Gen. Vidaurre.  Note the half-moon formation, characteristic of the period, with highest-ranking officers in the center flanked by their lieutenants.

Figure on far left in first two photos is Gen. Vidaurre.  (Descriptions for photos 3 and 4 on the original index appear to be transposed; this is definitely a "machine gun group".) 

A refreshingly informal scene, and a formidable looking machine-gun.

Detail of the machine-gun group.

(Above:  Bloor report, p. 3, describing Saturday, March 26.)

Major Bloor paints General Vidaurre as an incompetent procrastinator.  Under the heading, "Disposition for the march," Bloor writes:   "The advance guard of 150 men procedded the main body by about four miles, while the rear element of the command, 250 men, [General Vidaurre] followed one days' march in the rear of the main body. . . . The advance guard and main body remained all day Sunday in Teustepe waiting for the rear element to catch up, thus losing 24 hours valuable time. Some of the Conservative generals [i.e. General Vidaurre] do not seem to have any conception of the value of time, and the procrastination during the past three weeks is almost unbelievable, especially in view of the fact that the rainy season will commence in about six weeks and the campaign must be concluded before then or drag over for another year."   (my emphases).  Major Bloor had some good, even laudatory things to say about several Conservative generals, but he offered not even the first name of General Vidaurre, a minor player in any case. 

If, on the other hand, the goal of Gen. Vidaurre were to save the lives of his soldiers by avoiding fruitless battles, some might see in him an unsung hero. 

In other words, the US military attaché's remarks and the implicit assumptions that give them substance — that an aggressive military posture and making haste to the battlefield best suited the circumstances — need to be read against the grain of the imperial discourse of counter-insurgencency that informs them.  To the ill-armed, ill-shod, ill-clothed, ill-fed, ill-housed involuntary conscripts who filled the ranks of Gen. Vidaurrre's army — as they filled the ranks of most Conservative armies in the civil war — the prospect of rushing to battle after a string of defeats probably appeared both foolish and suicidal.  Perhaps, given the circumstances, for many conscripts & their families, Gen. Vidaurre's willful inaction made him a hero, or at least was a blessing.  Major Bloor's observations are often keen but his judgments should not be taken at face value; there's much more here than meets the eye.

A marvelous photograph of an army in motion, with the line of walking & riding troops & officers stretching far into the distance.  Two men standing on the left and two of the horsemen on the right seem to be taking note of the man taking a photograph.

"General Carlos Rivers Delgadillo.  About 35 years of age, fair education.  Military training acquired in present revolution. Although he is a popular hero, he is inclined to procrastinate and impresses me as being weak and vaccilating and not possessed of any particular military ability."   Bloor report, p. 8.

Left to right:   United States Corps Major D. Rodriguez (Ret.), Ejército Nacional de Nicaragua Gen. Carlos Rivers Delgadillo, and U.S. Military Attaché Major A. W. Bloor.

Above:   Excerpt from Bloor report, p. 2, describing events later in the afternoon of Saturday, March 26.  "At 4.25 pm we passed the main body, 300 men under General Rivers Delgadillo about four miles south of Teustepe, and upon arrival at Teustepe at 5 pm we found his advance guard of 150 men there."

This marvelous photograph conveys a vivid sense of ordinary troops briefly resting on march.  Note the women amongst the male troops. 

As Major Bloor noted at this point in his narrative:  "The usual number of women (3 or 4 to every 15 or 20 men) accompanied the command as cooks and washwomen.  One woman was marching with a rifle in the column with the men.  Her husband was one of the soldiers."

In the civil war as in the rebellion that followed, warfare & military mobilization were family affairs.

About half (ca. 75 of 150 soldiers) of the advance guard of Gen. Rivers Delgadillo's forces at Teustepe, around 5 p.m., Friday, March 26, 1927.

In Major Bloor's words, "The tendency of all the generals seems to be to get as high upon the hill as possible.  Gomez has some lines of trenches about 50 years in the rear of the firing line . . . The trenches are really 'fox holes'.  They are constructed for either one or two men and are placed from 5 to 10 yards apart.  Some are dug in, others are constructed by piling up loose stones, and still others by a combination of digging and stones.  No wire entanglements are constructed.  The principle of counter attack is not understood." 

In this photograph, Major Rodriguez looks on as the entrenched soldier under Gen. Noguera Gómez, rifle in hand, drapes his head with a cloth, probably drenched with water from his canteen on his left.