MARINE DETACHMENT, JICARO,
NICARAGUA.
12 October 1927.
From:
The Commanding Officer.
To:
The Commanding Officer 5th Regt., Managua, Nicaragua.
Subject:
Engagement with the enemy at SAPOTILLAL, Nueva Segovia
9 October, 1927
1.
At about 11:30 a.m., Saturday 8 October, word was
brought here by plane that Lt. Thomas and his observer
had crashed into the side of a hill near QUILALI and
that both were unhurt. A Ham map of Nicaragua was
also dropped to me showing the location of the plane
which indicated it to be about 3 miles NW of QUILALI.
At that time there was a patrol of ten men enroute from
here to OCOTAL, with all our good saddle animals.
A mounted guard immediately were asked to intercept
them. They returned to Jicaro at 3:30 p.m. with
the animals in a worn out condition due to their haste
in returning, so that they would have been useless for a
long patrol had I waited for them.
2.
Meanwhile realizing that haste was important since the
aviators were in grave
condition
danger, I took 8 marines (all the available men able to
stand the trip), 10 guardia nacional, and Dr. J. B.
O'Neill (since I believed it likely that the aviators
would need medical treatment), borrowed four horses and
one mule, and with 3 days rations proceeded at 12:45
p.m., by forced marching toward QUILALI. At 7:00
p.m., reached a point 7 miles NW of QUILALI, having
marched 18 miles, and halted for the night. The
men were at that time in an exhausted condition, 6 of
the marines and several of the Guardia being weakened by
a recent attack of malaria. Had I had more exact
information as to the location of the plane and the road
to follow, I would have rested a few hours and pushed on
that night. Before leaving JICARO I had told the
men that I expected to have to fight to get to the
plane, but I expected to reach there before any great
number of the enemy could assemble.
3.
At 6:45 a.m., Sunday, 9 October, proceeded toward
QUILALI and at 8:00 a.m., reached a point 3 miles NW of
QUILALI. Could obtain no information of a plane
from inhabitants and therefore halted and waited for the
planes to arrive. When planes arrived they
indicated for me the area where the wreck was located.
It was about 3 miles N of us in a direct line, but in
order to reach it we had to make a long circuit marching
back about 3 1/2 miles and then following a ridge of
difficult mountains. It took 3 1/4 hours marching
to reach the place and meanwhile the planes had to leave
us because of shortage of gasoline.
4.
The mountain on which the plane crashed is called
SAPOTILLAL. Before reaching it we met a woman and
a boy, both of whom separately told us that the plane
was there but they knew nothing of the aviators.
Before starting up the hill I halted the patrol and gave
hill a close scrutiny. No movement or anything
suspicious could be noted. The trail wound around
the side of the hill with hill rising steeply to our
left, and we were about 100 yards up when the advance
guard was fired on from the trail ahead. Halted,
took the best cover available and returned the fire.
The hill was occupied by about 200 bandits who seemed to
be well armed and had plenty of ammunition. It was
my intention to go forward and take the hill, when we
began to receive heavy fire from a hill to our right and
rear, and distant about 100 yards. About 10
dynamite bombs were thrown close to us at this time from
above. Amen above us were yelling to those on the
other hill to fire lower, and on the other hill they
were directing them to drop dynamite bombs on us.
[ p. 2 ]
5.
Considered that if we went forward we would be
completely cut off and that our ammunition would soon
run out. Directed no automatic fire, to save
ammunition. Decided to turn back and fight our way
thru the smaller force. There were about 100 of
them occupying the hill and the road we had just come
over, and we could hear more coming in the distance,
yelling as they came. We attacked this band and
drove them over the hill. Rifle and hand grenades
were of great assistance. We received heavy fire
from our rear during this attack, and Sergeant Porfirio
Melendez, GN, was shot through the head and instantly
killed. A dynamite bomb exploded halfway between
PFC R. H. Welch and myself, who dropped back of his own
accord, waited for a rush from our rear, and broke it up
with a hand grenade, probably killing three or four.
Pvt. McKenzie who was assigned to guard the rear,
dropped behind farther than was necessary and killed
three with his Thompson gun. One of these
obviously was a leader. Cpl. Neel accurately
placed rifle grenades where groups of enemy were ahead
of us and materially assisted in clearing the way.
I was leading with the hand grenades, and since the
brush along the road seemed to be full of the enemy it
was necessary to throw them only a short distance.
At one time while trying to pull a pin from a grenade
Pvt Struck shot and killed a bandit who was sighting in
on me about 10 yards distant. In the hollow
between the 2 hills Pvt Green killed 2 men hiding in a
banana grove and wounded a third, all of whom had
dynamite bombs in their hands. The guardia behaved
splendidly. One of them continued to fire his
rifle after half of the barrel had been blown off.
The entire patrol were cool and deliberate in their
actions, advancing under cover where possible and taking
careful aim before firing.
6.
In that manner we got out from between the two bands and
they ceased firing. 1 horse with rations, 1 loaded
with blanket rolls and a horse and mule with saddles
were killed. 1 horse remained. We took a
trail leading about north which would run into a road
for SAN ALBINO. Proceeded about 200 yards and
encountered another band of about 75 marching toward us,
who were evidently reinforcements coming in. We
were on a slight rise and halted. They attacked
immediately. The trail was narrow and the brush
thick on either side, so that it was not impossible to
deploy, and Dr. O'Neill, Pvt. Golak and myself received
and broke up the attack forcing them to retreat to the
next hill. The bandits to our rear had reorganized
and were closing in. Believing that our only way
out lay ahead, decided to push forward. Dr.
O'Neill at his own request led this attack. We
were held up by a heavy machine gun fire until a rifle
grenade killed the machine gunner. Pvt. F.
Gutierrez, GN, was shot thru the forehead by machine
gun. Pushed forward about 200 yards. The
enemy hid in the brush as we advanced and fired from
very close range. Dr. O'Neill and Pvt. Welch had
taken a rifle and belt from a dead Guardia and killed at
least two during this advance. Pvt. J. Benavides
and L. Bustos, GN, were killed, one shot thru heart and
the other thru the stomach.
7.
Halted after advancing about 200 yards and hearing
additional reinforcements coming for the band ahead of
us, decided as a last resort to take to the brush.
Had hesitated to do this because of the thick brush, the
danger of becoming split up and lost, and our
unfamiliarity with the country. Our guides had
left during the fight and I had lost my compass.
8.
At 5:45 p.m., having fought 2 1/4 hrs we turned left and
went down a very steep ravine. We apparently
slipped out from between the two forces without them
knowing it. Going down ravine, took 1 bandit
prisoner, fully armed and equipped. Were afraid to
shoot him for fear of giving away our position. He
had run into us accidentally. Followed this ravine
until we found a small stream and followed stream until
midnight. At 6:00 a.m., Oct 10, resumed travel
until we reached JICARO river about 8:00 a.m., and
followed it upstream to JICARITO where we took the main
road to JICARO and arrived there at 11:30 p.m. [
p. 3 ]
9.
Estimate distance traveled by this route about 30 miles.
The difficulties of travel cannot be accurately
described. At times we had to leave the stream and
cut our way over steep hills thru heavy brush, to get
past a bad spot in the stream. Were without food
from 5:00 a.m., the 9th until planes dropped rations the
afternoon of the 10th. We arrived in JICARO
suffering from exposure and complete exhaustion,
bruised, cut up by thorns and bitten by insects.
Believed that there was great danger that enemy,
traveling by road, would intercept and cut us off.
10.
A very conservative estimate of the total number we
engaged is 400 and it is believed that it may have run
over that number. During both phases of
engagements we were under very heavy fire and it is a
miracle that we did not suffer more casualties.
That the casualties were all Guardia cannot be explained
in any way, as they fought side by side with the marines
and were equally exposed.
11.
A fairly accurate count of the number of enemy known to
be killed or mortally wounded, brings it to about 40,
and this does not include any estimate of the casualties
from these hand and rifle grenades whose effect we could
not see. I believe that 55 or 60 would be no
exaggeration.
12.
Every marine and every Guardia did more than his share,
and every one of them did something exceptional.
13.
Separate recommendations for awards for bravery will be
submitted later, and I believe that this group of eight
marines and six surviving Guardia deserve the reward of
a decoration as much as anyone every before deserved it.
C. J. O'SHEA
1st Lieut. USMC,
Commanding.