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Quilali, Nicaragua.
January 31, 1928
[actually December 31, 1927]
From: Commanding Officer, Special Expedition
against Chipote.
To: The Brigade Commander.
Subject: Engagement with bandits.
1. At about 0930,
January December 30, 1927,
while marching on Quilali, this expedition
encountered a bandit force of Sandino, estimated
at 400 to 500 strong on the Camina [Camino]
Real, about 1500 yards south of Quilali. The
action continued on for about one hour and
twenty minutes when the enemy was driven off.
2. At the time the enemy force was encountered,
this force was marching single file on a narrow
trail along the side of a mountain with the
Jicaro river on our left (west) flank. The
mountain sloped at an angle of about 45 degrees
and the slope from the trail to the river 100
feet below us was about the same. The river at
this point was about 200 feet wide and made a
sharp turn to the west, and side of the
mountain, and a hill directly ahead flanking the
trail at the bend was covered with woods and
extremely heavy underbrush. A sketch, showing
the general situation, not to scale, is
enclosed.
3. As our point passed point "A", a midway point
to "B", it observed suspicious movements at
point "B". Fire was immediately opened by enemy
from point "A" and "B" all along the line "C",
and from across the river from point "E", with
machine guns, automatic rifles, rifles, pistols,
dynamite bombs, and unidentified weapons
sounding similar to our trench mortars and
mountain batter guns. Enemy guns and riflemen
were cleverly concealed; the riflemen being
along the barbed wire fence on the mountain
slope, each man being ab behind an individual
barricade of rocks piled around tree stumps
about 15" high and wide. Fire was opened
simultaneously from all points by the enemy on
discovery of this point at "B", but it is
believed that this was not in accordance with
his plans as our examination of the trail north
of "B" disclosed that he had prepared positions
along the trail thru a banana grove, and it is
believed that it was his plan to allow the
advance guard to enter the trail in the banana
grove, and strike the entire column
simultaneously. The discipline maintained, the
morale, and the accuracy of fire of the bandits,
as well as the tactical disposition of their
troops were far above anything displayed by them
in any of their actions heretofore in this
section and leads to the belief that they are
receiving training from sources other than
Nicaraguans because of the up-to-dateness of
their tactics. All enemy seen were garbed in
clothing similar to our summer field in color. No prisoners could be captured because of the
superiority of the enemy's position and the fat
that they removed their casualties with them. [
p. 2 ]
4. (a) Bandit leaders unknown.
(b) No mounts seen.
(c) Aerial assistance - none of our planes were
present during engagement but two planes arrived
immediately after, strafed the hills in the
direction given by us and departed.
5.
CASUALTIES:
Marines:-
(a) KILLED: HEMPHILL, John W. 1st Sgt. (Lt. GN)
THIEIHART, Adolph Cpl.
GOLDSMITH, George E. Pfc.
WATSON, Grady W. Pfc.
CROSSON, Estler Pvt.
(b) WOUNDED, seriously-
LIVINGSTON, Richard Captain
CORYALL, Fred Gy-Sgt.
COLLINS, Robert H. Pvt.
TURNER, Charles E. Pvt.
COYNE, Berhnard W. Pvt.
SMITH, Leonard J. Pvt.
(c) MINOR WOUNDS - Fragments of bombs, etc.
MINNICK, William T. Lt. (MC) USN
ROOS, Otto N. Sgt.
GOULD, Moses, J. 1st Lieut.
FIELDS, Scott Sgt.
NEEL, John W. Cpl. (Lt GN)
LEACH, Anthony J. Cpl.
BRANDENBURG, Raleigh R. Pfc.
DOWD, Thomas F. Pfc.
BLANCHARD, Harry M. Pfc.
LITTLE, Jacob Pvt.
FITZPATRICK, Arthur L. Pvt.
NEWBURGER, Albert H. Pvt.
ENDRESS, Clifford C. Pvt.
MERCHANT, William C. Pvt.
HUSKA, Paul Pvt.
SMITH, Glenn Pvt.
WALKER, Edgar, B. Pvt.
GUARDIA -
(a) KILLED: HEMPHILL, John W. Lt. (See above
under Marines)
HERNANDEZ, Enriques Cpl. #356
(b) Wounded seriously:-
GARCIAS, Louis C. Pvt. # 49
GUTIERREZ, Policarpo Pvt. #355
(not expected to live)
[ p. 3]
(c) WOUNDED, not seriously:
NEEL, John N. Lt. (See above under Marines)
NATIVE
GUIDE:
Killed: SALINI, Ramon.
BANDITS:
Losses unknown, but believed to be heavy.
PRISONERS:
None.
(6) Medical Officer considers it necessary that
all listed as seriously wounded be evacuated
immediately because of lack of facilities for
proper care.
(7) Pack train badly shot up and scattered,
report of losses of stores and animals will
follow later.
(8) No losses of ammunition or weapons known at
present. Check up being made.
(9) Check of ammunition expenditures being made.
(10) Further details later.
(11) Dead will be buried here.
(12) Captain Livingston was wounded immediately
after action started and the undersigned has
assumed command pending arrival of Lieutenant
Richal.
M. J. GOULD,
1st Lieutenant, USMC,
Commanding.
Sketch of Scene of Action
Capt. Livingston's Column
30 December 1927.
NA127/212/1 and /113C/12
See also Neill Macaulay,
The Sandino Affair
(Duke 1985), pp. 99-100.
Ancillary Document: Sandino's
account of the Fight at Trincheras, 30
December 1927
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Major Encounters near El Chipote
at the End of 1927 and on New Year's
Day, 1928
. . . On last December 30, at eight in
the morning, the enemy, made up of three
hundred Yankees and two hundred
patricides [Guardias], halted at a place
called Trincheras, four kilometers from
Quilalí, as if to conduct an
exploration, and by slow degrees they
maneuvered like some loathsome reptile,
which couldn't be some any other way
since they were not moving in a straight
line. The liberators' irony was
reflected in their gaze; their sarcastic
smiles accentuated their expressions of
hatred for the invaders; the firing
sights of the famous "concones" searched
eagerly for the hearts of the murderers
of our sovereignty. With their
feet firmly placed, the mortar operators
waited for the enemy to bunch up so that
they could exterminate them with the
terrible explosions of their bombs.
So it was that at five minutes past eight the chain of
Yankee riflemen, made up of sixty men
who advanced slowly against our
trenches, was completely destroyed by a
well-aimed discharge of our musketry,
causing tremendous confusion and
indescribable panic among the enemy, who
in giddy flight trampled down everything
in their way, the place we chose to
defeat them being called El Paso de la
Muerte. Those who miraculously
escaped with their lives will remember
that place forever. With the
enormous number of casualties inflicted
upon them over a period of five minutes,
the enemy could not reorganize at the
same point of combat to effect an
orderly retreat. Instead, in total
disarray they fled by different trails
toward Quilalí, hoping to join another
column of blond bandits who had left
Telpaneca, aiding the advance of the
seventh column of pirates who were
defeated at Trincheras. With the
violence of a thunderbolt and God's
help, in five minutes freedom's
defenders destroyed the battle plan that
the punitive army had taken two months
to prepare.
Exploring the field we affirmed the results of our
victory: sixty-four enemy
dead, sixty-nine rifles and a Lewis
machine gun, six thousand cartridges of
various kinds, and many items of less
importance.
With our one-day march the enemy's advance in this
sector was ended. . . .
Patria y Libertad.
/ s / A. C. SANDINO
Fortress of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua
El Chipote, January 4, 1928
Source: Robert Edgar
Conrad, Sandino, Testimony of a
Nicaraguan Patriot (Princeton,
1990), pp. 151-52.
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