Telpaneca (First)
 
At about 2:00 a.m., on October 6, 1929, Second Lieutenant Lewis H. Trogler, G.N. (Sergeant, USMC), Commanding Officer of the Guardia Nacional garrison at Telpaneca, Nueva Segovia, was shot to death in the town of Telpaneca by mutinous members of his command. The mutiny had been carefully planned and involved the entire garrison, although some were unwilling participants.
 
A written agreement had been drawn up by First Sergeant Fernando Larios, hijo, as leader, and five others, and signed by them on October 3rd, providing that Lieutenant Trogler, who was the only officer serving in Telpaneca, was to be killed, and, as circumstances permitted, all other North American officers, as a sign of their opposition to the "American occupation" of Nicaraguan territory. All other members of the garrison of twenty-three enlisted, signed the document, either voluntarily, or through fear for their personal safety if they refused. In each case a seal was placed opposite the signature, made from the blood of the respective individual, obtained by cutting and squeezing his thumb. Some of these signers had not read the document and had no knowledge as to its contents.
 
It appears that First Sergeant Larios, and one of the other conspirators who was a corporal, had been recommended for reduction by Lieutenant Trogler, and that both knew of this. Larios was undoubtedly the prime mover, and there is a strong probability that he was actuated also by other personal and political motives. He had been a Conservative prior to joining the Guardia, and his father Fernando Larios, padre, a leader of the Conservative element, had been exiled only shortly theretofore by the Liberal Government. His antipathy for North Americans had not been revealed previously, but became apparent by his actions during the signing of the pact of blood and during the subsequent mutiny. It was related by witnesses that he gleefully viewed the body of Lieutenant Trogler, and that he refused permission to civilians who desired to hold a wake over it. Several letters were found in the possession of Larios which boldly stated his hatred of foreigners.
 
There was dissatisfaction among some of the enlisted members of the command over a dance given by Lieutenant Trogler for the civilian population of Telpaneca on the night of October 5th. No Guardia was invited, and it has been said that Lieutenant Trogler had stated that the guardias were of a lower social status than his intended guests, and that on this account he had not invited them to participate. Some were disgruntled because they had been sent by Lieutenant Trogler to carry chairs from other houses to the scene of the party, and they believed that they should not have been so employed: that in so doing they were being utilized in the capacity of servants. A concerted effort was made by various guardias to induce the civilians not to attend the fiesta, intimating that some untoward event might occur there.
 
It was planned by the mutineers to simulate a bandit attack and to kill Lieutenant Trogler as he was returning to his quarters from the fiesta. To make it appear true in case of an investigation, men were stationed at various points throughout the town, with orders to open fire when they heard firing going on. That afternoon a civilian agent of First Sergeant Larios reported to Lieutenant Trogler, in accordance with Lario's instructions that a bandit attack on the town would take place that night. It does not appear that Lieutenant Trogler took any extraordinary precautions that night as to the security of the town.
 
Because of the fact that he returned from the dance about 1:30 a.m., in company with a prominent civilian, Lieutenant Trogler was not fired upon at that time. However, soon after reaching his quarters the simulated attack commenced, and weapons were trained and fired upon the doorway of the officers' quarters, through which Lieutenant Trogler emerged and safely ran across the street to the barracks. He then started in the direction of the church plaza where some of the defensive works were located, doubtless with the intention of directing the defense, when he was struck and killed.
 
Throughout the balance of the night sporadic firing took place, but it has been definitely established that no bandits attacked Telpaneca that night, and that the simulation of an attack was planned and carried out as a smoke-screen to hide the real purpose of the mutineers, the killing of Lieutenant Trogler. Having accomplished this object, no attempts were made to loot or commit other violence, and no one of the command deserted.
 
Proof of the complicity of First Sergeant Larios in the plot to mutiny was lacking at the time, but a strong suspicion rested upon him, and he was soon transferred to Ocotal, the Area Headquarters station. He was relieved by Sergeant Adrian Salinas, but his influence was to be felt within a short time in a second mutiny at Telpaneca. He was later tried before a general court-martial and convicted, when the investigation of the Second Telpaneca mutiny brought to light the facts as to the first.

Telpaneca (Second)

 

Following the death of Lieutenant Trogler, Second Lieutenant Charles J. Levonski, G.N. (Sergeant, USMC), was assigned to duty as Commanding Officer, Guardia Nacional, at Telpaneca, and assumed command. He was a capable, energetic and likeable officer, and the morale of the command seemed to improve. For two weeks he observed nothing which indicated to him that the men would not remain loyal.
 
Rumors were received from Ocotal by the men to the effect that First Sergeant Larios had been executed as a punishment for his part in the mutiny of October 6th. This was untrue but was believed by some of them. A newspaper published in Managua, La Prensa, at this time carried an article on the subject of the infliction of the death penalty upon members of the Guardia Nacional guilty of certain acts, and was read and discussed in Telpaneca. It should be remembered that practically the entire command at this station remained unchanged, and that they had just recently participated in a mutiny following the signing of the Larios Pact of Blood, and had treacherously murdered their Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Trogler. Unrest and a feeling of apprehension lest they be discovered and awarded the death penalty, filled the minds of the men.
 
A fatal error was made in not relieving at least fifty percent of the command and replacing them with other men of known integrity, immediately after the death of Lieutenant Trogler, as a matter of precaution if for no other reason, and especially as, even at that time, the circumstances surrounding the affair, with its "bandit attack" which everyone doubted, and other inconsistencies that pointed to mutiny, were sufficiently evident to warrant such action, particularly when one considers the isolated location of Telpaneca in the mountains, the lack of communications and the impossibility of bringing prompt relief in case of necessity. It was not until October 20th that a patrol under the command of Second Lieutenant James C. Rimes (Sergeant, USMC) arrived at Telpaneca via Palacaguina with ten replacements for the station. The patrol was composed of seventeen enlisted, all but two of whom were recruits.
 
The rumors of the execution of First Sergeant Larios and discussion of the newspaper article on the death penalty, brought to the minds of enlisted men and civilians in Telpaneca the thought, which soon became a thoroughly believed conviction, that the ten men ordered replaced and transferred were going to Ocotal to be executed for their part in the recent mutiny.
 
It was established later that one of the members of Lieutenant Rimes' patrol carried a letter from First Sergeant Larios in Ocotal to Sergeant Salinas, who had relieved him as Acting First Sergeant at Telpaneca, and who had previously served with him and was a good friend of his. This letter was not recovered, but it is known that Salinas announced to various of his men, following the second Telpaneca mutiny, that Larios would join the column of mutineers on the trail near Santo Domingo, between Telpaneca and San Juan de Telpaneca, and that Salinas and his group waited for him at this point until it became evident to them that he was not going to arrive.
 
It is highly probable that Larios' letter also contained plans, or suggestions, for another mutiny of the garrison at Telpaneca, and it may have been he who suggested the idea of the intended execution of the ten men being transferred, in order to induce Salinas and the others to carry out his plans for this mutiny, a continuation of his pact of blood scheme to kill North American officers and to demonstrate opposition to the presence of these officers in Nicaragua.
 
At any rate Sergeant Salinas, who theretofore had been a mild mannered company clerk, seemingly trustworthy and incapable of becoming the leader of a revolt (he had been Captain Burwell's sole body-guard on numerous pay trips earlier that year to the outlying stations of the Department of Managua and Carazo), held a meeting of various members of the command about 12:30 a.m., October 21st, and formulated plans for a mutiny. Salinas named himself as a colonel.
 
At 6:50 a.m., that same morning while Lieutenants Levonski and Rimes were about to have breakfast, they were surprised by six armed guardias, three having entered the house via the front door and three from the rear. Lieutenant Rimes was not armed; Lieutenant Levonski was disarmed, and both were taken prisoner, marched to the Guardia brig and confined. Expostulations on the part of the officers were silenced with threats of immediate death if they continued talking.
 
Lieutenant Rimes had intended clearing for Ocotal with his patrol at 7:30 a.m., had given the necessary orders for the movement, and,, before going to breakfast, had noted that the men were getting themselves and the animals ready. These men knew nothing about the plans of the mutineers, and were as much surprised at the events which transpired as the two officers. Some attempted to leave town, but were apprehended, and all were forced, through fear of death, to stand watches and to accompany the group when they cleared town later that day.
 
The mutineers at once placed sentinels over all trails leading out of town, also machine guns, destroyed the radio set and threw it into the river, and ordered the inhabitants to close their doors and not to leave their homes. Groups then looted the principal stores and private residences for money and merchandise, and secured animals upon which to carry their stolen goods. Guardia Nacional funds, and the cash, clothing and jewelry of the officers was taken, and all Guardia property, including machine guns, automatic weapons, grenades, ammunition, etc., was gathered together to be taken along. The services of various male civilians were impressed for the loading of the pack animals, and later for help in the crossing of the Rio Coco just below town, in boats.
 
About noon two Marine Corps planes passed over Telpaneca and made a drop of official and personal correspondence. The aviation panels at the station had been permanently laid out, and one of the mutineers, dressed in Lieutenant Rimes' uniform, recovered the drop, so that there was nothing apparent to the pilots that anything irregular was going on.
 
During the entire day the two officers remained in confinement, without food and hourly expecting to be taken out and shot. A record of events and some of their thoughts, written by them, was later found on the cell wall.
 
About 5:00 p.m., the officers were removed from confinement, and taken, with hands tied and lead-rope around their necks, to the river. They were accompanied by all members of the mutinous group, including both the regular garrison and Lieutenant Rimes' patrol, the cargo and animals. At this time they begged the mutineers to shoot them at once, for they feared torture. The crossing of the river was completed at about 7:00 p.m., and many bulky articles were left behind at this point, due either to haste and lack of direction or to insufficient animal transportation. However, all machine guns, automatic weapons and ammunition were taken.
 
The column continued the march all night, and at daybreak arrived at the Polanco ranch near Santo Domingo Valley. A number of the men who did not wish to accompany the mutineers were able to escape during the night, and did so. The following day others deserted the column as the opportunity presented itself. Lieutenants Levonski and Rimes were told by Salinas that they were going to be killed. Salinas, however, was courteous at all times, stood at attention when addressing them, and shared his food and drink with them.
 
One of the men agreed to assist the officers to escape, but lost heart and disappeared from the column alone. Later, about 8:00 p.m., Levonski and Rimes found a favorable moment when an accident to a cargo caused a halt and a separation of the force into two groups. They escaped and rushed precipitously up a side trail and into the brush, becoming separated almost immediately. Levonski sprained his ankle, but both encountered some of the loyal men, and with them returned to Telpaneca, Rimes arriving first.
 
Practically all of the personnel papers of Lieutenant Rimes' patrol, and a few of the original Telpaneca garrison, reported in either Telpaneca or at Palacaguina. The balance continued on and made their way to Honduras, where the arms and ammunition were confiscated, and the men jailed temporarily. They were not returned to Nicaragua.