From:
2nd Lieut. J. H. Satterfield, G. N. de Nicaragua.
To:
Commanding Officer, Pueblo Nuevo Area, Pueblo Nuevo,
Nic.
Via:
Commanding Officer, Marine and Guardia Detachment,
Telpaneca, Nicaragua.
Subject:
Reconnaissance and Combat Patrol, report on.
Reference: Map of Nicaragua,
by Clifford D. Ham, 1924.
Enclosure: (1) Sketch
showing relative position of groups seen.
1.
In accordance with verbal instructions of the commanding
officer of this post, I left TELPANECA at 8:00 a.m., 17
October, 1927, with a combat and reconnaissance patrol
of 15 men (7 marines, 7 guardia and 1 native guide), who
had furnished information of the presence of several
groups of bandits in the area of Cuje toward TOTOGALPA.
2.
I proceeded by way of PUEBLO NUEVO. Trail as far
as the top of the mountain about 12 miles from
TELPANECA, where the PUEBLO NUEVO trail turns to the
left and descends into PALACAGUINA. I took the
right branch of the trail at this point which leads to
TOTOGALPA, I had traveled this trail which generally
follows the ridge line for about 2 miles, when I located
a large bandit camp in valley to right of the trail,
apparently a headquarters as they were flying a red
flag, and a large number of men were in evidence.
The camp was about 1200 yards off to right of trail.
3.
The range from my point of observation was too great so
I determined to circle the camp and occupy a small hill
some four hundred yards in rear with the intention of
attacking the bandits by fire at daylight, since I could
not approach closer owing to terrain.
4.
I continued on for about four miles to reach a branch
trail which led into the camp from the rear. At
this point a native informed me that another group of
about fifty men armed with rifles and machettes lay
between me and my objective. I determined to brush
this group out of my path and continue to occupy the
desired position, noted above. Information was
given that this camp could be attacked from a hill at a
range of approximately 300 yards. This camp was
off to left of trail on the PALACAGUINA side of
mountain.
5.
When I reached within four hundred yards of the hill, I
desired to occupy, I was fired upon by an enemy outpost
of approximately twenty men which was camped up on that
hill. The outlook signaled the main camp by
shouting; my chance of a surprise attack on the main
body thus dissipated, I opened fire on the outpost,
killing 2 and wounding several. Two of the
wounded, by the way, were reported to have died. [
p. 2 ]
6.
When I reached the scene of the bandit outpost, I found
as I expected that both it and the main camp had been
hurriedly evacuated. I destroyed two rifles and a
quantity of food and articles of clothing, which had
been left by the enemy in their hurried flight.
There was a trail visible from the outpost camp leading
from the main camp towards PALACAGUINA, I covered this
with fire at at the least succeeded in wounding one more
of the enemy.
7.
At this point, I found it necessary to abandon my plan
of attacking the camp I had seen earlier in the day,
because of the inability of the marines to continue,
owing to sore feet caused by worn out shoes and lack of
good socks. It was then about 4:30 p.m., and I
estimated my distance from TELPANECA at about five and
one half leagues, and the close approach of night I
determined to camp in this area and return to TELPANECA
at daylight.
8.
I pitched camp in a good defensive position and spent
the night unmolested. Returning to TELPANECA at
daylight in the morning, I reached TELPANECA at 10:30
a.m., 18 October, 1927.
9.
During the night I observed several camp fires and from
this and other indications congested with my information
from friendly natives. I am convinced that there
is a minimum of 250 bandits in the area TELPANECA-TOTOGALPA-PALACAGUINA.
These are divided into several bands of from 30 to 50
men each, further information of the natives, which I
consider reliable owing to the obvious and proved desire
of the land owners to aid us in cleaning out this area,
is that the bands in this area are being daily augmented
by armed recruits from the area of SOMOTO. They
claim that there is a bandit chief or recruiting officer
who is arming men in that area and sending them into
this.
/ s./ JAMES H. SATTERFIELD
Lieutenant, Guardia Nacional
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1st Endorsement/ 20
October 1927.
Office of the Commanding Officer,
Marine and Guardia Detachment,
TELPANECA, NICARAGUA.
From:
The Commanding Officer
To:
The Area Commander, Pueblo Nuevo, Nicaragua
1. Forwarded.
2. The
observation and experience of Lt. Satterfield,
strengthens the opinion I had already formed from
personal reconnaissance and from persistent and
corroborating testimony of the natives namely, that
there is a strong concentration in this area chiefly
towards TOTOGALPA. Sandino himself is reported in
the area.
3. Because of
the costly defeat of the bandits suffered in [ p.
3 ] this town and the virtual impregnability of
our present position against the class of weapons at the
enemy's disposal, I doubt very strongly, information to
the contrary notwithstanding, that the concentration is
aimed against this post. If attack is their
purpose I believe SOMOTO or OCOTAL to be the objective.
But more do I believe that the routes of supply are
menaced and I strongly recommend increased and careful
guarding of all pack trains.
4. With a view
to breaking up the concentration in this area and
harrying the bandits, it is recommended that systematic
patrolling be undertaken from this station. To do
this properly an additional strength of fifteen marines
is necessary because less than twenty-five men is not a
sufficiently strong patrol, and that number cannot
easily or safely be spared from this garrison in the
face of the present aspect of the situation. Lt.
Satterfield and myself can alternate on from one to four
day patrols. This station is best suited to be a
center of such operations. No increase in the
officer personnel of the post is necessary.
However, the total absence of marine non-commissioned
officers is a handicap and it is requested that I be
furnished a sergeant or gunnery sergeant and that the
three men previously recommended be promoted to
corporals.
5. In the
absence of instructions to the contrary, no further
patrolling will be undertaken from this station until
the marines are properly shod. A requisition for
clothing is in the hands of the Regimental
Quartermaster. Anything done to hasten the issue
will be heartily appreciated by the entire command.
/ s / Wilburt S. Brown
