S E C R E T
Secret/ws        HEADQUARTERS, CENTRAL AREA.
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA.        JINOTEGA, NICARAGUA.
14 February, 1930.

From:    First Lieutenant Francis J. Cunningham, G. N.
To:      The Area Commander.

Subject: Annex No 1 – to patrol report dated 13 February, 1930.

Enclosures: (A) Letter signed by PEDRO ALTIMIRANO.
            (B) Letter signed by PEDRO ALTIMIRANO and
                J. S. MORALES, dated 18 January, 1930.
            (C) Letter to PEDRO ALTIMIRANO signed illegibly.

   1.        The following information was voluntarily given to Rasos Mercedes MACIAS, #2401, Francisco LOPEZ, #842, and Julio LOPEZ, #1597, by JUAN BLANDON, bandit message center operative at GUALE on 5 February, 1930. These men entered the bandit house dressed as Sandinistas and led him to believe they were from the ORTEZ group and anxious to join ALTIMIRANO.

            (a) One BLANDON (no relation to JUAN BLANDON) who is brother in-law to PEDRON lives near EMBOCADEROS. (He abandoned his house when my patrol approached him and fled.).

            (b) One VICTOR GUTIERREZ, hacienda owner at EMBOCADEROS, is a bandit although he holds passport signed my Jefe Politico of Jinotega. GUTIERREZ sent a message to JUAN BLANDON that I was advancing with FORTY (40) men, FOUR Thompsons (4), and THREE mules laden with high explosives and bombs.

            (c) PEDRON has two camps, one called EL REFUGIO, which is two days journey from BUALE, containing EIGHTY (80) men, and CERRO VERDE, where he maintains this general headquarters, has his houses, ranch, and women. CERRO VERDE is said to be at Mt Kilande. The precise location of EL REFUGIO is unknown, but is said to be on a mountain top. PEDRON is supposed to have ONE HUNDRED AND NINETY (190) men at CERRO VERDE.

            (d) PEDRON has AT LEAST the following supply system and courier service:

            1. AUGUSTIN CHAN of JINOTEGA and owner of HDA LA COLONIA supplies him with provisions, forwards and receives PEDRON’S mail.

            2. ROSENDO CHAVARRIA of JINOTEGA, and owner of a hacienda one and one-half miles west of La Colonia supplies Pedron with provisions.

            3. GUSTAVO DUARTE of Jinotega and Owner of HDA LA VENETIA one mile north of Corinto Finca, supplies PEDRON with provisions and information of troop movements.

            4. A wealthy ranch owner who has a place near TUMA [p. 2] name unknown, supplies large amounts of money.

            5. All people in Tomayunca and Embocaderos are bandits or bandit sympathizers, and rapidly relay information to JUAN BLANDON AT GUALE.

            6. Martin RUIZ a lieutenant in Pedron’s forces gets his correspondence in Jinotega and brings it to GUALE, where CRECENCIO LOPEZ, another lieutenant, picks it up and carries it to PEDRON.

            7. DANIEL PINEDA of Jinotega supplies PEDRON with supplies and information.

            8. LUIS ZELAYA of Los Robles does the same.

            9. PETRONILO CRUZ of BONETILLO does the same.

            10. TERESA REYES of JINOTEGA the same.

            11. THE RIZO family of Cerro Grande the same.

            12. CORNELIO LOPEZ of Jinotega is a bandit courier.

            13. There are other correspondents and purveyors whose names are unknown to BLANDON.

            14. PEDRON had TWELVE (12) victrolas shipped to CERRO GRANDE a short time ago from JINOTEGA.

            (e) Consistent propaganda is being put out that SANDINO is going to return. It is unknown who is doing this.

            (f) PEDRON boasts, “Guardia capturado, Guardia machetado, Yanquista capturado, Yanquisto quemado.”

            (g) AUGUSTIN CHAN and PEDRON arranged the attack of LA COLONIA, presumably, because its occupancy by the Guardia interfered with the service of supply and courier system.

            (h) Pedron is short of ammunition.

            (i) The bandit morale is high and they believe that the Guardia will not fight.

            (j) PEDRON uses EL REFUGIO as an advance base the base is frequently moved. There is no permanent construction.

             2. Considering all of the information gained prior and subsequent to the GUAPINOL combat, the following conclusion of fact have been reached:

            (a) The bandit advance base is within the area GUALE – BILAN – LAS TORRES – GUAPINOL – LA VIRGEN – GUALE.

            (b) This whole area is honey-combed with paths showing signs of use, by humans, mules, and pack bulls. The signs around the scene of the combat were, of course, the freshest.

[p. 3]

            (c) Small bandit camps are scattered all over this area. The only large one was found south of the scene of the contact.

            (d) Large numbers of spies report all movements of troops to PEDRON.

            (e) A considerable number of prominent people in JINOTEGA and elsewhere contribute money and supplies to PEDRON, receive and forward his correspondence.

            (f) At least nominally, PEDRON is subordinate to SANDINO.

            (g) Someone with a fair knowledge of military science and tactics is with PEDRON.

            3. It is respectfully recommended that an advance base be established at LOS CEDROS, LA VIRGEN, or GUALE, and that numerous foot patrols, heavily armed and carrying only such provisions as can be carried by each man, comb the territory mentioned. Operations against CERRO VERDE will undoubtedly be prolonged and discouraging before PEDRON is finally driven out.

            [signed]
               Francis J. Cunningham

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[p. 4]

SECRET
GBE.es 1st Endorsement, 14 February, 1930.
Headquarters, Central Area, G. N. de N., Jinotega, Nicaragua.

From:    Area Commander.
To:      The Jefe Director, Guardia Nacional, Managua, Nicaragua.

Subject: Annex No. 1 – patrol report dated 13 February, 1930.

   1.       Forwarded.

   2.       Conclusive evidence and proof for trial of persons reported as members of PEDRON ALTIMIRANO’S service of intelligence and supply has not been obtained. However, it is believed that those listed in basic letter are very active in bandit activities for personal gain, increase in their business, immunity from bandit depredations and other reasons. It is practically impossible to obtain conclusive proofs on account of the fact that so many mans of obtaining evidence are closed to the Guardia on account of the strong Anti-American sentiment prevailing.

   3.       Augustin Chan is one of the largest and most prosperous merchants of Jinotega. It would be impossible for him to operate his hacienda LA COLONIA without Guardia protection or agreement with Altimirano. He does not desire Guardia protection, and continues making improvements and installing more modern appliances at LA COLONIA. He claims Chinese citizenship.

   4.       Rosendo Chavarria is a prosperous coffee planter whose hacienda adjoins LA COLONIA. He has always been reported to have been a bandit agent. He recently brought the hacienda M. BLANDON for $4000.00 from Miguel Blandon, Administrador de Rentas of Jinotega. Miguel Blandon informed me that Chavarria could operate this place on account of relations with bandits and that it was his understanding that Chavarria contributed $50.00 per month to Altamirano, and helped in sending out supplies. Blandon also said that it was impossible for him to not serve two masters. Chavarria’s wife has been reported from various sources as being Altamirano’s sister.

   5.       Daniel Pineda is a brother of Adan Pineda who owns and operates a very profitable store in Jinotega. During the past year several persons have been captured with pistols, who stated that they purchased their pistols from Adan Pineda. Daniel Pineda has been suspected as being a bandit agent for some time.

   6.       Competent personnel and sufficient funds have not been available to this office to enable this office to obtain conclusive proofs to insure convictions of certain persons mentioned. I the meantime these persons are making good business of their knowledge of activities of occupying force. No definite results can be obtained against the bandit forces in the field until activities of these agents can be curbed.

   7.       It is recommended that this office be authorized to confine the prominent persons mentioned, make thorough search of all possessions, books, and papers, place them to proper authority for trial or request them to conduct their businesses and movements under the supervision of the police and military authorities.

                [signed]
                      G. B. Erskine,
                      Acting.

M30.02.14, RG127/198/2

STATEMENT RASO JULIO LOPEZ D., #1597, G.N.

The patrol consisted of twenty privates, one corporal and the Captain who is in command of Corinto Finca. The contact was made on the 9th of the month (I believe), and took place on the road which crosses from Guapinol trail to the south of Guapinol ridge just about one hundred yards from the place where we crossed the Gusanaro river.

The patrol came into the Pantasme river trail from the direction of San Antonio and followed this into Santa Cruz, then followed the trail leading over the mountain (Bujio) and took the east branch (main trail) coming into Los Torres in the afternoon of the same day. Here we found an established bandit camp, which was occupied by a woman, three or four girls and a boy (about 12 yeards old), who had just killed and prepared a large beef, apparently expecting the arrival of a large group. We captured a lot of guardia clothing and blankets, I recognized some as belonging to Guardia who lost it at La Pavona, and three marine blankets marked U.S., a number of machetes and cutachas. These people stated we could kill them but they would not talk. I do not know if any of these people left while we were there or not. They were interviewed by Cpl. Herrera and the Captain. The camp was not at the former site of Los Torres but on the side of the hill near El Poso. We left this camp and stopped in a selected camp site on a hill about six miles from there where we spent the night. We broke camp about eight in the morning and proceeding on to Guapinol, which we passed about nine o’clock, we crossed the Gusanaro river where some of the Guardia washed, and about 100 yds up the side of the ridge from the river we were ambushed. I and two other Privates armed with rifles were on the point and some distance from the main group, when three shots in rapid succession were fired on our right and then three more to the front and slightly to the left on top of the ridge. This seemed to be a signal for two machine guns opened up on us and they started discharging grenades. At this time a machine gun around the bend together with heavy rifle fire, apparently the main body of the bandits opened up on our main body, one shot going through the right shoulder of the Captain’s rain-coat and slightly grazing his arm. The Captain then galloped around the bend to the head of the main body and dove from his mount and gave orders organizing two sections for an attack on the enemy. They could not see us but we could see them so I stood up and shouted viva twice, so that they could locate us, at which time I was hit in the right breast. We could not see the bandits as they were on top of the ridge. That is all I know, I lost consciousness.

-awk.

M30.02.14, RG127/198/2

STATEMENT OF VICTOR M. JARQUIN, RASO, #1810.

There were three of us on the point, all armed with rifles and 100 rounds of ammunition per man. I was hit in the left leg by about the second shot which was fired. All three of us were wounded. Our patrol was armed with two TSMG and one BAR and one rifle grenade discharger. Garcia who had one of the TSMG’s was killed while trying to get it to operate. A private by name of Sandoval went back and left his rifle and got this Thompson, and put it into action, which was the only automatic weapon which we got into action. The man with rifle grenades fired four but only two of them discharged, two being duds. The enemy apparently directed one machine gun on the Captain for he was shot through the right shoulder of his raincoat, slightly grazing his arm. He was apparently calm and knew what he was doing for he continued at a fast gait to the head of the main body before he fell from his horse and pistol in hand started shouting orders. He fired several shots then formed two groups and attacked the enemy from two sides. We could not see the enemy but they could see us, as you know of course, the road is right in the open and they were behind the crest of the hill and also took advantage of the heavy brush on the crest and the large pines. I fired point blank eighteen times but do not have the least idea what was the effect. We could not do any good with volley fire wasting more ammunition than the good it would do. I fired at the smoke of the enemy shots, as no doubt the rest of the Guardia did. I lost my rifle, becoming dizzy twice, but regained it and continued firing slowly, some of the times while I was dizzy I know I must have fired in the wrong direction. I did not lose consciousness until after the Guardia charged up the hill and then due to inactivity and loss of blood. The Captain left some men with us. No one lost his arms or any part of equipment. We have no way of estimating the number of bandits nor who they were.

-awk.

M30.02.14, RG127/198/2

NOTE:-

It would appear that Los Torres is a regular stopping off camp for the bandits since the evacuating of Santa Cruz and abandoning of this section of the country to a state of inactivity. It has an excellent offensive and defensive terrain, being located above the trail on the side of a small hill and also there is plenty of beef run loose in this section and a well for water supply. This woman answers the description of a woman named Patrona, formerly the woman of Guadalupe Rivera, and now the Mujer of Sebastian Centeno, she has three daughters, all young, and a small boy, Jose, who is fourteen years of age. This woman is well known to the bandits and can furnish a lot of information if the right method is used. This section of the country is the natural haven of retreat for the bandits, there being a great number of animals, beef, cargo and riding, running loose. It is broken up into thousands of short ridges, and there are many trails. It is practically impossible to ambush the bandits here for the terrain is clear, very little underbrush in the trails.

The land is mostly all pasture land, with a clear vision for miles from the top of any of the higher peaks. This section was well inhabited at one time by large lumber camps.

-awk.

M30.02.14, RG127/198/2

Transcribed by Pleet Initiative-funded Lebanon Valley College student-researcher Nicholas J. Quadrini.