B-2 Report
Managua, Nicaragua
17 December, 1928

... 9. Miscellaneous:
 
In the last report there was included a statement made by Maximiliano Vallecillo, the former sergeant-major of Sandino's captured by Captain Holmes in October. Below is the substance of an interview with the brother on 8 December:  "Have just been down and checked up on Emilio Vallecillo, the brother of Maximiliano Vallecillo. Reference B-2 Report, 12-3-28, p. 6, par. 9(a). There is such a man. Was at Leon in Guardia up to 6 mos. ago, now at Chinandega in Guardia. The only purpose this bit of information serves is to confirm Maximiliano's truthfulness. His account in the B-2 Report is in the main true and checked with information in hands of Captain Edson in regard to military maneuvers, dispositions, etc.
 
"I talked with [Maximiliano] Vallecillo on several occasions at Murra in October. He impressed me as being desirous of telling the truth. However too much reliance can be placed in what begins as hearsay. He was glad to be captured, said that bandit morale was crumpling, and that Jiron was on the staff, Sandino distrusted him (Jiron) and keeps him "vigilado" (watched closely, i.e., virtually a prisoner).
 
"The Edson contact at Ililihuas on Aug. 7 resulted in such a terrible thrashing to Jiron, 32 dead, that I don't believe Sandino will risk another major contact unless cornered, the latter being a condition unlikely and difficult to bring about. Being forced to move about all the time to avoid Marine patrols is making an ass out of him and his jefes in the eyes of their men.
 
"This with loss of shelter, clothes, ammunition, and food is hastening the demoralization of his forces. The destruction of every bandit shelter possible, even old ones, is of value for these locations are known by all bandits and are used again and again by bandit bands as they pass to and fro. Some of them are quite elaborately fixed up with fireplaces, bunks, skin blankets, etc."

IR28.12.17.  RG127/209/1
On Maximiliano Vallecillo, see also EDSN28.01.01 and 28.09.04

Click on image for full view

[ From Rockey, San Albino ]
 
The patrol from Jalapa to Mina Americana via Los Encinos can make their objective in one day easily. Jenkins with a patrol last March made Murra from Jalapa in one day (about 9 hours) and returned the following day.
 
La Paz can be reached in one day (10-11 hours) from San Albino.
 
The Murra River forms a steep canyon. There are two bull cart trails into Murra, one from Pie de la Cuesta and Carmen which enters along a creek bed from the west and one that winds over the hilltops southwest of Murra and enters in plain view of San Pedro. It winds down the face of the canyon, affords no cover and should be avoided. A short cut leaves this bull cart trail on the heights a few miles from Murra and affords an approach with better cover and with good observation. However, in view of the extreme heights around the town the enemy can very easily observe any patrol going into Murra from any direction in the daytime.
 
From Murra north the trail runs up on the west bank of the canyon and comes into full view from the ridge above Plantel long before one reaches that place. Concealment along this trail is practically impossible. From Plantel to X on the attached sketch, every foot of the trail was ambushed for north-going troops last January. The terrain is part forest and part large ferns which afford excellent ambush positions. La Paz and Oakland lie in a hollow about 200 feet below the trail, which is on the crest of the knife-like ridge above them. A ridge spurs out to the east and the trail drops steeply down as it enters the valley between La Paz and Oakland. Any group that failed to put a sentry at I on the trail fork just south of it would be very foolish indeed.
 
If a force at San Pedro moved out after a Marine patrol arrived in Murra, they would have the Murra River bed trail open to the south. They could move along the Murra to Monchones and then towards Remangon or via Santa Ana and Sapotillal into the San Juan area.
 
If Sandino is at San Pedro, which seems likely, his best outpost system is: (1) Flores, -- from which he can see the Tamis River bed, and the approach from Division de Aguas and Rempujon, (2) the peak above Alexander's burned house -B- from which he can see every approach into Murra except along the river bed from the south, (3) Sacramento,- from which he can observe the south trails (one on each side of the river) and (4) the crest just north of Plantel, from which he can see all trails into Plantel.
 
If Edson strikes first from the Tamis Valley, the San Albino patrol will prevent Sandino's going west and will drive him north, probably, into Holmes while the American detail will prevent his using that trail to get around Holmes.

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[ text accompanying map: ]

 "A" can be reached by dawn, leaving San Albino or Jicaro in the evening after dark. ++ looks straight across the canyon at San Pedro and might be concealed and still prevent any use of the river-bed trail in either direction. Rempujon is the Palacios sugar mill on the ridge north of Chipote. Can be reached via Monchones from Quilali or San Albino. Navas says the advance is at La Paz. Line of withdrawal would appear to be south. Any patrol from Encinos will have difficulty getting past X without being seen. La Paz & Oakland are backed on the east by steep hills. Retreat could be east across these or directly south down the valley to Corona-San Pedro trail. Plantel cannot be approached from any direction without visibility at 600-800 yards. The trail southeast from San Pedro goes to Rempujon then Chipote-Division de Aguas, etc., and gives easy access to Rempujon and Wiwili. &f Rempujon were ambushed. And a heavy Browning outpost secretly established at A, a column from Los Encinos, might drive a bagful out of San Pedro.

RG127/220/6