with cane forage (a limited
supply) for the pack animals. The
strategic position of the base in
consideration of the mission assigned to
the San Albino Column by Operations
Order Four may readily be appreciated if
its location with relation to positions
of DIVISIONES DE AGUAS and REMANGON be
examined on the map made by Lieutenant
Clark, which accompanies this report.
The column after going into camp at 1100
rested until 0330 in the morning. At
0400 on April 7, Major Gray cleared camp
at MOCHONES with a patrol consisting of
Lieutenant Clark and himself and forty
enlisted, proceeding Northeast up the
slope of MOCHONES Mountain which
appeared suspicious the previous day. At
0500 when surrounding a house near the
crest of this [ p. 2 ] mountain the
point was fired on twice by a bandit who
narrowly missed Lieutenant Clark. The
house was a comparatively large, well
constructed affair on the edge of a
coffee plantation. Two bandits were seen
at this time who were fired on by the
patrol but escaped into the coffee
grove. Two trails cleverly ambushed led
through the coffee grove which covered
the top of the mountain. Both trails
were reconnoitered by the patrol and a
house roughly fortified with log
parapets, which contained about 3 tons
of coffee was found. On the eastern face
of the mountain at the farther edge of
the coffee grove a house was searched in
which was found a U.S. Engineer Corps
prismatic compass No. 27896, 1918, which
members of the patrol identified as
having belonged to the late Lieutenant
Bruce, G.N. The coffee grove was
thoroughly combed but no bandits
located. This house overlooked a very
deep wooded valley on the opposite side
of which towered BUFONA [Bujona]
Mountain. At 0730 machine gun fire and
rifle firing was heard from Captain
Kingston's column reconnoitering
REMANGON, which supposition Captain
Kingston later confirmed when he joined
me at MOCHONES. After a second search of
MOCHONES the patrol returned to base
camp at 1100 April 7, for food and rest.
4. The San Albino Column
repeatedly attempted to secure
communication by radio with the Area
Commander, Ocotal, and other radio
stations with no success. The radio
operator with the column could not get
the machine to function until the
morning of April 9, though I kept him
working on the machine continuously. At
1100 April 7, planes came over MOCHONES
and acknowledged the column
identification panels. This was the
first communication the column was able
to secure, though panels were exposed,
every pistol fired, and the radio
(sending) operated at every opportunity.
At 2100, April 7, I took a fresh patrol
consisting of myself and Lieutenant
Clark with 35 enlisted and marched
Northeast from base camp on the alleged
bandit camp in the DIVISION DE AGUAS
Area. The trail crossed the headwaters
of the CREEK DE ORO and CREEK SUNGANO
and was a very difficult rough trail
that wound along the southern and
southeastern slopes of CHIPOTE then
across very difficult terrain until it
came out on the lofty divide which is
DIVISION DE AGUAS. The patrol arrived in
the area at 0230 April 8th. The guide on
the trip was a young native boy who had
been held prisoner by CORONADO MARADIAGA
for a month at his camp on DIVISION DE
AGUAS. This guide knew the position of
the reten and main camp of Maradiaga. He
conducted the patrol to the vicinity of
the reten. Here I halted and waited
until 0530 when it was light enough to
shoot. The patrol then advanced up the
trail leading up and along the divide,
reconnoitered the reten in which a fire
about 12 hours old was burning and came
out at the main outpost on the south end
of the ridge. No bandits were
encountered. The house in which the main
body of this group had been quartered
was in great confusion as though vacated
in a hurry, with all manner of trash and
worthless debris strewn around. Five
rude shelters in the reten appeared to
have been fairly recently occupied. The
patrol returned south along the divide
arriving at base camp at 1145. Enroute
to camp firing was heard west across the
valley from DIVISION DE AGUAS at
REMPAJON. This was Lieutenant Kenyon's
Column reconnoitering REMPAJON, and his
column proceeded down the CHIPOTE Ridge
arriving at MONCHONES at 1400 April 8. [
p. 3 ]
5. At 1700 April 8 Captain
Kingston's Column arrived in camp at
MONCHONES. After a conference with
Captain Kingston and Lieutenant Kenyon I
decided that the missions assigned in
Par.3 (b) (c) and (d) of Operations
Order No.4 had been carried out and I
attempted to transmit this information
to the Area Commander, Ocotal, via
radio. This message was sent at about
2200 April 8, and was acknowledged by
JICARO. The radio operator by this time
had succeeded in getting the radio the
send and receive spasmodically, and it
may be that he was in error when he
stated to me that this message had been
acknowledged. The following morning I
had the message repeated and this time
Ocotal acknowledged receipt. I requested
further bandit intelligence as neither
Captain Kingston, Lieutenant Kenyon or
myself had received any information
regarding the location of any bandit
groups, and our respective columns had
thoroughly covered the areas and reputed
locations assigned in orders. At 1100
April 9, orders were received from the
Area Commander, Ocotal by all columns in
camp at MONCHONES to return to home
stations. The plane delivering these
orders dropped a message the original of
which is enclosed. The information given
that an unknown village lay 5 miles east
of Monchones and needed touching I
considered very meager. "Five miles east
of Monchones" is a very large order to
cover in terrain of the nature of that
lying east of CHIPOTE. No bombing was
heard nor could the planes be followed
after leaving the vicinity of MONCHONES
which is in a deep cleft in the hills. I
consequently did not investigate this
information particularly as I had
already patrolled 9 miles east of camp
to DIVISION DE AGUAS as described above
and had destroyed all bandit habitations
discovered between these two points.
6. At 1200 April 9, all
columns broke camp. I returned via the
CHIPOTE - MURRA RIVER - SANTA ROSA trail
mentioned as the left fork trail above.
No contacts enroute. San Albino Column
arrived at home station (San Albino) at
2300 April 9, 1928.
7. The following is a brief
resume of distances marched, time
includes all halts, patrolling
reconnoitering, etc.
MARCHING AND PATROLLING
SAN ALBINO to MONCHONES, 18 miles, 1800
April 5 to 1100 April 6.
MONCHONES to MONCHONES MOUNTAIN, 6
miles, 0400 April 7 to 1100 April 7.
MONCHONES TO DIVISION DE AGUAS,18
miles,2100 April 7 to 1145 April 8.
MONCHONES TO SAN ALBINO via CHIPOTE,15
miles, 1200 April 9 to 2300 April 9.
8. Every man and officer on
this patrol gave their very best to
carry out the mission assigned. That no
bandits were killed or captured in my
opinion cannot reflect any omission or
dereliction on the part of the
personnel.
/s/ John A. Gray.
127/43A/33
|
Gray: Summary & Notes:
•
A big patrol
— 80 Marines & Navy, 44
animals, all officers mounted, out for 5
days (April 5-9).
•
EDSN harassing actions (brief contact at
Monchones, early a.m., April 7).
•
Wonderful descriptions of the physical &
social geography; very difficult and rugged
terrain.
•
EDSN war souvenirs: Lt. Bruce's compass
found (Bruce killed near Sapotillal, 1 Jan 1928; see
PC 28.01.04b,
and
USMC-Docs, Marine Corps Casualties)
•
Native boy as Marine-GN guide, seemingly
willingly; said he had been held captive at
El Chipote by Coronado Maradiaga. Was he
coerced?
•
Radio communication
—
sporadic
("spasmodic"), infrequent, frustrating.
•
Defensiveness explaining why he didn't go
back "5 miles east of Monchones" after just
getting back from that zone; and why no
"bandits" killed or wounded.
•
Convergence of columns at Monchones evening
of April 8; they all agree that they've
fulfilled Field Order No. 4. Had had enough,
realized the futility of their mission
without explicitly saying so here.
•
Everybody back in their barracks by April 9.
Meanwhile the main body of Sandinistas is
marching east and will be striking at the
Bonanza & La Luz mines starting on April 15.
|
28.04.12 Kenyon, Patrol Report, Jalapa
Office of the Forty-Sixth Company,
Jalapa, Nicaragua.
12 April, 1928
From: |
1st Lieut. Howard Kenyon, U.S.
Marine Corps. |
To: |
The Area Commander. |
Subject: |
Patrol, report of. |
Enclosures: |
(1) Letter of Yamario Roches. |
1. In accordance with the provision of
Field Order No. 4, a column of 73
enlisted marines and hospital corpsman,
two officers, four armed guides and 14
animals left Jalapa at 9:45 PM on 3
April, 1928 for Juali via Las Cruces and
continued completely to investigate all
points mentioned in paragraph 3 (A)
including San Pedro and Division de
Aguas.
2. The march, conduct and
march discipline of the column was
excellent throughout, no animals or
equipment were lost. Only one man became
incapacitated by a sprained ankle and
was left at San Albino when the column
passed Santa Rosa. I wish in particular
to mention the excellent manner in which
the group of 46th Company men under
Lieut. Zuber who led on foot his group
as advance party under day and night
marching on unbelievably bad trails.
3. The column arrived at
Santa Cruz where the ex-Sandino
Commandant of Jalapa had a house and a
considerable supply of bandit corn. The
column continued on to Juali which was
passed at about daybreak. No stop was
made at Juali. The march was continued
all night. There were two rains that
made the mountain roads from Santa Cruz
to Juali bad. The column kept on to Los
Encinos where it arrived at about 8:00
A.M. As we entered Los Encinos a bandit
group without rifles fled. There were
about twelve men in the group waiting
there to get a guide to take them to
Honduras. Sebastian was a former member
of Sandino's staff and his companion
Tomas Servas with him was a Sandino
leader. They slept the night before in
the house of a German subject, Adolfo
Mences. The column rested all day and
slept the night of 4 April, 1928 in Los
Encinos. On the morning of 5 April, 1928
at 4:20 AM Lieut. Zuber proceeded to
Murra, via Mina Americana with the 46th
Co., men. I took the train and 20th Co.
men on the Esperanza trail. Both columns
destroyed all supply houses enroute. The
two columns joined at Plantel [ p. 2 ]
and proceeded to Murra where we arrived
at noon and made camp. The town was
deserted with no signs of bandit
occupancy. At 9 PM we proceeded to San
Pedro where we arrived at about 11 PM.
There had been recent occupancy at San
Pedro. It is a large well kept ranch.
Good sized group had been there possibly
two weeks before. About 400 or 500
bushels of corn in a new storehouse was
destroyed. The ranch is the property of
the bandit leader Colindres [MJS note:
Juan Colindres,
not Juan Gregorio Colindres] who
deals in coffee and buying up ore for
grinding in the former mill that was at
Murra but which Colindres moved to
Tamis. We slept at San Pedro and ate the
chickens there. The following morning we
left after breakfast on the road to
North Chipote on the left bank of the
Murra via Tamis. This latter road is one
that has been kept in repair by the
bandits to avoid taking the right bank
road that leads through Santa Rosa. It
is very rough and large packs on animals
on this road are impossible. We crossed
a very difficult pass of the river Tamis
near the junction of the Murra and
destroyed Palacio where we found a house
made with platforms around and outside
for lookouts. The occupants fled. There
was no food in the house and none in the
shacks on North Chipote or Chipote
proper. We camped for the night at Las
Flores which was abandoned. On the
morning of April 7 we proceed along the
ridge of the Chipote range, formerly
before bandit time known as Mount
Olingo, and at 2:30 PM came to camp at
Division de Aguas where we found a large
supply of coffee which we destroyed upon
leaving the next day. On the morning of
8 April we proceeded down the left bank
of the Quebrado de Oro, also known as
Crique de Oro and incorrectly shown on
the Patterson map as Monchones Creek,
through Rampujon which had been a bandit
rendezvous. There we found the place
that McDonald had found on the morning
of 28 January when he was operating with
major Young's battalion. [see
PC-Docs
28.02.04]
Here we found a saddle and all equipment
of an apparent bandit leader abandoned
just upon our arrival. In the saddle
bags we found six sticks of dynamite,
about fifteen caps and about 20 feet of
fuse and a letter from one Yamario
Roches stating "goodbye" to his
Nicaraguan companions that he was done.
I have translated the letter hereto and
attached it. There was a cane mill still
operating and 1000 yards below the
valley was an enormous native mill where
sugar was still fresh in the moulds. We
reached Monchones and at noon of 9 April
left for Jicaro via Santa Rosa. Chipote
was a deserted wreck. At Santa Rosa I
closed up the Jalapa column and
mustered. I put a sick man I found on
the road from the San Albino column
whose mule had played out on one of my
animals and sent a sick man of my own on
another horse from my column, with
saddle to San Albino in charge of the
San Albino hospital corpsman. The Jalapa
column reached Jicaro at about 2:30 AM
on 10 April. At Jicaro we rested until
the morning of April 11th when
Lieutenant Zuber took the column back to
Jalapa and arrived without further
incident at about 2 PM.
4. At about 4 PM on 10 April
I questioned a prisoner in Jicaro
relative to the hiding place of Carmen
Torres. He gave me what appeared to be
facts. My own men were too expended to
allow them to make this expedition and
since it had to be made on foot I called
for volunteers from Jicaro. Lieutenant
Thwing and three Marines and a hospital
corpsman volunteered to follow. We left
Jicaro at about 8:30 PM shortly before
daybreak we were nearing the bandit camp
and the prisoner guide trembled with
fear. We found the bandits sleeping on
the ground and under leaf covered sheds
in a deep gulch. I placed the men and
threw [ p. 3 ] a grenade directly on the
bunk of Torres but it proved to be a dud
and started the dog barking. By the time
we got other grenades and automatic
weapons started some of the bandits were
sitting or standing and hissing to one
another for silence to learn what had
fallen into camp and started the dog.
The following blast of the following
bombs and automatic weapons created a
riot. Without clothing, pistols or
shoes, Torres and those close to him
took off. Evidently two were left dying
from the howls made in the gulch shortly
below. We got Torres sword, all his
clothes, the .45 taken from Mr. Johnson,
two revolvers and all the clothing and
loot of the bandits, and several saddles
and about 10 machetes. Every item was
burned that we did not carry along. I
left the pistols with Lieutenant Thwing.
We found what was evidently the clothing
of Mr. Johnson taken from the body after
the ambush. At San Diego I separated
from the Jicaro Marines and left them
under Lieutenant Thwing to go to Jicaro
since they would pass Lieutenant Zuber
enroute. I went to Jalapa alone with two
armed guides since we were on the edge
of the plains and daylight had come.
5. OPINION. From what I have
seen of what was once the strong bandit
area I am convinced that the general
result of Field Order No. 4 was a
complete success. All known centers of
bandits groups are wrecked. Mr. Williams
of Los Encinos states that the staff
bandits of Sandino admit the cause is
hopeless. It is possible that a few
fleeing groups may be living in the
wilderness on the extreme top of Bujona
since I saw several columns of smoke
rising from that location as I passed
the heights of Santa Rosa on the evening
of 9 April. As the area settles for a
time information of small groups in
hiding will leak out and they can be
attacked by small combat groups
operating usually at night. In this
manner I believe Sandino will be killed
if he remains long in this area.
/s/ Howard N. Kenyon
127/43A/33
|
Ancillary Document:
Verses by Yamario Rocha Found by Lt.
Kenyon at Rempujón, 8 April 1928
1
Goodbye, Nicaragua. Because of you I am
happy. I am going to Paris to have a
good time on your money.
2
I leave you with Adolfo who is a robber
and a fine traitor and assassin besides.
3
Because of worldly ambition he did those
things but he made pieces of my black
pavilion. I was born amongst modern
robbers and Tyrants.
Yamaris Rocha
El Elabistas will populate you with
pain.
4
Goodbye comrades. My (Selonia) was cut
by treason. You me climb to power. You
will see that when I return I will bring
revolutions and my sergeants will finish
you. Yamaris Rocha.
English translation only; original not
found. n.d.
EDSN 28.04.16
|
Kenyon: Summary & Notes:
•
76 Marines, 4 armed native guides, 14
animals, long march from Jalapa to Chipote
area.
•
EDSN "Sebastian" & "Tomas Servas"?
Unknown.
•
German "Adolfo Mences"? Unknown.
•
"Mr. Johnson"? Unknown.
•
George (Jorge) Williams at Los Encinos
mentioned.
•
Juan Colindres, EDSN at this stage, owner of
San Pedro Ranch and several gold mines;
spent most of the war in exile in Danlí,
Honduras.
•
Column destroying stocks of food & shacks as
they go; Murra found deserted.
•
Chipote & environs has the feel of a place
recently buzzing with EDSN activity and now
mostly abandoned.
•
¶ 4
—
early a.m. April 11
—
surprise
contact with Carmen Torres group, which
flees unclothed & unshod & leaving
everything behind. Shows Lt. Kenyon's
aggression and determination, among other
things. (Above: Carmen Torres in
Mexico, Feb. 1930, this time elegantly
dressed and shod; US National Archives)
•
¶ 5
"Opinion" that mission was "a complete success"
—
more USMC wishful thinking;
there is little basis for this glowing
assessment; Mr. Williams tells Kenyon what
he wants to hear.
•
Yamario Rocha's verse: dark humor, sense of
fatalism, amusement, tragicomic irony.
Rocha remains in EDSN as late as Oct. 1931;
see EDSN 28.08.18 (Abraham Rivera notebook)
and 31.10.08.
|
28.04.20 Feland / Dunlap, Consolidated Report of
Recent Operations in Chipote Region
United States Marine Corps
Headquarters, Second Brigade
Managua, Nicaragua
20 April, 1928.
From: |
The Commanding General |
To: |
The Major General Commandant |
Via: |
(1) Commander Special Services
Squadron. |
Subject: |
Results of Operations lately
concluded in Nueva Segovia. |
1. In the latter part of March,
intelligence date, ground and aerial
reconnaissance indicated beyond doubt
that the enemy had concentrated men and
supplies in the area east of the general
line Jicaro-Quilali.
2. Following are the reports from that area:
Headquarters, Northern Area, Ocotal,
Nicaragua
18 April 1928.
From: |
Commander Northern Area |
To: |
Brigade Commander. |
Subject: |
Recent Operations in Chipote
Region, Consolidated Report of. |
References: |
Area Field Order no. 4 dated 30
March 1928. |
Enclosures: |
(4) |
1. There are forwarded
herewith for your consideration and
information, copies of reports and
extracts from fragmentary reports of the
several columns which operated in the
Chipote Region on or about 3-10 April,
in accordance with the above mentioned
reference.
2. A perusal of these
reports will disclose the fact that the
major part of the bandit forces had
moved out of the region just prior to
the commencement of the operation, and
only small groups were left to guard the
large supply of foodstuffs stored
therein.
3. There were approximately
ten minor contacts made by the several
columns engaged, with 3 known bandits
dead and 7 wounded, including Carmen
Torres, bandit leader and his son. A
recent report states that Torres died of
his wounds. There were no Marine
casualties.
4. In addition to the bandit
casualties inflicted, large quantities
of bandit supplies and equipment were
either captured or destroyed, some of
which were, roughly estimated, as
follows:
90,000 pounds of corn
10,000 " " coffee
13,000 " " beans
1,000 " " sugar
800 " " dried beef
300 " " salt
18 horses and mules
10 saddles
1 outboard motor
3 rifles
4 shotguns
3 pistols including Mr. Johnson's .45
Colt Automatic.
20 fighting machetes
12 boats
1 compass (Sergt Bruce's)
A large amount of ammunition, powder,
dynamite, lead, fuse,
detonators, etc.
Bull hide bags, clothing blankets and
various kinds of bandit loot.
Beds
Cattle, pigs, chickens and ducks.
5. While the number of
casualties inflicted upon the bandits
were not as numerous as was expected,
the amount of bandit military stores
captured or destroyed was far greater
than anticipated. As a conservative
estimate, it is believed that more than
125,000 pounds of foodstuffs were
captured or destroyed. The procuring and
assembling of these supplies was no
doubt the result of the work of numerous
foraging bands, operating over a widely
scattered territory for a period of
several months. Figuring a ration
allowance of approximately 3 pounds, it
may be fair to presume that we destroyed
or captured at least six months supply
for 300 men, or the main bandit force's
rainy season supply.
6. In view of the above, and
taking everything into consideration, it
is my opinion that the operation was a
great success in every way, and that the
loss of the large amount of supplies
just prior to the rainy season will
prevent the concentration of outlaws
east of Chipote from which area they
have hitherto been able to operate
westward into fertile territory at
liberty. This will go a long ways
towards cracking his morale, and thereby
hasten the eventual disintegration and
scattering of his forces.
/s/ R. H. Dunlap
[Reports appear in the following
sequence:
1. Gray
2. Kingston
3. Skidmore & Holmes
4. Kenyon]
[Excert from final report by
USMC Second Brigade Commander Logan
Feland:]
. . . 3. Prior to the
operations mentioned, it had frequently
been reported that people living in that
particular area, had, through terror of
the bandit forces, moved out. It is
significant at this time that many
people are moving back into this area
where they secure protection from our
forces.
/s/ Logan Feland
127/220/6
|
Summary & Notes:
•
Final report of the operation, with Col.
Dunlap's summary, and all patrol reports,
folded into General Feland's consolidated
summary (14 typescript pgs. total).
•
Dunlap correct that huge stocks of food
destroyed; pretty amazing quantities,
representing enormous expenditures of labor
by EDSN supporters.
•
Dunlap incorrect that the operation went a
long way toward "cracking [EDSN] morale";
more USMC wishful thinking.
•
Dunlap incorrect that Carmen Torres killed.
•
Dunlap's assessment that operation was a
"great success in every way" highly dubious.
•
Feland incorrect that people in the area can
now count on USMC-GN "protection"
—
in
effect the Marines marched around the zone
the zone for a week, destroyed tons of EDSN
stuff, killed & wounded a few dozen people,
and returned to their barracks; all the
zones traveled through quickly reverted to
EDSN control. In fact a very partial &
fleeting "success".
|
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P A T R O L & C
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1931 |
1932 |
1933 + |
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