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US Military Attaché Major Bloor's Reports on the Nicaraguan Civil War, March-May 1927
 

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MAJOR BLOOR'S REPORTS.  PAGE 1  5 March 1927, 'The Nicaraguan Situation'  PAGE 2  19 March 1927, 'Mexican Interference in Nicaraguan Affairs'  PAGE 3  20 March 1927, 'The Nicaraguan Revolution (Military Situation)'  PAGE 4   3 April 1927, 'Report of Trip to Field of Operations'  PAGE 5  10 April 1927, 'Distribution of U.S. Naval and Marine Forces in Nicaragua'  PAGE 6  13 April 1927, 'The Nicaraguan Revolution (Military Situation)'  PAGE 7  7 May 1927, 'The Nicaraguan Revolution, Military Situation'

US Military Attaché Major A. W. Bloor's Reports on the Nicaraguan Civil War, March-May 1927

     The seven web pages that comprise Page 99 of these Top 100 offer a series of seven reports (the originals comprising 59 pgs. of single-spaced text) by U.S. Military Attaché A. W. Bloor on "the Nicaraguan situation" covering parts of the crucial nine weeks from March 5 to May 7, 1927.  Major Bloor was a keen, thoughtful, perceptive, and highly biased participant-observer, and an effective and prolific report-producer.  His reports merit close attention.  His analyses are often flawed and his conclusions inapt, but the information he provides helps deepen understanding of the period in many ways.  Focusing mainly on the military forces the US government was supporting — the Conservatives — he says as much about their Liberal enemies as he can, in a telling illustration of the strengths and limitations of US intelligence capacities in Mexico, Central America, and Nicaragua during this period.  (photo of Major A. W. Bloor, March 1927).

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March 5, 1927.   Report No. 8.  "The Nicaraguan Situation."  (below)

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March 19, 1927.   Report No. 22.  "Mexican Interference in Nicaraguan Affairs."

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March 20, 1927.   Report No. 23.  "The Nicaraguan Revolution (Military Situation)."

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April 3, 1927.   Report No. 32.  "Report of Trip to Field of Operations."

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April 10, 1927.   Report No. 40.  "Distribution of U.S. Naval and Marine Forces in Nicaragua."

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April 13, 1927.   Report No. 46.  "The Nicaraguan Revolution (Military Situation)."

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May 7, 1927.   Report No. 48.  "The Nicaraguan Revolution, Military Situation."

     These seven reports add substantially to the existing stock of knowledge on the crucial last two months of the Nicaraguan Civil War of 1926-27 (hints here suggest that other reports in the sequence were "radios" or radio transmissions filed in another archival category).  The photographs referenced toward the tail end of the report of April 5 (p. 4) are reproduced and examined in Photo-Docs, USNA2, pp. 1-3.  I thank Lebanon Valley College student researcher Nicholas Quadrini for his excellent work transcribing these documents.


G-2 Report. 3,020-d.

NICARAGUA (Political-Military)

Subject: The Nicaraguan Situation.
From: M/A Nicaragua
Report No. 8

March 5, 1927

(a) INTRODUCTION:

I arrived at Corinto on February 21, 1927, and conferred with Admiral Latimer and the American Consul, Mr. C. T. Steger on same day. On February 22 I accompanied the Admiral to Leon, stopping off a few minutes at Chinandega.

Chinandega was captured by the Liberals on February 6 and recaptured by the Conservatives on February 9. Twelve square blocks of the business district of the city were destroyed by fire. Each army blames the other with the responsibility for the conflagration.

I arrived at Leon on February 22, and proceeded from there to Managua on February 23. Leon was occupied on February 22 by about 1,100 Conservatives under General Saenz, but the garrison has been reduced, as a result of the arrival of the marines, to about 200 men.

A square consisting of 15 blocks in the business center of Leon is enclosed by a wire fence built down the center of the streets. This fence is about six feet high and consists of 9 barbed wires stretched on heavy posts placed seven feet apart. Every block or two there are cross fences of same height and material. A few small openings are provided for the passage of troops and other pedestrians. Some of the street intersections are covered by combat groups of about two squads armed with machine guns (either Vickers-Maxim, Lewie or Colts). The riflemen were armed with Springfields, model 1898, Remingtons and Mausers.

The headquarters of the U.S. Naval and Marine forces of the Pacific aide is located at Leon in the Lupone hotel. This force consists of about 650 marines and about 650 sailors and now is distributed along the railroad from Corinto to Granada, both inclusive, and furnishing train guards and bridge guards at sensitive points on the railway.

Captain Clark H. Woodward, U.S. Navy, is in command of this force and Major Thomas S. Clark, U.S. Marine Corps, is in command of the marines. His headquarters at present is with Captain Woodward.

p. 2

There are about 300 sailors and marines on the Atlantic side distributed among the following places: Bragmann Bluff & Puerto Cabezas; Bluefields and El Bluff, and Rama.

Six De Haviland planes for the Marines with 10 officers and 82 men arrived at Corinto on February 26. The planes were landed there on the 28th and arrived at Managua on March 1st, where there is a fair landing field.

On February 22, 1927, the commanding officer, U.S. Naval Forces Ashore, Pacific Coast of Nicaragua, issued and published a proclamation, or order, directed to the Chief of the Liberal Revolutionary Forces, prohibiting fighting within 2,000 yards of the railway and certain cities and towns occupied by Naval Forces. A copy of the order is enclosed herewith (enclosure 1).

This order has had the effect of releasing a large number of the Conservative forces from the garrisons of the various cities and towns along the railway, especially at Leon where the garrison was almost immediately reduced from 1,100 or 1,200 to about 200. The order has also served to give the inhabitants of the localities mentioned therein a sense of security and has benefitted business to some extent, but as business in all the cities is dependent upon the prosperity of the farmers and ranchmen outside the 2,000 yard zone whose property is not protected by the order the effect of it has not been as beneficial as would appear at first glance.

The British warship “Colombo” arrived at Corinto on February 26, but did not land any sailors or marines.

The proposal made by President Diaz for a treaty between the United States and Nicaragua, referred to in Par. 2 of my cable No. 1 of February 27, is fully covered in report No. 6, March 4, under 3,850 (foreign relations).

Major C. B. Carter resigned and returned to the United States a few days ago. While he resigned, it is probable that he did so to avoid being discharged.

(b) CONSTABULARY (6,100)

Major D. Rodriguez, U.S. Army, retired, who was second in command to Major Carter, has taken over his duties as commander of the National Guard.

The organization, strength, composition and status of the National Guard is fully covered by report No. 5, March 4, under the head of “National Guard.”

There has been very little opportunity to follow the prescribed course of training since the organization of the National Guard. The men are carefully selected and very well disciplined, and in general the organization presents a good appearance.

p. 3

(c) HEALTH OF AMERICAN FORCES

The health of the American forces on the Pacific side is very good, but about 50% of those on the Atlantic Coast have suffered from malaria and dysentery. This is also true of native troops sent from the Pacific to the Atlantic Coast.

(d) ORGANIZATION – (Conservative Army) 6,100-a

Major General José Solorzano Diaz, nephew of the President, is Chief of Staff of the Army, and is chief military adviser to the president. His staff consists of one secretary with the rank of Colonel and two assistants. There are 14 generals actually commanding troops in the various stations indicated in enclosure 2 “distribution of troops”, but there are numerous other generals acting as second in command.

There is no general staff and no administrative and technical staff as we know them and nothing that corresponds to them.

The staff of a general consists of from one to three secretaries, whose duties appear to be principally those of a secretary.

General officers may and frequently do command any number of troops from a hundred up. The generals of departments operate under the direct orders of the President and he is the only coordinating agency.

As the commands are widely scattered and communications are very poor, coordination is almost impossible and as we understand it there is practically none.

(e) INFANTRY – Rifle companies. 6,100-a

The Infantry is organized into rifle companies composed of three officers and 100 men. The rifle companies are divided into detachments of from 15 to 20 men for purposes of meaning and for convenience in providing detached posts and outposts. They are called “peletones”, and correspond to our platoon but appear not to be employed as a combat unit. Three or four women usually accompany a peleton to cook and wash for the men and serve them in other useful capacities. Four rifle companies constitute a battalion and four battalions a brigade. This organization into battalions and brigades is not always strictly adhered to by the various commanding generals.

(f) MACHINE GUNS

Machine guns are organized into detachments. These detachments vary in strength from 5 or 6 men with one machine gun to 20 or 25 with 2 or 3 machine guns. These machine gun detachments are attached to rifle companies, according to the situation and their availability at the rate of 2 or 3 guns to 200 riflemen.

p. 4

(g) CAVALRY – 6,100-a

There is no cavalry in the true sense, but horses and mules are commandeered when they can be found and detachments of mounted infantry, consisting of from 15 to 50 men, are organized. As the animals receive very little care and only such forage as they can rustle, they soon become unserviceable.

(h) ARTILLERY – 6,100-a

There are no artillery organizations. There are, however, about 51 guns of various makes and calibers up to 77 mm here in the arsenal. All of them are obsolete and about 41 of them are unserviceable. There are 636 rounds of artillery ammunition on hand in the arsenal, condition unknown.

Some individual guns were used in the fighting on the Atlantic Side, and some of these are now in the hands of troops on the western coast. One or two old one pounders were in position in Leon on February 23.

(i) AIR SERVICE – 6,100-a

The Air Service consists of three second hand observation planes (commercial type) and two American pilots, Major W. C. Brooks and Major L. S. Mason, both of whom hold commissions in the Aviation Section of the National Guard. There are no enlisted men in the Air Service.

While these planes are not equipped for bombing, three bombs were dropped from them on Liberal troops at Filadelfia during the fighting at Chinandega on February 9.

A shipment of 100 twenty pound aerial bombs was recently received from the United States. Upon test the fuses were found to be defective, but the defective fuses have been replaced by improvised ones and the bombs made serviceable.

Majors Brooks and Mason are good pilots. Their principal employment has been in reconnaissance missions but in the future they certainly will be given bombing missions also.

(j) SMALL ARMS – 6,550-b

There are about 10,000 rifles including those in the arsenal and in the hands of the troops. Probably 7,000 or 8,000 of those are serviceable. 500 new Springfield rifles and 500 new carbines (Springfield) mod. 1898, and 50 Vickers-Maxim machine guns were received in January, 1927.

The greater portion of these rifles are Springfield, Mod. 1898, but 2,000 or 3,000 Remington and Mausers are also in use.

(k) MACHINE GUNS – 6,550-b

There are about 150 machine guns including those in the arsenal and in the hands of the troops. This 150 is made up of Colts, Lewis and Vickers-Maxim guns.

p. 5

(l) SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION – 6,550-b

Four million rounds of rifle and one million rounds of machine gun ammunition are on hand here in the arsenal. The amount in the hands of the troops could not be ascertained.

(m) UNIFORM AND EQUIPMENT – 6,550-a

The uniform consists of a suit of blue denim overall or coveralls, and a straw hat with blue band. The men are not furnished shoes. Those who have shoes wear them, but practically all the soldiers are barefooted or wear improvised sandals.

While the prescribed uniform is blue denim, clothing of all character and description is worn by the soldiers.

The equipment consists of a cheap light blanket, a rifle and a cloth bag containing from 50 to 150 cartridges. Many of the men wear pistols of various makes and calibers, but these are mostly their private property. Most carry machetes or cutaches.

(n) TRANSPORTATION – 6,600

(A) Rail. The railway is used for the transportation of troops and supplies, but as the area served by it is very small many of the troops have to be supplied by other means of transportation.

(B) Motor. On the outbreak of the revolution the Government commandeered about 150 private trucks and automobiles. These are being employed for the transportation and supply of troops where roads are available. There is no motor transport corps, and the machines are rapidly deteriorating as a result of inexperience, abuse and misuse.

(C) Animal. Ox carts, pack oxen and pack mules are employed on the poor roads and rough mountain trails.

(o) SUPPLY – 6,500-a.

The government attempts to supply its troops as well as practicable under the circumstances. Due to lack of roads this was a very difficult task even when supplies were available, and now that the government is without funds or credit it is almost impossible.

Rations for the men are of necessity obtained locally in almost every sense, but whenever practicable, the local supply is augmented by supplies sent by the government. It is difficult to say what the ration consists of. Tortillas, beans, rice, beef and native cheese is what the men prefer and is what they strive to furnish them.

(p) HOSPITALIZATION – 6,500-a

Under the law of the country all graduates and licensed doctors are required to serve in case of war. As many of them have attempted to evade service, they are drafted when necessary. They are required to do duty in hospitals or with troops according to requirements.

p. 6

Sick and wounded men are evacuated to nearest hospitals by most convenient means. One doctor and two assistants, usually pharmacists or medical students are attached to every 200 or 300 men when separate, and at the rate of 1 doctor and 2 assistants to 1,000 in larger commands. Such first aid as is practicable is given by them.

There is a Green Cross organization supported by the Government which is operating a government hospital in Managua. In addition to this there is a ladies aid society in Managua and other cities, the members of which serve without compensation. These ladies personally care for and nurse the sick and wounded soldiers. The government provides hospitals, medical supplies, etc.

(q) SANITATION – 6,100-a

There is no attempt at sanitation by the field forces.

(r) HEALTH

Health of troops is good, considering conditions.

(s) PAY – 6,200-e

The rate of pay is 30 cents per day. Due to lack of funds the troops are not paid regularly and this naturally has created some dissatisfaction.

(t) TRAINING – 6,700-a

Neither officers nor men receive any training other than the little they acquire through experience. Nothing is known of the principles of security and information and nearly every engagement comes as a surprise to one or both of the contending forces.

(u) DISCIPLINE AND MORALE – 6,300-b.

Discipline and morale are poor and the number of desertions is large.

(v) RECRUITMENT – 6,240-b

Recruitment is by conscription and is for the period of the war. There is no standard age or physical fitness. Young boys and old men are taken almost regardless of age. These conscripts are brought to Managua where they are equipped, organized into detachments of from 100 to 200 men and sent out to some of the Conservative Armies. They receive no training whatsoever.

(w) LIBERAL FORCES (Revolutionists) – 3,020-d

Very little is known about the Liberal forces. General José Maria Moncada, secretary of war of the Sacasa government is their outstanding general. He is supposed to be at either Matiguas or Tierra Azul, Department of Matagalpa.

p. 7

They are armed with the Russo-Mexican rifle and Thompson sub-machine guns. They have no artillery and no airplanes. They are supposed to have more mounted troops than the Conservatives due to the fact that they are located in a section of the country where there are plenty of horses and mules.

Their organization and training is probably about the same as that of the Conservatives. Their uniform is the same as that of the Conservatives, except that they have a red hat band.

Their recruitment is said to be voluntary enlistment and conscription. Their morale is probably slightly higher than that of the Conservatives.

(x) DISTRIBUTION OF CONSERVATIVE FORCES – 6,180-a

The distribution of the Conservative forces as of February 26th is enclosed herewith as enclosure 2. It shows a total of 6,704 men. However, the Minister of War admitted to me that 5,000 men was about all they had in the army. Of this 5,000 about 500 are mounted infantry, which they refer to as cavalry.

The government forces have been concentrating against general Moncada on Muymuy, Matiguas and Tierra Azul, Department of Matagalpa, for the past week. It is expected that this concentration will be completed in about one week, when a decisive engagement is contemplated by the government. The location of these forces, as of March 4, is shown on enclosure 3.

(y) STRENGTH OF LIBERAL FORCES – 3,020-d

The government estimates the strength of the Liberal forces to be between 1,500 and 2,000 men, of which number 600 are mounted infantry.

(z) ACTIVITIES – 3,020-d

No engagements have been reported within the past ten days, except an unimportant skirmish which occurred near Telion in the department of Leon on February 28.

The Liberal general Parajon who is said to have retreated into Honduras after the Chinandega fight is reported to be preparing to invade Nicaragua from the north. This report has not been confirmed.

The Government is concentrating all available forces as stated in 2nd paragraph of sub-heading (x) and shown on enclosure 3.

(aa) OVERTURES LOOKING TO PEACE – 3,020-d

On March 2 the Liberal Party of Managua sent a committee consisting of Antonio Medrano, Mariano Arguelle and Carlos Morales to confer with the Liberal general Moncada who is reported to be at Matiguas or Tierra Azul, Dept. of Matagalpa, and ascertain whether or not he will consider entering into negotiations for the conclusion of peace. This committee was accompanied by Major Thomas S. Clark, U.S. Marine Corps and Lieutenant Moran, U.S. Navy.

p. 8

No one can foretell what Moncada’s attitude will be toward this committee, but whatever it may be it will be the deciding factor for the present.

(bb) CONCLUSIONS

The forces on both sides are undisciplined, untrained, poorly led and poor organized and equipped. The morale of the Liberals is probably slightly higher than that of the Conservatives. The Conservative army outnumbers the Liberal army about 3 to 1.

The Liberal General Moncada is the leading general of the revolutionary forces and is the one most feared by the Conservatives. He is more aggressive than any of the generals of the Conservative forces. Moncada is waiting until the government exhausts its resources, which he must know cannot be long, when he will take the offensive, gain a few victories and be in a good position to conclude a peace acceptable to himself and the Liberal Party. Meanwhile he will harass the Conservatives by small raids and depredations against their forces and their property.

It is doubtful if Moncada will remain inactive while the government forces are concentrating.

The landing of our naval forces in Nicaragua to protect the lives and property of foreigners has accomplished that mission and has been beneficial to the country and the Conservatives, but at the same time it has caused as much criticism as would have been true of straight out intervention without the blessing of restoring peace to the country.

Sources of information: Personal observation, American Legation, Major D. Rodriguez, USA, ret’d, Nicaraguan Government and reliable informants.

3 encls.

A. W. Bloor,
Military Attaché.

Note: A blue print, covering the zone in which concentration of government forces is now taking place is attached as enclosure 4. The original tracing of this map will be forwarded at a later date.

[click on thumbnail for a serviceable digital image of this "blue print"]

United States National Archives, College Park MD, Record Group 165, Entry 77, Box 2660.

Transcribed by Nicholas J. Quadrini.


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