1.  October 7, 1931.  Naval Intelligence Report on Sandino, no author indicated.     "104-400 ¶ NICARAGUA ¶ SANDINO ¶ Recurrent and believed to be reliable reports have come in that Sandino was very sick and desirous of leaving Nicaragua to regain his health in some other place unknown. ¶ José de Paredes, ex-publicity man and of Sandino’s staff in company with Socrates Sandino came from Mexico and proceeded via Tegucigalpa into the wilds of the disputed territory between Honduras and Nicaragua with the avowed purpose of conferring with Sandino on matters unknown. ¶ Since then, recurrent rumors have had it that José de Paredes was killed at Sandino’s orders and that Sandino himself was a virtual prisoner of his Jefes who refused to let him leave the country, realizing they would lose the prestige of his name if he did so. ¶ The Nicaraguan bandit ammunition supply and the method of procurement has been reported on and remains unchanged. In order to buy ammunition in Honduras and at the Islands and capes along the Belize coast, all that is necessary is money. A possible and very probable source of bandit money lies in cattle smuggling. A beef can be bought in northern Segovia at from $4 to $8. It can be stolen for nothing. Beef on the hoof brings as high as $30 to $40 in Salvador and the time necessary to rustle a bunch of cattle from one country to another means nothing in the lives of the bandits. Again, it must be remembered that bandit Jefes are constantly levying tribute on the Nicaraguan merchants and that although many such levys [levies] are reported to the Guardia Nacional, many also, undoubtedly are not, but are fully paid instead. Circumstancial [Circumstantial] proof of this lies in the systemic raiding of certain fincas and haciendas and the absolute immunity to raids very evidently enjoyed by others. ¶ Whether the bandits have received any SOVIET or communist money lately is not known. That they at one time did is positive. It must be remembered that bandit Jefes address communications to one another as, and sign themselves as “brother”, “comrade” or both. ¶ Brewer’s lagoon on the Honduran North Coast and the Gulf of Fonseca on the South Coast still remain favority [favorite?] landing points for bandit ammunition. ¶ One, Mario Ribas, of Spanish origin, resident of Tegucigalpa, Associated and United Press correspondent, is a message center for Sandino. At one time Ribas was in sympathy with Sandino’s cause and even helped some of the bandits passing through Tegucigalpa. Lately he has come to realize the damage banditry is doing to Nicaragua and has offered his aid to ehlp [help] rid Nicaragua of its scourge. Ribas is in communication with one José Idiaquez who lives in Danli, is slightly demented, very pro-Sandino and a bandit message center. Idiaquez has two brothers who are very strong politically and the three own large amounts of property. Due to this, José Idiaquez enjoys a practical immunity and suggestions to the Honduran government to have him cease his pro-Sandino activities have proven fruitless. However, as the bandit sympathizers do not know that they have lost Mario Ribas’ support, Idiaquez has remained in communication with Ribas and Ribas has turned in the information so acquired."

2.  September-October 1931.  G-2 Newspaper article translations:  Sept 29: El Cronista, Mexico City.   Oct 7 & 9: El Sol, Mexico City.     "29 September ¶ “El Cronista” published article that Sandino ordered his brother Socrates Sandino bound and held prisoner and his Secretary, José Paredes, executed by firing squad, because they came to him to urge him to desist. He also is reported to have abandoned his trip to Salvador for medical treatment due to the death of Miguel Angel Ortez whom he considered his right hand man. Three students of Argentina who came to the Segovias to join the ranks of Sandino were found dead on the banks of the Tuma river. ¶ COPY TO: Comsperon. ¶ Oct. 7/31 ¶ “El Sol”--article stating that Sandino has ordered the execution of his Sergeant Major, Ventura Rodriguez, and his brother, who were accused of treason in that they led Government troops to combat in which General Miguel Angel Ortez was killed; which sentence was executed even before positive proof was acquired. He has also promoted Juan Pablo Umanzor to Brigadier General and placed him in command of the column led by Ortez prior to his death. ¶ 9 October, 1931. ¶ Article published in “El Sol” stating they were shown a letter from Sandino’s Secretary, Captain José de Paredes (Mexican) to the effect that neither he nor Sandino’s brother, Socrates, had suffered any mistreatment, and the report probably originated from the fact that he sat on a court martial which condemned a Sandinista and his two sons for the treason of leading a guardia column commanded by Yankee Officers to the combat in which Captain Agapito Altamirano was killed."

3.  September 15, 1931.  G-2 Report on Mexican Press on Nicaragua, Capt. Robert E. Cummings, Acting Military Attaché, Mexico City.     "G-2 Report ¶ 3850: ¶ MEXICO ¶ POLITICAL ¶ SUBJECT: Foreign Relations: ¶ Mexican Press on Nicaragua. ¶ 1. Following is translation of an article which appeared in “Excelsior” of September 12, 1931: ¶ “Sandino enjoys good health and will continue the struggle. ¶ “The health of General Sandino is excellent and there is no reason to believe the absurd rumors which a certain Central-American paper has been publishing to the effect that he will leave Nicaragua to seek rest or recovery. ¶ “This, at least, is the report given out by Dr. Pedro José Zepeda, General Representative of the ‘Ejercito Libertador de Nicaragua’, when interviewed yesterday. ¶ “It had been reported that General Sandino was suffering from tuberculosis and that his health was seriously affected, - which Dr. Zepeda assures us is untrue. ¶ “Not only from my personal relations with General Sandino, but on account of my profession, I have had occasion to keep informed regarding his health. I remember that when he visited this capital, even in his very short stay, he added ten kilograms to his weight, which is technical and indisputable proof that he not only is not ill, but enjoys good health. ¶ “Furthermore, General Sandino will never leave Nicaragua, from motives of health, even should he contract a serious malady; and under no pretext would he go to the United States, soliciting safe-conduct, in order to abandon the struggle. ¶ “The rumor of his illness is absurd, and of course originated with enemies of the cause.” ¶ Robert E. Cummings, ¶ Captain, Infantry, DOL ¶ Acting Military Attaché. ¶ Source: Press. ¶ C/p ¶ From: M.A.Mexico. ¶ Report No.3537. ¶ Date: Sept. 15, 1931."

4.  September 2, 1931.  G-2 Report on Bandit Activities, Lt. Col. Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, San José.     "NICARAGUA ¶ POPULATION AND SOCIAL ¶ No. 2700 – Public Order and Safety. ¶ Bandit Activities. ¶ Late in August Captain Frisbie, in command of a patrol from Quilali, had a fight with a bandit force of about 70 men, northeast of Chamaste, a place near Quilali. The bandits had both rifles and machine guns, but were surprised in their camp by the patrol and after about twenty minutes those that were not killed surrendered. Agapito Altamirano, a well known bandit chief, was killed in the fight. A large quantity of arms was captured but the most important thing was that prisoners stated that General Gregorio Colindres was present at the fight. Colindres was one of the first men to join Sandino, but I have heard no mention of him, that is in the field, since Sandino left Nicaragua in June of 1929. In the picture of Sandino that I forwarded from Honduras in 1928, General Colindres is the man on Sandino’s left. ¶ Report No. 1385 ¶ San José--Sept. 2, 1931 ¶ Source – Newspapers and personal knowledge. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Lieut. Col., F.A. ¶ M.A."

5.  August 25, 1931.  G-2 Translation of "Sandino Continues Victorious Against the Yankees," La Prensa, 25 Aug 1931, Capt. Robert E. Cummings, Acting Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 1.     "G-2 Report ¶ 3850: ¶ MEXICO ¶ POLITICAL ¶ SUBJECT: Foreign Relations: ¶ Mexican Press on Nicaragua. ¶ 1. Forwarded herewith is translation of an article appearing in “La Prensa” of this date, August 25, 1931, entitled “Sandino continues victorious against the Yankees”, etc., and reporting that Sandino’s troops are in control of eight of the thirteen Departments of the Republic of Nicaragua. ¶ Robert E. Cummings, ¶ Captain, Infantry, DOL ¶ Acting Military Attaché. ¶ Source: As stated. ¶ C/p ¶ From: M.A.Mexico. ¶ Report No. 3506. ¶ Date: Aug. 25, 1931."

6.  August 25, 1931.  G-2 Translation of "Sandino Continues Victorious Against the Yankees," La Prensa, 25 Aug 1931, Capt. Robert E. Cummings, Acting Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 2.     "Translation. ¶ Article published in “La Prensa” of Aug. 25, 1931. ¶ SANDINO CONTINUES VICTORIOUS AGAINST THE YANKEES. ¶ His troops are in control of eight of the thirteen Departments of the Republic of Nicaragua. ¶ Dr. Pedro José Zepeda, general representative of the “Ejercito Defensor de la Soberanía Nacional de Nicaragua”, has furnished us a copy of the latest report from General Augusto César Sandino, as follows: ¶ “Everyone knows that our army is fighting against an army of ferocious mercenaries, provided with modern war material and all the other material resources of the United States. Nevertheless, we noe [now] control the camps of eight of the Departments of our Nicaragua. We have no city nor town in our power, because that is not in our program of guerrilla warfare, but we will do that when our army considers it expedient to engage in field warfare. Our tactics at present consist in holding under seige [siege] the towns of the Departments in which our army is operating. ¶ “The enemy has been talking of scarcity of food supplies in Las Segovias, but the scarcity exists in the towns and cities occupied by the mercenaries of the army of the Yankee bankers. In our camps there is no hunger, - our army has plenty to eat. ¶ “The effectives of our army are composed of eight expeditionary columns, in the places and under the orders of the following chiefs: ¶ Our column No. 6, commanded by Generals Carlos Salgado P. and Abraham Rivera, and successfully operating on the Atlantic Coast. ¶ Our column No. 1, commanded by General Pedro Altamirano, controls the Departments of Chontalea [Chontales] and Matagalpa. ¶ Our column No. 3, commanded by General Pedro Antonio Irias, controls the Department of Jinotepa [Jinotega]. ¶ Our column No. 7, commanded by General Ismael Peralta, controls the Department of Estolí [Estelí]. ¶ Our columns Nos. 4 and 8, commanded by Generals Juan Gregorio Colindres and Juan Pablo Umanzor, control the zones of Somoto, Ocotal, Quilali and Jícaro. ¶ Our column No. 5, commanded by General José León Díaz, controls the Departments of León and Chinandega. ¶ Our headquarters is established in the centre of the eight Departments mentioned. Our columns are mobilized with mathematical precision, at the right and left of our headquarters. Our army is the best disciplined, loyal and disinterested, of any in the whole world, because it is conscious of its high historical role. ¶ It does not matter that Hoover, and cringing and salaried pens, call us ‘bandits’. Time and history will tell whether the bandits are in the White House at Washington, or in the Nicaraguan Segovias where human love and fraternity reign. Even in the cases where our army . . . "

7.  August 25, 1931.  G-2 Translation of "Sandino Continues Victorious Against the Yankees," La Prensa, 25 Aug 1931, Capt. Robert E. Cummings, Acting Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 3.     " . . . orders the shooting of traitors, this is done because of love of liberty. And only these extreme cases are reached when liberty is threatened, in the attempt, through ignorance or perversity, to impose upon us a slavery which we repulse with holy wrath. ¶ In our general headquarters there will be found, at the disposition of whoever cares to see them, a large quantity of documents, flags, maps, surgical cabinets, and a multitude of other important things, belonging to the Army of the United States, which were taken from the enemy in various fights. We have also had numerous casualties, but we do not deceive the public, as they do, by saying that enemy bullets only pierce our hat-brims. ¶ The present news should be sufficient for the observing public to indignantly reject false news (reports) from the enemy, with which they have been sowing confusion and making the people drunk, with their lies. However, today, the 17th of July, is the fourth anniversary of our first battle in the city of Ocotal, Nuevo [Nueva] Segovia, against the army of the most grotesque imperialism in the world. Yesterday, as today, our impotent enemy has brandished against us all its arms, including calumny which is the most powerful that cowards can wield. ¶ I myself am no different from any other soldier private of the armies of the world. My voice is not haughty, nor does my presence inspire terror, but we have had the pleasure, while fulfilling our duty, of seeing in our midst thousands of haughty chiefs of the North American Army. We have proven how far the power of right can go against the power of brute force. My conscience is clear, and I have the satisfaction which comes from duty fulfilled. Even in sleep I am happy: I sleep with the peace and tranquility of a healthy child. Can this be said of those who control the international policy of North America? What is the reply of the human scraps scattered over the fields of battle? ¶ Headquarters of the Ejercito Defensor de la Soberanía Nacional de Nicaragua, Las Segovias, Nicaragua. July 16, 1931. ¶ Patria and Libertad, ¶ (signed) Augusto César Sandino."

8.  August 14, 1931.  "Managua Back to Normal," New York Times.      "State of Seige Ends in Nicaraguan Capital—Outlaw Captured.  ¶  MANAGUA, Nicaragua, Aug. 14.—  ¶  The state of seige established after the earthquake has been discontinues because Managua enjoys normal business conditions.  ¶  Colonel Julian C. Smith of the United States Marine Corps is now in command of the Nicaraguan National Guard in the absence of General Calvin B. Matthews, who left for the United States today via Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields.  ¶ Juan Castillo, second in command of the outlaw forces of José Leon Diaz, has been captured near Somotillo."

9.  August 14, 1931.  "Managua Back to Normal," New York Times (close-up of above).  

10.  July 21, 1931.  Confidential Report on Bandit Activities on the East Coast of Nicaragua, Sheridan Talbott, US Consul, Bluefields, to Sec. State, Washington D.C., p. 1.     "No. 22. ¶ AMERICAN CONSULATE, ¶ Bluefields, Nicaragua, July 21, 1931. ¶ CONFIDENTIAL ¶ SUBJECT: BANDIT ACTIVITIES ON THE EAST COAST OF NICARAGUA. ¶ THE HONORABLE ¶ THE SECRETARY OF STATE, ¶ WASHINGTON. ¶ SIR: ¶ I have the honor to refer to my telegram to the Legation at Managua dated July 30, 1931 (repeated to the Department), relative to the attack on the small Guardia garrison stationed at Rama by discharged workmen, and to the bandit activities in the Puerto Cabezas area, and to submit for the Department’s information more detailed advice as to the general situation on this Coast. ¶ Taking advantage of the opportunity offered by the arrival of two hydroplanes of the Marine Corps, which reached this port from Managua on the 16th en route to Puerto Cabezas, I left Bluefields on the morning of the 17th and remained in Puerto Cabezas until Monday, July 20, arriving here about three in the afternoon of that day. As Consul Fernald has not yet officially opened the Puerto Cabezas consulate I considered the journey as an inspection trip ¶ in . . . "

11.  July 21, 1931.  Confidential Report on Bandit Activities on the East Coast of Nicaragua, Sheridan Talbott, US Consul, Bluefields, to Sec. State, Washington D.C., p. 2.     " . . . in my own district, but he will furnish the Department and Legation with reports regarding bandit activities in the Puerto Cabezas district in the future. ¶ During my stay in Puerto Cabezas I had opportunities to discuss the general situation in the north eastern section of Nicaragua with officials and employees of the American fruit and lumber company with extensive holdings in that area, and with officers in the American Navy and Marine Corps (Guardia), all with long experience in Nicaragua, and the advice gathered from these sources, officers and civilians in Bluefields, as well as my own observations, is the basis of the information contained in the telegram mentioned and in this despatch. ¶ The commanding officer of the Guardia in Bluefields has been receiving reports from Managua over a period of weeks stating that one of Sandino’s principal lieutenants with around two hundred men was operating in the eastern part of Matagalpa with indications of a movement towards the east coast of the country. About ten days ago the small village of Wauni in north western Prinzapolka was visited by bandits and four men were murdered and a number of stores looted. In addition, there have been repeated rumors to the effect that a general movement of these marauders towards the eastern section of the country was taking place notwithstanding the fact that it is the generally accepted theory that they do not operate during the rainy season. As the result of this situation and the fight at Logtown in April the Guardia officials stationed in this area have been on the alert to detect ¶ any . . . "

12.  July 21, 1931.  Confidential Report on Bandit Activities on the East Coast of Nicaragua, Sheridan Talbott, US Consul, Bluefields, to Sec. State, Washington D.C., p. 3.     " . . . any evidence of a movement which might indicate a threat to the individuals and interests in this part of the country. ¶ Upon arrival in Puerto Cabezas I learned that the commanding officer of the Guardia Nacional in that area (a captain in the Marine Corps), with twenty men had traveled by motor boat up the Coco River in an effort to detect an signs of bandit movements in the district around Kisalaya and Saklin, both situated on the Coco River and in a district where concentrations of bandits for expeditions to the south and east may be expected to originate. On the following morning – July 18 – the planes left Puerto Cabezas, located the detachment of Guardia on the Coco River and learned that they had been fired on from the shore near Kisalaya, and a native lieutenant of the Guardia had been wounded. The Guardia returned the fire and reported that three of the estimated number of forty men composing the attacking party had been killed. The detachment of Guardia returned to Cape Gracias and the commanding officer reached Puerto Cabezas yesterday morning. In a conversation with him he stated that his observations and reports received indicated a movement of a group of bandits from the neighborhood of the Waspook River towards Puerto Cabezas. He, therefore, abandoned his intention of returning on a reconnaissance trip up the Coco River and remained in Puerto Cabezas. ¶ During a journey over the railway maintained by the American lumber and fruit company I visited an isolated Guardia post commanded by an American Marine officer and situated about fifty miles west of Puerto Cabezas, and ¶ during . . . "

13.  July 21, 1931.  Confidential Report on Bandit Activities on the East Coast of Nicaragua, Sheridan Talbott, US Consul, Bluefields, to Sec. State, Washington D.C., p. 4.     " . . . during our conversation he stated that he had received information which suggested the advisability of visiting the surrounding country and that he was going out with a patrol that same afternoon. As an indication of the difficult conditions under which these Americans are serving, I may state that this officer is the only white person in this detachment of twenty Guardia enlisted men. ¶ The American company mentioned has made a considerable reduction in its personnel within the last few weeks and a number of rumors have reached Bluefields to the effect that they were having difficulty with former employees along the line of their railway, which extends for about eighty or ninety miles west of Puerto Cabezas, and, while there is undoubtedly considerable latent dissatisfaction among the unemployed, there was no evidence of this during my journey over most of the line with one of the officials of the company. The company has ceased entirely its considerable lumbering activities during the present year, and the banana market in the United States together with disease affecting the plantations has greatly curtailed its production and export of this fruit. ¶ The two aeroplanes, after their contact with the Guardia detachment on the Coco River, continued their observation work until ordered to return to Bluefields on Monday, July 20. During their flights, they covered the area between the Coco, Waspook, and Prinzapolka Rivers and the Atlantic Coast and were unable to discover other signs of bandits than an unusual number of small boats anchored in the Coco River at the town of ¶ Saklin, . . . "

14.  July 21, 1931.  Confidential Report on Bandit Activities on the East Coast of Nicaragua, Sheridan Talbott, US Consul, Bluefields, to Sec. State, Washington D.C., p. 5.     " . . . Saklin, and the fact that no residents of that town were visible during the time the planes were in the vicinity. It may be stated that while the planes have a very great effect on the morale of the bandits, it is very seldom in this stage of the bandit activities that they can be identified when the planes appear. ¶ On Monday morning (July 20), reports reached Puerto Cabezas of a disturbance in Rama – a small village on the Kacondido River about sixty miles west of Bluefields and the point from which an attack on Bluefields might be expected to originate – and on reaching Bluefields that afternoon, I learned that around thirty of the one hundred and thirty five men employed by the Nicaraguan Government in constructing the Rama-Boaco highway had attacked the 20 Guardia stationed in Rama on Sunday evening and had killed one and wounded several others. The men of the Guardia accounted for twelve of the workmen in killed, captured, and wounded. It appears that this trouble had been brought about by the action of the Government in discontinuing work on the highway and failing to pay the laborers their wages. ¶ As Rama is at the head of the river transportation route from the interior to Bluefields and was apparently one of the points at which the bandits[‘] efforts were directed during the April raids on this coast, as well as the fact that Sandino’s lieutenant is operating not far to the west, caused many in Bluefields to interpret the early reports as indicating a bandit attack on Rama and possibly an advance towards this port. The Guardia commander sent to Rama as reinforcements around ten of ¶ the . . . "

15.  July 21, 1931.  Confidential Report on Bandit Activities on the East Coast of Nicaragua, Sheridan Talbott, US Consul, Bluefields, to Sec. State, Washington D.C., p. 6.     " . . . the thirty Guardia stationed in Bluefields and placed under arms a number of the civilians in this city who have agreed to undertake its defense in case of an emergency. There was considerable apprehension on the part of the residents until the nature of the disturbance and its outcome had been learned. ¶ As soon as I arrived in the afternoon, after consulting with the commanding officer of the Guardia (a major in the Marine Corps), and learning that he and I were agreed in the opinion that the situation held possibilities of not only serving as a recruiting argument for Sandino’s outlaws, but creating a precedent that might encourage others among the considerable number of unemployed along this coast to attempt more successful outbreaks, I called upon the Governor of the Department of Bluefields and made inquiry as to the general situation, but with particular reference to the payment of the workmen. He showed me copies of telegrams to the officials (one to the President) urging that the local Bank be authorized to advance the funds (around $2,600) with which these wages might be paid, and to-day (July 21) he called at the Consulate with a telegram from Managua stating that the necessary sum had been transferred to the Bluefields bank from that city. He stated that arrangements would be made to pay the workmen immediately. ¶ As soon as possible after my arrival yesterday afternoon I sent the telegram to the Minister which was repeated to the Department, not because there was any urgent situation demanding action from either, but in order that ¶ advice . . . "

16.  July 21, 1931.  Confidential Report on Bandit Activities on the East Coast of Nicaragua, Sheridan Talbott, US Consul, Bluefields, to Sec. State, Washington D.C., p. 7.     " . . . advice as to the situation in this area might be available. I assume that the suggestion contained therein as to the desirability of having planes at both this port and Puerto Cabezas was acted on, as the Guardia Commander informed me to-day that the hydroplanes, which went back to Puerto Cabezas this morning, would be relieved by land planes from Managua and would return here to-morrow. ¶ The opinion of the Commander of the Eastern Area of the Guardia and my own observation agree in that there are probably sufficient forces at Puerto Cabezas to take care of any ordinary situation that might arise, and I think he accepts my belief that at least two aeroplanes for reconnaissance and combat work should be left on this coast practically all of the time – if land planes, at Puerto Cabezas, where there is a field, and if hydroplanes, at either port. As regards Bluefields, it might be desirable that the garrison here be increased considerably to allow for unusual situations in the immediate vicinity and for assignment of men to strategic points throughout this area as the urgency of the occasion may require. ¶ Respectfully yours, ¶ Sheridan Talbott, ¶ American Consul. ¶ 800. ¶ ST/JB."

17.  July 20, 1931.  Naval Intelligence Report of Information (Secured through Agent) of Bandit Activities in Nicaragua, Agent "G", p. 1.     "Sandino has lately been reported as sick with malaria and rheumatism but planning another incursion of his groups into Chontales in the near future. ¶ Miguel Angel Ortez, bandit Jefe who has been reported dead, is being actually corroborated as being such by the bandits although he is alive. (Verified by Honduran police) This is done in order to facilitate his voyage to receive arms and ammunition via Estero Real, Amatillo, near Palo Grande, Province of Chinandega, Nicaragua. He was identified as being in Choluteca Honduras, on 6 July, 1931. ¶ Toribio Tijerino (See report No. 39-31 and 89-30) has been reported as having acted as an agent in the purchase of two boats on the North Coast of Honduras, for use of the Nicaraguan bandits. ¶ Socrates Sandino, brother of the bandit, passed through Tegucigalpa heading for Choluteca. An Agent of the Attaché, unknown to Socrates as being such, accompanied him. (The above information was furnished to Second Brigade telegraphically on 25 June.) One Hector Estrada P. Left Corinto, Nicaragua, for San José, Guatemala, with mail for Dr. Zepeda. ¶ Pancho Estrada and Almendares (Sandino sub-jefes) reported as being in Choluteca, Honduras, 6 July. . . . "

18.  July 20, 1931.   Naval Intelligence Report of Information (Secured through Agent) of Bandit Activities in Nicaragua, Agent "G", p. 2.     " . . . José Jesus Zamora, Sandino Agent in El Salvador, reported to have arranged, and sent, the motor boat “Plomo” to some point unknown whereat the boat picked up arms, ammunition and medicine. These were unloaded at “Indizuelo”, a landing on the Estero Real, about 12 July, 1931. Rafael Rodriguez, the mandador of the hacienda of Jos Francisco Valladares Carcache (“Pancho Valladares C.”) is said to have handled the shipment ashore. (Note: Valladares is a strong Moncadist liberal and he may not know about Rodriguez who in turn is known to be very Anti-American). Perez Estrada (whose right name is believed to be Leopoldo Ortiz) a criminal from Leon hangs around the vicinity of “Mayocunda”, the Sanchez hacienda, with a group of about 14. ¶ Sandino is recurrently reported as very sick with malaria and rheumatism, his right leg being nearly useless. Is reported as being desirous of going to Mexico for treatment but other bandits fearing he will not return this time are using all expedients to detain him. ¶ Sandino’s latest orders issued to all groups is said to be the following: ¶ To forage and lay in large supplies of food, ammunition and clothing. ¶ To recruit men and keep large concentrations in mountain hide-outs. ¶ To refrain from attacking any towns for the present, but to await until strength is greater so that when towns are attacked, they will undoubtedly fall. ¶ To remain in mountain hide-outs until they become known, and to ambush columns when Guardia or Marines move out towards them. ¶ Two general Cuartels are said to have been established. One on the Olama river in Chontales near Olama, the other in the Pis Pis region, exact location unknown. He plans to attack the town of Boaco in Chontales to secure supplies in the future. ¶ The new communication route is said to be via the Estero Real in Chinandega proceeding north to Namasigue and Choluteca, Honduras. ¶ NOTE: Copy of this report has been furnished Second Brigade and Guardia Nacional, via air mail."

19.  June 13, 1931.  G-2 Translation of "There Is No Split In the Sandino Group — The Rebel Leader of Nicaragua Has Called a Meeting of His Generals — Another Offensive — His Representative in Mexico Refutes the Affirmation of Colonel MacDugal," Excelsior, Mexico City.     "(Translation) ¶ (Article appearing in EXCELSIOR of June 13, 1931.) ¶ THERE IS NO SPLIT IN THE SANDINO GROUP ¶ The Rebel Leader of Nicaragua has called a Meeting of his Generals ¶ Another Offensive ¶ His Representative in Mexico Refutes the Affirmations of Colonel MacDugal ¶ Dr. Pedro José Zepeda, general representative of the Ejercito Defensor de la Soberania Nacional de Nicaragua, a propos of the declarations made by Colonel Douglas MacDugal, Commander of the Invading Forces in the unfortunate Republic of the south, has delivered to us for publication, the following bulletin: ¶ “After a violent offensive, which culminated in the taking of the important town of Ocotal, General Sandino, who has the direct command of the column which figured in the combats of Ciudad Antigua, Jicaro and Sabana Grande, - has issued orders to Generals Pedro Altamirano, Miguel Angel Orhtez [Ortez], Pedro Antonio Irias, and Francisco Estrada, to hold a meeting in a certain place for the purpose of exchanging views and coordinating the campaign to be begun in July. This, because we are convinced for the hundredth time that the phrases and promises of the North American State Department have no other end than to disorient the opinion of the Latin-American peoples, and likewise mislead the honest opinion of the people of the United States who have repeatedly condemed [condemned] the unjustified occupation of our territory. ¶ “This general representation of the Army declares absolutely false the statements of Colonel MacDugal [Gen. McDougal], who from Washington, affirms that there is dissension and discord in the ranks of General Sandino. Colonel MacDugal, incapable of putting himself at the head of the troops which he commands, and which only serve to assassinate defenceless Nicaraguans, contents himself with spreading, from a desk, false news, which the following day are proven worthless. ¶ “This general representation of the Army takes pleasure in announcing the promotion, to the next higher grade, of Brigadier General Pedro Blandon, who, at the head of a powerful column of picked men, brought to a close the brilliant campaign of the East Coast of Nicaragua, which culminated with the taking of Cape “Gracias a Dios”, Prinzapolea [Prinzapolka], and all the important towns of that region. ¶ “In the joint report rendered to the Supreme Jefatura by all the high ranking officers of our Army, the highest optimism is noted, and the unquenchable and reiterated desire to continue this campaign of sacrifices until the complete evacuation of our territory has been obtained.”"

20.  May 15-20, 1931.  News clippings:  May 15: "Navy Pursues Ship Carrying Sandino Arms," Washington Herald.   May 15: "Nicaraguan Guardsmen Kill 2 Outlaws In Fight," Baltimore Sun.  May 17: "Hondurans Joining Nicaraguan Rebels," New York Times.   May 19: "10 Insurgents Killed In Nicaraguan Fights," New York Times.   May 20: "Nicaraguan Guards Raze Rebel Camps," U.S. Daily.     "NAVY PURSUES SHIP CARRYING SANDINO ARMS ¶ Gunboat Seeks Freighter Off Nicaraguan Coast; Threat Of Rebellion Is Renewed ¶ MANAGUA, May 14 (U.S.) With new bandit outbursts threatened, Guardia Nacional were rushed to the interior and northern coastal town by plane late today to reinforce garrisons. ¶ Meanwhile, dispatches from Puerta Cabezas [Puerto Cabezas] stated that the U. S. S. Asheville, gunboat, steamed hurridly [hurriedly] out of that harbor this afternoon to search for a Scandinavian tramp steamer said to be en route to a Sandino rendezvous near Bluefields with a load of arms for the bandits. ¶ DEPARTURE REPORTED ¶ It was learned authentically that radios from Washington had told of the departure of a Norwegian vessel from a Gulf port late last night. This ship, it was stated was bound for a secluded river in the vicinity of Bluefields, where it is to deliver a considerable quantity of ammunition, machine guns, and rifles. ¶ The reinforcement of interior and coastal garrisons came late today, after vigorous demands on the part of the Standard Fruit and Steamship Company, which has vast holdings in both sections. This company, it is understood, advised authorities here that new bandit attacks are inevitable and that the present garrison strength is not sufficient. ¶ TO PAY TROOPS ¶ The central government, it is understood, replied that it is unable to send troops because of lack of funds to pay them and support them, at which the Standard Fruit and Steamship Company agreed to pay the men and support them, if the government would permit their use. The authorities consented to this plan, it is learned, on condition that the Fruit Company would provide the transportation. ¶ Attempts to move the reinforcements by means of the Pan-American Airways failed, it is learned, when that company refused to move the troops on the ground that there were not adequate landing facilities at various garrisons. ¶ The fruit company eventually was able to charter sufficient planes to make the movements this afternoon, and it is thought that at least 50 men can be rushed into the most needed positions by noon tomorrow. ¶ Nicaraguan Guardsmen Kill 2 Outlaws In Fight ¶ Virginian Commands Patrol Which Had Skirmish With Group In Jinotga [Jinotega] ¶ Managua, Nicaragua, May 14 (AP)—A National Guard patrol, in command of Capt. L. B. Puller and Lieut. W. A. Lee, engaged in a skirmish with a group of outlaws today near the junction of the Gusanera and the Cua rivers in the province of Jinotga [Jinotega], killing two of them. ¶ The outlaws were coming up the river Cua in canoes on a foraging expedition from their main camp when the fight occurred. The National Guard detachment located the camp two hours later, but the main force had decamped. Firearms, ammunition and machetes were captured. Captain Puller is a Virginian and Lieutenant Lee is from Texas. ¶ HONDURANS JOINING NICARAGUAN REBELS ¶ Several of Former Noted in Band Routed by National Guard in Fight at Palacaguina. ¶ INSURGENTS WELL ARMED ¶ Use Machine Guns and Rifle and Hand Grenades—Several Casualties, All Among the Irregulars. ¶ Special to The New York Times. ¶ WASHINGTON, May 16.—Men appearing to be Hondurans were observed in a force of 100 well-armed rebels who clashed with the Nicaraguan National Guard for more than two hours early yesterday morning at the town of Palacaguima [Palacaguina], twenty-five miles south of Ocotal in the northwest part of Nicaragua, according to a report received by the Navy Department today from Colonel Franklin G. Garrett, commander of the Second Brigade of marines in Nicaragua. ¶ There were several rebel casualties, but none among the Guard. The rebels, many of whom were disguised as guardsmen, were repulsed. Marine planes followed up the pursuit. ¶ The presence of Hondurans would come as no surprise, inasmuch as on previous occasions it has ben [been] understood that irregulars from the country have participated in outlaw depradations [depredations] in Nicaragua, while Honduras is at present in a period of unrest consequent upon an attempt at revolution. The attack was the first made in force in the bandit stronghold of Northwestern Nicaragua since Augustino Sandino and his chieftains recently retired from the east coast after sorties there. ¶ “Palaoaguima [Palacaguina],” Colonel Garrett reported, “attacked at 1:55 A. M. May 15 by Ortez, Blas Gonzalez and 100 bandits, using machine guns, rifle and hand grenades and rifles. Attack lasted until 4:15 A. M. Many houses damaged by bombs and rifle fire. Bandits dressed in Guardia clothing, red and black emblems. Three Jefes present and men in khaki believed to be Hondurans. Two stores looted to amount of about $1,000. Bandit casualties estimated at several killed and wounded. No Guardia casualties. Patrols cleared in pursuit and planes made reconnaisance [reconnaissance] about 11 A. M., without result.” ¶ Although revolutionary activities have apparently subsided on the north coast of Honduras on the Atlantic side, the State Department announced today that a consulate would be opened at Puerto Cortes for the purpose of transmitting information. Most American interests in Honduras, consisting primarily of fruit plantations, are located in that region. ¶ 10 INSURGENTS KILLED IN NICARAGUAN FIGHTS ¶ Two of National Guard Wounded—Admiral Smith Reports Honduran Coast Quiet. ¶ Special to The New York Times. ¶ WASHINGTON, May 18.—Additional rebel activity in Western and Central Nicaragua, which has resulted in the death of ten bandits and the wounding of two of the National Guards, was reported to the Navy Department today by Colonel Franklin B. Garrett, commander of the Second Brigade of Marines at Managua. Guard patrols, led by marine officers, repulsed the bandits. ¶ The report was supplemental to one received from Colonel Garrett on Saturday, telling of an attack by 100 well-armed rebels at Palacaguima [Palacaguina] in the same region on Friday. The insurgents were dispersed at that time in a fight of more than two hours. ¶ The contacts involved patrols led by Captain John C. McQueen and Lieutenants Mark H. Bell, Harry D. Hutchcroft, Harry E. Kip and C. A. Brown. One of the insurgent bands was that of José Leon. The clashes occurred at Joconuco [Jocomico] and Rio Grande. ¶ Rear Admiral Arthur St. C. Smith, commander of the Special Service Squadron, reported today that conditions were quiet along the east coast of Nicaragua. The gunboat Asheville is at Puerto Cabezas. ¶ Nicaraguan Guards Raze Rebel Camps ¶ Fatalities in Three Days of Fighting Number 15 ¶ Bringing the total insurrectionists killed in three days to 15, patrols of the Nicaraguan Guardia Nacional destroyed two bandit camps in northwest Nicaragua May 16, the Department of the Navy announced May 19. Two contacts in which 10 insurrectionists were killed occurred May 13 and 15 as guerrilla warfare was renewed. The announcement follows in full text: ¶ Five Nicaraguan bandits were killed and two bandit camps 15 miles east of Ocotal, northwestern Nicaragua, were destroyed in two contacts with Guardia patrols on May 16, according to dispatch received today in the Navy Department from Col. Franklin B. Garrett, U. S. M. C., commanding the Second Brigade of Marines in Nicaragua. ¶ In the first contact, a Guardia patrol from Palacaguina under Second Lt. James O. Brauer, U. S. M. C., of Fargo, N. Dak., and Sergt. Harry E. Kipp, U. S. M. C., of Winnebago, Minn., met a group of 12 bandits under the leader Ortez. Although there were no known casualties, the bandit camp was destroyed. ¶ A Guardia patrol under Corp. Ross A. Trosper, U. S. M. C., of Albion, Nebr., later had contact with a small group of bandits in the same vicinity. Five bandits are known to have been killed and their camp destroyed. There were no Guardia casualties."

21.  May 1, 1931.  News clippings: "Kills Sandino Aide In Nicaragua Clash," New York Times.   "Soviets' Gold Backs Sandino, U.S. Informed," New York Americas.
     "KILLS SANDINO AIDE IN NICARAGUA CLASH ¶ Guardia Nacional Reports Two Skirmishes in Vicinity of Ocotal, in Northwest. ¶ MANAGUA LOOTING CHARGED ¶ Mexican Professor Makes Accusation, but Washington Denies It—Battle Near in Honduras. ¶ Special to The New York Times. ¶ WASHINGTON, April 30.—Two skirmishes between the Guardia National of Nicaragua and outlaws, in one of which Chavarria, one of General Sandino’s chief lieutenants was killed, were reported to the Navy Department today by marine headquarters at Managua. Lieutenant Donald Leroy Truesdale of Lugoff, S. C., a corporal in the Marine Corps, was in command of the Guardia patrol, which sustained no casualties. ¶ The patrol pursued on Monday a group of outlaws who were attacking a farm west of Condega, twelve miles south of Ocotal, and caught up with them at Aguacatel, eighteen miles southwest of Ocotal. They fired at the outlaws, who escaped in the brush, and captured eleven animals, clothes and blankets. The next day the patrol made contact with another band near Las Oucillas, seventeen miles south of Ocotal, and killed Chavarria. Ten outlaws were wounded. ¶ Coincidentally with this report came one to the State Department from Matthew E. Hanna, the United States Minister, stating that the program of withdrawing marines from Nicaragua was proceeding on schedule and that only twenty marines remained in the northwestern area, where the principal outlaw operations have been conducted. As the marines have been withdrawn their places have been taken by Guardsmen. ¶ Guard Gets 450 Recruits. ¶ That force has recruited more than 450 of the 500 men planned when the United States decided to withdraw. ¶ With only twenty Marines remaining near Ocotal, 100 have been withdrawn from the central area to Managua and the rest in that area, numbering 125, will be withdrawn by the middle of May. The Guardia has replaced these reserves and now numbers 1,400 enlisted men in the northern and central areas and soon will be increased to 1,500. ¶ Charges by Lombardo Toledano, a professor at the National University in Mexico City, who recently visited Managua, that Marines had sacked Managua after the earthquake, had dynamited safes, and killed persons attempting to enter the ruins of their homes, were de- [fold in paper - 'detained'] -ed here today. The charges were contained in an interview in Universal in Mexico City. ¶ Adams Contradicts Charge. ¶ “I have no reason to believe,” Secretary of the Navy Adams said, “that the Marines in Nicaragua have carried on their relief work at Hanagua [Managua] in any manner except deserving of the highest commendation. Reports from the President of Nicaragua, the American Minister at Managua and the Red Cross director of relief at Managua indicate that the relief activities carried on by the Marine Corps and the naval personnel stationed or sent there, were carried out speedily, efficiently, in an orderly manner and most certainly without violence.” ¶ Ernest J. Swift, who returned here yesterday after directing Red Cross relief activities at Managua, said the marines committed no excesses and did a splendid job. ¶ The State Department said its reports showed that discipline was maintained and that only two looters were shot. ¶ A clue to Señor Toledano’s charges was seen in a report received by the War Department today from Lieut. Col. Dan I. Sultan, the officer in charge of the Nicaraguan canal survey. ¶ “Safes and vaults damaged by the fire,” he said, “were opened upon the request of the owners, provided they were public or semi-public officials. These consisted of the safe in the British Legation, one safe and a vault in the Anglo-South American Bank and a safe in the office of the Collector of Cuctoms [Customs].” ¶ SOVIETS’ GOLD BACKS SANDINO, U. S. INFORMED ¶ State Department Witness Declares He Saw Checks Sent Bandit Leader from Russia ¶ TOTAL PUT AT $1,000,000 ¶ Stimson Says There Will Be No Delay in Withdrawing Marines from Nicaragua ¶ By FULTON LEWIS, ¶ Universal Service Staff Correspondent. ¶ WASHINGTON, April 30.—Evidence that bandit activities in Honduras and Nicaragua are being financed by Communist agents of Soviet Russia was placed before the State Department today. ¶ Dr. Pedro Munoz, of Costa Rica, who knew General Sandino, rebel leader, in Mexico City prior to the recent outbreak, presented the evidence. ¶ $1,000,000 PROVIDED. ¶ The Russian Government, Dr. Munoz estimated, has furnished about $1,000,000 to back activities that have cost lives of numerous American marines and private citizens. The gold was sent to the bandit leader in Bluefields, Nicaragua, through a round-about route, Dr. Munoz charges. ¶ The Russian Embassy in Paris, Dr. Munoz declared, has been sending money to an agent in Cartagena, Colombia, who in turn, has been forwarding it to a second agent in Bluefields, who has been making frequent contracts with Sandino. ¶ SAW CHECKS. ¶ While he was in Mexico City, Dr. Munoz said, Sandino showed him checks for $10,000 to $25,000 from Communist sources, together with numerous papers and documents concerning plans for revolutionary activities. At that time Dr. Munoz declared, Sandino was receiving the Communist funds through Pedro Zapata, his representative in Mexico City."

22.  May 22, 1931.  G-2 Report on Renewed Bandit Activities in Nicaragua (no author indicated), p. 1.     "L A T I N A M E R I C A ¶ Nicaragua: ¶ Renewed Bandit Activities - ¶ After the announcement by the Government of the United States on February 13, 1931, which provided for the gradual withdrawal of the Marines in Nicaragua, there was no immediate reaction on the part of the Sandino bandits. There were some encounters between Guardia and bandit detachments in the Province of Nueva Segovia in northwest Nicaragua, but they were of no greater frequency or importance than those which formerly occurred during the dry season. Nueva Segovia has long been the bandit stronghold because of its accessibility to Honduras, to the east coast of Nicaragua via the Coco River, and because its pathless jungles and mountainous terrain furnish man hiding places. ¶ On March 31 an earthquake destroyed Managua, the capital of Nicaragua. As this was also the headquarters of the Marine Corps and the Guardia Civil, as well as the base for the marine aviation, all local units were engaged for a considerable time in relief measures. All available personnel was needed to clear up the debris, bury the dead, care for the injured, repair the water supply system and feed the natives. During this time there were rumors of a bandit attack on Managua by Sandino, but shortly thereafter Zepeda, Sandino’s publicity agent in Mexico, announced in the press that Sandino had declared a truce, so that all energy might be used to assist in the recovery from the catastrophe. ¶ However, on April 6, just a week after the earthquake, the Big Falls power plant of the Neptune mines was blown up. It is located about 100 miles east and south of the usual haunts of the bandits and is only 85 miles from Puerto Cabezas, on the east coast where the Bragman Lumber Company has an investment of some $13,000,000. On April 11, the bandits were reported at Logtown, a Bragman Lumber Company settlement on the Wawa River some 35 miles from Puerto Cabezas, where eight American civilians, two British citizens and an unknown number of Nicaraguans were killed. The leader of the Guardia patrol, Captain Harlan Pefley, Marine Corps noncommissioned officer commissioned in the Guardia, was killed in an attack upon the rebels. Official reports stated that one of the bandits who was killed was identified as Pedro Blandon, one of Sandino’s chief lieutenants, but Zepeda has since denied this in the press. United States naval vessels were immediately despatched to east coast ports but ship commanders were instructed not to send men inland. ¶ On April 15 Gracias a Dios, in the extreme northeast corner of Nicaragua, was looted by a small group of bandits under the leadership of Abraham Rivera who was reported by Zepeda in September, 1930, as having been appointed in charge of the River Coco district. No deaths are known to have resulted from the raid but the town was thoroughly looted and the Tropical Fruit Company’s radio station destroyed. ¶ Since that date there have been no attacks, although Pedro . . . "

23.  May 22, 1931.  G-2 Report on Renewed Bandit Activities in Nicaragua (no author indicated), p. 2.     " . . . Altamirano, another Sandino lieutenant, was reported to be assembling men for an attack on Puerto Cabezas. ¶ When the depredations were reported it was at first assumed that they were sporadic outbursts of disaffected labor elements who had been discharged from the various industries of the district on account of the poor economic situation in Nicaragua; but it was soon established that they were the work of the more or less organized bodies of bandits who have been operating in the northwestern area of Nicaragua for some time. However, it is not established that this outbreak may be dignified as an offensive against the present Moncada Government. Zepeda has tried to make it appear that the murders were incidental to the requisitioning of supplies by the bandits in lieu of taxes; and that the attack at Logtown was precipitated by the request of inhabitants of that place for armed help from Puerto Cabezas. On April 18, 1931, Zepeda announced in Mexico City that Sandino was fighting to clear Nicaragua of all foreign troops, that the purpose of the presence of Marines in Nicaragua did not affect the situation, and that Sandino had promised President Moncada his support when the Nicaraguan Government follows a nationalist policy and works without American Marines for its protection. He has since declared that Sandino would also insist upon a revision of the Nicaraguan Canal Treaty of 1914 and the abrogation of American influence in customs, railroad, and banking activities in Nicaragua. While Zepeda claims to speak for Sandino it is very probable that his pronouncements are made upon his own initiative and have little relation to the exact situation which may exist in Nicaragua at any given time. One opinion expressed is that the bandit outbreak was similar to that of previous years, and was occasioned by the approach of the rainy season; according to this observation the bandits were engaged in laying in a supply of stores to last them over the rainy season when they would not be able to operate. ¶ On April 13, the gunboat “Asheville” was en route to Puerto Cabezas, but according to plans at that time it was not to land any forces unless a serious situation should be found to exist; subsequently, Marines from the “Asheville” were authorized to go ashore to protect American citizens and during the 13th about 25 Marines were landed but soon returned to the ship, prepared to land again if needed. Previous to this Puerto Cabezas was defended by civil outposts. There had been a detachment of the Nicaraguan National Guard of 43 officers and men at the port prior to the outbreak, but all except one officer and a few men had been sent on patrols into the interior. The only Marines in the Puerto Cabezas region, except those on warships, were those acting as officers of the National Guard, probably not more than three or four. Bluefields was also protected by a force of the Nicaraguan National Guard. An American force was landed at Bluefields to insure order during the absence of the Guard on patrol. On April 14, additional American naval vessels were diverted to the Nicaraguan east coast, with orders to limit their defensive efforts to seaports, to offer asylum to Americans, and to use all force necessary to protect life and property in the ports under guard. The commanders, however, were warned not to extend their operations into the interior or beyond the limits of the towns to which they were assigned. ¶ The outbreak has not caused a change in the plan of the . . . "

24.  May 22, 1931.  G-2 Report on Renewed Bandit Activities in Nicaragua (no author indicated), p. 3.     " . . . American Government for the gradual withdrawal of the Marines which was announced on February 13, 1931, and which was described in the G-2 Summary of Intelligence of March 27, 1931. While it was indicated that the United States intended to retain complete liberty of action at all times as to what it should do to protect its nationals it was also indicated that American troops were not to be used in a campaign of extermination of Sandino’s outlaws, nor to garrison or police the interior of the country for the protection of foreigners. It was pointed out that concentrating responsibility upon the Nicaraguan Government to employ its National Guard in this situation was the most effective way of meeting the emergency, and confidence was expressed that other countries would eventually see the problem in the same way. The United States, it was pointed out, is as much concerned as ever in the protection of Americans and foreigners in Nicaragua, and in warning Americans to evacuate the interior it is merely facilitating their protection. It is felt that there is no menace to Americans in Nicaragua in the withdrawal of the Marines under the plan recently announced. The Guard is furnishing protection and is regarded as strong enough to continue such protection after the Marines leave. Better communications through the bandit-infested territory, now in prospect, should materially aid the Guard in maintaining order. ¶ Transportation difficulties in northeastern Nicaragua necessitated the sending of Marine Corps planes into that territory; three additional transport planes were sent from the United States to reinforce the Marine Corps Aviation Section at Managua. ¶ The formal announcement of the attitude of the United States toward the current situation was contained in the following releases to the press: ¶ Telegram from the Secretary of State to the American Legation at Managua and the American Consul at Bluefields, April 17, 1931: ¶ “In view of outbreak of banditry in portions of Nicaragua hitherto free from such violence you will advise American citizens that this Government cannot undertake general protection of Americans throughout that country with American forces. To do so would lead to difficulties and commitments which this Government does not propose to undertake. Therefore, the Department recommends to all Americans who do not feel secure under the protection afforded them by the Nicaraguan Government through the Nicaraguan National Guard to withdraw from the country, or at least to the coast towns whence they can be protected or evacuated in case of necessity. Those who remain do so at their own risk and must not expect American forces to be sent inland to their aid.” ¶ Statement of the Secretary of State to the press, April 18, 1931: ¶ “The problem before the Government to-day is . . . "

25.  May 22, 1931.  G-2 Report on Renewed Bandit Activities in Nicaragua (no author indicated), p. 4.     " . . . not a problem of the protection of its citizens in Nicaragua from a war, but from murder and assassination. In that respect it is totally different from the problem which existed in 1926. ¶ “In 1926, two armies, consisting of two or three thousand men each, were fighting in Nicaragua on the east coast. Both armies professed to be carrying out the rules of warfare and to be protecting neutrals and neutral property. So the problem of this Government was solved by establishing neutral zones in which, by agreement with both armies at that time, hostilities did not enter. These neutral zones, as I recall it, were established with the consent of both the Liberal and Conservative commanders of the contending armies. There was no organized attempt to murder private citizens of any country. The problem was only to protect them from the inevitable catastrophes of war. ¶ “Now we have a situation where small groups of confessed outlaws -- treated as outlaws by the Nicaraguan Government -- are making their way through the jungle to the east coast, with the avowed intention of murdering and pillaging the civilian inhabitants of the country. The terrain where this is taking place is one of the thickest jungles in the world. The rainfall on the east coast of Nicaragua is something more than double the rainfall on the west coast and as a result this is very thick jungle country, a region where it would be almost impossible for regular troops to operate effectively even if it were attempted. ¶ “Another point of difference which is vital is that in 1926 there was no Nicaraguan Constabulary. Since that time, for nearly four years, our officers have been helping the Nicaraguan Government train a force of Constabulary especially for fighting in this kind of terrain, the very object being to produce the most appropriate kind of force to meet tropical and jungle conditions of warfare. That force has been recently raised from 1,850 to over 2,100 and is reported by its officers as being highly efficient. Purely from the standpoint of protection the most effective way to protect the American and foreign civilians who have been suddenly exposed to this danger in the forests of eastern Nicaragua is to give them warning of the danger and an opportunity to escape to the protection of the coast towns; and then for this specially trained Constabulary to operate in the jungle against the bandits. If the number of Constabulary now on the east coast is not sufficient for that purpose, there are certainly enough elsewhere to reinforce them against these comparatively small bands of outlaws. American naval vessels are standing by at all the threatened east coast ports with orders to pro- . . . "

26.  May 22, 1931.  G-2 Report on Renewed Bandit Activities in Nicaragua (no author indicated), p. 5.     " . . . [pro]tect life and property at these ports. These ships will remain until the danger is over. ¶ “By assisting the Government of Nicaragua in organizing and training a competent guardia, we are not only furnishing the most practical and effective method of meeting the bandit problem and the protection of Americans and foreigners in Nicaragua from its attendant perils, but we are at the same time recognizing that it is a problem with which the sovereign Government of Nicaragua is primarily concerned and a problem which it is primarily the right and duty of that Government to solve. There has been no change in the determination of the American Government not to send American troops into the interior. ¶ “The events of this last week have pretty thoroughly torn the mask off the character of the mythical patriot, Sandino. Two of his lieutenants have been recognized as leaders of these outlaw bands, and both from their work and from the evidence of captured papers they are shown to have been engaged in a deliberate plan of assassination and pillage against helpless civilians of various nationalities, including Nicaraguans, working in mines and logging camps. The movements of these outlaws from the northwestern provinces to the eastern coast of Nicaragua came just after the terrific earthquake which prostrated the center of that country, when every humane impulse was to assist those who were suffering from the catastrophe and when all forces, including Marines and Constabulary were engaged in the alleviation of distress. It was in the hour of his country’s desolation that Sandino chose to send his outlaws across the country to attack the region which he believed to be left unguarded.” ¶ On May 9, 1931, the Secretary of State of the United States in a radio broadcast made the following statement: ¶ “. . . In January, 1929, there were over five thousand American marines and naval forces in Nicaragua. By February 1, 1931, that number had been reduced to less than fifteen hundred. On February 13, after consultation between the Government of Nicaragua, the Marine Commander of the Nicaraguan National Guard, and the Secretary of State, a plan was announced and put into effect providing for the completion of the instruction of the Nicaraguan National Guard and the orderly and safe removal of all of the remaining American training forces by the autumn of 1932, thus finally removing all American soldiers from the soil of that Republic. In spite of the difficulties that have been and may be caused by outlaw activities in that country, we are proceeding, and intend to proceed, with this plan. We have no intention of removing from American citizens in Nicaragua the protection which . . . "

27.  May 22, 1931.  G-2 Report on Renewed Bandit Activities in Nicaragua (no author indicated), p. 6.     " . . . American citizens in foreign lands are entitled and accustomed to receive under the law of nations. By assisting the Government of Nicaragua to organize and train a competent national guard, we are furnishing the most effective method of protection against bandits, and at the same time we are recognizing that the bandit problem is one with which the sovereign government of Nicaragua is primarily concerned and which it is her right and duty primarily to solve. As a matter of fact a fair consideration of the facts makes clear that the new National Guard of Nicaragua is giving to strangers in the interior of that country a better protection than they have ever had before or than can be found in the interior of many other countries of that locality. . . .” ¶ At the present time the naval forces on the east coast of Nicaragua have been reduced to one small vessel; no further bandit activities have been reported in the eastern part of the country and the bandits have apparently withdrawn to the northwest, where they have continued their activities and are being successfully opposed by the Guardia Nacional."

28.  May 18, 1931.  G-2 Report on Doctor Pedro J. Zepeda, Lt. Col. Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, San José.     "NICARAGUA ¶ POPULATION AND SOCIAL ¶ No. 2700 – Public Order and Safety. ¶ Doctor Pedro J. Zepeda. ¶ In report No. 1147 I mentioned that Doctor Zepeda intended to go to Nicaragua by plane with a shipment of medical supplies from Mexico. This item appeared in Costa Rican and Panama papers, and was stated definitely - - that Dr. Zepeda had left Mexico by plane for Nicaragua. These newspaper reports also contained a statement said to have been published by him, that in view of the earthquake and the urgent need of Marines and Guardia in Managua, Sandino would not undertake any operations against the Government. ¶ Zepeda, however, did not go to Nicaragua, and as far as I can find out, has no intention of going there. His recent statements have been the usual fantastic exaggerations, the latest one to the effect that Russia had offered Sandino $100,000.00 and 5,000 rifles, which offer had been turned down. There is no need to state that no such offer was made and that if it had been made it would have been accepted promptly. Information from a number of reliable sources is that Toribio Tijerino is the man who is getting arms into Nicaragua, and it is the general belief that he is furnishing them both to the bandits and to the Conservative leaders. However, no one seems to have any idea where the money for these rifles is coming from, unless it is from Mexico, and this seems to be only a guess. ¶ Report No. 1223 ¶ San José--May 18, 1931 ¶ Source – Personal knowledge. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Lieut. Col., F.A. ¶ M.A."

29.  May 18, 1931.  G-2 Report on Doctor Pedro J. Zepeda, Lt. Col. Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, San José (copy).     "COPY ¶ G-2/2657-P-405 ¶ 2 ¶ NICARAGUA ¶ POPULATION AND SOCIAL ¶ No. 2700 – Public Order and Safety. ¶ Doctor Pedro J. Zepeda. ¶ In report No. 1147 I mentioned that Doctor Zepeda intended to go to Nicaragua by plane with a shipment of medical supplies from Mexico. This item appeared in Costa Rican and Panama papers, and was stated definitely -- that Dr. Zepeda had left Mexico by plane for Nicaragua. These newspaper reports also contained a statement said to have been published by him, that in view of the earthquake and the urgent need of Marines and Guardia in Managua, Sandino would not undertake any operations against the Government. ¶ Zepeda, however, did not go to Nicaragua, and as far as I can find out, has no intention of going there. His recent statements have been the usual fantastic exaggerations, the latest one to the effect that Russia had offered Sandino $100,000.00 and 5,000 rifles, which offer had been turned down. There is no need to state that no such offer was made and that if it had been made it would have been accepted promptly. Information from a number of reliable sources is that Toribio Tijerino is the man who is getting arms into Nicaragua, and it is the general belief that he is furnishing them both to the bandits and to the Conservative leaders. However, no one seems to have any idea where the money for these rifles is coming from, unless it is from Mexico, and this seems to be only a guess. ¶ Report No. 1223 ¶ San Jose--May 18, 1931 ¶ Source – Personal knowledge. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Lieut. Col., F.A. ¶ M.A."

30.  May 13, 1931.  Naval Intelligence Personal Report on Ramiro Molla Sanz, from Agent "G", Tegucigalpa.     "Born 28 February, 1885, in Villa de Canals, Valencia, Spain, about sixty six inches of height, blue eyes, medium brown hair, high forehead, prominent roman nose, small mouth which droops at the corners.  ¶  He left New York City on 26 December, on a trip with the intentions of hiking through all the republics of North, Central and South America with Buenos Aires, Argentina as his destination.  To date his pedometer registers 5,500 miles to Tegucigalpa. He stated that in the latter part of January or early part of February he arrived at Danli, Honduras, and spent a short time working on the road in that place, then he headed south into Nicaragua to the northwest of Ocotal where he met up with a group of Sandino's followers who were led by Francisco Estrada and they took him to Sandino's Cuartel General.  He had a long conversation with Sandino who autographed his book of signatures which he carries.  ¶  "The coming of Ramiro Molla Sanz to our Cuartel General was not accidental --" was the first sentence which was written then continued to say that he brought greetings from their Hispano brothers.  During the time which he spent in Sandino's camp, which he explained to the best of his knowledge was located near the source of the Cua river, he came into contact with Pedro Blandon, Alejandro Rivera, Juan Santos Morales who signed as secretary to General Pedro Blandon First Expeditionary General and Commander of Column #12, and General Carracas, whom he stated is a new Brigadier General who has recently joined Sandino.  According to his observations they have four heavy Browning machine guns, two Lewis machine guns, two Vickers aircraft machine guns, various B.A.R.s or Thompsons, as he described them as rifles with large ammunition clips on the lower side of the gun, a number of Springfield rifles, model 1912, with rifle grenade dischargers, also a small quantity of hand grenades.  He did not know the names of any of the arms but according to his description they are as listed above.  He stated that Blandon's column had all of the good arms and the larger supply of ammunition and that Rivera had the larger number of followers but they were a rougher class of indian and had poor arms and hardly no ammunition, being armed with mostly old Concon, Infume and Remington rifles, which had from time to time been picked up.  He went with them when they proceeded to Poteca where they all embarked in "pipantes" (dugouts) and proceeded down the Coco River to Cabo Gracias Adios where he left them as he was afraid to continue in their company.  ¶  He stated that no one in the group knew anything about Marines being withdrawn from Nicaragua or about the earthquake in Managua, further stated that the bandit jefes were unanimous in saying they would immediately go to work if the Marines were once withdrawn.  He returned to Tegucigalpa via: North Coast of Honduras.  ¶  NOTE: All the bandits called Molla "brother" in their autobiographic addenda which were strongly Iberro Hispanic, and anti-American with a strong Communistic trend. ..."  [NOTE:  For further information on this episode with Ramiro Molla Sáenz, see TOP 100, PAGE 66]

31.  May 7, 1931.  Naval Intelligence Report on Object of Nicaraguan Good Will Mission to Guatemala and El Salvador, from Agent "G," Tegucigalpa, p. 1.     "Two letters were brought by Mrs. Magdalena Ibarra Villalobo from Nicaragua to Tegucigalpa for further transmittal to Sandino. An agent of this office acquired the letters and copied them. Their contents being what they were, the letters were allowed to go through to destination. Following is translation of the letters: “Managua, 23 December, 1930.- General A. C. Sandino, His Encampment, My Esteemed General: As you will remember, the last time I wrote you was before you had definitely arranged your trip to Mexico, today I talked with the same friends of Antonio, and I am satisfied to inform you that we are all agreed, as, in addition to being patriotic, the present situation is hard and painful, more so for us than for any other. ¶ “I am agreed in the other matter but I believe it more convenient that this insinuation be made by you in some way, or by a friend of yours, and remember that we accept, because what you propose is preferible [preferable] to the present order of affairs. Tacho (Anastacio) told me that he gave the order to Leon that he send something to you and your friends. I salute you, Your most afectionate [affectionate] friend, (s) Andres Largespada.” ¶ “Managua, January 3, 1931.- General A. C. Sandino, His encampment, Do not be surprised that I write the following based on what the friends say, and believe that we are all completely agreed, frankly anything is prefereable [preferable] and not the present condition, the (patria) fatherland before everything. As it is now we can never elevate ourselves to a higher level, and the whole world will see that you are done justice, as you will prove your ture [true?] patriotism, and that you have no individual ambition. Proceed as soon as possible as this situation is terrible and I repeat, we prefer everything, less this. Say in what and how we can assist you. (s) M. Barreto P.” ¶ The Naval Attaché attended the inaugural ceremonies of President Araujo in El Salvador on 1 March, 1931, and the official opening of the Presidential period of office of President Ubico in Guatemala on 15 March, 1931. At the two places and at the same times a “Good Will Mission” from Nicaragua, composed of Dr. Julian Irias, Minister of Foreign Affairs, with Drs. Andres Largaespada and Bernabé Portocarrero as secretaries also attended. ¶ During the “Good Will Mission’s” stay both in El Salvador and Guatemala it is known the mission approached officials of each of these governments in turn with the following proposal: ¶ 1. That the government make the gesture to Honduras for a closer cooperation with Nicaragua to eradicate banditry and the smuggling of arms and ammunition. ¶ (See page two.) . . . "

32.  May 7, 1931.  Naval Intelligence Report on Object of Nicaraguan Good Will Mission to Guatemala and El Salvador, from Agent "G," Tegucigalpa, p. 2.     " . . . 2. That the government advance $10,000.00 (gold) to buy off Dr. Zepeda (Sandino’s principal protagonist in Mexico). ¶ 3. That the government advance such sum as would be necessary to buy off Sandino. ¶ 4. That the reasons for these requests were to give the world at large to understand (if the requests were complied with) that Central America was not in sympathy with Sandino and his followers and policies. ¶ 5. That the sums so advanced would be repaid by Nicaragua at a later date. ¶ 6. That each oof [of] these governments gestion the U.S. to allow Nicaraguan civilians the right to carry weapons. ¶ Each of these requests were turned down by El Salvador and Guatemala. ¶ NOTE:- The Attaché has from time to time heard rumors that the Moncada regime were behind Sandino and backed him in order to keep Marines in Nicaragua. The above would tend to prove the opposite. It must be remembered that this report dates to happenings prior to the State Department’s statement that marines would be withdrawn from Nicaragua."

33.  May 4, 1931.  G-2 Translation of "Four Years of Terrible Struggle," Excelsior, Mexico City, Col. Gordon Johnston, Military Attaché, p. 1.     "G-2 Report ¶ 3850 ¶ MEXICO ¶ POLITICAL ¶ SUBJECT: Foreign Relations: ¶ C. A. SANDINO ¶ 1. Forwarded herewith is translation of an article appearing in “Excelsior” of this date, entitled “Four Years of Terrible Struggle”, being an interview given out by Dr. Zepeda, Sandino’s personal representative in Mexico. ¶ Gordon Johnston. ¶ Colonel, Cavalry. ¶ Military Attaché. ¶ Source: As stated. ¶ J/p ¶ From: M.A.Mexico. ¶ Report No.3338. ¶ Date: May 4, 1931. . . . "

34.  May 4, 1931.  G-2 Translation of "Four Years of Terrible Struggle," Excelsior, Mexico City, Col. Gordon Johnston, Military Attaché, p. 2.     " . . . Translation of article appearing in “EXCELSIOR”, Mexico City, May 4, 1931. ¶ FOUR YEARS OF TERRIBLE STRUGGLE. ¶ Sandino’s Representative in Mexico denies the charges made against the Insurgent Leader. ¶ Says he has never been a Communist. That he never has received aid from Russia, and that his economic situation is precarious. ¶ Dr. Pedro José Zepeda again denies the charges that have frequently been made against General Augusto César Sandino. As his representative in Mexico, Dr. Zepeda, as his legal representative in Mexico, has given us fresh statements, denying, with authentic facts and documents, the assertions that have been made, which are absurd, and contradictory. ¶ Just four years ago today General Sandino began his armed struggle in Nicaragua to fight the Yankee invaders, today also being the anniversary of the killing of three hundred civilians by bombs from planes of the American Army, in El Ocotal. ¶ In spite of this tenacity, which could only be inspired by noble causes,; in spite also of the attacks against him and the scarcity of elements of war with which to fight against an enemy who can count with everything, General Sandino has been able to stand firm, becoming not only a clever and valiant ‘guerrillero’, but an apostle of liberty. ¶ Dr. Zepeda told us yesterday that, notwithstanding the high ideals of the Nicaraguan hero had been demonstrated again and again, yet there were individuals, like a certain Sr. Muñoz, whose statements were recently published to the effect that Sandino receives pecuniary aid from the Soviet Government. ¶ Coincident with those declarations, the communists distributed, on Labor Day, leaflets attacking General Sandino and making it appear that he was an accomplice of North American Imperialism. The United States Government declares Sandino to be an ‘outlaw’ and announces its intention to keep on fighting him until he is exterminated. ¶ It has been stated that General Sandino left Mexico a year ago with several thousand dollars that had been supplied him by the Soviet Government; while precisely at that time, in April of 1930, Dr. Zepeda sent him the sum of $250. to cover his most pressing items of travel expenses. General Sandino’s receipt for this amount was shown to us yesterday by Dr. Zepeda, a fac similie of which we shall publish in our edition of tomorrow. ¶ CONDITIONS FOR LAYING DOWN ARMS. ¶ It is useless to reply to each of the attacks made against General Sandino, Dr. Zepeda tells us, since the bases proposed for reaching an agreement, are well known. Furthermore, the detractors themselves are disconcerted, and do not know what charges to make. Some state that Sandino is in the service of Yankee Imperialism, and others that he receives aid . . . "

35.  May 4, 1931.  G-2 Translation of "Four Years of Terrible Struggle," Excelsior, Mexico City, Col. Gordon Johnston, Military Attaché, p. 3.     " . . . from Soviet Russia to attack that Imperialism; and lastly, the Communists consider Sandino one of the worst enemies of their cause. ¶ The fact is that Sandino’s banner carries only one word “Patria”, and the bases for laying down arms, which have been repeatedly announced, are the following: ¶ First: Evacuation of the national territory by the invading forces/ ¶ Second: Revision of the Canal Treaty, and cancellation of all agreements and compromises prejudicial to the national honor. ¶ Third: Release of the customs houses, banks, and railroads, now in the hands of American Jews who are backed by the State Department at Washington. ¶ Dr. Zepeda added-- “If Moncada could obtain these terms, we would be the first to support his Government until the completion of his Presidential period, and for no motive or cause whatever would we become part of his Government.” ¶ Naturally, as Dr. Zepeda said, sufficient guarantees would be demanded for due compliance with the above terms; and without those conditions, which are considered perfectly patriotic and stripped of all personalism, they are determined to put their disinterestedness (unselfish motives) and love of country, to the test. ¶ Dr. Zepeda ended by saying- “A single reading of the above three points is sufficient to demonstrate the high ideals of Sandino.”"

36.  April 21, 1931.  "Hoover Denounces Sandino As Outlaw; Expects Capture," New York Times.     "HOOVER DENOUNCES SANDINO AS OUTLAW; EXPECTS CAPTURE ¶ President Says Bandit’s “Cold-Blooded Murder” Puts Him “Outside Civilized Pale.” ¶ MONCADA ASSAILS REBEL ¶ Nicaragua Musters 1,300 Men in Drive to Combat Insurgent—Work Resumed. ¶ CRUISERS REACH HONDURAS ¶ American Women and Children at La Lima Flee as Rebels Try an Unsuccessful Attack. ¶ The troubled conditions in Nicaragua and Honduras continued yesterday to receive the close attention of Washington. ¶ Reports received from Honduras were that the government there had the situation in hand, though two minor clashes occurred and Americans were forced to flee La Lima. ¶ HOOVER DENOUNCES SANDINO. ¶ By RICHARD V. OULAHAN. ¶ Special to The New York Times. ¶ WASHINGTON, April 21.—President Hoover today denounced Augusto Sandino, Nicaraguan outlaw, as a cold-blooded bandit “outside the civilized pale.” ¶ The State Department, through Secretary Stimson, had taken the same attitude, but it is surmised that his declarations had not made the impression that the administration desired. The course of the President in repeating his Secretary of State’s condemnation of Sandino was evidently the result of a determination to emphasize his personal approval of that attitude and at the same time make clear to the world that the United States holds there is no revolutionary movement in Nicaragua but merely some sporadic disorders fomented by a murderous band. ¶ Speaks at Press Conference. ¶ The President’s condemnation of Sandino and his following was made orally at noon today during the course of his semi-weekly press conference. To a group of about fifty newspaper representatives, gathered in his office in the Executive Building, the President referred to Sandino’s acts in scathing terms. ¶ He mentioned with evident satisfaction that the Nicaraguan Government was functioning through a force of more than 1,300 members of the new National Guard which was several times greater than the total of the Sandino bands and that raids of these bands on important points had been frustrated by the guard. ¶ The President put his stamp of approval upon the way the Nicaraguan Government is functioning. He said it had shown itself “fully cognizant of its responsibilities,” and was moving vigorously, despite the difficulties of the recent devastating earthquake at Managua, the capital. In conclusion the President said he was confident Sandino “will be brought to justice.” ¶ Text of Hoover Statement. ¶ What the President had to say was afterward handed to newspaper representatives as a prepared statement, which read as follows: ¶ Our advices are that the Nicaraguan Government has now placed in the field a total of over 1,300 men of the newly created National Guard in a drive to clean up Sandino and his fellow bandits. Our representatives advise that this force is several times that of Sandino and his bands. His raids upon important points have been frustrated by the dispositions of the guard, and protection of our citizens on the coast is made doubly sure by the presence of our naval vessels. ¶ Sandino has placed himself and his band outside the civilized pale by the cold-blooded murder of eight or nine American civilians and many Nicaraguans at isolated places in the interior. ¶ The Nicaraguan Government has shown itself fully cognizant of its responsibilities. It is moving vigorously despite the difficulties created by the earthquake. While it may require some time to accomplish their purpose due to the mountainous and jungle character of the country, I am confident Sandino will be brought to justice. ¶ New Policy Emphasized. ¶ The President’s remarks to newspaper men are regarded as further emphasizing what has come to be recognized as a new policy of the Hoover administration in dealing not only with disturbances in Nicaragua but in the rest of Central America. It seems to be clear that it has set its face against any further American activities in those countries which would amount to intervention or would savor of intervention on the part of the United States. ¶ Judging by the course announced by the State Department last week and by explanation since then, the administration hereafter will confine itself in Central American troubles to protecting the lives and property of Americans and foreigners at ports and in coastal regions which can be reached by warships, and will hold the authorities of the country concerned responsible for protective measures at interior points. ¶ The administration emphasized repeatedly in the past several days that it reserved for itself the right to protect its nationals and those of foreign nations. This was done after Secretary Stimson asserted that the general protection of Americans throughout Nicaragua “would lead to difficulties and commitments which this government does not propose to undertake.” ¶ Pleased by British Stand. ¶ Great interest was attracted in official quarters here by the policy of the British Government to make no move under present conditions in behalf of its citizens in Nicaragua, but to rely upon the protection of the National Guard and American forces. The statement of the British position was accepted with gratification, particularly as it was construed to mean that the Nicaraguan situation will not be complicated, for the present at least, by considerations pertaining to the Monroe Doctrine. Secretary Stimson maintained on Saturday that the doctrine was not involved. ¶ The British attitude is interpreted as similar to that taken by the United States in warning its citizens to go to the coast if in danger. Some international lawyers here contended today that there was a difference because Great Britain did not have armed forces in Nicaragua, just as the United States did not have troops on Mexican soil when President Wilson in 1914 and 1916 warned Americans to go to coastal points and the border to obtain protection. ¶ It was pointed out that it was customary for governments to warn their nationals to go to points of safety when serious disturbances occurred in countries where these governments were not able to afford protection to their own people. ¶ Navy Reports on Raids. ¶ The Navy Department made public today a report from Rear Admiral Arthur St. Clair Smith, commander of American naval forces in Central American waters, who said work was being resumed in Nicaragua. His message also completed the list of casualties of the bandit raids. ¶ “Most of the dead are foreigners,” he reported, adding that this was “evidently done deliberately and not done in the previous yearly raids.” ¶ Admiral Smith’s denunciation of the bandits followed his estimate of the raids as being of the type usual at this season, except for the killings and mutilation of bodies indulged in by the followers of Sandino. He also reported that papers seized from a captured Sandino follower, known as Blandon Bore, “a rough seal showing a bandit cutting the head from a prostrate dead marine.” ¶ Rear Admiral Smith’s complete report of casualties in Nicaragua showed sixteen dead, not including one native Nicaraguan killed by an American patrol from the U. S. S. Asheville when the Nicaraguan failed to answer a challenge. The foreign dead included eight American civilians, one marine officer, four British subjects, one Guatemalan, one Colombian and one German missionary. ¶ Text of Admiral’s Report. ¶ Rear Admiral Smith’s report follows: ¶ Situation is quiet. No bandits in vicinity. Work being resumed. Bluefields also reports quiet. ¶ Bandits first appeared in this vicinity at Logtown, about sixty miles inland on about April 11. Nearly all the deaths occurred in this vicinity and between April 11 and 13. Those killed were overseers or workers on the fruit farms of the Bragman Bluff Lumber Company and they were surprised and killed without chance of escape. The bandits, who were not known to be in the area, numbered in all about 150. Captain Pefley ran into an ambush of them and it was from men who escaped from this patrol that the first alarm was given. ¶ The best opinion hereabout is that all the present activity is similar to that which has occurred at this time in previous years and is for the purpose of raiding for supplies and stores. Raids are made just before the rainy season and furnish the supplies needed for the ensuing months. ¶ The earthquake, while it helped the situation by engaging the activities of the Guardia, otherwise seems to have had nothing to do with the original plan, though it was taken advantage of by the bandits. The Bragman Bluff Lumber Company lost about $21,000 worth of stores from their commissaries, mostly carried away by bandits. In addition to these a large amount was looted from stores at Cabo Gracias a Dios. ¶ When the Asheville (gunboat of Special Service Squadron) arrived at midnight of April 13 the entire population of Puerto Cabezas was in a highly excited state and was congregated about the pier. The Guardia being absent near Logtown, there was no one to protect the town. The bandits at this time had gotten between the Guardia and the town and a considerable party were but eight miles from the town. They never came nearer and the arrival of the Asheville at the opportune moment is generally thought to have been the reason. . . . "

37.  April 21, 1931.  "Hoover Denounces Sandino as Outlaw; Expects Capture" (cont.); "Says Hoover Policy Hurts Our Prestige," and "Rebels' Raid Awaited by Nicaraguan Guard," New York Times.     " . . . Guardia Deserves Credit. ¶ The Guardia extricated itself from its position at Logtown and returned to town on the 14th at 1 P. M. Fighting by the Guardia, under difficulties due to being outnumbered and surrounded, continued from the first contact and until the bandits were forced to retire. In this the planes assisted materially by bombing. The conduct of the Guardia is universally praised and there is no doubt that they deserve greatest credit. ¶ I have inspected the papers captured from Blandon Bore and find them as first reported. They are now in the hands of Major John Marston (Colonel in Guardia, commanding eastern area of Guardia Nacional). Two of them bear a rough seal showing a bandit cutting the head from a prostrate dead marine. ¶ In addition to the eight Americans previously reported killed, the following others previously reported, though not by name, are now listed: Lucias May, Walter Manning, E. Rodney, Henry Roper, all British subjects from Jamaica; M. Sagastume, Guatemalan; A. Viskaino, Colombian. Also not previously reported, the Rev. Carl Bregenzer, a Moravian missionary, a German who took out his first American papers in 1921 but did not complete. There were in addition a small number of Nicaraguans, but most of the dead are foreigners, evidently done deliberately and not done in the previous yearly raids. ¶ Rear Admiral Smith, aboard the cruiser Rochester, arrived at Cape Gracias a Dios, off the border line of Nicaragua and Honduras, today. ¶ The Navy Department ordered three transport planes to Managua for use in transporting Nicaraguan Guardia Nacional troops from the west to the east coast, these planes to be added to three other transport planes already available for this work there. One transport, a Ford, will go from Fort Benning, Ga.; another Ford will proceed from San Diego, and a Sikorsky transport today flew up from the naval air station at Coco Solo, Panama. ¶ Moncada Assails Outlaws. ¶ MANAGUA, Nicaragua, April 21 (AP).—Outlaws who were responsible for recent fatal raids in Nicaragua, President Moncada of the republic said today, are “not civilized.” ¶ “Nicaragua, prostrated by the recent catastrophe,” President Moncada said, “felt the comfort of the whole world’s helpful hand and saw the patriotic harmony of the Nicaraguan people demonstrated. But we feel that those who still follow banditry and who kill in these hours of Nicaragua’s travail and efforts to reconstruct the quake-torn area are not civilized. Even if previously they have enjoyed some favorably opinion, they have now fallen the world’s respect.” ¶ Foreign Minister Julian Irias announced today that financial help was still coming in to Managua and that about 40,000 bolivars was received from the government of Venezuela, as well as $2,000 from the new Spanish Republic transmitted through the Secretary of the Spanish Central American Legation at Salvador. ¶ SAYS HOOVER POLICY HURTS OUR PRESTIGE ¶ Representative Ayres of Kansas Asserts Coolidge’s Methods in Nicaragua Are Reversed. ¶ Special to The New York Times. ¶ WASHINGTON, April 21.—Secretary of State Stimson’s instructions to the United States Legation in Nicaragua to advise American citizens that the United States Government “cannot undertake general protection of Americans throughout that country with American forces,” and that those who remain “do so at their own risk,” were characterized tonight by Representative W. A. Ayres of Kansas, as a sharp abandonment of Coolidge policy. In a statement issued through the Democratic National Committee he accused the administration of “wabbling” indecision. ¶ “President Hoover and Secretary Stimso [Stimson],” said Mr. Ayres, “seem to have some difficulty in making up their minds as to just what position to take in the present Nicaraguan situation. ¶ “I might say this country established the present Nicaraguan Government. We interfered in a civil war and superintended an election which we were solemnly assured would mark the end of the use of our marines in the disturbed little republic. Ever since we have been chasing the Sandinista forces, which may be designated either as rebels against the government imposed on them by ourselves, or as bandits. Invariably the people in power choose the latter designation for those who are in arms against them. It makes no particular difference whether we fight the jungle hostiles with American Marines or with Nicaraguan National Guardsmen officered by our marine officers. ¶ “Now a number of American civilian citizens, presumably engaged in their own commercial enterprises, have been killed by the Sandinistas, and our State Department has issued an extraordinary order that Americans in the Nicaraguan interior who stay there must ‘do so at their own risk and must not expect American forces to be sent inland to their aid.’ ¶ “This sharp abandonment of the Coolidge policy, which gave notice that ‘the persons and property of a citizen are a part of the general domain of a nation even when abroad,’ naturally caused a lot of criticism. Whereupon the administration hastened to explain that the American Government has no intention of allowing American lives in Nicaragua to be jeopardized. ¶ “Of course, there is no way of reconciling the two announcements. When we tell an imperiled American citizen in Nicaragua that if he remains on his own property he does so at his own risk, we certainly are not relieving him from jeopardy. The policy of the present administration for the past two years undoubtedly caused these American citizens to feel that the Coolidge policy was to be continued. ¶ “It would seem to be simple common sense that we do one thing or the other in Nicaragua—either to permit that country to work out its own destinies, by revolution if it is so minded, or to go through with what our government started in to do—would be intelligent and consistent. The half-way measures we have pursued and are pursuing satisfy nobody and constitute simply an invitation for a continuation of whatever outrages are perpetuated. ¶ “We are not in Nicaragua because of the Monroe Doctrine. No country of any other hemisphere is threatening to extend its political system to Nicaragua, or do aught that would need to cause concern to our government. We are there for but one reason—under the guise and claim that it is for the protection of American lives and property. ¶ “We have had many examples of the unfortunate effects of indecision, lack of courage and inconsistency on the part of the administration in our domestic affairs. Now the administration’s wabbling has brought about an impossible situation in the foreign field and President Hoover is as usual floundering, with consequent destruction of our prestige and an accretion of the suspicion and resentment of the smaller American nations toward this country.” ¶ REBELS’ RAID AWAITED BY NICARAGUAN GUARD ¶ Large Groups of Sandino’s Men Reported in Jungles Outside 2 Tows [Towns]—Work Resumed. ¶ BLUEFIELDS, Nicaragua, April 21 (AP).—Augusto Sandino’s rebels were reported skulking today in large groups in the jungles of the Wanks River at Saclin and San Pedro del Norte with Nicaraguan National Guardsmen on the alert for renewed outbreaks. ¶ During the last twenty-four hours the guard had received no reports of any encounter with the outlaws but the guardsmen and foreigners were packing their arms handy in case the rebels should strike again. ¶ Since the ships have left with the last of the women and children from the rebels’ zone, workmen were reported to have resumed the cutting of bananas for delivery to steamer Bluefields and Puerto Cabezas were reported quiet today with conditions normal. ¶ Definite news was brought in that no lives were lost in the raid of Apr il15on [April 15 on] Cape Gracias a Dios but the little town was looted of all movable merchandise and the Tropical Radio station was wrecked. ¶ Word also was received of the safety of the wife and children of the murdered Moravian missionary, the Rev. Karl Bregenser. They were reported safe at the Neptune mine under the protection of the native national guard. Mr. Bregenser was killed by Pedro Blandon, leader of the Logtown massacre, who in turn was slain by Americans. ¶ American and other foreign refugees were brought into Puerto Cabezas, all well and uninjured, today aboard the U. S. S. Asheville and the U. S. S. Rochester arrived at Puerto Cabezas from Bluefields with Rear Admiral Smith aboard. ¶ PUERTO CABEZAS, Nicaragua, April 21 (AP).—Rumors of an impending attack on Puerto Cabaezas by Nicaraguan insurgents under General Sandino continued to persist today. Reinforcements for the National Guard patrol here arrived by plane from Managua, equipped with machine guns and a supply of ammunition. Sandino was rumored to be at Al Tamirano on the Wanks River. ¶ The U. S. S. Asheville was preparing to sail tonight and the aircraft carrier Langley was expected to replace her. There were no actual contacts with the bandits today, but the National Guard was maintaining an active patrol on all railroads."

38.  April 22, 1931.  Press Release on Nicaragua, US Department of State.     "DEPARTMENT OF STATE ¶ FOR THE PRESS ¶ April 22, 1931 ¶ NICARAGUA ¶ A radiogram to the Navy Department from the Commander of the Second Brigade in Nicaragua, dated 10:23 this morning, reported that Sergeant Altamarino’s guardia patrol from Telpaneca surprised a group of 15 bandits under an unknown chief in camp on the 14th of April near Anucayan. Four bandits were killed and one rifle, one pistol and two machetes captured. Lieutenant Kipp’s guardia patrol from Togalpa was in contact with a group of 10 bandits under an unknown chief on April 19 on the Cerro Grande River near Totogalpo. One bandit was killed, the bandits having been surprised in camp. There were no guardia casualties. ¶ A telegram from the Commander of the Special Service Squadron to the Navy Department dated 2:04 a.m., April 22, reported that an American naval vessel had visited Cape Gracias á Dios on April 21 and found conditions quiet. There had been no bandits there since April 15. There was some apprehension ashore of a possible return of bandits, but it was thought unlikely. Conditions at Bluefields and Puerto Cabezas were reported quiet. ¶ The same telegram reported with reference to the situation on the North Coast of Honduras that the Commander of the cruiser division had exchanged calls with Honduran officials at Truxillo. ¶ The rebels were reported breaking into small groups and offered no resistance to government troops. The U. S. S. MEMPHIS reported all quiet at Ceiba and stated that cargoes were being loaded as usual and that communication was had with Tela by telephone and all was reported quiet there. The U. S. S. MARBLEHEAD at Puerto Cortes reported that reports of engagements near San Pedro Sula appeared unfounded. ¶ NICARAGUA ¶ Vice Consul Alvin T. Rowe, jr., at Bluefields, Nicaragua, reported yesterday afternoon that the marines which were landed at Bluefields on April 18 had on April 28 returned to the U. S. S. SACRAMENTO since a part of the Guardia patrol at El Gallo had returned to Bluefields. The commander of the eastern area Guardia reported that in his belief all bandit forces of consequence have left Eastern Nicaragua and that this area may now be considered quiet. Bandits can operate efficiently in Eastern Nicaragua only in the dry season which usually ends in the middle of May. Conditions on the coast are rapidly returning to normal. ¶ 4/29/31"

39.  April 30, 1931. "Four Rebels Killed in Nicaragua Clash," New York Times, and "Nicaraguan Guard Drives Off Rebels," Washington Post.     "FOUR REBELS KILLED IN NICARAGUA CLASH ¶ Guardia Nacional Also Reports Three Wounded by Patrol Headed by a Marine. ¶ PEACE NEAR IN HONDURAS ¶ President Mejia Says Insurgents Lacking Popular Support, Are Now Driven Into Corner. ¶ Special to The New York Times. ¶ WASHINGTON, April 29.—Four Nicaraguan outlaws were killed and three wounded in a skirmish with a Guardia Nacional patrol under the command of O. A. Inman of Oakland, Cal., a Marine Corps officer, last Thursday at Lacus Creek in the northeastern section of the Department of Jinotega, according to report received by the Navy Department today from Rear Admiral Arthur St. Clair Smith, commander of the special service squadron. There were no Guardia casualties. The Guardia then proceeded to Saklin, thence down the Coco River to Cape Gracias à Dios, and thence to Puerto Cabezas, without incident. ¶ Reports to both the Navy and State Departments today said that conditions in Eastern Nicaragua were rapidly returning to normal. It was pointed out that outlaws can operate efficiently in that region only in the dry season, which usually ends in the middle of May. Guardia officials expressed the belief that all outlaw forces of consequence have left Eastern Nicaragua and that this area may now be considered quiet. ¶ Marines Return to Ship. ¶ Alvin T. Rowe Jr., vice consul at Bluefields, advised the State Department that the marines which were landed there on April 18 returned to the gunboat Sacramento yesterday, since a part of the Guardia patrol at El Gallo had returned to Bluefields. Admiral Smith supplemented this in a report to the Navy Department by stating that detachments of the Guardia were at each of the three principal ports on the east coast and were sufficient to hold the situation. ¶ Admiral Smith arrived at Trujillo, Honduras, yesterday in his flagship, the cruise Rochester, and proceeded this morning to Puerto Cortes, Honduras. He said conditions in Honduras were quiet. ¶ Two transport planes piloted by marine officers arrived at Managua, Nicaragua, yesterday after a flight over water from Miami, Fla. They will augment the marine planes in Nicaragua, as will a transport plane, which was flown yesterday from the naval air station at Cocosolo, Canal Zone. ¶ NICARAGUAN GUARD DRIVES OFF REBELS ¶ Four Insurgents Are Slain in Renewed Fighting at Lacus Creek. ¶ (Associated Press.) ¶ Renewed fighting between Nicaraguan insurgents and the native guardia was reported to the Navy Department yesterday with word of four dead and three wounded among the insurgents. ¶ A dispatch from Rear Admiral Arthur St. Clair Smith told of a skirmish at Lacus Creek, on April 23. The guardia suffered no casualties. ¶ The guardia was commanded by Capt. O. A. Inman, of the Marine Corps. After the battle he led his patrol down the Coco River to Cape Gracias a Dios and then to Puerto Cabezas without incident. ¶ Another dispatch from Rear Admiral Smith said conditions generally were quiet in Nicaragua and Honduras. ¶ The gunboat Sacramento has withdrawn forces landed at Bluefields, Nicaragua, to guard the town. Detachments of native troops are stationed at each of the three principal Nicaraguan ports on the east coast. Admiral Smith said these were “sufficient to hold the situation.” ¶ Two Marine Corps transport planes arrived at Managua for service in transferring troops of the native guardia from place to place. They flew from the United States by way of Cuba, piloted by Lieuts William G. Manley and Sidney R. Williamson."

40.  April 30, 1931.  Press Release on Nicaragua, US Department of State.     "DEPARTMENT OF STATE ¶ FOR THE PRESS ¶ April 30, 1931 ¶ NICARAGUA ¶ Minister Matthew E. Hanna at Managua, Nicaragua, reported at 11 a.m., April 29, that Marines in the northern area have been withdrawn to Managua with the exception of 20 men in Ocotal who are to be withdrawn shortly. One hundred Marines have already been withdrawn to Managua from the central area and the remaining garrisons in that area numbering approximately 125 men will be withdrawn by the middle of May. The Guardia has replaced the Marine garrisons. ¶ The Guardia in the northern and central areas now numbers approximately 1400 enlisted men and will shortly be increased to 1500 by new enlistments under the plan of February last. The situation in these areas is reported to be quiet and patrols are not encountering any organized bands of bandits. General Calvin Matthews considers the repulse of the bandits’ incursion into the eastern area, combined with killing of Blandon, as the severest blow organized banditry has suffered for a long time. He says he has more confidence than ever in the ability of the Guardia to handle the situation. ¶ Minister Hanna also reported that a Guardia patrol from Puerto Cabezas under Captain Inman, Guardia Nacional (Lieutenant United States Marine Corps), encountered a group of 20 bandits on the Lecus River, killing four and wounding three bandits. Captain Inman has searched Saklin – Cape Gracias à Dios area, and found no signs of bandits. He is leaving a post of six enlisted Guardia at Cape Gracias à Dios."

41.  April 19, 1931.  Press Release on Nicaragua, US Department of State.     "DEPARTMENT OF STATE ¶ FOR THE PRESS ¶ APRIL 19, 1931 ¶ Honduras ¶ The U.S.S. MEMPHIS was this morning ordered from Puerto Cabezas to visit the north coast of Honduras to safeguard American life and property in the north coast towns if they were endangered. These orders were issued upon receipt of word of revolutionary disturbances on the north coast which might imperil American lives. The situation in Honduras is different from that in Nicaragua as there is apparently a revolutionary movement against the Honduran Government. The American forces will limit themselves to making provisions for the safety of American lives and property in the coast towns. ¶ Before leaving Puerto Cabezas the MEMPHIS landed an officer and 13 men, 2 Browning machine guns and a Lewis machine gun for the protection of Americans there pending the arrival of another naval vessel. ¶ Nicaragua ¶ The Americana Vice Consul at Bluefields, Mr. Alvin T. Rowe, reported to the Department on the evening of April 18 that, in view of repeated rumors of a threatened bandit attack upon El Gallo Fruit Company station at Galloon, 3 officers and 27 enlisted Guardia were being sent there, leaving 3 officers and 13 Guardia in Bluefields. One officer and 30 enlisted Marines from U.S.S. SACRAMENTO were being landed at Bluefields in insure order in the absence of the Guardia. ¶ Radiograms from the Commanders of the naval vessels on the east coast of Nicaragua reported everything quiet at 6:00 p.m., on April 18, at Puerto Cabezas, Bluefields and Cape Gracias a Dios. ¶ Honduras ¶ The American Minister to Honduras, Mr. Julius G. Lay, reported to the Department on the evening of April 18 that the American Consuls at Port Castilla and Ceiba had reported persistent rumors of imminent uprisings in their districts. There has been serious unrest on the north coast, especially in the Ceiba and Truxillo districts due principally to unemployment, which might easily result in riots. The American women and children in the Truxillo district have been concentrated at Castilla as a precaution. ¶ The consul at Ceiba had requested a warship and stated that American lives were in danger. Minister Lay approved the request for a ship. ¶ Minister Lay reported Sunday morning that the Consul at Tela has telegraphed him that a revolutionary force had captured Progreso and was moving towards Tela. New Tela was being put under a civilian patrol. The Minister added that word had reached Tegucigalpa that General Diaz had captured Progreso. General Diaz was quoted as stating he was operating in the name of General Ferrera."

42.  April 19, 1931.  "Peace Terms Given By Sandino's Aide," New York Times.     "PEACE TERMS GIVEN BY SANDINO’S AIDE ¶ Dr. Zepeda in Mexico City Says All Marines Must Depart From Nicaragua. ¶ TELLS OF REBEL’S PLEDGE ¶ Outlaw Will Support Moncada When Troops Go, He Says—Congratulates Hoover. ¶ Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES. ¶ MEXICO CITY, April 18.—Not until the last American marine has been withdrawn from Nicaragua will there be peace there, according to Dr. Pedro Jose Zepeda, spokesman for Augusto Sandino, rebel leader. ¶ “Sandino is and has been fighting to clear Nicaragua of all foreign troops, and what the marines may be there for does not affect the situation,” said Dr. Zepeda. “They must all go. ¶ “Sandino has promised President Moncada his support when the government follows a nationalist policy and works without American marines for its protection. Why, then, does he wish to retain them? ¶ American lives and property in Nicaragua are not in danger, added Dr. Zepeda. He said there was not a single case of damage to American property and emphasized that Sandino’s collections of money were reasonable taxes which would have been levied by a recognized government. ¶ The recent fighting at Logtown, Dr. Zepeda said, was caused by civilians who telephoned to Puerto Cabezas for military aid against Sandino’s men when they came for supplies. Because of the hostile reception, Sandino called off the truce which followed the Managua earthquake, Dr. Zepeda explained. ¶ Message Sent to Hoover. ¶ Believing then that all marines were to leave Nicaragua at once, Dr. Zepeda telegraphed to President Hoover yesterday as follows: ¶ “As official representative of the Army for the Defense of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua, permit me to extend to your Excellency cordial congratulations upon the changed policy of your government toward Latin America, especially Nicaragua. Your Excellency’s declaration that the Nicaraguan National Guard should be charged with sole responsibility for conserving order in Nicaragua—a statement implying the prompt withdrawal of the American forces of occupation—is the first real guarantee of peace for that unfortunate country. ¶ “Your statesmanlike attitude not only insures a new order in Nicaragua but will doubtless dissipate the deep resentment of all Spanish-speaking countries of our continent, which until now have observed that, despite the reiterated promises of your country to respect the sovereignty of such nations, Nicaragua has been obliged continually to struggle for national independence. ¶ “Such a formal promise was announced by you to the ex-President of Argentina, Hipolito Irigoyen, that the United States would with lofty idealism respect the democratic rights of all nations. We are sincerely pleased that such rights will be observed regarding Nicaragua in accordance with the ideals for which our army of defense has been fighting. ¶ “If the promise of your Excellency is carried out in a manner permitting the liberty-loving Nicaraguans to dedicate themselves henceforth to honest labors, as they have always desired, your Excellency may be assured we will be the first to cooperate in an effective manner to bring enduring peace and that the citizens of all countries will enjoy within our territory all the guarantees and safety which they would be enjoying now if the unjust military occupation had ceased. Such guarantees of life and property can only be assured in Nicaragua by the good-will and friendship of all Nicaraguan citizens and not by brute force. ¶ “Permit me, therefore, to offer your Excellency my sincere congratulations on the proposed change in your policy toward our country. May your Excellency be assured that the solution of Nicaraguan affairs rests upon the complete abandoning of force and upon respect for our national sovereignty.” ¶ Shift Featured in Press. ¶ MEXICO CITY, April 18 (AP).—The decision by the United States Government not to use the Marine Corps against insurgents in Nicaragua was displayed under glaring headlines by the newspapers here today, but some of them characterized the move as a “confession that American troops are unable to protect the lives of American citizens or to restore peace in Nicaragua.” ¶ Dr. Pedro José Zepeda, Augusto Sandino’s representative here, cautioned his countrymen not to receive the change of policy with too much enthusiasm, asserting that the declaration of the State Department did not leave the situation entirely clear in his mind."

43.  March-April 1931.  Press clippings:  March 25: "Guardsman Is Killed In Nicaraguan Clash," New York Times.   April 12: "Nicaraguan Rebels Kill U.S. Officer - Capt. Harlen Pefly Slain in Clash Near Logtown; Native of Ohio," Washington Post.   April 13: "Nicaraguan Patrol Reported Surrounded," New York Times.     "Nicaraguan Rebels Kill U. S. Officer ¶ Capt. Harlen Pefley Slain in Clash Near Logtown; Native of Idaho. ¶ (Associated Press.) ¶ The Navy Department was informed last night that Capt. Harlen Pefley, of the Marines, had been killed in a clash between a Nicaraguan Guardia detachment and insurgents yesterday in northeastern Nicaragua. ¶ Capt. Pefley, a native of Idaho, was leading the Guardia detachment, the dispatch to the Navy said, when the insurgents were encountered. An enlisted man was wounded, but the Navy was not advised whether he was a Marine or Guardsman. ¶ The clash occurred near Logtown, which is about 12 miles from Puerto Cabezas, base of the Guardia patrol. There were about 50 in the insurgent band, and the dispatch made no mention of its casualties. ¶ NICARAGUAN PATROL REPORTED SURROUNDED ¶ Force Sent to Aid Slain Marine Captain’s Group Is Fighting Bandits Near Logtown. ¶ By Tropical Radio to THE NEW YORK TIMES. ¶ MANAGUA, Nicaragua, April 12.—A Nicaraguan National Guard patrol under command of Lieutenant Darrah, United States Marine Corps, was reported today to have been surrounded by bandits yesterday on a moss farm south of Logtown, near Puerto Cabezas, on the east coast, with fighting continuing all night and today. ¶ The patrol had been dispatched to the aid of another guard detachment whose leader, Captain Harlan Pefley of the Marine Corps, was killed yesterday morning as his patrol entered Logtown, the end of a railroad owned by the Bragman’s Bluff Lumber Company, to investigate a rumor that bandits were operating near by. ¶ After scouting the territory and entering Logtown, according to National Guard Headquarters, Captain Pefley opened the door of a house and was shot on the doorstep by bandits hidden within, with Corporal Morales of the guard wounded. The leader of the bandits was unknown. ¶ The report telling of the surrounding of the patrol headed by Lieutenant Darrah was received late last night from Señor Salassi, the manager of the lumber company. Two Americans, names unknown, were said to have been captured by the outlaws, with one later escaping. The report is unconfirmed and is thought probably to have been exaggerated. ¶ Guard patrols have cleared Puerta Cabezas [Puerto Cabezas] to aid Leutenant [Lieutenant] Darrah. Two marine bombing planes left Managua early this morning and the U. S. S. Asheville is reported here as having left Panama for Puerta Cabezas [Puerto Cabezas] in order to protect the town, thus enabling the entire guard force located there to pursue the bandits. ¶ From 10 A. M. to noon today Lieutenant Darrah’s patrol was reported fighting the bandits, who are apparently well armed. ¶ (From Late Editions of Yesterday’s TIMES.) ¶ GUARDSMAN IS KILLED IN NICARAGUAN CLASH ¶ Three Bandits Are Slain and One Captured in Another Contact—Groups Reported Converging. ¶ By Tropical Radio to THE NEW YORK TIMES. ¶ MANAGUA, Nicaragua, March 24.—National Guard headquarters report that Captain Kelly, commanding nineteen guards and three armed civilians, met a bandit group numbering forty under the bandit leader Umanzor at 9 o’clock this morning near Alta Gracias in the Department of Nueva Segovia. ¶ The firing lasted ten minutes, when the bandits withdrew. The bandit casualties are unknown, while the guard casualties were one Nicaraguan Guard, named Mendoza, killed, and three guards, including one sergeant, all Nicaraguans, wounded. Patrols dispatched from Daraili and Telepaneca [Telpaneca] are pursuing the bandit group. ¶ Lieutenant Klein, with eight guards, surprised a group of bandits numbering fifteen near Chaguite Grande at 10 o’clock this morning. The firing lasted for ten minutes and when the bandits fled the guard patrol pursued, regaining contact and killing three bandits and capturing one. The bandit leader was unidentified. There were no guard casualties. ¶ Rumors current in Managua state that 150 men, all armed with new rifles and eight machine guns, under command of Margerito Espinoza, former Colonel in the Nicaraguan Army, have headed into the northwestern section of the Department of Chontales. This group is reported to be endeavoring to meet two more groups coming from the east coast up the Rio Grande River, where bandit groups were recently reported in camp. ¶ Another rumor has it that 120 men under the noted bandit chieftain, Pedron Altamirano, and Herrera passed through a farm east of Muy Muy owned by Señor Correa, a Deputy, from the east coast. The group was en route to Chontales. Guard patrols have been dispatched in pursuit."

44.  April 29, 1931.  G-2 Report on Bandit Activities in Nicaragua, Lt. Col. Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, San José.     "NICARAGUA ¶ POPULATION AND SOCIAL ¶ No. 2700 – Public Order and Safety. ¶ Bandit Activities. ¶ With the partial withdrawing of Marines from Nicaragua the bandits have had an opportunity to organize and to forage in comparative security, particularly since the earthquake. As a result they were able to put over the attacks on the East Coast. It is reliably reported that they have now withdrawn from this region and are back near the headwaters of the Coco river. This is what would be expected as the rainy season starts early in May and they will have to accumulate supplies, which they could not do in the East Coast region. ¶ In the attack on Puerto Cabezas Pedro Blandon was killed. He had been one of the principal leaders of the bandit forces during the last year. ¶ Colonel Carlos Quesada, who left Sandino’s forces two years ago, after being severely wounded, was with General Filiberto Díaz Zelaya when the latter attempted to leave Guatemala to join Ferrera in the recent revolution. Both men were captured by Guatemalan authorities and are still held. It was probably the presence of Carlos Quesada which started the rumor that Ferrera’s uprising was connected with Sandino. ¶ Sandino himself continues to be nothing but a rumor, although papers found on Pedro Blandon make it certain that he planned the attack on Puerto Cabezas. There is no indication that Sandino was even on the East Coast during the actual attack. ¶ Report No. 1191 ¶ San José--April 29, 1931 ¶ Source – Evaluation of reliable information received. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Lieut. Col., F.A. ¶ M.A."

45.  April 14, 1931.  Press Release on Nicaragua, US Department of State.     "DEPARTMENT OF STATE ¶ FOR THE PRESS ¶ APRIL 14, 1931 ¶ Nicaragua ¶ The Commander of the U.S.S. ASHEVILLE now at Puerto Cabezas reports that all the Guardia except one officer and a few men have left Puerto Cabezas in operations against the bandits and they were last heard from at Waki, seventy-eight kilometers from Puerto Cabezas. The bandits were last reported thirteen kilometers from the port and between Puerto Cabezas and the Guardia detachment. There are approximately three hundred American citizens at Puerto Cabezas who are now either assembled on the dock or on the steamship CEFALU belonging to the Standard Fruit and Steamship Company. An additional detachment of the Guardia on the Poco River is advancing in the direction of Puerto Cabezas but as it cannot arrive for at least twenty-four hours and unreliable civil outposts are the only guard of Puerto Cabezas at present and they do not cover all approaches, the Commander of the ASHEVILLE has been authorized to land forces for the protection of American lives until the Guardia detachment can arrive and take charge. When the Guardia detachment arrives the landing forces from the ASHEVILLE will be withdrawn aboard ship and the entire situation left in the hands of the Guardia detachment. Arrangements have been made for the Americans to leave on the steamship CEFALU or the ASHEVILLE."

46.  April 15, 1931.  Press Release on Nicaragua, US Department of State.     "DEPARTMENT OF STATE ¶ FOR THE PRESS ¶ April 15, 1931 ¶ NICARAGUA ¶ A telegram was received by the Navy Department from the Commanding Officer of the Second Brigade at Managua, Colonel Bradman to the following effect: ¶ A report had been received from the Guardia at Bluefields that on the 6th of April bandits blew up the Big Falls power plant of the Neptune mines. The mines are operating, however, as one dynamo has been repaired. The bandits avoided the Neptune mines proper. ¶ On April 14 Captain John C. Wood was at Wawatotom with an enemy group at his rear and front. His planes had left to reconnoitre. Aviator Young requests relief planes with more bombs. ¶ Three hundred persons spent the night on board the Steamship CEFALU. The Civicos were exhausted and were leaving their posts. ¶ Disorders had been reported along the railroad lines committed mostly by unruly, vicious employees who had recently been discharged and who were reported as taking advantage of conditions caused by the bandit raid. A later message from Bluefields stated that the planes had returned to Puerto Cabezas and were proceeding at once to Managua where Young was to make a report and request that a plane well supplied be sent to Puerto Cabezas. ¶ A bridge at Kilometer 20 was burning. Captain John C. Wood was returning to Puerto Cabezas on the schooner NORTH STAR via the Wawa River. ¶ The Captain of the USS ASHEVILLE reported to the Navy Department that a landing force from the ASHEVILLE returned to the vessel after the return of the Guardia at 1:30 p.m. April 14. The Guardia did not succeed in dislodging the bandits and it was stated that it will be necessary to send out patrols. The inhabitants of Puerto Cabezas were reported last night as panic-stricken."

47.  April 16, 1931.  Press Release on Nicaragua, US Department of State.     "DEPARTMENT OF STATE ¶ FOR THE PRESS ¶ April 16, 1931 ¶ NICARAGUA ¶ Consul Alvin T. Rowe, jr., at Bluefields, Nicaragua, telegraphed the Department last night that Mr. John Bryan had been reported killed and a Moravian missionary, Bregenzer, had been reported killed on the Coco River. ¶ Cape Gracias was reported captured and looted by bandits. A telegram had been received at Bluefields at 9 p.m., April 15, reporting a bandit attack on Rama on the Escondido River sixty miles from Bluefields. Consul Rowe stated that the names of the killed and injured would be telegraphed as soon as received. ¶ Eight Americans were killed by bandits, according to a report from the Commander of the U.S.S. ASHEVILLE to the Navy Department sent last night. They are: ¶ W. H. Selser, ¶ W. H. Bond, jr., ¶ Percy Davis, ¶ Rip Davis, ¶ H. O. Wilson, ¶ J. H. Bryan, ¶ J. L. Pennington, ¶ J. D. Phelps. ¶ In addition one Guatemalan, one Nicaraguan and one British subject, and a few other unidentified nationals of Nicaragua or Jamaica were reported killed. All the Americans killed were employes [employees] of the Standard Fruit Company. ¶ No further contacts with the bandits had been reported and the Guardia patrol left Puerto Cabezas at 6 o’clock the morning of April 15. ¶ The CEFALU sailed at noon, April 15. ¶ Another telegram from the Commander of the U.S.S. ASHEVILLE received late last night stated that W. H. Selser was with the Guardia detachment and was shot in combat. All the other Americans previously reported killed were captured by bandits and then killed. All were killed on April 11 or 12 in an area between Sukwas and the mouth of the Zungla River about latitude 14-20, longitude 84 – 04. ¶ Twenty-two adults, mostly women and eight children, departed on the CEFALU at noon, April 15. There are only four American women now at Puerto Cabezas. ¶ Conditions at Puerto Cabezas were reported late on the night of April 15 as quiet. The patrol found no bandits for a distance of 26 kilometers. No bandits have been reported in the immediate vicinity of Puerto Cabezas for two days."

48.  April 17, 1931.  Prefatory Remarks By Mr. Walter C. Thurston, Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs, US Dept. of State, at the 35th Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Political & Social Science, Philadelphia, Sat. April 18, p. 1.     "DEPARTMENT OF STATE ¶ FOR THE PRESS ¶ April 17, 1931 ¶ LATIN AMERICA ¶ CONFIDENTIAL FUTURE RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION IN NEWSPAPERS THAT DO NOT APPEAR UPON THE STREETS BEFORE 2:30 P.M. (EASTERN STANDARD TIME) SATURDAY, APRIL 18, 1931. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM, OR USED IN ANY WAY. ¶ PREFATORY REMARKS BY MR. WALTER C. THURSTON, CHIEF OF THE DIVISION OF LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AT THE 35TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENE [SCIENCE], PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, SATURDAY, APRIL 18, 1931. ¶ Gentlemen: ¶ I have been invited to appear before you today for the purpose of addressing you upon the general subject of our future relations with Latin America. I have prepared a paper on that subject, which I shall shortly have the privilege of reading to you. ¶ I am confident, however, that as American citizens you have been distressed by the events of the past few days in Nicaragua, and that you will wish to be informed of the situation which has resulted in the shocking murder of unoffending private American citizens there. That situation, Gentlemen, has been created by one man. His name is Sandino. I shall tell you about him. ¶ You will recall that what was perhaps the most disastrous civil war, measured by loss of life and destruction of property, that has ever taken place in Nicaragua was brought to its close by the good offices of our present Secretary of State, the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, who had been sent by President Coolidge to that country as his Special Representative early in 1927. The actual accomplishment of this peace took the immediate form of a general disarmament of the country. The Government of Nicaragua was completely disarmed and the opposing forces, led by General Moncada, were likewise all disarmed. All, that is, save the forces of one of Moncada’s chieftains, Sandino, who, after having promised General Moncada that he too would surrender his arms, broke his word and secretly fled to the hills. There, safe within the pathless mountain fastnesses of a desolate region some 15,000 square miles in extent, he has preyed upon his fellow countrymen by pillage and murder, and waged an intermittent guerilla warfare of ambush and flight against the forces of his Government and the cooperating forces of the Government of the United States. . . . "

49.  April 17, 1931.  Prefatory Remarks By Mr. Walter C. Thurston, Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs, US Dept. of State, at the 35th Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Political & Social Science, Philadelphia, Sat. April 18, p. 2.     " . . . He was well trained for such a career, for it is understood that he was schooled in similar tactics by service under Pancho Villa, whose activities resulted in bloodshed and destruction on both sides of the common frontier of Mexico and the United States. His present followers are outlaws of varied nationalities – they are not all by any means Nicaraguans. Moreover, he was already familiar with the terrain in which he now operates, for he was employed by an American mine owner in the Department of Nueva Segovia – his patron’s mine being one of the first properties to be seized and looted by Sandino when he turned to his present career. ¶ It is an ironical commentary upon the unequal struggle between truth and propaganda that this petty chieftain, schooled in outlawry and dedicated to rapine and destruction, should have assumed the proportions of a hero, even of a defender of the “vestiges of sovereignty in an invaded republic”. I regret that such misconceptions are not confined to misinformed citizens of Latin America, whose sentiments might have been influenced by the ties of race, but have been shared and expounded by some American citizens whose access to the facts should have better informed them. ¶ It is such a man then, who, when a great catastrophe has overtaken his native land and at the time his capital city lies a smouldering waste of ruins, when the Nicaragua Government has been practically paralyzed and has been obliged to call upon all its forces and all its resources for the essential immediate task of protection and relief in the neighborhood of the disaster, devises and deliberately sets in motion a program for the destruction of American and other foreign lives and property and the lives and property of Nicaraguans as well, not in open warfare but by the stealthy and ruthless tactics which characterized the savages who fell upon American settlers in our country 150 years ago. For these Americans who have been killed in Nicaragua during the past few days were first taken prisoner and then slaughtered. ¶ A further word about the alleged patriotism of Sandino. It has frequently been stated by those said to be his spokesmen that his objective is not loot, but that his only purpose is to rid Nicaragua of the American Marines. How truly are his colors shown by his recent acts! As long ago as February 13 widespread public announcement was made by our Government of the conclusion of a program whereunder the Government of Nicaragua would increase its own forces, the Nicaraguan National Guard, and whereunder the forces of the United States would be decreased rapidly and drastically, and would be completely removed from Nicaragua immediately after the next presidential elections of 1932. Within the two months which have since elapsed 154 Marines have left Nicaragua and the plans for the continuing evacuation of those forces are in active operation. It is under these circumstances that Sandino has resorted to the very measures against foreign lives and property that would be most likely to precipitate the foreign military intervention he is said to oppose. . . . "

50.  April 17, 1931.  Prefatory Remarks By Mr. Walter C. Thurston, Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs, US Dept. of State, at the 35th Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Political & Social Science, Philadelphia, Sat. April 18, p. 3.     " . . . DEPARTMENT OF STATE ¶ FOR THE PRESS ¶ April 17, 1931 ¶ NICARAGUA ¶ The American Consul at Bluefields, Nicaragua, Mr. Alvin. T. Rowe, jr., reported to the Department last night that the following Americans were killed in Eastern Nicaragua by bandits: ¶ John H. Bryan of Clinton, Maryland; ¶ William H. Bond, jr., of Sarasota, Florida; ¶ Percy Davis of Hammond, Louisiana; ¶ Will L. Selser of Little River, Florida; ¶ Herbert H. Wilson; ¶ John D. Phelps of Livingston, Louisiana; ¶ John L. Pennington of Croset, Arkansas; ¶ Rip Davis of Mississippi. ¶ The following foreigners were killed: ¶ Henry Roper of Bluefields, British; ¶ Walter Manning of Jamaica, British; ¶ Moses Sagastume of Guatemala; ¶ F. O’Ramirez of Corinto. ¶ Hubert O. Wilson was reported by press despatches to have been killed, but Consul Rowe says this was an error and that it was Herbert H. Wilson who was killed. ¶ All other Americans at Puerto Cabezas are accounted for and none are injured. ¶ Consul Rowe states that a previous report of an attack on Rama was erroneous, but small bandit groups have been reported in that vicinity."