1.  ca. Sept. 15, 1931.  "Mexican Aid to Nicaraguan Rebels - Sandino Activities Beginning 1926.  Index," p. 1.   "1926  ¶  D.J. report, San Antonio Texas, week ending June 26, 1926.--Officially denied that President Galles or the Mexican Government is cooperating with or aiding Liberal revolution against Nicaraguan Government.  ¶  O.N.I., July 22, 1926.--Details concerning reported shipment of arms and ammunition from Mexico to rebels in Nicaragua.  ¶  Translation from La Prensa, Managua (Government paper), August 6, 1926.-- Excerpt from alleged confidential letter by Dr. Sacasa to Liberal leader in Nicaragua, concerning assistance rendered by Mexican Goverment.  ¶  Report No. 1925 from M/A, Guatemala, August 27, 1926.-- Alleged reported proof of Mexican aid to Nicaraguan rebels.  ¶  Memo. for the A.C. of S., G--2, August 30, 1926, from Chief, Latin American Section.-- A resume of information concerning alleged shipment of arms and ammunition to Nicaraguan rebels by officials of the Mexican government.  ¶  Report No. 1069 from M/A, Mexico, August 31, 1926.-- Status of relations with Nicaragua.  ¶  M/A, Mexico, No. 175-26, Sept. 24, 1926-- Mexican-Nicaraguan Relations.  ¶  Monthly Political Report, State Department, October, 1926.-- Mexican assistance to the revolutionaries.  ¶  O.N.I report, Serial No. 230-26, November 12, 1926.-- Aid to Sacasa.  ¶  8th Corps Area Summary, Dec. 15, 1926.-- Nicaraguan Liberal revolutionary government recognized by the Mexican Goverment  ¶  Clipping from Washington Post, December 28, 1926.-- Concerning statements from Russian and Mexican sources denying that Mexico or soviet Russia is giving aid to revolutionists in Nicaragua.  ¶  1927  ¶  Report No. 1353 from M/A, Mexico, January 28, 1927.-- Facts as to original shipment of arms to Nicaragua.  ¶  Department of Justice, Feb. 1, 1927.-- Mexican aid to Sacasa.  ¶  Information prepared in G-2 concerning Mexican aid for Nicaraguan revolutionists, February, 1927: G-2/2657-P-241, pages 15 and 19.  ¶  Report No. 22, M/A, Nicaragua, March 19, 1927.-- Concerning Mexican interference in Nicaraguan affairs.  ¶  Report No. 1451 from M/A, Mexico, March 22, 1927.-- Alleged purchase of munitions of war by Mexico for shipment to Nicaragua.

2.  ca. Sept. 15, 1931.  "Mexican Aid to Nicaraguan Rebels - Sandino Activities Beginning 1926.  Index," p. 2.    "1927 (cont.) ¶ Report No. 1496, NMA, Mexico, April 26, 1927.-- Alleged shipment of ammunition from Germany. ¶ Report No. 85, M/A, Costa Rica, July 13, 1927.-- Reaction of Central America to American intervention in Nicaragua. ¶ 1928 ¶ Report from Amer. Consul, Guadalajara, Mexico, Jan. 29, 1928.-- Formation of committee for collection of funds to be used in aiding Sandino in Nicaragua. ¶ Letter from G-2, 8th Corps Area, Fen. 16, 1928, to A.C. of S., G-2.-- Activity in Mexico in support of Sandino revolution in Nicaragua. ¶ D.J. report, San Antonio, Texas, week ending Feb. 18, 1928.-- Mexicans again helping Nicaraguan rebels. ¶ Letter from 8th Corps Area, March 20, 1928, to A.C. of S., G-2.-- Mexican aid to Sandino in Nicaragua. ¶ Report from M/A, Mexico, No. 2995, March 23, 1928.-- Formation and Activities of the “Hands Off Nicaragua Association”. ¶ Letter from G-2, 8th Corps Area, March 23, 1928, to A.C. of S., G-2.-- Activity in Mexico in support of Sacasa revolution in Nicaragua. ¶ Letter from G-2, 8th Corps Area, March 28, 1928, to A.C. of S., G-2.-- Activity in Mexico in support of Sacasa revolution in Nicaragua. ¶ Letter from Amer. Ambassador, Mexico, April 11, 1928, to Secretary of State.-- Concerning alleged forwarding of officers and men from Mexico to assist Sandino in Nicaragua. ¶ Secret letter from Major H. Schmidt, U.S.M.C., Managua, Nicaragua (no date).-- Statement of Julio Cesar Rivas, former agent of Sandino and now in the National Penitentiary in Managua, Nic., given April 21, 1928. ¶ Secret letter from M/A, Costa Rica, May 14, 1928, to A.C., of S., G-2.-- Mexican Aid to Sandino.¶Report from M/A, Mexico, No. 2072, May 14, 1928.-- Copy of Organ of “Hands off Nicaragua League” and clippings re Sandino rebels. ¶ Report from M/A, Micaragua, June 18, 1928.-- Entire aspect in Nicaragua changed. ¶ Cable from M/A, Nicaragua, dated July 5, 1928.-- Sandino situation. ¶ Report No. 31, M/A, Nicaragua, July 9, 1928.-- Messenger service to Turcios. ¶ Report No, 34, M/A, Nicaragua, July 18, 1928.-- Line of communication from Sandino to Turcios. ¶ Report No. 68, M/A, Nicaragua, November 17, 1928.-- Sandino situation. ¶ 1929 ¶ Report No. 410, M/A, Costa Rica, January 4, 1929.-- Resumption of Costa Rican diplomatic relations with Nicaragua."

3.  ca. Sept. 15, 1931.  "Mexican Aid to Nicaraguan Rebels - Sandino Activities Beginning 1926.  Index," p. 3.   "1929 (cont.) ¶ Letter No. 2398 from M/A, Mexico, May 17, 1929, to A.C. of S., G-2.-- Sandino,- Attitude of Julio Sierra, Assist. Sec. of State, toward ¶ Letter No. 2469 from M/A, Mexico, June 28, 1929, to A.C. of S., G-2.-- Sandino,-Arrival in State of Chiapas en route to Vera Cruz for Yucatan. ¶ Letter No. 2477 from M/A, Mexico, July 5, 1929, to A.C. of S., G-2.--Sandino,- Arrival in Vera Cruz on June 28, 1929, with staff. ¶ Report No. 2489 from M/A, Mexico, July 12, 1929.-- Press propaganda in connection with Sandino. ¶ Letter No. 2667 from M/A, Mexico, December 10, 1929.-- No indication that Sandino was endeavoring to leave Mexico. ¶ 1930 ¶ Report No. 2735 from M/A, Mexico, Jan. 31, 1930.-- Activities of Sandino in Mexico City. ¶ Report No. 2736 from M/A, Mexico, Feb. 3, 1930.-- Activities of Sandino in Mexico City. ¶ Report No. 2743 from M/A, Mexico, Feb. 6, 1930.-- Activities of Sandino in Mexico City. ¶ Report No. 2755 from M/A, Mexico, Feb. 11, 1930.-- Activities of Sandino in Mexico City. ¶ Report No. 2759 from M/A, Mexico, Fen. 13, 1930.-- Activities of Sandino in Mexico City. ¶ Report No. 2765 from M/A, Mexico, Fen. 18, 1930.-- Activities of Sandino in Mexico City. ¶ Report No. 2771 from M/A, Mexico, Feb. 19, 1930.-- Activities of Sandino in Mexico City, Feb. 16, 17 and 18, 1930. ¶ Report No. 2776 from M/A, Mexico, Feb. 21, 1930.-- Activities of Sandino in Mexico City. ¶ See page 4. ¶ Report No. 2783 from M/A, Mexico, Feb. 28, 1930.-- Activities of Sandino in Mexico City; departure of Sandino on Feb. 22, 1930, for Merida via Vera Cruz. ¶ Report No 2797 from M/A, Mexico, March 10, 1930.-- Payments of funds made to Sandino through the Mexican War Department and Treasury, by direction of the President. ¶ Report No. 2911 from M/A, Mexico, May 23, 1930.-- Sandino’s return to Nicaragua. ¶ Report No. 744 from M/A, Nicaragua, June 4, 1930.-- Sandino’s situation. ¶ Report No. 768 from M/A, Nicaragua, June 18, 1930.-- Recent reports from bandit areas; has been ascertained that Sandino entered Nicaragua through Totecasinte. ¶ Report No. 2948 from M/A, Mexico June 17, 1930.-- Sandino has severed relations with Mexican Communist Party."

4.  ca. Sept. 15, 1931.  "Mexican Aid to Nicaraguan Rebels - Sandino Activities Beginning 1926.  Index," p. 4.    "1930 (cont.) ¶ Comment by M/A, Costa Rica, received in G-2 July 30, 1930, in connection with report No. 2949, from M/A, Mexico, June 17, 1930.-- Relations of Sandino with Esteban Pavletich, representative of Communist Party in Mexico. ¶ Report No. 2963 from M/A, Mexico, June 30, 1930.-- Translation of article in “El Excelsior” of Mexico City, June 26, 1930, purporting to be an interview with Dr. Zepeda, Sandino’s representative in Mexico City. ¶ Report No. 3031 from M/A, Mexico, August 8, 1930.-- Translation of article in “El Excelsior”, Aug. 5, 1930, entitled “Sandino Relates how he was Wounded by a Bomb from American Airplanes”. ¶ Report No. 3037 from M/A, Mexico, August 12, 1930.-- Translation of article in “La Prensa” of Mexico City, Aug. 9, 1930, purporting to be a bulletin furnished by Sandino to Dr. Zepeda, his representative in Mexico City. ¶ Report N. 3045 from M/A, Mexico, August 15, 1930.-- Translation of article in “La Prensa”, Aug. 14, 1930, entitled “Relatives of Sandino and other Rebel Chiefs Tortured”. ¶ Report No. 3049 from M/A, Mexico, Aug. 19, 1930.-- Report on Nicaraguan revolutionists. ¶ Report No. 3054 from M/A, Mexico, August 22, 1930.-- Translation of two articles in “La Prensa” of August 16 and 18, 1930 - Nicaraguan propaganda. ¶ Report No. 3077 from M/A, Mexico, Sept. 12, 1930.-- Translation of article in “La Prensa” of Aug. 30, 1930.-- Bulletin furnished by Dr. Pedro Zepeda, Sandino’s representative in Mexico. ¶ Report No. 3081 from M/A, Mexico, Sept. 24, 1930.-- Translation of articles appearing in press of Sept. 15 and 21 - Nicaraguan propaganda. ¶ Report No. 909 from M/A, Nicaragua, October 2, 1930.-- Information on Sandino given by Feliciano Centeno after his surrender. ¶ Report No. 3097 from M/A, Mexico, October 4, 1930.-- Translation of article in “La Prensa” of Oct. 2, 1930 - Nicaraguan propaganda. ¶ Report No. 3108 from M/A, Mexico, October 10, 1930.-- Translation of article in “La Prensa” of October 8, 1930, headed “Sandino will keep on Fighting to the End”. ¶ Report No. 960 from M/A, Nicaragua, October 29, 1930.-- Socrates Sandino, brother of Sandino. ¶ Excerpt from Summary of Intelligence, Panama Canal Dept., October 30, 1930.-- Brother of Sandino held by local quarantine officials at Balboa. ¶ Report No. 969 from M/A, Nicaragua, November 10, 1930.-- Socrates Sandino deported from Panama November 8 with destination La Union, Salvador. ¶ Report No. 3154 from M/A, Mexico, November 27, 1930.-- “General” Rafael deo Nogales, and Dr. Pedro J. Zepeda, Sandino’s representative in  Mexico - Sandino propaganda. ¶ Report From M/A Mexico, No. 2783, February 24, 1930.-- Nicaraguan propaganda - “The Sacking of Nicaragua”, by Rafael de Nogales, Venezuelan author."

5.  ca. Sept. 15, 1931.  "Mexican Aid to Nicaraguan Rebels - Sandino Activities Beginning 1926.  Index," p. 5.   “1931 ¶ Report No. 3190 from M/A, Mexico, January 2, 1931.-- Message sent from Sandino to the Congress of Latin-American Students which has been holding sessions in Mexico City. ¶ Report No. 3226 from M/A, Mexico, February 3, 1931.-- Report sent to the Los Angeles Times on January 29, 1921, by its staff correspondent, C. W. Martin. ¶ Report No. 3242 from M/A, Mexico, February 17, 1931.-- Propaganda given to Excelsior and El Universal by Dr. Zepeda, Sandino representative in Mexico. ¶ Report N0. 3266 from M/A, Mexico, March 13, 1931.-- Propaganda given to Excelsior by Dr. Zepeda, Sandino representative in Mexico. ¶ Report No. 3381 from M/A, Mexico, June 2, 1931.-- Article on Dr. Pio Palacios in Excelsior of May 29, 1931, entitled “The Health Envoy to Nicaragua has just Returned to Mexico”. ¶ Report No. 3391 from M/A, Mexico, June 16, 1931.-- Article in Excelsior of June 13, 1931, entitled “There is no Split in the Sandino Group - Another Offensive”. ¶ Report No. 3506 from M/A, Mexico, August 25, 1931.-- Article in La Prensa of Aug. 25, 1931, entitled “Sandino continues victorious against the Yankees”. ¶ Report No. 3537 from M/A, Mexico, September 15, 1931.-- Article in Excelsior of Sept. 12, 1931, entitled “Sandino enjoys good health and will continue the struggle.”

6.  May 16, 1930.  Military Attaché, Mexico to Col. Ford; incl.  telegram from American Consul in Progreso, Yucatán to US Embassy in Mexico City.    "NICARAGUA.  ¶  Upon my return I found a telegram from the State Department, which has doubtless come to your attention, with reference to the departure of Sandino.  There have been so many rumors and contradictory reports in regard to him that I thought it best to send Captain Cummings down by plane at once.  I had intended him to take this trip within the next few days anyhow, and in view of the concern of the State Department, thought it best to send him at once. His instructions were to go by airplane from Vera Cruz to Yucatan directly, investigate the Sandino situation in cooperation with the Consul at Progreso, and then return by way of Campeche and Tabasco.  ¶  P.S.  ¶  Following telegram just received:  ¶  From American Consul at Progreso, Yucatan: To Embassy, dated May 16, 8 a.m.  ¶  “Following telegram has been sent to the Department May 15 10 A.M Department’s telegram of May 14 6 P.M.  Today’s press contains report of Sandino’s return to Nicaragua with notation to the effect that investigation proves that he has been absent from Merida for about one month. Lane.”  ¶  (Excerpt from letter to Col. Ford from M/A, Mexico, May 16. 1930.)"

7.  March 1930.  "Sandino Situation and Assistance he received from the Anti-Imperialistic League from February 1928 to March 1930."  "NICARAGUA  ¶  SANDINO SITUATION  ¶  and  ¶  Assistance he received from the Anti-Imperialistic League from February 1928 to March 1930.  ¶  (Current Sandino Situation in Nicaraguan Digest under 3020-d.)"  [Cover page for all documents to follow, up to March 1930.]

8.  February 13, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Campaign, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 1.   "So far as Sandino is concerned, the situation up to date is approximately this: ¶ After the capture of Sandino’s stronghold at Chipote (exact date unknown), his force apparently was split into two parts; the larger part, in fact practically his entire remaining force was driven northwest towards the Honduran border near Jalapa and has disintegrated and practically disappeared. This force contained Nicaraguans, a considerable number of men from Salvador and a few men from Honduras. At least four hundred men who were with Sandino up to the time of the Chipote fight have been accounted for passing through Honduras since the fight. ¶ Arms. ¶ There is no evidence anywhere to show that Sandino has received arms or ammunition from any source outside of Nicaragua, with the possible exception of a few rifles carried into Nicaragua by Salvadorians who joined Sandino some months ago. It is said everywhere that all the rifles Sandino has were already in Nicaragua and were simply not turned in when General Moncada and the Liberal forces were disarmed. It is reported, and in my opinion the report is definite, that Sandino has three machine guns. One of these he got from General Concepción Peralta, who is a Honduran and is in revolt against the present Honduras government. The other two are machine guns which Sandino took from government forces in the fight at Jinotega shortly after he declared himself unwilling to surrender with Moncada. There seems to be little doubt that the anti-aircraft mounts for these guns, first used at Quilali, were made in the machine shop of the Zurcher mine in Yuscaran, probably under the direct supervision of Sandino himself. A fact not previously stressed is that Sandino has been for years an expert mechanic. ¶ The government of Honduras is doing all it can against operations by Sandino or his men in Honduras, but the situation along the frontier is this: on the Nicaraguan side there are towns and fairly good trails. Immediately opposite, on the Honduras side is wild country with practically no villages and no trails. Patrols can maintain themselves in the mountains not more than two or three days at the end of which time they have to go back, probably two days’ march to some small center such as: Paraiso, Zapotillo or Pedregalito, all of which are tiny places affording in themselves hardly any facilities at all. . . . "

9.  February 13, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Campaign, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 2.   " . . . Reports are constant from these border patrols and from practically all other sources of information that Sandino is anxious to get out of the country and actually is either preparing to do so or has already done so. ¶ These reports do not seem to be confirmed by information from the Nicaraguan side; which are to the effect that Sandino is still in Nicaragua with a considerable armed force and shows no signs of leaving the country. ¶ Finally, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that no evidence whatever has been found on this side indicating that Sandino receives, has received or can receive any substantial help from the outside. He sends men constantly to Danli, Yuscaran and smaller towns to buy all pistol ammunition they can, even four or five rounds at a time purchased from any person who will sell it. The only thing so far discovered in the nature of outside assistance is the purely moral support given him by a few radical newspapers editors, the one in Tegucigalpa being a well known writer named Froilan Turcios. Turcios undoubtedly communicates with Sandino and purports to receive daily communications from him. As these reports could not possibly be received by telegraph, they could only be brought by messenger, who would require at least seven days to get from the vicinity of Jalapa to Tegucigalpa. To all intents and purposes Sandino now has the marines in front of him and practically unknown country at his back. ¶ In my opinion he can accomplish nothing further and can only end by endeavoring to get out through Honduras, which he will probably do after the next attack by the marines."

10.  February 16, 1928.  Secret G-2 Report on Activity in Mexico in Support of Sandino Revolution in Nicaragua, Candidate of Mexican Goverment to Oppose General Obregon, Major Robert J. Halpin, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Dept., Washington D.C.   "1. A reliable informant of this office has rendered the following report, based upon information received from sources which he deems reliable. This office has no other information on the subject and the report is submitted without evaluation or comment. ¶ a. General José Alvarez, Chief of Staff of President Calles, is the head of a society organized in Mexico City, four months ago, for the purpose of raising funds for the support of the cause of the Nicaraguan revolutionists headed by Sandino. The society has organized and conducted popular entertainments in the capital and other cities in the vicinity, and has succeeded in raising about 25,000 pesos a month. These funds have been forwarded, through the Mexican Consul General, Arturo M. Elias, to Sandino’s representative in New York City, one Salomon de la Selva, who is associated with a Doctor Timoteo Baca. ¶ b. General Pablo Gonzales, retired Mexican Army officer, opponent of the Calles regime, now living in Laredo, Texas, has received a letter from one of his former officers, now imprisoned in Mexico City for participation in the Gomes-Serrano revolt, stating that he and other officers in confinement have been approached by agents of General José Alvarez with a promise of release and pardon in April on condition that they join an expedition to be organized in Mexico for the purpose of assisting General Sandino in Nicaragua. ¶ c. President Calles and Luis N. Morones, Secretary of Commerce, Industry and Labor, are supporting General Amaro, the present Secretary of War, as a candidate to oppose General Obregon ¶ (Signed) Robert J. Halpin"

11.  February 18, 1928.  D. J. Report on Mexicans Again Helping Nicaraguan Rebels, from San Antonio District, Texas.   "On February 15, 1928, Adam Z. Moralez [Adán Z. Morales], Nicaraguan Consul in San Antonio, Texas, came to the Bureau office and stated to this Agent that he had information to the effect that Gen. Agustin Sandino, rebel chief in Nicaragua, was getting financial help from Mexico; also that they are preparing to send Mexican soldiers to join General Sandino’s rebel group in Nicaragua. ¶ This agent questioned Adam Moralez as to the veracity of this informant. Morales stated that General Pablo Gonzales of San Antonio, Texas, received a letter from a Mexican General prisoner in Mexico City. Mr. Moralez stated he saw this letter and that this Mexican General told General Gonzales that a man representing General Jose Alvarez, Chief of Staff, came to the penitentiary and offered to free them if they agreed to join an armed expedition that was being organized in Mexico to join Gen. Agustin Sandino’s rebel forces in Nicaragua sometime next April to fight the U. S. Marines. The Mexican General prisoner asked General Gonzales’ advice and what he should do in the matter. ¶ Other information is that by instructions of General Jose Alvarez, Chief of Staff, certain social organizations have given entertainments with the object of raising money to help Sandino; that one Solomon de la Silva and Dr. Timoteo Baca, both now in New York City, received certain amounts of money from the Mexican Consul Arturo Elias of New York; that Solomon de la Silva [Salomón de la Selva] sent this money by General Sandino’s brother to Guatemala and from there by land to Sandino’s camp in Nicaragua."

12.  March 12, 1928.  G-2 Report on Marine Air Tactics in Nicaragua, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 1.   "On March 3d the Marines sent two Curtiss Falcon planes to bring me to Managua. We left Tegucigalpa at 9:00 A.M. and proceeded via Amapala and the volcanoes, to Managua, arriving 11:30 A.M. This report covers two flights made in a Vought Corsair pursuit plane, with Major Rowell piloting. Before going up I spent one afternoon learning the panel and pistol signals, and the handling of the Lewis gun. ¶ Flight of March 7, 1928. ¶ This was strictly routine flight over the zone of action in Matagalpa, Esteli and Leon. The original plan was to go through the Yali pass, just north of San Rafael del Norte, and scout the area to the north and east. ¶ The Yali pass was found to be under heavy clouds and although we followed the cloud line all the way west to the Honduran border near Somotillo there was no break. We therefore returned east and landed at Esteli. This is a supply base to which supplies come by ox-cart and are forwarded by pack-train. The supply service is now so far established that a mobile column can be maintained in the field. ¶ From Esteli we returned via Trinidad and Granada to Managua. ¶ Time in air—Three hours. ¶ Distance covered—300 miles. ¶ Flight of March 9, 1928. ¶ This was a special flight to try and definitely locate Sandino, information received the previous day having definitely located him somewhere in an area north and east of the town of Yali. ¶ Took off at 8:45 A.M. and flew almost directly north to San Rafael de Norte. For the next hour we flew over small towns in the vicinity where detachments are stationed. The co-operation between the planes and ground troops seemed to be excellent. Most towns displayed the panel TX - nothing to report. In a few there was an MM panel, which called for a message pickup. In such cases the message was on a string stretched between two poles, and we lowered a weighted hook and picked them up from a height of about sixty feet. Most of these messages were late information, but some called for assistance of one sort of another. ¶ Answers were given by dropped messages, and in some cases by red or green flares from the Very pistol. ¶ At San Juan Telpaneca, which is slightly southeast from Telpaneca itself we found the C.P. of the column in the field. They displayed a panel reading:- “I am marching to-morrow.” Just then the two contact planes from Ocotal came over and we signaled them and again started out, following the mountain range along the south side of the Coco River as far as Insina, and then swung southeast. ¶ From then on we were in bandit country. This fact became evident almost as once. Up until then the towns and houses had seemed, at least from the air, to be perfectly normal and at ease. It was different now. As we passed over houses one of two things happened:-either no one appeared at all, or the whole family rushed out and stood in the open. Where no one showed up major Rowell opened up to about a hundred and forty miles an hour and dived down for a look. The country was all steep mountains and deep valleys, so by doing this we could actually, for a short time, see right into the houses. ¶ Finally, over the first mountain range from Yali we saw a fair-sized house with a totally disproportionate amount of laundry hung out to dry. We flew round on one wing watching and spotted about a dozen saddled horses tied near the house. Major Rowell immediately dived and opened up with the bow gun, shooting into the dust alongside the [ . . . ] There was no reaction, as there would have been with innocent p [ . . . ] the location was marked and we went on. We did not attack, as it [ . . . ] policy to use two planes, one attacking and the other trying to [ . . . ] . . ."

13.  March 12, 1928.  G-2 Report on Marine Air Tactics in Nicaragua, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 2.   " . . . and concentrate on any machine-guns that may open up. On our present trip the constant effort was to draw the fire of machine-guns, as these label the place as the headquarters of either Sandino or his principal lieutenant, General Montoya. ¶ We proceeded northeast, looking into every house that seemed in any way suspicious. In two places men ran out and waved white flags. It has been found that this means Sandino or Montoya have recently stopped there, and the inhabitants fear the plane has been informed and will bomb the place. We located two more groups of bandits and then turned north and flew around Chipote. This is an enormous mountain mass and the trenches and burned houses were clearly visible. Chipote was attacked late in January by planes, and Sandino suffered terrible losses. In fact he has had no real force since. ¶ From Chipote we flew west to San Albino mine, working some more garrisoned towns by means of panels and messages and then landed at Ocotal. The country there is like around El Paso and other border towns. A Fokker transport had just landed with supplies. Our information checked with information sent by informants, so we were probably over Sandino’s headquarters in one of the three places mentioned. ¶ From Ocotal we returned to Managua. ¶ Time in air--Four hours. ¶ Distance covered--Close to 500 miles."

14.  March 16, 1928.  Supplementary G-2 Report on Marine Air Tactics in Nicaragua, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 1.   "Planes in Use. ¶ The Marines have three types of land planes in use in the operations against the bandits. ¶ Tri-motored Fokker transports maintain a regular supply service from Managua to Ocotal, Jicaro and Jalapa, and bring in wounded from these points. They carry eighteen hundred pounds of supplies each trip and usually make two trips each every day. ¶ Curtiss Falcon observation planes of the latest type are used for all other purposes except attack or scouting in the high mountains. ¶ An entirely new class of ship, a pursuit plane capable of carrying two men, is the one relied on for the difficult and dangerous work of scouting and fighting in the present mountainous area. ¶ These Vought Corsairs are tremendously effective. With the throttle less than half open they cruise at a speed of a hundred miles an hour, and for work under fire they travel readily at 140 or 150. They carry a bow gun, located on top of the upper wing and fired by a lever on the control stick and a Lewis gun mounted on the edge of the rear cockpit, and eight bombs under the wings. Owing to shortage of bombs planes have not been dropping unused ones before landing, but land with them all the time, without any accidents so far. ¶ These planes can circle standing up on one wing indefinitely giving an excellent view of the ground, and enabling the gunner to get perfect aim with the Lewis gun. ¶ Attack of Houses. ¶ Where bandits are located in houses, as they nearly always are, the procedure is something like this:-- the plane dives down, using the bow gun, then swings over on one wing, climbs fast and drops a bomb. By fast work the ship can then turn over on the right wing in time to see the bomb hit. The bandits have learned how to tell when a bomb is dropped and run for cover before it hits. The plane, circling on one wing, is then in perfect position to attack them with the Lewis gun. A group attacked in this way is usually entirely wiped out. In the meantime the second plane circles or dives, on the lookout for machine-guns. ¶ Flying conditions always bad. ¶ It should be emphasized that the Marines are facing the most continuously dangerous flying conditions I have ever seen. There are two mountain ranges to cross before even the fringe of hostile territory is reached and usually two of three more before going into action. The winds and cross currents over these are always bad. Drops of two hundred to a thousand feet are an everyday occurrence and on the two flights in the Corsair mentioned in my No.18 we were repeatedly dropped absolutely sideways and down without the slightest warning. ¶ In the area between Chipote and Yali, where Sandino was last located, it is necessary to fly low in the valleys in order to really observe, and only the Corsairs could ever get out of some of the air conditions encountered. With their reserve speed of more than forty miles an hour for emergencies, they have so far been able to avoid a crash, when suddenly dropped or swept sideways, but they may not always be so fortunate. ¶ At his own headquarters Sandino always has two anti-aircraft machine-guns, one on each side of the valley, and there is hardly a plane that hasn’t bullet holes through the wings. Several times lately low-flying planes have been fired at with sky-rockets, probably in the hope of setting the wings afire. These sky-rockets are made of nitrates and charcoal obtained locally. They are usually seen as soon as they leave the ground and are of course a dead give-away of the location of the bandits. . . . "

15.  March 16, 1928.  Supplementary G-2 Report on Marine Air Tactics in Nicaragua, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 2.   " . . . Contact with Moving Columns. ¶ Two Corsair planes are stationed at Ocotal, and act as contact planes for the two columns which are now closing in on Sandino. One of the principal objectives of the Marines has been to deprive him and his men of the opportunity to rest in towns or villages and this has now been accomplished. He is restricted to the area south of the headwaters of the Coco River, east of Telpaneca and north of Yali. ¶ On March 9th, when I saw them, one column was moving east through Insina, the other east through Yali. The contact planes were maintaining communication between them and attacking bandit groups wherever found. The planes have never been permitted to bomb towns, and this has let Sandino escape several times. For instance, on February 4th, the day Beals claims to have interviewed him, he was in San Rafael del Norte with 150 men. The planes knew this and stayed over the town practically all day, but beyond getting word of his location to the nearest troops there was nothing they could do."

16.  April 1, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 1.   "When I reached Honduras early in February it was evident at once that Sandino and his men were using Honduran territory opposite Jalapa as a back-yard or rest area. They came and went about as they pleased, not exactly openly, but still freely. Men of their type are willing to undergo almost any sort of danger or hardship if they can periodically get into some village for a rest and good time. ¶ The Minister of War of Honduras is General Martinez Funes, who when I left Central America in 1922 was in revolt in the very area in questions. I went to him and after some discussion he agreed to send Colonel Ramon Nolasco to command the patrol opposite Jalapa. Colonel Nolasco is not only a good, reliable soldier, but a fanatical Conservative—that is, give him one Liberal and one machete and he would know exactly what to do. He took over the patrol on Feb. 3d, since which date Sandino and his men have given the region a wide berth. ¶ The next helpful thing was word from the Marines to look out for General J. Antonio Sequeira, supposed to be the messenger between Ferrera and Sandino. He was located and picked up here the same day, and while he never admitted anything else he did state that he was the man who had guided Beals from here to Sandino. Although the Government has no real right to hold him, the Minister persuaded them to do so. He was held for two weeks, which should have been sufficient to disrupt his line of communication, and we believe that it was. ¶ Sandino would have been finished long ago had the Marines not lost their heads after the Quilali fight and broadcast the statement that he had appeared there with a real army and all sorts of modern weapons. That, naturally; made him a real object of admiration and encouraged him tremendously, but it was entirely untrue. The whole thing turns out to have been based on the fact that he fired on the planes which anti-aircraft machine-guns, which were nothing but his same three guns on some mounts which he made himself in Yuscaran. ¶ Evidence continues to accumulate that he had, with the possible exception of some smuggled cartridges, nothing but the same old guns that are buried near the frontiers after every revolution. ¶ Sandino has no prestige in Honduras. This is due to the fact that the Conservatives have no use for him and the Liberals see that he is actually damaging their cause. To-day, when a couple of thousand men were gather around the Comandancia here to draw lots for military service, a man threw his hat in the air and yelled “Viva Sandino!” A couple of men called out “We don’t know him.” And that was all there was to the affair. ¶ It has been supposed that Sandino received supplies by way of the Patuca River in Honduras. This river is navigable for the big dug-outs called “pitpans” from the Gulf to Totecasinte, on the northern tip of the Nueva Segovia. However, a captain B.C. Brown, who was aide to General W.H. Gordon during the war, has a string of lumber camps for a hundred miles along the Patuca. I got in touch with him at Puerto Castilla on Jan. 27th, and he assured me that nothing could go up the river without his knowing about it and that nothing had gone up. ¶ The Government of Honduras is much on the alert for arms shipments, as they are dangerously short themselves and would be more that delighted to get some for nothing."

17.  April 1, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 2.    " . . . It is continually reported, no so much here as in Nicaragua and Guatemala that Sandino will combine with Liberal elements and if driven out of Nicaragua will invade Honduras, assisted by them. That for a while was a serious plan, but about ten days ago when the Liberal Party held its Convention here to nominate a candidate for President, the leaders held a secret conference at the Pension Nuila, next door to the hotel where I am staying. At this meeting the Delegate from Yuscaran, who is violently Radical and anti-American made this statement: ¶ That he had been the man through whom the liberals had been dealing with Sandino: that he had been out of communication with him for a month, and the Party had dropped Sandino because he repeatedly violated instructions and broke agreements: and that he amounted to nothing anyway, as he had only a few men and was going to get out of Nicaragua and go to Guatemala or Mexico. ¶ In Mexico, Guatemala and other Latin-American countries the papers continually publish stories of funds being raised for Sandino. Not a dollar of this money has reached him or ever will. Even if it got as far as Nicaragua or Honduras, his agents are hardly the type who would take even twenty dollars and deliver it to him. ¶ Finally, there are hardly even rumors here now about Sandino, which means that he must be restricted to a very small, or very uninhabited area in Nicaragua."

18.  April 7, 1928.  Secret G-2 Report on Activity in Mexico in Support of Sandino Revolution in Nicaragua, Major Robert J. Halpin, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, p. 1.   "Subject: Political Issues and Problems. ¶ Rebel Activities. ¶ Activity I Mexico in Support of Sandino Revolution in Nicaragua. ¶ TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, ¶ War Department General Staff, ¶ Washington, D.C. ¶ (Through Commanding General, 8 th Corps Area) . ¶ 1. A reliable agent of this office, an active member of the “Catholic League of Mexico” of El Paso, Texas, has submitted the following report which is forwarded without comment: ¶ a. LUIS J. BUSTOS, Treasurer of the “Catholic League of Mexico”, and the ‘real driving force behind this organization’, has returned from Rome and other European cities, by way of Havana, New York and Philadelphia, arriving in El Paso on the 2d inst. A general meeting of the League has been called for today and it is expected that many eminent Catholic clergy-men will attend. In connection with the mission and activities of Señor Bustos, it is said that the Catholic Church in Spain, Hungary, and Germany, (specifically on Cologne) has commenced propaganda of protest against the Mexican Government’s abusive treatment of Catholics in Mexico. ¶ b. Arms and ammunition for the Yaqui Indians and Catholic rebels in Jalisco, Purchased in California, through a Mexican engineer, Señor - - - TRASLOSHERORS, were recently sent into Mexico, through Tucson, Arizona. ¶ c. Yaqui Indians, followers of Chief Matus, are again on the war-path, two groups, numbering 200 each, having joined the Nayarit rebels from Sinaloa. ¶ d. CASTULO HERRERA, president of the C.R.O.M (Confederacion Regional de Obreros Mexicanos) in Ciudad Juarez, Chuahua, is known to be the Delegate General of Pro-Sandino Clubs in Mexico, now in Juarez: these two men have been recently seen in company with one - - - BRINGAS is said to be a Mexican envoy to Sandino, about to leave for Central America from an American port. Bringas . . . "

19.  April 7, 1928.  Secret G-2 Report on Activity in Mexico in Support of Sandino Revolution in Nicaragua, Major Robert J. Halpin, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, p. 2.   " . . . Was seen entering Laredo, Texas, three or four days ago and it is believed that his full name can be secured from the register at the international bridge. ¶ Robert J. Halpin ¶ Major, General Staff, A. C. of S., G-2. ¶ 1st Ind. ¶ HEADQUARTERS EIGHT CORPS AREA, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, April 7, 1928. – To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 War Department General Staff, Washington, D.C. ¶ For the Commanding General: ¶ GEO. L. HICKS, ¶ Colonel, Adjutant General’s Department, ¶ Adjutant General."

20.  April 11, 1928.  Confidential Report on Mexican Aid to Sandino, Dwight D. Morrow, Mexico, to Secretary of State, Washington.    "The Honorable ¶ The Secretary of State, ¶ Washington. ¶ Sir: ¶ I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of the Department’s strictly confidential instruction No. 232 of April 3, 1928, transmitting for my information copy of a report to the War Department with regard to the alleged forwarding of officers and men from the Mexico to assist Sandino in Nicaragua. ¶ As indicated in the Department’s instruction under reference, a copy of the report received by the War Department had already reached the Military Attaché of this Embassy. Colonel MacNab informs me that he places no reliance in the report in question; nor has he any information that would confirm the statement made therein that officers and men were sent or are being sent from Mexico to assist Sandino or the statement that Mexico is continuing to sent forward fighting men in small detachments for the purpose. ¶ While, as previously reported, the Mexican Government has not concealed its belief that the policy of the United States in Nicaragua is a mistaken one, I am persuaded that its disagreement with us in that respect finds no expression in secret aid to Sandino and others in Nicaragua who are now engaged in hostilities against the United States forces in that country. The Mexican Government is at present far too preoccupied with its own internal problems to make any other course practicable, even if it be assumed that it may wish to aid Sandino. ¶ The Department is aware of course, of the existence in Mexico, as elsewhere, including the United States, of a so-called “Comité-pro-Sandino”, which collects funds openly in public places and by private solicitation, ostensibly for the purpose of sending medical supplies to Sandino’s forces. This organization is understood to be an entirely private one and to have no connection whatever with the Mexican Government, although the latter certainly refrains from any interference with it. The organization seems to enjoy the particular favor of the “Ucsaya”, which is also active in this country but which likewise, has no connection with the Mexican Government. The newspapers here occasionally report the dispatch of funds collected by the “Comité-pro-Sandino” to Sandino and the forwarding of medical supplies, but it is believed that the funds collected are quite inadequate to recruit officers and men, supply and equip them, and forward them to Nicaragua. ¶ I have the honor to be, sir, ¶ Your obedient servant, ¶ DWIGHT W. MORROW.

21.  May 11, 1928.  G-2 Report on the Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa.    "G-2 report. ¶ NICARAGUA (Pop. & Social) ¶ Subject: ¶ The Sandino Situation. ¶ I left Tegucigalpa, Honduras, by airplane on April 20th. As stated in the previous report there had been hardly even rumors of Sandino for about three weeks. Upon reaching Managua, I was informed by General Feland and Major Rowell, commanding the marine air force, that he following had happened early in April. ¶ General J.A. Sequiera, after being released by the Government of Honduras, proceeded directly to join Sandino. Although the Minister had arranged for his detention, it seems that he had frequently seen me with the Minister of War and undoubtedly came to the conclusion that I was the one who had gotten him in trouble. He also saw the landing of the big Fokker transport which brought Colonel Parker and myself from Managua to Tegucigalpa on March 12th, and noted that it landed two miles away from the city and was protected only by a small guard of about eight men. ¶ Upon rejoining Sandino, whom he found in the vicinity of Murra, he looked over the situation and found that at Jalapa there existed the identical situation so far as the landing field was concerned, that he had seen at Tegucigalpa. He proposed to Sandino to quietly assemble a sufficient force in the woods near the landing filed and to ambush one of the big transports which arrive every day on regular schedule. It seems that a squad of 8 marines had been sent out to protect the plane every time it landed. ¶ Sandino approved the plan and turned over all of his men to Sequiera for the operation. Just when the ambush was to take place will not be known, but within a day or so of the planned attack, Lieut. Guyman, flying a Corsair plane, heard two shots from the woods in the vicinity of the landing field. He returned to Ocotal where he found Major Rowell. The latter, on hearing that Lieut. Guyman had not returned the fire, thought that the men might still be in the woods, so with another Corsair plane, that is with a flight of three, he proceeded to Jalapa and literally “found the woods full of them”. The planes bombed and machine gunned the vicinity practically all day. Their work was followed up by ground troops and near Murra these troops captured all of Sandino’s supplies which he had collected for the rainy season. ¶ Sandino’s movements since that date were not certain when I left Managua on April 22, but apparently he had headed down the Coco river toward Bocay. On April 23, the USS Cleveland left Corinto taking 150 marines from Leon to the east coast and at last reports Sandino had been again located, this time in the vicinity marked “Mineral de Pis Pis”. Since arriving here I have had no further information of any sort concerning activities in Nicaragua. Source: Gen Feland & Maj. Rowell. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Military Attache."

22.  May 14, 1928.  Secret G-2 Report on Mexican Aid to Sandino, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa.    "Subject: Mexican Aid to Sandino. ¶ To: The A.A. of S., G-2, War Dept., Washington, D.C. ¶ 1. With reference to the attached report concerning Mexican aid to Sandino in Nicaragua, I would make the following statements, based on personal observation in Honduras and Nicaragua and numerous talks with the Marine Intelligence Officer in Managua: ¶ (a) I know of no instance with the possible exception of one where members of Sandino’s band who have been captured or killed have been identified as Mexicans. The one exception was a report sent to me by the marines, stating that one of Sandino’s sub-chiefs was supposed to be a Mexican. ¶ (b) The route stated by which Mexicans would enter Nicaragua is entirely feasible until you come to the last step - - - - - in other words from the coast to Sandino. A very few men might occasionally slip in this way but anything like a number of Mexicans going through would be spotted very promptly. ¶ (c) On arrival here a few days ago I had a long conversation with a young Nicaraguan who was Dr. Juan B. Sacasa’s private secretary during the revolution started by Sacasa. He informed me that Sacasa had been helped fairly freely by some source in Mexican aid so far as officers and men were concerned. ¶ (Signed) Fred T. Cruse. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Military Attache. ¶ 1 encl."

23.  May 28, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Costa Rica, p. 1.   "Sandino Situation. ¶ Since about April 30th there have been two distinct areas of bandit activity in Nicaragua - - one on the western border of Nueva Segovia, centering opposite San Marcos de Colon in Honduras, the other in northern Jinotega. ¶ The first has nothing to do with Sandino, the trouble being caused by small, unrelated bands of pure bandits, composed of Hondurans, Nicaraguans and Salvadoreans. A recent report from Gen. Juan B. Chaves, who commands the Honduran border guard opposite the disturbed area, states that Marines and airplanes are making a thorough and effective clean-up. There should be little more difficulty in this region. ¶ The second area is now the upper BOCAY and CUA River valleys. Sandino’s main force, under command of General Giron, is there. With Marine columns moving toward the area from the East, West, and South, most of these bandits are going to be forced over into Honduras. I explained the situation to General Pineda Honduran general as soon as I arrived here a week ago, and he immediately ordered the bulk of the border patrol, under General Mondragon, to move to CIFUENTES. This is a little place in Honduras, opposite the northeast tip of Nueva Segovia, and near the point marked on the map as LAS TROJAS. There is some evidence now that this point was a sort of information center for Sandino personally, so it is likely that another, and possibly the last one of his lines of communication has been out. ¶ Gen. Mondragon, apparently after conferring with Marines in the vicinity, marched yesterday with two weeks’ supplies, via Paredes and the WAQUE River, toward BOCAY. He will thus be in a good strategic position to pick up men forced over the border. ¶ As for Sandino himself, Froylan Turcios admitted day before yesterday to a reliable informant that for the first time one of his messengers had been captured, so that while he knew . . . "

24.  May 28, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 2.   " . . . Sandino was still in Nueva Segovia, he did not know where, and probably would not hear from him for some time. In the meantime, on the PATUCA River, about apposite where Marine forces are working on the COCO, are some lumber camps belonging to American named Capt. B.C. Brown. I advised him of the situation, and he immediately sent a man to get in touch with the Marine forces, help them get reliable guides and son on. He will also do the same with Mondragon’s force, so about everything has been done on this side that can be done. ¶ May 28, 1928 ¶ Fred T. Cruse ¶ Major, G.S."

25.  June 18, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 1.   "Sandino Situation. ¶ Entire Aspect Changed. ¶ In a previous report I stated that Sandino had not received a dollar of the sums collected for him, and until recently that was so. He was demanding contributions of as little as five dollars everywhere he went. ¶ The situation is radically changed now. During May Turcios received $11,000 from the Communist Party in Mexico, but early this month a messenger came in, and a few days later Turcios sent on $3000 by a man who calls himself Gustavo Morales or Machado. He is a Mexican and is the agent of “El Machete” a Communist paper in Mexico. He made the trip and when he returned brought a complete set of photographs of Sandino’s operations at La Luz. They were for Turcios to publish in his paper, but were turned over to me before Turcios saw them and I sent them on to the Marines. ¶ Since then money has been pouring in, and Turcios has sent several messengers on with it. I know in most cases who they are, and all details of the route- -as far as the Nicaraguan border, and have reported these details to the Marines and to Gen. Pineda, who is co-operating fully. ¶ Sandino’s New Plan. ¶ There is ample evidence that after losing his supplies near Murra, Sandino saw that armed resistance would soon accomplish nothing, and informed Turcios that only money and lots of it, would keep the situation alive. That money is now being sent from Mexico and is actually reaching Sandino. Reliable reports are that it will be used to organize a series of uprisings I the interior with the object of preventing the election being held in October. ¶ Turcios Has No Initiative. ¶ Turcios is purely an agent of the Communists in Mexico and particularly of the Sandino faction of it. He does not receive . . . "

26.  June 18, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 2.   " . . . money from different organizations. Apparently all funds collected for Sandino go to ¶ Carlos Leon ¶ P.O. Box # 619, ¶ or Avenida F. I. Madero ¶ Box 215, ¶ both in Mexico City. Messengers then bring it to Turcios. I usually know when these men reach Tegucigalpa, and when someone takes the money on , but there is so much activity that it is impossible to keep track of it all. ¶ Radical newspaper men are constantly being sent on to Sandino. They all come via Mexico and have letter from there. No other credentials will do. This activity also started suddenly about three weeks ago. ¶ General. ¶ It is clearly evident that all parties in Nicaragua are playing their own selfish politics, and leaving everything to the Marines. I am convinced from Froylan Turcios’ sudden activity and apparent lack of any fear of consequences, that he has been informed that the Nicaraguan Government will not ask for action against him. That being so it seems unreasonable to expect the Government of Honduras to do the dirty work that Nicaragua will not do. Also Mexico should be able to a great extent to stop the aid being given to Sandino. If it cannot be stopped there, there is no reason for expecting it to be stopped here. ¶ Source: - -Personal observation and confidential information. Report No.28. ¶ June 18, 1928. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Major, G.S."

27.  July 2, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa.     "SANDINO SITUATION. ¶ Sandino Afraid of Treachery. ¶ About a week ago Turcios received a letter from Sandino in which he begged earnestly that no more newspaper men or other outsiders be send to him, and that only the regular messengers be used in communicating with him. He gave as his reason that the Marines had an enormous price on his head and he was afraid of treachery. He added that what he needed was good fighting men, BRINGING THEIR GUNS AND PISTOLS WITH THEM. ¶ Anti-Imperialistic League. ¶ Attached are some examples of propaganda sent by this organization to Froylan Turcios, who is translating them for publication in “El Ariel.” The back page is particularly vicious. The contributions collected go to ¶ Carlos Leon, ¶ P.O. Box #619 ¶ or ¶ Avenida F.Y.Madero ¶ Box 215. Mexico City. ¶ Both of these are the address of “El Machete”, an openly Communist paper, of which a late issue, obtained from Turcios, is attached. The marked article publishes a letter from Turcios to the Editor, accounting for some $800 received from the paper for Sandino during March. ¶ Photographs. ¶ Enclosed are the photographs brought back by Machado from Nicaragua. This is the original set, the Marines having made copies and returned the originals to me. They are the only real pictures made so far of Sandino’s activities, and it is probable that no others will be made, so they are worthy of some care. ¶ Report No. 29 ¶ July 2, 1928. ¶ Sources:--Personal observation and confidential information. ¶ Fred T. Cruse."

28.  May 31, 1928.  G-2 Report on A Letter from Froylan Turcios to Sandino (English translation), Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa.    "TRANSLATION. ¶ A LETTER FROM FROYLAN TURCIOS. ¶ Revista Ariel, ¶ Tegucigalpa, ¶ May 31, 1928. ¶ Señor Dr. Carlos Leon, ¶ Mexico. ¶ My Distinguished Friend: ¶ On the night of the 3d of April last I handed over to Macedonio Diaz, a messenger sent directly to me by Sandino, and in whom he has the utmost confidence, $740.62 ($80.82 in medicines and other things you told me to get and $660 in cash) – from the thousand-dollar draft from MAFUENIC brought me by Lic. Gustavo Machado, and for which my receipt was published in No. 17 of “El Libertador”. ¶ In accordance with instructions from the General the other $259.38 is deposited in a bank here to be available for getting any other things he may send for. ¶ There were present when I handed over the $740.62 to Macedonio Diaz; Lic. Gustavo Machado, Agent of Mafuenic; Esteban Pavletich, (who signed the receipt for the mail from Sandino, as the messenger couldn’t write) – and the Nicaraguans Mairena Hernandez and Altamirano, companions of the other two in their trip to Sandino’s camp. The said Macedonio Diaz was the guide for the group. ¶ Since that date – the 3d of April – I have heard nothing further directly from Sandino, nor from our friend Gustavo Machado, nor any word of the mail and other things we sent, with the exception of two letters they wrote me before they arrived at his camp. ¶ By the time you receive this letter Machado will be with you, according to an item I saw in “El Libertador”. When you have talked with him, and read the letter I sent please let MAFUENIC know of the safe delivery of the above mentioned $740.62. ¶ Apparently Sandino is in Northern Nicaragua and on account of the great distances I have heard nothing from him for the last two months. ¶ Heartiest greetings, ¶ FROYLAN TURCIOS. ¶ Certified an accurate translation. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Major, G.S. ¶ Note:-- As stated in a previous report, a few days after this letter was written a messenger finally came in from Sandino and Turcios has been in fairly regular communication with him since. In addition to the sum mentioned Machado also carried $2000 from “El Machete”, making about $3000, as stated in my report. ¶ MAFUENIC is Manos Fuera de Nicaragua."

29.  ca. July 5, 1928.  Cable on Sandino's Lines of Communication, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, to the Adjutant General, War Department.   "CABLEGRAM. ¶ Received at the War Department ¶ July 5, 1928. ¶ 9:30A.M. ¶ From Tegucigalpa ¶ To The Adjutant General. ¶ For G-2. Line of communication from here to Sandino is wrecked. Fact that messengers were carrying money became known here and of 8 sent out during the month 7 disappeared or were killed before reaching Nicaraguan border. Latter most probably as only 3 were taking money and one of them got through and delivered $3,000. Sandino can still communicate with Turcios but Turcios will probably not be able get through any more messengers to him. ¶ Cruse. ¶ X INDICATES CABLE ROUTED FOR ACTION; [check-mark] FOR INFORMATION."

30.  July 9, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa.   "Sandino Situation. ¶ Messenger service to Turcios. ¶ I finally have most of the details of this line of communication. Turcios has never at any time known Sandino’s location. All he can do is wait for Sandino to send him a messenger and then send things to him by this man. ¶ Apparently everybody suddenly got wise to the fact that messengers were carrying money, and as stated in my radiogram of July 2nd of eight men who got through to Turcios, only one got back to Sandino. Two messengers have arrived so far this month. One came in at 2:00 P.M., July 4th and left at 1:00 A.M. the next morning. Attached is copy of letter he carried. Beside the letter he had only a package of quinine and copies of some of Turcios’ propaganda. ¶ Another messenger came in the afternoon of July 6th, and left that same night. Attached is the substance of a letter he brought. Both men left on foot and with the greatest caution, the last one taking the old trail direct to Yuscaran, which messengers have not used since March. ¶ It will be impossible from now on for Turcios to send anything more than a few letters by these messengers, and most of them will stand very little chance of getting back to Sandino. ¶ El Ariel. ¶ Attached is a copy of the latest issue of Turcios’ paper. It contains a list of the men who took the field with Sandino last year. ¶ Report No. 31 ¶ July 9, 1928. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Major, G.S."

31.  June 28, 1928.  G-2 Report on Substance of a Letter from Sandino to Froylan Turcios in Tegucigalpa, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa.     "El Chipoton, ¶ June 28th. ¶ I want to tell, you, so you will understand, about Sequeria. He was always a dangerous type and for some time I had him prisoner, for fear he would go over to the Marines. Finally, on June 16th I had him tried by a formal Military Court, for treason. He was found guilty and sentenced to be shot, but I took no action, as it seemed unwise to admit that we had ever had to shoot one of our men. ¶ However, the morning of June 27th he escaped, and as we were sure he had made up his mind to betray us, I sent out the alarm. As a result, that afternoon about three o’clock he ran into some of my mounted men about three miles from Jinotega and they killed him. ¶ Please tell his widow Augustina C. de Sequeira, ¶ Porton del Mercado, ¶ San Salvador. ¶ that he died of malaria and do not let anyone beside yourself know what really happened, because he has plenty of friends who might resent our saying he was a traitor. ¶ Note. This is the substance of a letter from Sandino to Turcios, brought by the messenger who arrived the afternoon of July 6th. Note that under date of June 28th Sandino describes something that happened at three o’clock the afternoon before, three miles from Jinotega. I cannot reconcile this with the fact that all messengers recently have carried considerable quantities of quinine, which Sandino should be able to get easily if near Jinotega."

32.  July 4, 1928.  G-2 Report on Letter from Froylan Turcios to Sandino (English translation), Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 1.   "Esteemed General and friend: ¶ Received your two letters dated June 24th and 25th. ¶ In reply I want to state that I personally delivered the instructions to Trujillo, who has already left for Salvador, where he will remain at least two weeks and then go on to Mexico. ¶ It is a pleasure to me to inform you that in Salvador, Guatemala and Mexico our campaign has reached the highest pitch, and there is more personal glory for yourself and your glorious army every day. Also, throughout the Latin world there is devotion, real love and admiration. ¶ Regarding the other, I have heard nothing, absolutely nothing, from Nicaragua, but I am certain things are moving, because the Doctor assures me they are, in a late letter I have already mentioned to you. I believe it wise for you to send directly to Posoltega and Leon to find our what has happened and why they have delayed so long in carrying out your instructions. However, I believe they have done as you directed in the letter you sent to me for transmission to Nicaragua, since my messenger is a trusted friend of the Doctor’s. ¶ Have received a letter from Managua, and if they have done little it is only because they have not been able to, for the reasons they have already communicated directly to you. ¶ I am giving the bearer, Emilio Melendez Rivera, 16 pesos silver to get some clothes and for the return trip. ¶ With the arrival of Trujillo and Machado the campaign in Mexico, Guatemala and Salvador will be intensified, as well as in Colombia, since our good friend D.R. Castillo leaves shortly for there. ¶ it will be better for you to deal directly with our friends in Nicaragua, as it is very difficult for me--I cannot trust [ . . . ]"

33.  July 4, 1928.  G-2 Report on Letter from Froylan Turcios to Sandino (English translation), Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 2.    ". . . the mail, as everybody tampers with it, and I have no reliable men by whom to send it, as the two I sent will not return, although they carried out the previous mission all right. ¶ As soon as I have word from our friends in Mexico I will get word to Nicaragua some way and I think it would be well for you to send me messengers frequently, as the word may arrive at any moment. I have already sent you on the socks, and the formula for the acid quinine, which is the best thing for malaria. ¶ Take care of yourself for the sake of the race and Nicaragua, and may the great and just God take care of you and the Army until you can complete your great work--the work of Liberty. ¶ Best regards. Always and enthusiastically yours, ¶ (Signed) Froylan Turcios. ¶ Notes. ¶ The Doctor referred to is Dr. Escolastico Lara. ¶ Trujillo is Esteban Trujillo, a Peruvian journalist, mentioned in a previous report. He spent several months with Sandino. ¶ D.R. Castillo is a Venezuelan newspaper man. He also spent several months with Sandino. ¶ The two men referred to as having been sent to Nicaragua are Domitilo Ledesma and Martín Guevara."

34.  July 12, 1928.  Memorandum for Colonel Howze.   "The following two radiograms received from the Commander Special Service Squadron located in Central American waters are quoted for your information: ¶ 0110 on July seventh (120) self confessed bandits turned themselves in at OCOTAL, (Nicaragua) and requested amnesty period they were unarmed--1230 ¶ 0110 my 0010- 1230 sixty-six (66) additional bandits surrendered at OCOTAL July ninth 1605"

35.  July 12, 1928.  G-2 Report on Unrest in Guanacaste, Costa Rica, in connection with Nicaraguan Political Situation, Alex A. Cohen, in absence of Military Attaché Costa Rica, p. 1.    "For the past several weeks there have been persistent, although unconfirmed rumors that a movement was on foot in the province of Guanacaste, Costa Rica, bordering on Nicaragua, among the Nicaraguan refugees there, tending toward an invasion of Nicaraguan territory. ¶ The Costa Rican Government, although not making any public announcement, has become alarmed at the situation. The government very well realizes that should such a movement actually be on foot it would be almost impracticable to prevent its crossing into Nicaragua. With an army of but 200 men and a small police force, the government of Costa Rica is physically incapacitated to patrol and watch a frontier most of which is entirely unpopulated. With the American intervention in Nicaragua being far from popular with the general public in Costa Rica, the government would experience differently in calling additional troops under arms for the purpose of preventing such a movement. ¶ This office has carefully investigated the alleged movement. It has been found that no organized movement, that is, the enlistment and equipment of bands is or has been going on in Costa Rica. Neither arms nor ammunition can be obtained in any quantity here. Although there is considerable sympathy with the Sandino movement, such sympathy is no more than a mental attitude and hardly will take the form of physical, material or financial assistance. In a conversation with General Volio, the radical leader in sympathy with the Sandino movement he is quoted to have stated in confidence that although an organization has been formed here for the purpose of collecting money for the Sandino cause, no money had ever been actually collected or forwarded to him. ¶ It will be remembered that several years ago, during a period of unrest in Honduras, the charge was frequently made that bands were permitted to organize within Guatemalan territory and received arms there. The undersigned personally conducted an investigation in the frontier territory and found no indication whatsoever of the charge. At the same time, even though the border was patrolled, there was nothing to prevent little groups of three or four men with arms to go back and forth as they please. An identical condition is found in Guanacaste. No force, no matter how large or well distributed could prevent small groups from crossing into Nicaraguan territory. Such isolated groups could probably purchase an old rifle and a few rounds of ammunition from individual farm owners, but as to the organizing and arming of any force, say from twenty men up, this possibility may be entirely discarded. ¶ In this connection it also should be remembered that wherever, in Central America, one finds three or four emigrados from one of the other republics, one has a potential group of revolutionists whose favorite topic whenever they get together in a bar room or other public place is the laying of plans for a revolution in their country. They may have been away from their mother country for years, yet they remain the same patriots: with plans for the redemption: of their country and chasing out the usurpers: of the government. In other words, one can always hear plotting- it’s the favorite indoor sport of this political emigrado element- they thrive on it. The actually outbreak, however, seldom occurs. . . . "

36.  July 13, 1928.  G-2 Report on Unrest in Guanacaste, Costa Rica, in connection with Nicaraguan Political Situation, Alex A. Cohen, in absence of Military Attaché Costa Rica, p. 2.   "G-2 report. ¶ 2,700 ¶ With a large number of Nicaraguan emigradoes in Costa Rican territory at the present, it is believed that such abstract planning, probably made in some public place, has given rise to the rumors quoted above and that no actual movement is either now on foot or contemplated for the near future. ¶ Source: Personal investigation. ¶ IN THE ABSENSE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE: ¶ Alex A. Cohen, ¶ in charge of office. ¶ From: M/A Costa Rica ¶ Report No. 290 ¶ July 13, 1928."

37.  July 19, 1928.  Secret Paraphrase of Message from Commander Special Service Squadron on East Coast of Nicaragua, p. 1.    "Referring your message 1317-1130: COMSPERONS accompanied by the Brigade Commander recently completed an inspection trip that included the east coast. It was a scrutinizing personal inspection and it was found (?) that as the result of good organization on the part of the Brigade Commander and consistent hard work of the Brigade of Marines, the military situation in Nicaragua has been steadily improving and is now in a very satisfactory condition even though Sandino is still at large. It was brought out on the trip that a great amount of prestige has been lost by Sandino due to raids on mines and having antagonized local population by robbery and harsh treatment of the natives. It is believed that Sandino’s prestige throughout Nicaragua has been decreasing steadily and that it is now much greater throughout Latin America than it actually is in Nicaragua. Outlaws for sometime have avoided contact with the Marines and our one (?) casualty was on May 18. During the rainy season the Marines have arisen vigorously against the outlaws. During the past six weeks a total of 538 self confessed bandits, many of whom were former followers of Sandino, have surrendered and availed themselves of the amnesty offered by the private proclamation of the President dated April 11. Even though only 22 of this number turned in arms, their surrender shows that they no longer are able to subsist themselves and they prefer the life afforded by the Marines to that offered by Sandino. It is believed that the present force of Marines and Bluejackets in Nicaragua will be sufficient to prevent Sandino and his followers from affecting appreciably the outcome of the Presidential elections. Navy and Marine personnel who can speak Spanish are being assigned to duty in connection with the election under the command of General McCoy. A school for Spanish with native Nicaraguan instructors is being conducted. Very satisfactory progress is being made with this school and Navy will furnish General McCoy with an excellent corps of assistants for election duty. Due to the fact that there is only one candidate (General Moncada, a Liberal) whose nomination has received the approval of the National Board of Elections. The political situation is still far from satisfactory. As we have before stated, the Conservative Party split into two factions both of which held nominating conventions at the same time in Managua (May 20). One faction is backed by President Diaz and nominated Cuadro Pasos, the other headed by Chamorro nominated Rappaciolli. After hearing the claims of both sides, the Board of Elections on July 7th decided that neither side has duly established its rights to be recognized as the representative of the historical Conservative Party to the exclusion of the other and that neither of them is entitled to designated a candidate to represent that party in the coming election. Not withstanding the offer of the National Board of Elections to give prompt responsive consideration to any practical plan advanced by the two factions to compose their differences, no agreement has yet been arrived at and present indications are that a compromise between the two factions seems unlikely and that an attempt will be made to have each candidate recognized by the Board through a petition. Since the Board has not made known or published the rules for the conduct of the election or the method by means of which candidates may be recognized on petition, this situation is rather awkward and complicated. While matters . . . "

38.  July 19, 1928.  Secret Paraphrase of Message from Commander Special Service Squadron on East Coast of Nicaragua, p. 2.  ". . . pertaining to the election and the supervision of the same come directly under General McCoy, who naturally acts in matters of this sort, he had consultation with the Squadron Commander. While the Squadron Commander deems it proper to the Department that the decision of the Electoral Board is undoubtedly correct technically, he believes that it would have been wiser and in keeping with our avowed and often repeated policy pertaining to the Nicaraguans and a fair election to have permitted both Conservative candidates to run. Obviously two sets of candidates could not run as the representatives of the Conservative Party, but this is a detail that could have easily been arranged. General McCoy’s desire to heal the breach in the Conservative Party and have them combine on one candidate, thus making the coming election a fair test of strength between the two parties is fully appreciated, but to disqualify the two Conservative candidates, each of whom has a considerable following, even if it may be said that such disqualification is only temporary, in the opinion of the Squadron Commander savors of sacrificing the board general principle of a free election to the considerations of administrative convenience. The Squadron Commander has concluded that rules for the conduct of the election will be printed soon and issued and will contain provisions for enabling candidates to be nominated by petition."

39.  July 18, 1928.  G-2 Report on Anti-Imperialist League, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 1.   "Attached are copies of the magazine published in Mexico by the above organizations subsidiary MAFUENIC (Manos Fuera de Nicaragua.) which means “Hands off in Nicaragua.” There is nothing of special importance in this issue except the announcement that in the next issue will begin Gustavo Machado’s story of his experiences with Sandino’s forces. ¶ Personnel. ¶ So far as I can ascertain here the men who are active heads of the Anti-Imperialist League are all connected with the Communist organization that publishes “El Machete. “The following may be of importance. ¶ Dr. Pedro J. Zepeda. ¶ He is a man of considerable standing and is apparently the lobbyist or liaison officer between these organizations and the Government. His great friend was General Alvares, recently dismissed as Chief of the Presidential Staff. ¶ Esteban Pavletich. ¶ So far as I can find out he is the direct connection between the Communist Party of Russia and the Anti-Imperialist League. He spent a couple of months with Sandino’s forces. ¶ Jacobo Hurwitz. ¶ Secretary of MAFUENIC. Nothing else known about him. ¶ Carlos Leon. ¶ Seems to be connected with “El Machete,” “El Libertador” and all the various Communist and anti-American organizations in Mexico. Turcios gets his instructions and make his reports to him. ¶ FUNDS. ¶ There is no way for me to tell how much money has been received from all over the world for Sandino, MAFUENIC, the Anti-Imperialist League and connected organizations, but of it all I am convinced that Sandino has received less than twenty thousand dollars since he first . . . "

40.  July 18, 1928.  G-2 Report on Anti-Imperialist League, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 2.   ". . . took the field, and the greater part of this was in Medical supplies. ¶ I believe the Mexican Government should be able to break up these organizations on the ground that they are pure swindling schemes. All the men concerned are making plenty of money for themselves and using Sandino’s name simply as bait to get funds. ¶ General. ¶ The Anti-Imperialist League so far in Central America is the same old group of Radical and grafting newspaper men like Turcios and Zuñiga Huete. They spread propaganda constantly, collect money which they keep themselves, and really do not do one-tenth the damage that their fellow-members in the United States do."

41.  July 18, 1928.  G-2 Report on Line of Communication from Sandino to Turcios, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa.   "Route. ¶ Tegucigalpa to Talanga--50 miles--by automobile. ¶ Talanga to Jacaleapa, Danlí or Escuapa--two days on horseback. ¶ From each of these points there were several trails across the border. ¶ System. ¶ There is never any previous warning of the arrival of a messenger from Sandino. They simply show up at Turcios’ office or other rendezvous. ¶ Returning, they were picked up outside of town after dark by an automobile. Turcios paid the following men for being available to carry messengers to Talanga: ¶ Benditti--Proprietor Hotel Roma. ¶ Lala Moncada---A well-known sport. ¶ Dr. José Durón---Surgeon at General Hospital ¶ There were at least two others, all men who could leave in a car at any house without attracting comment. ¶ Points where horses were available at any hour without previous notice. ¶ Cantarranas--Rafael Salazar. ¶ Jacaleapa----Gen. Teofilo Cárcamo. ¶ Danlí--------Manuel Guillen. ¶ Cifuentes----Leopoldo Gamero. ¶ As stated in radiogram of July 2nd this system led to the death of at least seven messengers and had to be abandoned. Messengers now leave on foot and there is no way to ascertain their route."

42.  ca. July 20, 1928.  Confidential Report on Information received from General Manager of the United Fruit Company, from the Commander Special Service Squadron.    "0020 The following received from Commanding Officer, U.S.S. CLEVELAND, which is not at Puerto Cortes, Honduras: “The General Manager of the United Fruit Company imparted the following information: ‘The Minister of War of Honduras arrived at (four letter word), X Believed to be TELA, today, Wednesday, and states that the President of Honduras informed him that Sandino crossed the border into Honduras on Tuesday, 17th, Minister of War states that he is sending approximately 200 troops from La Ceiba and Trujillo, Honduras to intercept Sandino. ‘ “1115 ¶ Received at 2228 20 July, 1928. ¶ Memorandum in for Colonel Howze. Up to 15 July, 1928- 217 bandits had surrendered. Headquarters Marine Corps is of the opinion that Sandino with a following of 100 to 150 men, is the only group now operating in the field."

43.  July 20, 1928.  G-2 Report on Trip of Sandino Follower to Mexico, Alex A. Cohen, in absence of Military Attaché, Costa Rica, p. 1.   "Gustavo Machado, claiming to be delegate to Sandino of the “Central Committee of a United Front- Hands off Nicaragua” recently passed through Salvador and Guatemala on his way to Mexico. He claimed as the purpose of his trip the necessity of rendering a full report to the headquarters of the organization in Mexico City regarding what is taking place in Nicaragua. ¶ Both in Salvador and Guatemala Machado made extensive anti-American statements in the press. A translation of one of these statements follows. As most likely the object of Machado’s trip to Mexico is to obtain aid for Sandino, this office has cabled the Military Attache in Mexico City to inform this office as to Machado’s movements. ¶ TRANSLATION OF ARTICLE BY MACHADO IN “DIARIO LATINO” OF SAN SALVADOR. ¶ “THE FEROCIOUS WAR OF AGGRESSION.” ¶ The Marine Corps of the United States, formed by the social scum of that country does not go to any trouble in carrying out the mission conferred upon it by the Department of State; the disarmament and capture of General Sandino and preparation for the coming presidential elections. The marines do not do anything but assassinate in a cold blooded, cowardly and systematic manner the defenseless inhabitants; set fire to their abodes and crops; kill their cattle; rob their fruit and, finally, flee terrorized before the Sandino forces. It is Sandino who persecutes the invaders and when some fight takes place it is because Sandino catches them by surprise. They keep their good mounts at the discreet distance from the Nicaraguan patriots. This ferocious war, this war without quarter against the defenseless population of a country has no antecedent in history. The cruelest wars of imperialistic nations always has as their primordial end, as their principal object, the destruction of the army of the adversary. In Nicaragua the entire population of the regions where the Liberating Army passes has been declared “beyond the law” (FUERA DE LA LEY). During holy week and the week thereafter more than seventy hamlets in the department of Nueva Segovia were set fire to. Why? Because General Sandino had abandoned the Segovias by his expedition to the Atlantic Coast, which the public already knows about. The proof? I have enormous lists of the inhabitants assassinated and the names of the places. The Honduran frontier furnishes an eloquent proof of the “civilizating” procedure of the United States bankers. In Danli and Paraíso (Honduras) hundreds of women and children, many of them wounded by explosive bullets are dying from hunger. Their abodes were burned and their husbands either killed by machine gun fire or else are in the ranks of the liberating army. General R. Mondragon, commander of the Honduran garrison which guards the frontier is an assassin in the pay of the Yankees; the .45 pistol which he uses is a present from the commanding officer of the marine detachment at Jalapa, Nicaragua. This wretch captures and assassinates those who endeavor to cross the frontier to join the Sandino forces and abuse the poor fugitive families which seek hospitality in the sister republic. The ladies of Tegucigalpa, moved by so much suffering have organized assistance for these Nicaraguan families. ¶ THE ANTI IMPERIALIST LATIN AMERICAN ARMY. . . ."

44.  July 20, 1928.  G-2 Report on Trip of Sandino Follower to Mexico, Alex A. Cohen, in absence of Military Attaché, Costa Rica, p. 2.   ". . . In the army of the defender of the national sovereignty of Nicaragua there does not exist the least vestige of frontier grudges. The majority of the Latin American nations are represented. The ideal of unification and fraternity of our people is realized and practiced in the Nicaraguan camps. The Sandino boys know definitely that the Nicaraguan problem can not be solved in an isolated manner, that Nicaragua defends the sovereignty of all Latin American countries violated or threatened by American capitalism. The situation of the anti imperialist struggle is perfectly known and discussed there. General Sandino and his army are not a group of Quijotes; optimism, unbreakable faith in triumph is the product of the experience of more than a year of strife during which the group of thirty which refused the ratification of the treasonable Stimson-Moncada pact has converted itself in an army well equipped with all classes of arms, good mounts and riding equipment and sufficient ammunition to sustain the struggle till the final triumph. All the equipment, absolutely everything has been captured from the invading troops. The Sandino uniform is the same as that of the marines, the only difference being the read and black ornament of the collar and the hat. And even this difference does not exist because the “machos” (and insulting name for foreigners) when they try to surprise some hamlet use the Sandino insignia so they will not be discovered from a distance. The most powerful imperialistic nation in the world has been beaten and humiliated in more than 25 combats, arms and ammunitions, provisions, medical kits, photographic apparatus and various flags having been captured from them. The Stars and Stripes have been abandoned various times on the battlefield. And the marines seat to the battlefield are still being fooled by being told in Managua that “they are to go and disarm a badly armed groups of bandits”. We are fighting in Nicaragua to triumph and it has been shown that, militarily speaking, we are invincible before the invading forces. ¶ It is the duty of the laborers of Latin America, in whatever country they may be, to comply with the urgent duty of contributing their contingent in confronting the common enemy. One can be a Sandino soldier outside of Nicaragua and can be so even more useful and more efficient than with a rifle in the Segovias. In these moments of confusion and danger for Central America there are three men in Nicaragua who are a symbol and who mark the path of duty to the inhabitants of Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras. These three fighters are Generals Manuel Maria Giron Ruano, Guatemalan; Simon Montoya, Honduran and Colonel Jose Leon Diaz, Salvadorian, chiefs of the first and second companies and the Somoto Zone. ¶ The immediate and principal problem of these three countries is not found on the banks of the Motagua nor in the exaltation of nationalism against the Central American Union; these are maneuvers of imperialistic interests. The real problem, vital to Central America, is in Nicaragua. We all should endeavor to see that the popular and genuine enthusiasm which is manifested in the three countries materializes in effective help. The army defending the sovereignty of Nicaragua does not require anything. The marines have everything which they need. But the army had to relieve the defenseless victims, has to assist the families interned in the mountains, has to nurse those wounded by machine guns and airplane bombs and all should contribute their aim to prevent that the defenseless population, victim of the systematic ferocity of the marine corps of the United States, perish. ¶ The urgency of my return to Mexico, proceeding from the headquarters of the Liberating Army of Nicaragua prevents me from complying with the express recommendation of General A.O. Sandino to visit the important newspapers of this city. . . . "

45.  July 20, 1928.  G-2 Report on Trip of Sandino Follower to Mexico, Alex A. Cohen, in absence of Military Attaché, Costa Rica, p. 3.   ". . . General Sandino knows of the energetic and valiant manner with which the Salvadorian press has defended the sovereignty of Lain America, militarily concreted in the bloody strife against the Yankee filibusters in Nicaragua. I desire therefore, in the name of General A. C. Sandino and in the name of his illustrious general representative in Latin America, present to the Salvadorian people through the press of the capital, fraternal greeting and an expression of absolutely faith in triumph. ¶ At the same time I wish to state along general lines the impression which I bring from Nicaragua and clear up some important points. The complete and detailed report which I will present in Mexico to the Central Committee of United Front HANDS OFF NICARAGUA, will be sent in the near future to the entire press of the Continent. ¶ GUSTAVO MACHADO” ¶ COMMENT BY OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE: ¶ No thing new or startling is revealed by this report. It is cloaked by the same spirit of bravado which has characterized all of Sandino’s acts. ¶ One important point, however, is contained in the article, and that is a virtual admission that the Honduras frontier is well guarded by the Honduran authorities."

46.  July 23, 1928.  G-2 Report Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 1.   "On the morning of the 18th a cable was received from Managua to the effect that Sandino was moving down the PATUCA River toward CARATASCA LAGOON with the object of receiving a shipment of arms. AS we had previously had word from Guatemala that a schooner was trying to bring some from Progreso, Mexico to that point, I went to GEN. Pineda and the Government organized a force of 200 men from CEIBA and TRUJILLO and started them off with two launches for the Lagoon. I also informed Capt. Brown, who immediately started off from Castilla on his own initiative to watch the PATUCA River. ¶ The next morning word came from Managua that Sandino with 300 men was eight miles up the POTECA River from the COCO River, in Honduras. I had a talk that afternoon with Gen. Pineda and he went over immediately to see the President. The next morning-(the 20th)- Gen. Pineda sent for me and told me the Government was very anxious to know if the report about the POTECA River were true. I suggested the planes, and this was apparently what they wanted, because he approved at once and told me the President had authorized him to grant permission for the Marine planes to scout the area as far as the PATUCA River if necessary. He also said that if the force were really there the Government-(SECRET)- would declare martial law and secretly give the Marines permission to cross the frontier and operate against it with both planes and ground troops.-( End of SECRET?) ¶ I cabled immediately the permission for the planes to scout the area and the next morning Dr. Dana H. Munro arrived by plane for the purpose of securing permission for the Marines to attack. This having already been given, The Minister and Dr. Munro simply verified it by a call on the President, and the permission was cabled to Managua at 4:00 P.M. on the 21st. ¶ About the same hour a cable came from Managua that Major Rowell had scouted the area that morning, had found a regular little . . .

47.  July 23, 1928.  G-2 Report Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 2.  ". . . cantonment established in the buildings of a former lumber camp, that he had been fired on by anti-aircraft guns-always a sign of the presence of Sandino--that he had not been hit and had returned without apparently observing anything unusual. ¶ So far as we know now the Marines will attack to-morrow or Wednesday, using all the Corsair planes they have. No ground troops will be employed."

48.  July 19, 1928.  Strictly Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Honduras on the North Coast, Vice Consul Winfield Scott, Tegucigalpa.   "STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL ¶ POLITICAL CONDITIONS ¶ Political conditions throughout the district continued calm throughout the three month period under consideration, although the report received from the American Minister, Tegicigalpa, to the effect that Sandino intended to enter the Mosquitia Territory, created some concern to the officials of the local American Fruit Company, and to the representatives of the Honduran Timber Corporation, engaged in lumbering activities in the region through which Sandino would logically pass. ¶ In cooperation with Captain Byron C. Brown, who departed Puerto Castilla for the scene of Sandino’s alleged entry into the country on July 18, with the view of ascertaining personally or through his reliable agents, whether flight from Nicaragua or pillage in this district was contemplated, the Vice Consulate is endeavoring to keep with the situation, and to cooperate fully with major Cruse at Tegucigalpa."

49.  July 24, 1928.  G-2 Report Political Leaders: Toribio Tijerino, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa.     "3700.b.--POLITICAL LEADERS. ¶ TORIBIO TIJERINO arrived here from Salvador at 11:30 P.M. the night of the 22nd. He is associating here with Froylan Turcios, Pablo Leal and a Venezuelan named H.K. Farrer The latter came to my notice several weeks ago when he went to the bank carrying ten 1000-dollar bills. The banks were suspicious and refused either to change one of them or to accept them for deposit. Farrer then went to the North Coast and I heard no more of him until he showed up here a few days ago. ¶ Tijerino informed the Minister yesterday that he would be here for a few days and would then leave from Puerto Cortes for either New Orleans or New York. ¶ Report No.36. ¶ July 24, 1928. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Major, G.S."

50.  September 10, 1928.  G-2 Report on Political Leaders: H. K. Farrer, oil-operator from Venezuela, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa.    "Honduras. ¶ 3700--b. Political Leaders. ¶ In my report No.36 I mentioned a man named H.KFarrer, who appeared here with ten thousand-dollar bills. Mr. Farrer turns out to be entirely all right. He is an oil-operator from Venezuela and the money had been intrusted to him by a Mr. Todd, a well-known engineer here in Honduras. ¶ Mr. Farrer says he is looking for oil here in Honduras. This is camouflage for some other activity. ¶ Report No.51. ¶ Tegucigalpa--Honduras--Sept. 10, 1928 ¶ Source-Mr. J.H. Wilson. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, Major, G.S."